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  1. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2009). Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.
  2. Peter B. Todd, The Entangled State of God and Humanity. Asheville Jung Center Webinar Series, 22.
    As the title, The Entangled State of God and Humanity suggests, this webinar dispenses with the pre-Copernican, patriarchal, anthropomorphic image of God while presenting a case for a third millennium theology illuminated by insights from archetypal depth psychology, quantum physics, neuroscience and evolutionary biology. It attempts to smash the conceptual barriers between science and religion. The published work of C.G. Jung, Wolfgang Pauli, David Bohm and Teilhard de Chardin outline a process whereby matter evolves in increasing complexity from sub-atomic particles (...)
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Psychophysical Supervenience
  1. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2005). Morgan's Canon Revisited. Philosophy of Science 72 (4):608-31.
    The famous ethological maxim known as “Morgan’s Canon” continues to be the subject of interpretive controversy. I reconsider Morgan’s canon in light of two questions: First, what did Morgan intend? Second, is this, or perhaps some re-interpretation of the canon, useful within cognitive ethology? As for the first issue, Morgan’s distinction between higher and lower faculties is suggestive of an early supervenience concept. As for the second, both the canon in its original form, and various recent re-readings, offer nothing useful (...)
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  2. Jan Almäng (2006). McDowell's Naturalism. In Björn Haglund & Helge Malmgren (eds.), Kvantifikator för en Dag. Essays Dedicated to Dag Westerståhl on his Sixtieth Birthday. Philosophical Communications.
    This is an essay on McDowell’s naturalism. It is, pace some commentators, argued that McDowell’s naturalism does not end up in any strange metaphysical positions in the philosophy of mind, because second nature non-reductively supervenes on first nature and have causal powers. Pace certain other commentators, it is also argued that McDowell can be read as drawing a clear line between ethical platonism, and his own naturalized platonism, but only at the cost of landing in standard naturalism.
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  3. Suzanne Bliss & Jordi Fernández (2011). Does the Supervenience Argument Generalize? Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):321-346.
    We evaluate the scope of Jaegwon Kim's “supervenience argument” for reduction. Does its conclusion apply only to psychology, or does it generalize to all the special sciences? The claim that the supervenience argument generalizes to all the special sciences if it goes through for psychology is often raised as an objection to the supervenience argument. We argue that this objection is ambiguous. We distinguish three readings of it and suggest that some of them make it a plausible claim, whereas other (...)
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  4. Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.) (1997). Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.
  5. Tim Crane (1991). Why Indeed? Papineau on Supervenience. Analysis 51 (January):32-7.
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  6. Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne (2014). Semantic Plasticity and Speech Reports. Philosophical Review 123 (3):281-338.
    Most meanings we express belong to large families of variant meanings, among which it would be implausible to suppose that some are much more apt for being expressed than others. This abundance of candidate meanings creates pressure to think that the proposition attributing any particular meaning to an expression is modally plastic: its truth depends very sensitively on the exact microphysical state of the world. However, such plasticity seems to threaten ordinary counterfactuals whose consequents contain speech reports, since it is (...)
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  7. Reinaldo Elugardo (1988). Against Weak Psychophysical Supervenience. Dialectica 42 (2):129-43.
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  8. Robert Francescotti (2007). Emergence. Erkenntnis 67 (1):47 - 63.
    Here I offer a precise analysis of what it takes for a property to count as emergent. The features widely considered crucial to emergence include novelty, unpredictability, supervenience, relationality, and downward causal influence. By acknowledging each of these distinctive features, the definition provided below captures an important sense in which the whole can be more than the sum of its parts.
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  9. Stevan Harnad (2000). Minds, Machines and Turing: The Indistinguishability of Indistinguishables. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (4):425-445.
    Turing's celebrated 1950 paper proposes a very general methodological criterion for modelling mental function: total functional equivalence and indistinguishability. His criterion gives rise to a hierarchy of Turing Tests, from subtotal ("toy") fragments of our functions (t1), to total symbolic (pen-pal) function (T2 -- the standard Turing Test), to total external sensorimotor (robotic) function (T3), to total internal microfunction (T4), to total indistinguishability in every empirically discernible respect (T5). This is a "reverse-engineering" hierarchy of (decreasing) empirical underdetermination of the theory (...)
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  10. Katherine Hawley (1998). Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic. Mind 107 (428):841-843.
    Trenton Merricks argues against the following doctrine: Microphysical Supervenience (MS) Necessarily, if atoms A1 through An compose an object that exemplifies intrinsic qualitative properties Q1 through Qn, then atoms like A1 through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that exemplifies Q1 through Qn. (Merricks 1998, p. 59) Imagine a person, _P_. Microphysical Supervenience entails that there is an object, the finger-complement, (...)
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  11. Giovanna Hendel (2002). On What Does the Issue of Supervenience and Psychophysical Dependence Depend? Dialogue 41 (2):329-348.
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  12. Giovanna Hendel (2002). Psychophysical Supervenience: Digging in its Foundations. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:115-141.
