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  1. Mark Alfano (2015). Placebo Effects and Informed Consent. American Journal of Bioethics 15 (10):3-12.
    The concepts of placebos and placebo effects refer to extremely diverse phenomena. I recommend dissolving the concepts of placebos and placebo effects into loosely-related groups of specific mechanisms, including (potentially among others) expectation-fulfillment, classical conditioning, and attentional-somatic feedback loops. If this approach is on the right track, it has three main implications for the ethics of informed consent. First, because of the expectation-fulfillment mechanism, the process of informing cannot be considered independently from the potential effects of treatment. Obtaining informed consent (...)
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  2. Murat Aydede, Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum (TD). Pain experiences are consistent with TD. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis (ST) that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about phenomenology. I argue that pain experiences (as well as some other similar experiences) are not transparent in this strong sense. Hence I argue that representationalism is false. Then, I outline a framework about how the introspection (...)
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  3. Murat Aydede (forthcoming). Defending the IASP Definition of Pain. The Monist.
    [Penultimate draft -- please consult the final version for reference] I explain in detail the influential definition given by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) and defend it against various criticisms in the literature. (Written for interdisciplinary audiences.).
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  4. Murat Aydede (forthcoming). Pain: Perception or Introspection? In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge
    [Penultimate draft] I present the perceptualist/representationalist theories of pain in broad outline and critically examine them in light of a competing view according to which awareness of pain is essentially introspective. I end the essay with a positive sketch of a naturalistic proposal according to which pain experiences are intentional but not fully representational. This proposal makes sense of locating pains in body parts as well as taking pains as subjective experiences.
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  5. David Bain (2013). What Makes Pains Unpleasant? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
    The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be accounted for purely in terms of pain’s possession of indicative representational content. Instead, they have explained it in terms of subjects’ inclinations to stop their pains, or in terms of pain’s imperative content. I claim that such “noncognitivist” accounts fail to accommodate unpleasant pain’s reason-giving force. What is needed, I argue, is a view on which pains are unpleasant, motivate, and provide reasons in virtue of (...)
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  6. David Bain (2011). The Imperative View of Pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.
    Pain, crucially, is unpleasant and motivational. It can be awful; and it drives us to action, e.g. to take our weight off a sprained ankle. But what is the relationship between pain and those two features? And in virtue of what does pain have them? Addressing these questions, Colin Klein and Richard J. Hall have recently developed the idea that pains are, at least partly, experiential commands—to stop placing your weight on your ankle, for example. In this paper, I reject (...)
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  7. David Bain (2010). Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, Edited by Murat Aydede. [REVIEW] Mind 119 (474):451-456.
    Review of Murat Aydede's edited collection, *Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study".
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  8. David Bain (2009). McDowell and the Presentation of Pains. Philosophical Topics 37 (1):1-24.
    It can seem natural to say that, when in pain, we undergo experiences which present to us certain experience-dependent particulars, namely pains. As part of his wider approach to mind and world, John McDowell has elaborated an interesting but neglected version of this account of pain. Here I set out McDowell’s account at length, and place it in context. I argue that his subjectivist conception of the objects of pain experience is incompatible with his requirement that such experience be presentational, (...)
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  9. David Bain (2007). The Location of Pains. Philosophical Papers 36 (2):171-205.
    Perceptualists say that having a pain in a body part consists in perceiving the part as instantiating some property. I argue that perceptualism makes better sense of the connections between pain location and the experiences undergone by people in pain than three alternative accounts that dispense with perception. Turning to fellow perceptualists, I also reject ways in which David Armstrong and Michael Tye understand and motivate perceptualism, and I propose an alternative interpretation, one that vitiates a pair of objections—due to (...)
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  10. Lisa Bortolotti & Andrew Wright (2011). Introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):9-10.
    Introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies on Pain and the Experience of Pain.
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  11. B. Cutter & M. Tye (2014). Pains and Reasons: Why It is Rational to Kill the Messenger. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):423-433.
    In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behavior. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at getting rid of the experience of pain rather than its intentional object. If (...)
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  12. Brian Cutter & Michael Tye (2011). Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):90-109.
  13. Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Jacob (2012). What Is It Like to Feel Another's Pain? Philosophy of Science 79 (2):295-316.
    We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our account, contagious pain consists in imagining the former, whereas empathetic pain consists in imagining the latter. We further (...)
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  14. Athina Demertzi, Eric Racine, Marie-Aurélie Bruno, Didier Ledoux, Olivia Gosseries, Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Marie Thonnard, Andrea Soddu, Gustave Moonen & Steven Laureys (forthcoming). Pain Perception in Disorders of Consciousness: Neuroscience, Clinical Care, and Ethics in Dialogue. Neuroethics.
