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  1. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1995). The Psychophysical Nature of Humans. Axiomathes 6 (1):31-37.
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  2. R. F. Alfred Hoernle (1917). The Mental and the Physical as a Problem for Philosophy. Philosophical Review 26 (3):297-314.
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  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Reply to Frank Jackson. Philosophical Explorations 3:196-8.
    Commonsense psychological explanations are an integral part of a comprehensive commonsense background that includes almost everything that we deal with everyday— from traffic jams to paychecks to cozy dinners for two. It is the comprehensive commonsense background that I think is not wholesale refutable by science. A good deal of the comprehensive commonsense background itself depends on there being beliefs, desires, intentions and other propositional attitudes. If there never have been propositional attitudes, then there never have been statues or schools (...)
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  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Reply to Jackson, II. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):196-198.
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  5. R. L. Barnette (1978). Grounding the Mental. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (September):92-105.
  6. John Bolender (2003). A Farewell to Isms. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 109.
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  7. Stewart Candlish (1971). Physiological Discoveries: Criteria or Symptoms. Analysis 31 (April):162-165.
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  8. Morris R. Cohen (1917). The Distinction Between the Mental and the Physical. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (10):261-267.
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  9. Grace A. de Laguna (1918). The Empirical Correlation of Mental and Bodily Phenomena. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (20):533-541.
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  10. J. N. Findlay (1950). Linguistic Approach to Psychophysics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50:43-64.
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  11. John A. Foster (1968). Psychophysical Causal Relations. American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (January):64-70.
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  12. Robert Francescotti (2002). Whether Mentality is Higher-Level. Philosophical Inquiry 24 (3-4):65-76.
  13. Stephen Harrison (1989). A New Visualization of the Mind-Brain Relationship. In The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
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  14. Stephen Harrison (1989). The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
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  15. H. Heath Bawden (1904). The Physical and the Psychical. Philosophical Review 13 (5):541-546.
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  16. H. Heath Bawden (1902). The Functional View of the Relation Between the Psychical and the Physical. Philosophical Review 11 (5):474-484.
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  17. Carl G. Hedman (1970). On Correlating Brain States with Psychological States. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (August):247-51.
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  18. H. L. Hollingworth (1916). The Psychophysical Continuum. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (7):182-190.
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  19. Ted Honderich (1991). Better the Union Theory. Analysis 51 (June):166-173.
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  20. James Hopkins (1978). Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 221:221-236.
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  21. Jennifer Hornsby (2000). Reply to Jackson, I. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):193-195.
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  22. K. D. Irani (1980). Body & Mind: Past, Present And Future. New York: Academic Press.
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  23. K. D. Irani (1980). Conceptual Changes in Problem of Mind-Body Relation. In Body & Mind: Past, Present And Future. New York: Academic Press.
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  24. Jaegwon Kim (2003). Supervenience, Emergence, Realization, Reduction. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
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  25. Jaegwon Kim (2002). Horgan's Naturalistic Metaphysics of Mind. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):27-52.
    Terry Horgan has made impressive and highly important contributions to numerous fields of philosophy ? metaphysics, philosophy of mind and psychology, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and value theory, to mention the most prominent ones. What gives Horgan's work a powerful and clarifying unity is his deep and unflagging commitment to philosophical naturalism. In fact, Horgan himself has often invoked naturalism to motivate his positions and arguments on a number of philosophical issues. In this talk, I will discuss some (...)
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  26. S. S. Laurie (1894). Reflexions Suggested by Psychophysical Materialism. Mind 3 (9):56-76.
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  27. Eric Marcus (2006). Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem. Synthese 150 (1):99-129.
    In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical (...)
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  28. Ausonio Marras (2001). On Putnam's Critique of Metaphysical Realism: Mind-Body Identity and Supervenience. Synthese 126 (3):407-426.
    As part of his ongoing critique of metaphysical realism, Hilary Putnam has recently argued that current materialist theories of mind that locate mental phenomena in the brain can make no sense of the proposed identifications of mental states with physical (or physical cum computational) states, or of the supervenience of mental properties with physical properties. The aim of this paper is to undermine Putnam's objections and reassert the intelligibility – and perhaps the plausibility – of some form of mind-body identity (...)
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  29. Colin McGinn (1978). Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:195-220.
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  30. M. McGinn (2000). Real Things and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):303-17.
