Psychophysical Supervenience
- Sean Allen-Hermanson (2005). Morgan's Canon Revisited. Philosophy of Science 72 (4):608-31.
- Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (1997). Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.
- Tim Crane (1991). Why Indeed? Papineau on Supervenience. Analysis 51 (January):32-7.
- Robert Francescotti (2007). Emergence. Erkenntnis 67 (1):47 - 63.
- Stevan Harnad (2000). Minds, Machines and Turing: The Indistinguishability of Indistinguishables. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (4):425-445.
- Katherine Hawley (1998). Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic. Mind 107 (428):841-843.
- Giovanna Hendel (2002). On What Does the Issue of Supervenience and Psychophysical Dependence Depend? Dialogue 41 (2):329-348.
- Giovanna Hendel (2002). Psychophysical Supervenience: Digging in its Foundations. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:115-141.
- Jaegwon Kim (1982). Psychophysical Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 41 (January):51-70.
- Jaegwon Kim (1979). Causality, Identity and Supervenience in the Mind-Body Problem. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):31-49.
- David Mark Kovacs (2010). Is There a Conservative Solution to the Many Thinkers Problem? Ratio 23 (3):275-290.
- Brian Loar (1993). Can We Confirm Supervenient Properties? Philosophical Issues 4:74-92.
- C. Macdonald (1995). Psychophysical Supervenience, Dependency, and Reduction. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
- Nicholas Maxwell (2000). The Mind-Body Problem and Explanatory Dualism. Philosophy 75 (291):49-71.
- D. H. Mellor (1993). Supervenience? No Chance! Reply to Menuge. Analysis 53 (4):236-239.
- Trenton Merricks (2003). Maximality and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):150-158.
- Trenton Merricks (1998). Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience. Mind 107 (425):59-71.
- Trenton Merricks (1998). On Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic. Mind 107 (428):845-846.
- Harold W. Noonan (1999). Identity, Constitution and Microphysical Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (3):273-288.
- Harold W. Noonan (1999). Microphysical Supervenience and Consciousness. Mind 108 (432):755-9.
- David Papineau (1991). The Reason Why: Response to Crane. Analysis 51 (January):37-40.
- David Papineau (1989). Why Supervenience? Analysis 49 (2):66-71.
- Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (1995). Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
- Theodore Sider (2003). Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):139-149.
- Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (1985). Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press.
- Daniel von Wachter (2009). What Kind of Modality Does the Materialist Need for His Supervenience Claim? In Alexander Battyany & E. Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.
- D. Gene Witmer (1998). What is Wrong with the Manifestability Argument for Supervenience? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):84-89.
Other Psychophysical Relations, Misc
- Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1995). The Psychophysical Nature of Humans. Axiomathes 6 (1).
- R. F. Alfred Hoernle (1917). The Mental and the Physical as a Problem for Philosophy. Philosophical Review 26 (3):297-314.
- Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Reply to Jackson, II. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):196-198.
- R. L. Barnette (1978). Grounding the Mental. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (September):92-105.
- Stewart Candlish (1971). Physiological Discoveries: Criteria or Symptoms. Analysis 31 (April):162-165.
- Morris R. Cohen (1917). The Distinction Between the Mental and the Physical. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (10):261-267.
- Grace A. de Laguna (1918). The Empirical Correlation of Mental and Bodily Phenomena. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (20):533-541.
- J. N. Findlay (1950). Linguistic Approach to Psychophysics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50:43-64.
- John A. Foster (1968). Psychophysical Causal Relations. American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (January):64-70.
- H. Heath Bawden (1904). The Physical and the Psychical. Philosophical Review 13 (5):541-546.
- H. Heath Bawden (1902). The Functional View of the Relation Between the Psychical and the Physical. Philosophical Review 11 (5):474-484.
- Carl G. Hedman (1970). On Correlating Brain States with Psychological States. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (August):247-51.
- H. L. Hollingworth (1916). The Psychophysical Continuum. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (7):182-190.
- Ted Honderich (1991). Better the Union Theory. Analysis 51 (June):166-173.
- James Hopkins (1978). Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 221:221-236.
- Jennifer Hornsby (2000). Reply to Jackson, I. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):193-195.
- Jaegwon Kim (2002). Horgan's Naturalistic Metaphysics of Mind. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):27-52.
- S. S. Laurie (1894). Reflexions Suggested by Psychophysical Materialism. Mind 3 (9):56-76.
- Eric Marcus (2006). Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem. Synthese 150 (1):99-129.
- Ausonio Marras (2001). On Putnam's Critique of Metaphysical Realism: Mind-Body Identity and Supervenience. Synthese 126 (3):407-426.
- Colin McGinn (1978). Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:195-220.
- M. McGinn (2000). Real Things and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):303-17.
- T. R. Miles (1964). The Mental--Physical Dichotomy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64:71-84.
- Claudia M. Murphy (1984). Anti-Reductionism and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophy Research Archives 10:441-454.
- Herbert R. Otto (1988). Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Ullin T. Place (2000). The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation. Brain and Mind 1 (1):29-43.
- Francis V. Raab (1965). Of Minds and Molecules. Philosophy of Science 32 (January):57-72.
- J. H. Randall Jr (1946). A Note on Mr Sheldon's Mind. Journal of Philosophy 43 (April):209-213.
- Max Rieser (1946). A Methodological Investigation Into the Relation Between Mind and Body. Journal of Philosophy 43 (September):551-557.
- A. D. Ritchie (1931). The Relations of Mental and Physical Processes. Mind 40 (158):171-187.
- W. Teed Rockwell (2005). Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
- John R. Searle, Biological Naturalism.
- A. Skillen (1984). Mind and Matter: A Problem Which Refuses Dissolution. Mind 93 (October):514-26.
- Erling Skorpen (1973). Pin-Pricks to the Body and Pains to the Mind: A Natural History and Philosophy. Philosophy Forum 14 (September):53-79.
- Nathan Stemmer (2001). The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory. Behavior And Philosophy 29:187-202.
- A. E. Taylor (1904). Mind and Body in Recent Psychology. Mind 13 (52):476-508.
- Ian J. Thompson (2002). Are Quantum Physics and Spirituality Related? New Philosophy 107:333-355.
- Tim van Gelder (1998). Monism, Dualism, Pluralism. Mind and Language 13 (1):76-97.
- Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (2003). Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
- Richard A. Watson (1994). Having Ideas. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):185-198.
- Warner A. Wick (1953). Minds, Artificial Languages, and Philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14 (December):228-238.
- W. H. Winch (1910). Physiological' and 'Psychological. Mind 19 (74):200-217.
- John O. Wisdom (1952). A New Model for the Mind-Body Relationship. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (February):295-301.
- Francis J. Zucker, Three Counter Strategies to Reductionism in Science.
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
|