  15. Andreas Dorschel (2011). Music and Pain. In Jane Fulcher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the New Cultural History of Music. Oxford University Press 68-79.
    Ancient mythology related music to pain in a twofold way. Pain is the punishment inflicted for producing inferior music: the fate of Marsyas; music is sublimation of pain: the achievement of Orpheus and of Philomela. Both aspects have played defining roles in Western musical culture. Pain’s natural expression is the scream. To be present in music at all, pain needs to be transformed. So even where music expresses pain, at the same time it appeases that very pain. Unlike the scream, (...)
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  16. Andreas Dorschel (2008). Musik und Schmerz. Musiktheorie 23 (3):257-263.
    Ancient mythology related music to pain in a twofold way. Pain is the punishment inflicted for producing inferior music: the fate of Marsyas; music is sublimation of pain: the achievement of Orpheus and of Philomela. Both aspects have played defining roles in Western musical culture. Pain’s natural expression is the scream. To be present in music at all, pain needs to be transformed. So even where music expresses pain, at the same time it appeases that very pain. Unlike the scream, (...)
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  17. S. Benjamin Fink (2011). Independence and Connections of Pain and Suffering. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):46-66.
    Is a phenomenal pain a conscious primitive or composed of more primitive phenomenal states? Are pain experiences necessarily or only contingently unpleasant? Here, I sketch how to answer such questions concerning intra-phenomenal metaphysics using the example of pain and unpleasantness. Arguments for a symmetrical metaphysical independence of phenomenal pain and unpleasant affect are presented, rejecting a composite view like the IASP definition and dimensional views. The motivating intuition of these views is explained by common binding mechanisms in consciousness and characterized (...)
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  18. S. Benjamin Fink (2010). Pain: A Natural State Without a Nature? Dealing with the Ambiguity of „Pain“ in Science and Ethics. In Heather McKenzie, John Quintner & Gillian Bendelow (eds.), At the Edge of Being: The Aporia of Pain. Inter-Disciplinary Press
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  19. S. Benjamin Fink (2010). Review of Arne Vetlesen's „The Philosophy of Pain“. [REVIEW] Metapsychology 14 (25).
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  20. S. Benjamin Fink (2010). Review of Victoria Braithwaite's „Do Fish Feel Pain?“. [REVIEW] Metapsychology 14 (34).
  21. Richard Gray (2014). Pain, Perception and the Sensory Modalities: Revisiting the Intensive Theory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):87-101.
    Pain is commonly explained in terms of the perceptual activity of a distinct sensory modality, the function of which is to enable us to perceive actual or potential damage to the body. However, the characterization of pain experience in terms of a distinct sensory modality with such content is problematic. I argue that pain is better explained as occupying a different role in relation to perception: to indicate when the stimuli that are sensed in perceiving anything by means of a (...)
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  22. Ivan V. Ivanov (2011). Pains and Sounds. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):143-163.
    I argue that an analogy between pains and sounds suggests a way to give an objective account of pain which fits well with a naïve perceptualist account of feeling pain. According to the proposed metaphysical account, pains are relational physical events with shared qualitative nature, each of which is constituted by tissue damage and the activation of nociceptors. I proceed to show that the metaphysical proposal is compatible with platitudes about pains being animate, private, and self-intimating states.
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  23. Guy Kahane (2010). Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49.
    In this paper I present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason. My argument is inpired by Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument. I ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time. Such an agent, I argue, will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain. This argument presents a similar difficulty for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value. I end by suggesting that some debates in meta-ethics and in the (...)
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  24. Guy Kahane (2009). Pain, Dislike and Experience. Utilitas 21 (3):327-336.
    It is widely held that it is only contingent that the sensation of pain is disliked, and that when pain is not disliked, it is not intrinsically bad. This conjunction of claims has often been taken to support a subjectivist view of pain’s badness on which pain is bad simply because it is the object of a negative attitude and not because of what it feels like. In this paper, I argue that accepting this conjunction of claims does not commit (...)
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  25. Lisa Folkmarson Käll (ed.) (2013). Dimensions of Pain. Routledge.
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  26. Colin Klein & Manolo Martínez (forthcoming). Imperativism and Pain Intensity. In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Nature of Pain.
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  27. Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Pain and Incorrigibility. In J. Corns (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge
    This chapter (from Routledge's forthcoming handbook on the philosophy of pain) considers the question of whether people are always correct when they judge themselves to be in pain, or not in pain. While I don't show sympathy for traditional routes to the conclusion that people are "incorrigible" in their pain judgments, I explore--and perhaps even advocate--a different route to such incorrigibility. On this low road to incorrigibility, a sensory state's being judged unpleasant is what makes it a pain (or not).
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  28. Harold Langsam (1995). Why Pains Are Mental Objects. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):303-13.