    I put forward and defend the thesis (Th) that psychophysical supervenience (PS) in its full generality can be satisfactorily supported if and only if one is willing to make one or another of some substantial assumptions (the Assumptions) about the nature of mental and physical properties. I first deal with the “if” part of the claim by presenting and considering the Assumptions. I then argue for the inadequacy of suggestions of support for PS that do not require any of the (...)
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  13. Terence E. Horgan (1987). Supervenient Qualia. Philosophical Review 96 (October):491-520.
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  14. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2005). Against Functional Reductionism in Cognitive Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):319 – 333.
    Functional reductionism concerning mental properties has recently been advocated by Jaegwon Kim in order to solve the problem of the 'causal exclusion' of the mental. Adopting a reductionist strategy first proposed by David Lewis, he regards psychological properties as being 'higher-order' properties functionally defined over 'lower-order' properties, which are causally efficacious. Though functional reductionism is compatible with the multiple realizability of psychological properties, it is blocked if psychological properties are subdivided or crosscut by neurophysiological properties. I argue that there is (...)
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  15. Jaegwon Kim (1997). Supervenience, Emergence, and Realization in the Philosophy of Mind. In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.
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  16. Jaegwon Kim (1982). Psychophysical Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 41 (January):51-70.
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  17. Jaegwon Kim (1982). Psychophysical Supervenience as a Mind-Body Theory. Cognition and Brain Theory 5:129-47.
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  18. Jaegwon Kim (1979). Causality, Identity and Supervenience in the Mind-Body Problem. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):31-49.
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  19. David Mark Kovacs (2010). Is There a Conservative Solution to the Many Thinkers Problem? Ratio 23 (3):275-290.
    On a widely shared assumption, our mental states supervene on our microphysical properties – that is, microphysical supervenience is true. When this thesis is combined with the apparent truism that human persons have proper parts, a grave difficulty arises: what prevents some of these proper parts from being themselves thinkers as well? How can I know that I am a human person and not a smaller thinker enclosed in a human person? Most solutions to this puzzle make radical, if not (...)
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  20. Harry A. Lewis (1985). Is the Mental Supervenient on the Physical? In Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press.
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  21. Brian Loar (1993). Can We Confirm Supervenient Properties? Philosophical Issues 4:74-92.
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  22. Cynthia Macdonald (1995). Psychophysical Supervenience, Dependency, and Reduction. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. 140--57.
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  23. Nicholas Maxwell (2000). The Mind-Body Problem and Explanatory Dualism. Philosophy 75 (291):49-71.
    An important part of the mind-brain problem arises because sentience and consciousness seem inherently resistant to scientific explanation and understanding. The solution to this dilemma is to recognize, first, that scientific explanation can only render comprehensible a selected aspect of what there is, and second, that there is a mode of explanation and understanding, the personalistic, quite different from, but just as viable as, scientific explanation. In order to understand the mental aspect of brain processes - that aspect we know (...)
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  24. Brian P. McLaughlin (1983). Response: Event Supervenience and Supervenient Causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (Supplement):71-91.
    In this paper, I examine, from a metaphysical point of view, a recent notable attempt by Jaegwon Kim to explain how macro-events are dependent on micro-events and how causal transactions between macro-events are dependent on causal transactions between micro-events.
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  25. D. H. Mellor (1993). Supervenience? No Chance! Reply to Menuge. Analysis 53 (4):236-239.
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  26. Trenton Merricks (2003). Maximality and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):150-158.
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  27. Trenton Merricks (1998). Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience. Mind 107 (425):59-71.
    The doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience (MS) states that: Necessarily, if atoms A1 through An compose an object that exemplified intrinsic qualitative properties Q1 through Qn, then atoms like A1 through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that exemplifies Q1 through Qn. I show that MS entails a contradiction and so must be rejected. And my argument against MS provides the resources (...)
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  28. Trenton Merricks (1998). On Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic. Mind 107 (428):845-846.
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  29. Harold W. Noonan (1999). Identity, Constitution and Microphysical Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (3):273-288.
    The aim of the paper is to discuss some recent variants of familiar puzzles concerning the relations of parts to wholes put forward by Trenton Merricks and Eric Olson. The argument is put forward that so long as the familiar distinction between 'loose and popular' and 'strict and philosophical' senses of identity claims is accepted the paradoxical conclusions at which Merricks and Olson arrive can be resisted. It is not denied that accepting the distinction between 'loose and popular' and 'strict (...)
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  30. Harold W. Noonan (1999). Microphysical Supervenience and Consciousness. Mind 108 (432):755-9.
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  31. David Papineau (1995). Arguments for Supervenience and Physical Realization. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
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  32. David Papineau (1991). The Reason Why: Response to Crane. Analysis 51 (January):37-40.
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  33. David Papineau (1989). Why Supervenience? Analysis 49 (2):66-71.
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  34. Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.) (1995). Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    Supervenience is one of the 'hot discoveries' of recent analytic philosophy, and this collection of new essays on the topic represents a 'state of the art' examination of it and its application to major areas of philosophy. The interest in supervenience has much to do with the flexibility of the concept. To say that x supervenes on y indicates a degree of dependence without committing one to the view that x can be reduced to y. Thus supervenience is a relationship (...)
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  35. Theodore Sider (2003). Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):139-149.
    A property, F, is maximal i?, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical superve- nience by Trenton Merricks. The argument assumes that conscious- ness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic.
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  36. Pierre Steiner (2013). The Delocalized Mind. Judgements, Vehicles, and Persons. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2013 (3):1-24.
    Drawing on various resources and requirements (as expressed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom), this paper proposes an externalist view of conceptual mental episodes that does not equate them, even partially, with vehicles of any sort, whether the vehicles be located in the environment or in the head. The social and pragmatic nature of the use of concepts and conceptual content makes it unnecessary and indeed impossible to locate the entities that realize conceptual mental episodes in non-personal or subpersonal contentful (...)
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  37. Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.) (1985). Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press.
    This collection brings together previously unpublished works by well-known philosophers on the philosophy of action, the metaphysics of causality, and the philosophy of psychology. Nine of the essays directly discuss Donald Davidson's work on these topics, while three others challenge a Davidsonian approach through discussion of independent but related issues. These essays are followed by replies from Davidson, including a previously unpublished essay, "Adverbs of Action.".
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  38. Joel Walmsley (2010). Emergence and Reduction in Dynamical Cognitive Science. New Ideas in Psychology 28:274-282.
    This paper examines the widespread intuition that the dynamical approach to cognitive science is importantly related to emergentism about the mind. The explanatory practices adopted by dynamical cognitive science rule out some conceptions of emergence; covering law explanations require a deducibility relationship between explanans and explanandum, whereas canonical theories of emergence require the absence of such deducibility. A response to this problem – one which would save the intuition that dynamics and emergence are related – is to reconstrue the concept (...)
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  39. D. Gene Witmer (1998). What is Wrong with the Manifestability Argument for Supervenience? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):84-89.
    The manifestability argument presented by Papineau and Loewer turns on the premise that nonphysical properties are capable of making a difference to physical conditions. From this and the completeness of physics a strenuous supervenience conclusion is supposed to follow. I argue that the plausible version of this premise implies a weaker supervenience thesis only, one that is too weak to be of any use for a physicalist. There is a more contentious premise one might use to deduce the needed conclusion, (...)
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Psychophysical Emergence
  1. Paul L. Allen (2013). An Augustinian Philosopher Between Dualism and Materialism: Ernan McMullin on Human Emergence. Zygon 48 (2):294-304.
    In claiming the independence of theology from science, Ernan McMullin nevertheless saw the danger of separating these disciplines on questions of mutual significance, as his accompanying article “Biology and the Theology of the Human” in this edition of Zygon shows. This paper analyzes McMullin's adoption of emergence as a qualified endorsement of a view that avoids the excesses of both dualism and materialism. I argue that McMullin's distinctive contribution is the conceptual clarification of emergence in the light of a precise (...)
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  2. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2005). Morgan's Canon Revisited. Philosophy of Science 72 (4):608-31.
    The famous ethological maxim known as “Morgan’s Canon” continues to be the subject of interpretive controversy. I reconsider Morgan’s canon in light of two questions: First, what did Morgan intend? Second, is this, or perhaps some re-interpretation of the canon, useful within cognitive ethology? As for the first issue, Morgan’s distinction between higher and lower faculties is suggestive of an early supervenience concept. As for the second, both the canon in its original form, and various recent re-readings, offer nothing useful (...)
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  3. A. Atkin (1992). On Consciousness: What is the Role of Emergence? Medical Hypotheses 38:311-14.
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  4. John Blodwell (2011). Physicalism and Emergence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):11-12.
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  5. Godehard Brüntrup (1998). Is Psycho-Physical Emergentism Committed to Dualism? The Causal Efficacy of Emergent Mental Properties. Erkenntnis 3 (2):133-151.
  6. Tim Crane (2001). The Significance of Emergence. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
    This paper is an attempt to understand the content of, and motivation for, a popular form of physicalism, which I call ‘non-reductive physicalism’. Non-reductive physicalism claims although the mind is physical (in some sense), mental properties are nonetheless not identical to (or reducible to) physical properties. This suggests that mental properties are, in earlier terminology, ‘emergent properties’ of physical entities. Yet many non-reductive physicalists have denied this. In what follows, I examine their denial, and I argue that on a plausible (...)
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  7. Cian Dorr (2003). Merricks on the Existence of Human Organisms. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):711–718.
    BB Whenever a baseball causes an event, the baseball’s constituent atoms also cause that event, and the baseball is causally irrelevant to whether those atoms cause that event.
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  8. Todd E. Feinberg (2001). Why the Mind is Not a Radically Emergent Feature of the Brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):123-145.
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  9. Robert Francescotti (2007). Emergence. Erkenntnis 67 (1):47 - 63.
    Here I offer a precise analysis of what it takes for a property to count as emergent. The features widely considered crucial to emergence include novelty, unpredictability, supervenience, relationality, and downward causal influence. By acknowledging each of these distinctive features, the definition provided below captures an important sense in which the whole can be more than the sum of its parts.
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