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  1. Wolfgang Baer (2010). Introduction to the Physics of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):3-4.
    The 'Hard Problem' of consciousness and its 'Explanatory Gap' can only be explained if we develop a physical theory which recognizes the Universe as a cognitive being and is based upon a fundamental process that transforms mind into body and back again. The physical requirements needed to realize such a transformation cycle are investigated and an explicit implementation of the consciousness process is presented. This implementation consists of an integrated mind-body activity that explains mental experiences with a model of the (...)
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  2. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). The Status of Consciousness in Nature. In Steven Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Consciousness, Volume 2. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
    The most central metaphysical question about phenomenal consciousness is that of what constitutes phenomenal consciousness, whereas the most central epistemic question about consciousness is that of whether science can eventually provide an explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Many philosophers have argued that science doesn't have the means to answer the question of what consciousness is (the explanatory gap) but that consciousness nonetheless is fully determined by the physical facts underlying it (no metaphysical gap). Others have argued that the explanatory gap in (...)
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  3. Barry Dainton (2011). Review of Consciousness and its Place in Nature. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):238-261.
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  4. W. G. Lycan (2006). Resisting ?-Ism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):65-71.
    Professor Strawson's paper is refreshing in content as well as refreshingly intemperate. It is salutary to be reminded that even the Type Identity Theory does not entail physicalism as that doctrine is usually understood (since c-fiber firings are not by definition purely physical). And it's fun to consider versions of panpsychism. I can see why Strawson finds his position hard to classify (p. 7), and I sympathize. In my title I have cast my own vote for '?-ism' on the grounds (...)
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  5. Gregory Nixon (2010). Hollows of Memory: From Individual Consciousness to Panexperientialism & Beyond. QuantumDream, Inc..
    The question under discussion is metaphysical and truly elemental. It emerges in two aspects – how did we come to be conscious of our own existence, and, as a deeper corollary, do existence and awareness necessitate each other? I am bold enough to explore these questions and I invite you to come along; I make no claim to have discovered absolute answers. However, I do believe I have created here a compelling interpretation. You’ll have to judge for yourself.
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  6. Gregory Nixon (2009). Skrbina's *Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium*. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (9):116-121.
    Is the great god Pan reborn? For a while there, it seemed every intellectual movement began with the prefix ‘post’, implying non-totality, but now there are indications that ‘pan’ (all) is returning to provide another answer to one of the most basic of ontological questions: What is the relationship of mind to matter? In this important book with 17 different authors, panpsychism is given its due.
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  7. Robert Schroer (2013). Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in All Worlds? Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.
    A slew of conceivability arguments have been given against physicalism. Many physicalists try to undermine these arguments by offering accounts of phenomenal concepts that explain how there can be an epistemic gap, but not an ontological gap, between the phenomenal and the physical. Some complain, however, that such accounts fail to do justice to the nature of our introspective grasp of phenomenal properties. A particularly influential version of this complaint comes from David Chalmers (1996; 2003), who claims, in opposition to (...)
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  8. Peter Simons (2006). The Seeds of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 10-11):146-150.
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