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  29. Manolo Martínez (2015). Pains as Reasons. Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2261-2274.
    Imperativism is the view that the phenomenal character of the affective component of pains, orgasms, and pleasant or unpleasant sensory experience depends on their imperative intentional content. In this paper I canvass an imperativist treatment of pains as reason-conferring states.
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  30. Manolo Martínez (2011). Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
    Representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness have problems in accounting for pain, for at least two reasons. First of all, the negative affective phenomenology of pain (its painfulness) does not seem to be representational at all. Secondly, pain experiences are not transparent to introspection in the way perceptions are. This is reflected, e.g. in the fact that we do not acknowledge pain hallucinations. In this paper, I defend that representationalism has the potential to overcome these objections. Defenders of representationalism have tried (...)
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  31. Manolo Martínez & Colin Klein (2016). Pain Signals Are Predominantly Imperative. Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):283-298.
    Recent work on signaling has mostly focused on communication between organisms. The Lewis–Skyrms framework should be equally applicable to intra-organismic signaling. We present a Lewis–Skyrms signaling-game model of painful signaling, and use it to argue that the content of pain is predominantly imperative. We address several objections to the account, concluding that our model gives a productive framework within which to consider internal signaling.
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  32. Olivier Massin (forthcoming). Bad by Nature, An Axiological Theory of Pain. In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge
    This chapter defends an axiological theory of pain according to which pains are bodily episodes that are bad in some way. Section 1 introduces two standard assumptions about pain that the axiological theory constitutively rejects: (i) that pains are essentially tied to consciousness and (ii) that pains are not essentially tied to badness. Section 2 presents the axiological theory by contrast to these and provides a preliminary defense of it. Section 3 introduces the paradox of pain and argues that since (...)
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  33. Olivier Massin (2014). Pleasure and Its Contraries. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):15-40.
    What is the contrary of pleasure? “Pain” is one common answer. This paper argues that pleasure instead has two natural contraries: unpleasure and hedonic indifference. This view is defended by drawing attention to two often-neglected concepts: the formal relation of polar opposition and the psychological state of hedonic indifference. The existence of mixed feelings, it is argued, does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure.
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  34. Brendan O'Sullivan & Robert Schroer (2012). Painful Reasons: Representationalism as a Theory of Pain. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):737-758.
    It is widely thought that functionalism and the qualia theory are better positioned to accommodate the ‘affective’ aspect of pain phenomenology than representationalism. In this paper, we attempt to overturn this opinion by raising problems for both functionalism and the qualia theory on this score. With regard to functionalism, we argue that it gets the order of explanation wrong: pain experience gives rise to the effects it does because it hurts, and not the other way around. With regard to the (...)
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  35. Kevin Reuter (2011). Distinguishing the Appearance From the Reality of Pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):94-109.
    It is often held that it is conceptually impossible to distinguish between a pain and a pain experience. In this article I present an argument which concludes that people make this distinction. I have done a web-based statistical analysis which is at the core of this argument. It shows that the intensity of pain has a decisive effect on whether people say that they 'feel a pain'(lower intensities) or 'have a pain' (greater intensities). This 'intensity effect'can be best explained by (...)
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  36. Joel Michael Reynolds (2014). Feeding Upon Death: Pain, Possibility, and Transformation in S. Kay Toombs and Kafka's The Vulture. In Florian Steger & Bettina von Jagow (eds.), Jahrbuch Literatur und Medizin. Universitätsverlag Winter 135-54.
    While representations of pain are neither new nor sparse, pain marks a persistent and pressing issue for medical sciences. This issue, I claim, is not resolvable by simply altering or expanding current medical methodologies, but rather by turning to other fields such as a phenomenology and literature. I begin by discussing the work of S. Kay Toombs, contending that her phenomenological account of multiple sclerosis demonstrates how degenerative disease and its attendant pain ultimately effect a constriction of one’s world. Drawing (...)
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  37. Simonvanrysewyk, An Approach to Understanding Fetal Pain and Consciousness.
  38. Simon van Rysewyk, Arguing Pain-Brain Relationships in the Fetus.
  39. Simon van Rysewyk (2014). Robot Pain. International Journal of Synthetic Emotions 4 (2):22-33.
    Functionalism of robot pain claims that what is definitive of robot pain is functional role, defined as the causal relations pain has to noxious stimuli, behavior and other subjective states. Here, I propose that the only way to theorize role-functionalism of robot pain is in terms of type-identity theory. I argue that what makes a state pain for a neuro-robot at a time is the functional role it has in the robot at the time, and this state is type identical (...)
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  40. Simon van Rysewyk, Self and World: The Case of Pain.
  41. Simon van Rysewyk, Towards Raising Awareness of Qualitative Pain Research.