This essay challenges a "meta-theory" in just war analysis that purports to bridge the divide between just war and pacifism. According to the meta-theory, just war and pacifism share a common presumption against killing that can be overridden only under conditions stipulated by the just war criteria. Proponents of this meta-theory purport that their interpretation leads to ecumenical consensus between "just warriors" and pacifists, and makes the just war theory more effective in reducing recourse to war. Engagement with the new (...) meta-theory reveals, however, that these purported advantages are illusory, made possible only by ignoring fundamental questions about the nature and function of political authority that are crucial to all moral reflection on the problem of war. (shrink)

In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, James Kellenberger argues that the “ethics of love” aspect of Christianity entails pacifism, In response, I present an argument designed to show that Christian doctrine entails the falsity of pacifism, I go on to show, however, that the spirit of Kellenberger’s point may survive, for perhaps Christ’s teaching regarding “mental sin” prohibits the war-related activity known as nuclear deterrence.

Two significantly different, if related, themes run through pacifist ideas in western history. One school of pacifism rejects violence as itself evil by whomever practiced and in whatever cause, but accepts the state as the agent of change to abolish violence. This point of view includes an expressed hope that a Utopian reconstitution of government will produce a totally peaceful world society. The other major theme expressed by pacifists in western culture accepts violence as inevitable in history and perhaps even (...) in some sense "ordained by God." The moral rejection of violence follows from an all-encompassing desire to separate from the society where violence is practiced and to live apart in a peaceful society ruled by the love of Christ. This paper explores these two themes in the western historical context via examination of the pacifism of Erasmus, exemplifying the first theme, and that of the Anabaptists of the Schleitheim Confession, representing the second theme. (shrink)

In this article, after providing a preliminary characterization of pacifism, the author first argues that pacifism sensibly articulates with the concepts of force and rights and then critically discusses the just war position, the correctness of which would entail the wrongnessof pacifism in a strong construction. The author goes on to argue that a primary moral obligation of justice is sufficient to make it wrong to resort to war and that, moreover, utilitarian ethics, deontological ethics, and the religious ethics of (...) love, on their own separate grounds, arguably should agree on a repudiation of war, but, finally, religious ethics repudiates war best because it sees best the heart of the matter. (shrink)

There is a nonabsolute or “contingent” form of pacifism that claims that war in contemporary conditions inevitably involves the killing of innocent people on a scale that is too great to be justified. Some contingent pacifists argue that war always involves a risk that virtually everyone that one might kill is innocent – either because one can never be sure that one’s cause is just or because even most of those who fight in wars that lack a just cause are (...) nevertheless not culpable and are therefore innocent in the relevant sense. Others argue that there is no just cause for war that is sufficiently important to justify the large-scale killing of innocent civilians that is unavoidable in war. I seek to refute contingent pacifism by arguing that its theoretical presuppositions are untenable. (shrink)

Pacifism and terrorism are at opposite ends of one spectrum: pacifists have too many friends; terrorists have too many enemies. The indiscriminacy robs both of any credibility. Both fail to distinguish between aggressors and their victims. Discussion of terrorism, however, is complicated by insufficient attention to the distinction between noncombatants and innocents. Just War theory relies heavily on that distinction, providing protections to noncombatants as such, without going into the further question of innocence. Terrorism thus violates the restrictions on justice (...) within combat, as well as those on just cause. And in the end, it invites retaliation in kind, which is tantamount, nearly, to moving battle back to the Hobbesian State of nature. (shrink)

Many commentators cite John Dewey's support for Woodrow Wilson's administration and U.S. entry into the First World War as evidence against the claim that he was a pacifist. However, what they ignore is his leadership of the Outlawry of War Movement and his subsequent renunciation of his earlier pro-war views. This paper examines the controversy, beginning with Dewey's debate with Randolph Bourne over American involvement in the war to "make the world safe for democracy" and ending with his activities as (...) a leader of the Outlawry of War Movement. The touchstone essays for the debate between Dewey and Bourne are Dewey's "What America Will Fight For" and Bourne's "Twilight of the Idols." For Dewey's involvement in the Outlawry of War Movement, the essays "If War Were Outlawed" and "What Outlawry of War is Not" are instructive for how we might salvage Dewey's pacifist vision as a resource for the contemporary Peace Movement. I conclude that Dewey's writings and actions do provide good reason to restore his credentials as a philosopher of peace. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that cosmopolitanism prohibits war and requires a global approach to criminal justice. My argument proceeds by drawing out some implications of the core cosmopolitan intuition that every human being has a moral status which constrains how they may be treated. In the first part of this paper, I describe cosmopolitanism. In the second part, Cosmopolitanism and War, I analyse violence, consider the standards cosmopolitanism sets for its justification, and argue that war fails to meet them. (...) In the third part, Cosmopolitanism and Criminal Justice, I argue that cosmopolitanism implies a moral obligation to deal justly with human wrongdoing wherever it occurs. Cosmopolitan pacifism follows: war is prohibited, and a consistent global criminal justice system is required. In the fourth part, Why No Cosmopolitan Pacifists?, I consider why cosmopolitans tend not to identify as pacifists, and in the final part, Objections, I discuss some objections. (shrink)

Some recent authors have argued that Aquinas deliberately integrated a pacifist outlook into his just war theory. Others, by contrast, have maintained that his rejection of pacifism was unequivocal. The present article attempts to set the historical record straight by an examination of Aquinas's writings on this topic. In addition to Q. 40, A. 1 of Summa theologiae II–II, the text usually cited in this connection, this article considers the biblical commentaries where Aquinas explains how the Gospel “precepts of patience,” (...) especially Matthew 5:39, “Do not resist evil,” should be interpreted in light of the doctrine of just war. The article concludes that Aquinas formulated a two-stage theory whereby pacifism was rejected as a suitable form of agency for the state (respublica), while it was affirmed as the appropriate response to evil for the agency of the church (ecclesia). (shrink)

All the standard and some esoteric objections to pacifism are refuted, either directly or (as with the charge of impracticality) in outline. Familiar arguments to the inconsistency and irresponsibility of pacifism are shown to turn upon illegitimately construing pacifist activities such as resisting, preventing, and defending as involving violence. Several arguments against pacifism from violence as a lesser evil turn out to be fallacious; some involve the erroneous assumption that violence is the only evil, but some lead into what pacifism (...) can simply concede, moral dilemmas. It is argued that pacifism is not a form of fanaticism, is not morally insensitive, does not imply anarchism, or vegetarianism, is not completely impractical, and can be positively underpinned. In the course of the arguments various types of pacifism are classified, pacifism is distinguished from nonviolent action, and pacifism and, differently, pacificity are disassociated from passivity: The question of a more general characterization of violence (which is different from force) emerges as a crucial issue, along with the problem of integrating pacifism into a more comprehensive moral position. (shrink)

From 1895, the year he published his first signed article, to four days before his death when he wrote his last, Bertrand Russel was a powerful figure in the world of mathematics, philosophy, human rights and the struggle for peace. During his liftime he published 70 books, almost as many pamphlets and over 2,000 articles. The No-Conscription Fellowship: Pacifism and Revolution, 1916-18 is the fouteenth volume in an extensive collection of the writings of Bertrand Russel. This book begins when (...) Russel became the Acting Chairman of the No-Conscription Fellowship (NCF) very soon after the establishment of the Lloyd George coalition which signaled official British resolve to defeat Germany decisively. This uncompromising determination was matched by the German decision in January of 1917 to initiate unrestricted submarine warfare. The No-Conscription Fellowship: Pacifism and Revolution, 1916-18 contains many short papers reflecting Russel's immediate responses todevelopments in the conflict as seen as from his position as the most important political commentator for the official publication of the NCF, The Tribunal. (shrink)