    Naturalism about the mind is often taken to be equivalent to some form of physicalism: the existence of mental properties must be shown not to compromise the autonomy of the physical realm. It is argued that this leads to a choice between reductionism, eliminativism, epiphenomenalism or interactionism. The central aim of the paper is to outline an Aristotelian alternative to the physicalist conception of natural bodies. It is argued that the distinction between form and matter, and an ontology which treats (...)
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  31. T. R. Miles (1964). The Mental--Physical Dichotomy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64:71-84.
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  32. Claudia M. Murphy (1984). Anti-Reductionism and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophy Research Archives 10:441-454.
    I argue that there are good reasons to deny both type-type and token-token mind-brain identity theories. Yet on the other hand there are compelling reasons for thinking that there is a causal basis for the mind. I argue that a path out of this impasse involves not only showing that criteria of individuation do not determine identity, but also that there are sound methodological reasons for thinking that the cause of intelligent behavior is a real natural kind. Finally, a commitment (...)
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  33. Herbert R. Otto (ed.) (1988). Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    INTRODUCTION Phenomenology and analytic philosophy have skirmished often, but seldom in ways conducive to dialectical progress. ...
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  34. Ullin T. Place (2000). The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation. Brain and Mind 1 (1):29-43.
    The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinctionbetween the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental,and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as thebrain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mentalstates depend causally on and are, thus, ''''distinct existences'''' fromthe states of the brain microstructure with which ''they'' are correlated.It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity andits composition/underlying structure applies across the board. allstuffs and processes are the same (...)
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  35. Willard V. Quine (1978). Reply to Lycan and Pappas's Quine's Materialism. Philosophia 7 (July):637-638.
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  36. Francis V. Raab (1965). Of Minds and Molecules. Philosophy of Science 32 (January):57-72.
    "Of Minds and Molecules" attempts to show the difficulties in mental-state brain-state monism. By exploring the differences in meaning between mental-state sentences and brain-state sentences, and by analysing the implications of the theory of the molecular composition of matter, a kind of dualism is arrived at that no scientist should feel uncomfortable with. It is a dualism without mental substance but it does not deprive mental states of their uniqueness. Arguments are given for the propriety of asserting causal connections and (...)
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  37. J. H. Randall Jr (1946). A Note on Mr Sheldon's Mind. Journal of Philosophy 43 (April):209-213.
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  38. Michael J. Raven (2013). Is Lewis's Mixed Theory Mixed Up? Theoria 79 (1):57-75.
    My aim is to rekindle interest in David Lewis's (1983) infamous but neglected Mixed Theory of mental states. The Mixed Theory is a mix of physicalism and functionalism designed to capture the intuitions that both Martians and abnormal human Madmen can be in pain. The Mixed Theory is widely derided. But I offer a new development of the Mixed Theory immune to its most prominent objections. In doing so, I uncover a new motivation for the Mixed Theory: its unique ability (...)
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  39. Max Rieser (1946). A Methodological Investigation Into the Relation Between Mind and Body. Journal of Philosophy 43 (September):551-557.
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  40. A. D. Ritchie (1931). The Relations of Mental and Physical Processes. Mind 40 (158):171-187.
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  41. W. Teed Rockwell (2005). Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
  42. M. Schectman (1997). The Brain/Body Problem. Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):149-64.
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  43. John R. Searle, Biological Naturalism.
    “Biological Naturalism” is a name I have given to an approach to what is traditionally called the mind-body problem. The way I arrived at it is typical of the way I work: try to forget about the philosophical history of a problem and remind yourself of what you know for a fact. Any philosophical theory has to be consistent with the facts. Of course, something we think is a fact may turn out not to be, but we have to start (...)
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  44. A. Skillen (1984). Mind and Matter: A Problem Which Refuses Dissolution. Mind 93 (October):514-26.
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  45. Erling Skorpen (1973). Pin-Pricks to the Body and Pains to the Mind: A Natural History and Philosophy. Philosophy Forum 14 (September):53-79.
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  46. Ralph L. Smith (1999). A Testable Mind-Brain Theory. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):421-436.
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  47. Douglas M. Snyder (1988). On Complementarity and Causal Isomorphism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 9:1-4.
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  48. Timothy L. S. Sprigge (1981). Honderich, Davidson, and the Question of Mental Holism. Inquiry 24 (October):323-342.
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  49. Nathan Stemmer (2001). The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory. Behavior and Philosophy 29:187-202.
    Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. According to the (...)
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  50. William R. Stoeger (1999). Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.
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