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  1. Robert Merrihew Adams (2013). Consciousness, Physicalism, and Panpsychism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):728-735.
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  2. Susan Armstrong (2006). For Love of Matter: A Contemporary Panpsychism. Environmental Ethics 28 (1):99-102.
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  3. Robert Arp (2007). Consciousness and Awareness - Switched-on Rheostats: A Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):101-106.
    I question whether it is completely accurate to think of the philosophical meaning of consciousness as being switched-on or switched-off. It may be that, once consciousness is switched-on, it is then found in degrees in animals we deem conscious. In which case, consciousness is more like a switched-on rheostat, rather than a simple on-off switch. Christian de Quincey (2006) gives a list of what would be considered the marks of consciousness, including 'experience, subjectivity, sentience, feeling, or mentality of any kind'. (...)
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  4. Nathaniel F. Barrett (2009). The Perspectivity of Feeling. Process Studies 38 (2):189-206.
    For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the explanatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibilityof special, “experiential” properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special properties are everywhere. In contrast, process panpsychism understands the explanatory gap in terms of the particularity of feeling. While the particularity of feeling cannot be captured by third-person accounts, for this very reason it is amenable to understanding consciousness as an evolutionary process. Thus (...)
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  5. Pierfrancesco Basile (2009). Back to Whitehead? Galen Strawson and the Rediscovery of Panpsychism. In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind that Abides. Panpsychism in the new millennium. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
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  6. Michael Beaton, J. Bricklin, Louis C. Charland, JCW Edwards, Ilya B. Farber, Bill Faw, Rocco J. Gennaro, C. Kaernbach, C. M. H. Nunn, Jaak Panksepp, Jesse J. Prinz, Matthew Ratcliffe, Jacob J. Ross, S. Murray, Henry P. Stapp & Douglas F. Watt (2006). Switched-on Consciousness - Clarifying What It Means - Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.
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  7. Jonathan Beever & Vernon Cisney (2013). All Things in Mind: Panpsychist Elements in Spinoza, Deleuze, and Peirce. [REVIEW] Biosemiotics 6 (3):351-365.
    Benedict de Spinoza, C.S. Peirce, and Gilles Deleuze delineate a trajectory through the history of ideas in the dialogue about the potentials and limitations of panpsychism, the view that world is fundamentally made up of mind. As a parallel trajectory to the panpsychism debate in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology, this approach can inform and enrich the discussion of the role and scope of mind in the natural world. The philosophies of mind developed by Deleuze and Peirce are (...)
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  8. Charles Birch (1999). Why I Became a Panexperientialist. Australasian Association for Process Thought.
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  9. John Mark Bishop (2003). Dancing with Pixies: Strong Artificial Intelligence and Panpsychism. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
  10. Andrew G. Bjelland (1982). Popper's Critique of Panpsychism and Process Proto-Mentalism. Modern Schoolman 59 (May):233-43.
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  11. Godehard Brüntrup (1998). Is Psycho-Physical Emergentism Committed to Dualism? The Causal Efficacy of Emergent Mental Properties. Erkenntnis 3 (2):133-151.
  12. Clark W. Butler (1978). Panpsychism: A Restatement of the Genetic Argument. Idealist Studies 8 (January):33-39.
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  13. Ernest Reid Calvert (1942). The Panpsychism of James Ward and Charles A. Strong. [Boston].
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  14. Peter Carruthers & Elizabeth Schechter (2006). Can Panpsychism Bridge the Explanatory Gap? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):32-39.
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  15. Paul Carus (1893). Panpsychism and Panbiotism. The Monist 3 (2):234-257.
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  16. Roberto Casati (2003). Qualia Domesticated. In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
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  17. David J. Chalmers, What is It Like to Be a Thermostat? (Commentary on Dan Lloyd, "What is It Like to Be a Net?&Quot;).
    The project that Dan Lloyd has undertaken is admirable and audacious. He has tried to boil down the substrate of information-processing that underlies conscious experience to some very simple elements, in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon. Some people will suspect that by considering a model as simple as a connectionist network, Dan has thrown away everything that is interesting about consciousness. Perhaps there is something to that complaint, but I will take a different tack. It seems (...)
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  18. David J. Chalmers (1996). Is Experience Ubiquitous? In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  19. Amita Chatterjee (ed.) (2003). Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
  20. Stephen R. L. Clark (2002). Nothing Without Mind. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
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  21. D. S. Clarke (2003). Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude. State University of New York Press.
    In this bold, challenging book, D. S. Clarke outlines reasons for accepting panpsychism and defends the doctrine against its critics.
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  22. David S. Clarke (2002). Panpsychism and the Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16 (3):151-166.
    This article summarizes the principal arguments for panpsychism given by Charles Hartshorne by separating it from Whitehead's event metaphysics and Hartshorne's natural theology. It sorts out the plausible reasons for panpsychism given by Hartshorne from those less plausible. Among the plausible reasons are those based on analogical reasoning and the impossibility of explaining how mentality originated. Among the implausible ones are those that postulate a type of psychic causation between wholes and parts. The conclusion is that the plausible reasons tip (...)
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  23. David S. Clarke (2002). Panpsychism and the Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16 (3):151-166.
    This article summarizes the principal arguments for panpsychism given by Charles Hartshorne by separating it from Whitehead's event metaphysics and Hartshorne's natural theology. It sorts out the plausible reasons for panpsychism given by Hartshorne from those less plausible. Among the plausible reasons are those based on analogical reasoning and the impossibility of explaining how mentality originated. Among the implausible ones are those that postulate a type of psychic causation between wholes and parts. The conclusion is that the plausible reasons tip (...)
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  24. James Van Cleve (1990). Mind--Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:215 - 226.
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  25. John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.) (1977). Mind in Nature. University Press of America.
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  26. John B. Cobb & William H. Thorpe (1977). Some Whiteheadian Comments on the Discussion. In John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.), Mind in Nature. University Press of America.
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  27. Sam Coleman (2012). Review of 'The Mental as Fundamental' Ed. Michael Blamauer. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  28. Sam Coleman (2009). Mind Under Matter. In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind that Abides. Benjamins.
    Panpsychism is an eminently sensible view of the world and its relation to mind. If God is a metaphysician, and regardless of the actual truth or falsity of panpsychism, it is certain that he regards the theory as an honest and elegant competitor on the field of ontologies. And if God didn’t create a panpsychist world, then there’s a fair chance that he wishes he had done so, or will do next time around. The difficulties panpsychism faces, then, are not (...)
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  29. Sam Coleman (2006). Being Realistic - Why Physicalism May Entail Panexperientialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):40-52.
    In this paper I first examine two important assumptions underlying the argument that physicalism entails panpsychism. These need unearthing because opponents in the literature distinguish themselves from Strawson in the main by rejecting one or the other. Once they have been stated, and something has been said about the positions that reject them, the onus of argument becomes clear: the assumptions require careful defence. I believe they are true, in fact, but their defence is a large project that cannot begin (...)
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  30. David Cunning (2005). Review of David Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (11).
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  31. Christian de Quincey (2006). Switched-on Consciousness - Clarifying What It Means. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.
    'Consciousness' has been called the 'final frontier' for science, philosophy's 'hard problem', and the greatest mystery in mysticism. It is a central focus in philosophy of mind. Yet confusion abounds about what 'consciousness' means -- even among philosophers, scientists, and mystics who have built careers exploring the mind. Different scholars and different disciplines use the same word to mean very different things. Debates and dialogues on consciousness often run aground because scholars conflate two radically different uses of the term. This (...)
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  32. Christian de Quincey (2002). Radical Nature: Rediscovering the Soul of Matter. Invisible Cities Press.
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  33. Christian de Quincey (1994). Consciousness All the Way Down? An Analysis of McGinn's Critique of Panexperientialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):217-229.
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  34. Liam P. Dempsey (2013). The Side Left Untouched: Panpsychism, Embodiment, and the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3-4.
    This paper considers Galen Strawson's recent defence of panpsychism. Strawson's account has a number of attractive features: it proffers an unflappable commitment to the reality of conscious experience, adduces a relatively novel and constructive appeal to the explanatory gap, and presents a picture which is in certain respects consistent with Herbert Feigl's version of mind-brain identity theory, what I call twofold-access theory. Strawson is right that the experiential and physical are not irreconcilable, for at least some physical phenomena have an (...)
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  35. Jonathan E. Dorsey (2011). On the Supposed Limits of Physicalist Theories of Mind. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):207-225.
    Is physicalism compatible with either panpsychism or so-called fundamental mentality ? Minimal physicalism, I contend, is compatible with both. We should therefore jettison the No Fundamental Mentality constraint, a proposed constraint on the definition of the physical , not to mention the false limits it places on physicalist theories of mind.
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  36. Richard Double (1983). Nagel's Argument That Mental Properties Are Nonphysical. Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22.
    One of Thomas Nagel’s premises in his argument for panpsychism (in Mortal Questions) is criticized. The principal criticisms are: (1) Nagel has failed to provide a clear sense in which mental properties are nonphysical. (2) Even within the framework of Nagel’s argumeent, there is no strong reason to think that the psychological lies outside the explanatory web of physical properties. This is because certain reducing properties common to both the psychological and nonpsychological may well be physical.
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  37. Durant Drake (1919). Panpsychism Again. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (16):433-439.
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  38. Jonathan C. W. Edwards (2006). How Many People Are There in My Head and in Hers? An Exploration of Single Cell Consciousness. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
    This expands the proposal in 'Is consciousness only a property of individual cells?' to attempt to cover all relevant psychological, neuroscientific and philosophical issues. Some of the material is now dated (in 2011) but chiefly in the sense that tentative proposals have become firmer views for me. An example of this is the clarification of complementarities in "Are our spaces made of words?'.
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  39. Paul Edwards (1967). Panpsychism. In , The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 5. Collier-Macmillan.
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  40. Paul Edwards (ed.) (1967). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 5. Collier-Macmillan.
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  41. P. Farleigh (1998). Whitehead's Even More Dangerous Idea. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. 2--127.
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  42. Lewis S. Ford (1995). Panpsychism and the Early History of Prehension. Process Studies 24:15-33.
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  43. Marcus Ford (2008). Panpsychism in the West. Process Studies 37 (2):216-219.
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  44. Marcus P. Ford (1981). William James: Panpsychist and Metaphysical Realist. