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  1. Robert Merrihew Adams (2013). Consciousness, Physicalism, and Panpsychism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):728-735.
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  2. Susan Armstrong (2006). For Love of Matter: A Contemporary Panpsychism. Environmental Ethics 28 (1):99-102.
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  3. Robert Arp (2007). Consciousness and Awareness - Switched-on Rheostats: A Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):101-106.
    I question whether it is completely accurate to think of the philosophical meaning of consciousness as being switched-on or switched-off. It may be that, once consciousness is switched-on, it is then found in degrees in animals we deem conscious. In which case, consciousness is more like a switched-on rheostat, rather than a simple on-off switch. Christian de Quincey (2006) gives a list of what would be considered the marks of consciousness, including 'experience, subjectivity, sentience, feeling, or mentality of any kind'. (...)
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  4. Nathaniel F. Barrett (2010). The Perspectivity of Feeling: Process Panpsychism and the Explanatory Gap. Chromatikon: Annales de la Philosophie En Procès / Yearbook of Philosophy in Process 6 (2):63-77.
    For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the explanatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibilityof special, “experiential” properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special properties are everywhere. In contrast, process panpsychism understands the explanatory gap in terms of the particularity of feeling. While the particularity of feeling cannot be captured by third-person accounts, for this very reason it is amenable to understanding consciousness as an evolutionary process. Thus (...)
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  5. Nathaniel F. Barrett (2009). The Perspectivity of Feeling. Process Studies 38 (2):189-206.
    For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the explanatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibilityof special, “experiential” properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special properties are everywhere. In contrast, process panpsychism understands the explanatory gap in terms of the particularity of feeling. While the particularity of feeling cannot be captured by third-person accounts, for this very reason it is amenable to understanding consciousness as an evolutionary process. Thus (...)
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  6. Pierfrancesco Basile (2010). Materialist Vs. Panexperientialist Physicalism: Where Do We Stand? Process Studies 39 (2):264-284.
    This paper provides a brief critique of Jaegwon Kim’s evaluation of the achievements of materialist physicalism and then goes on to examine the case for panpsychism and the main objection that has been raised against it, i.e., the composition problem. The object of this examination is to lay bare the fundamental assumptions underlying both the main argument in support of the theory and the objection against it. Whitehead’s panexperientialism has a fair claim to be regarded as the most elaborate version (...)
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  7. Pierfrancesco Basile (2009). Back to Whitehead? Galen Strawson and the Rediscovery of Panpsychism. In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind that Abides. Panpsychism in the new millennium. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
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  8. Pierfrancesco Basile (2008). Mind-Body Problem and Panpsychism. In Michel Weber (ed.), Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought. De Gruyter. 383-394.
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  9. Michael Beaton, J. Bricklin, Louis C. Charland, J. C. W. Edwards, Ilya B. Farber, Bill Faw, Rocco J. Gennaro, C. Kaernbach, C. M. H. Nunn, Jaak Panksepp, Jesse J. Prinz, Matthew Ratcliffe, Jacob J. Ross, S. Murray, Henry P. Stapp & Douglas F. Watt (2006). Switched-on Consciousness - Clarifying What It Means - Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.
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  10. Jonathan Beever & Vernon Cisney (2013). All Things in Mind: Panpsychist Elements in Spinoza, Deleuze, and Peirce. [REVIEW] Biosemiotics 6 (3):351-365.
    Benedict de Spinoza, C.S. Peirce, and Gilles Deleuze delineate a trajectory through the history of ideas in the dialogue about the potentials and limitations of panpsychism, the view that world is fundamentally made up of mind. As a parallel trajectory to the panpsychism debate in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology, this approach can inform and enrich the discussion of the role and scope of mind in the natural world. The philosophies of mind developed by Deleuze and Peirce are (...)
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  11. Charles Birch (1999). Why I Became a Panexperientialist. Australasian Association for Process Thought.
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  12. John Mark Bishop (2003). Dancing with Pixies: Strong Artificial Intelligence and Panpsychism. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
  13. Mark Bishop (2002). And Panpsychism. In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. 360.
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  14. Andrew G. Bjelland (1982). Popper's Critique of Panpsychism and Process Proto-Mentalism. Modern Schoolman 59 (May):233-43.
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  15. Michael Blamauer (2013). The Role of Subjectivity in the Continuity-Argument for Panpsychism. Polish Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):7-18.
    The Principle of Continuity is a major premise in what can be called the “Continuity-Argument for Panpsychism” : If we, as complex conscious organisms, are the evolutionary products of originally inorganic components and processes, and consciousness is a metaphysically irreducible feature, thenconsciousness must have already been a feature of these fundamental components, assuming there is continuity between the inorganic and the organic. This argument faces one serious objection, based on the possible vagueness of consciousness: If consciousness is a feature of (...)
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  16. Michael Blamauer (2011). Is the Panpsychist Better Off as an Idealist? Some Leibnizian Remarks on Consciousness and Composition. Eidos 15:48-75.
    Some philosophers of mind have argued for considering consciousness as a further fundamental feature of reality in addition to its physical properties. Hence most of them are property dualists. But some of them are panpsychists. In the present paper it will be argued that being a real property dualist essentially entails being a panpsychist. Even if panpsychism deals rather elegantly with certain problems of the puzzle of consciousness, there’s no way around the composition problem. Adhering to the fundamentality claim of (...)
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  17. A. Blank (2000). Leibniz and the Panpsychism Interpretation of the Theory of Simple Substances. Studia Leibnitiana 32 (1):117-125.
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  18. Andreas Blank (2000). Leibniz und die panpsychistische Deutung der Theorie der einfachen Substanzen. Studia Leibnitiana 32 (1):117 - 125.
    In this discussion note, I defend four claims: (1) The interpretation of Leibniz's theory of simple substances as a philosophy of panpsychism has no direct support from Leibniz's texts. (2) According to Leibniz there is a perfect continuity between perceptions of different degrees of distinctness. (3) Nevertheless, due to the reflective structure of sensation, there is a discontinuity between the perceptions of bare simple substances and sensations, which are characteristic of souls. (4) Finally, Leibniz's principle of continuity leaves room for (...)
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  19. Godehard Brüntrup (1998). Is Psycho-Physical Emergentism Committed to Dualism? The Causal Efficacy of Emergent Mental Properties. Erkenntnis 3 (2):133-151.
  20. Clark Butler (2010). Panpsychism and the Dissolution of Dispositional Properties. Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (2):87-108.
    The article explains my third argument for panpsychism, based on disolving all properties, including dispositional physical properties like mass, energy, and force, into phenomenal properties. I thus reject a dual-property version of panpsychism. I seek to show, contrary to Paul Churchland, that the general panpsychist hypothesis has some explanatory value, and makes a cosmology consisting in comparative psychology possible. The mental life even of so-called physical particles in physics is hypothesized to help explain their behavior.
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  21. Clark W. Butler (1978). Panpsychism: A Restatement of the Genetic Argument. Idealist Studies 8 (January):33-39.
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  22. Ernest Reid Calvert (1942). The Panpsychism of James Ward and Charles A. Strong. [Boston].
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  23. Peter Carruthers & Elizabeth Schechter (2006). Can Panpsychism Bridge the Explanatory Gap? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):32-39.
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  24. Paul Carus (1893). Panpsychism and Panbiotism. The Monist 3 (2):234-257.
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  25. Roberto Casati (2003). Qualia Domesticated. In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
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  26. David J. Chalmers, What is It Like to Be a Thermostat?
    The project that Dan Lloyd has undertaken is admirable and audacious. He has tried to boil down the substrate of information-processing that underlies conscious experience to some very simple elements, in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon. Some people will suspect that by considering a model as simple as a connectionist network, Dan has thrown away everything that is interesting about consciousness. Perhaps there is something to that complaint, but I will take a different tack. It seems (...)
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  27. David J. Chalmers (1996). Is Experience Ubiquitous? In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  28. Amita Chatterjee (ed.) (2003). Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
  29. Noam Chomsky (1998). Comments: Galen Strawson, Mental Reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):437-441.
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  30. Stephen R. L. Clark (2002). Nothing Without Mind. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
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  31. D. S. Clarke (2004). Panpsychism: Past and Recent Selected Readings. State University of New York Press.
    An anthology of readings in panpsychism, spanning two millennia.
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  32. D. S. Clarke (2003). Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude. State University of New York Press.
    In this bold, challenging book, D. S. Clarke outlines reasons for accepting panpsychism and defends the doctrine against its critics.
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  33. David S. Clarke (2002). Panpsychism and the Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16 (3):151-166.
    This article summarizes the principal arguments for panpsychism given by Charles Hartshorne by separating it from Whitehead's event metaphysics and Hartshorne's natural theology. It sorts out the plausible reasons for panpsychism given by Hartshorne from those less plausible. Among the plausible reasons are those based on analogical reasoning and the impossibility of explaining how mentality originated. Among the implausible ones are those that postulate a type of psychic causation between wholes and parts. The conclusion is that the plausible reasons tip (...)
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  34. David S. Clarke (2002). Panpsychism and the Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16 (3):151-166.
    This article summarizes the principal arguments for panpsychism given by Charles Hartshorne by separating it from Whitehead's event metaphysics and Hartshorne's natural theology. It sorts out the plausible reasons for panpsychism given by Hartshorne from those less plausible. Among the plausible reasons are those based on analogical reasoning and the impossibility of explaining how mentality originated. Among the implausible ones are those that postulate a type of psychic causation between wholes and parts. The conclusion is that the plausible reasons tip (...)
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  35. James Van Cleve (1990). Mind--Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:215 - 226.
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  36. John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.) (1977). Mind in Nature. University Press of America.
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  37. John B. Cobb & William H. Thorpe (1977). Some Whiteheadian Comments on the Discussion. In John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.), Mind in Nature. University Press of America.
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  38. Sam Coleman (2012). Review of 'The Mental as Fundamental' Ed. Michael Blamauer. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  39. Sam Coleman (2009). Mind Under Matter. In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind that Abides. Benjamins.
    Panpsychism is an eminently sensible view of the world and its relation to mind. If God is a metaphysician, and regardless of the actual truth or falsity of panpsychism, it is certain that he regards the theory as an honest and elegant competitor on the field of ontologies. And if God didn’t create a panpsychist world, then there’s a fair chance that he wishes he had done so, or will do next time around. The difficulties panpsychism faces, then, are not (...)
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  40. Sam Coleman (2006). Being Realistic - Why Physicalism May Entail Panexperientialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):40-52.
    In this paper I first examine two important assumptions underlying the argument that physicalism entails panpsychism. These need unearthing because opponents in the literature distinguish themselves from Strawson in the main by rejecting one or the other. Once they have been stated, and something has been said about the positions that reject them, the onus of argument becomes clear: the assumptions require careful defence. I believe they are true, in fact, but their defence is a large project that cannot begin (...)
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  41. David Cunning (2005). Review of David Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (11).
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  42. Christian de Quincey (2006). Switched-on Consciousness - Clarifying What It Means. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.
    'Consciousness' has been called the 'final frontier' for science, philosophy's 'hard problem', and the greatest mystery in mysticism. It is a central focus in philosophy of mind. Yet confusion abounds about what 'consciousness' means -- even among philosophers, scientists, and mystics who have built careers exploring the mind. Different scholars and different disciplines use the same word to mean very different things. Debates and dialogues on consciousness often run aground because scholars conflate two radically different uses of the term. This (...)
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  43. Christian de Quincey (2002). Radical Nature: Rediscovering the Soul of Matter. Invisible Cities Press.
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  44. Christian de Quincey (1994). Consciousness All the Way Down? An Analysis of McGinn's Critique of Panexperientialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):217-229.
    This paper examines two objections by Colin McGinn to panexperientialist metaphysics as a solution to the mind-body problem. It begins by briefly stating how the `ontological problem' of the mind-body relationship is central to the philosophy of mind, summarizes the difficulties with dualism and materialism, and outlines the main tenets of panexperientialism. Panexperientialists, such as David Ray Griffin, claim that theirs is one approach to solving the mind-body problem which does not get stuck in accounting for interaction nor in the (...)
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  45. Liam P. Dempsey (2013). The Side Left Untouched: Panpsychism, Embodiment, and the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3-4.
    This paper considers Galen Strawson's recent defence of panpsychism. Strawson's account has a number of attractive features: it proffers an unflappable commitment to the reality of conscious experience, adduces a relatively novel and constructive appeal to the explanatory gap, and presents a picture which is in certain respects consistent with Herbert Feigl's version of mind-brain identity theory, what I call twofold-access theory. Strawson is right that the experiential and physical are not irreconcilable, for at least some physical phenomena have an (...)
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  46. Jonathan E. Dorsey (2011). On the Supposed Limits of Physicalist Theories of Mind. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):207-225.
    Is physicalism compatible with either panpsychism or so-called fundamental mentality ? Minimal physicalism, I contend, is compatible with both. We should therefore jettison the No Fundamental Mentality constraint, a proposed constraint on the definition of the physical , not to mention the false limits it places on physicalist theories of mind.
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  47. Richard Double (1983). Nagel's Argument That Mental Properties Are Nonphysical. Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22.
    One of Thomas Nagel’s premises in his argument for panpsychism is criticized. The principal criticisms are: Nagel has failed to provide a clear sense in which mental properties are nonphysical. Even within the framework of Nagel’s argumeent, there is no strong reason to think that the psychological lies outside the explanatory web of physical properties. This is because certain reducing properties common to both the psychological and nonpsychological may well be physical.
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  48. Durant Drake (1919). Panpsychism Again. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (16):433-439.
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  49. Editor Editor (1892). Panpsychism and Panbiotism. The Monist 3:234.
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  50. Editor Editor (1892). Panbiotism, Panpsychism And. The Monist 3:234.
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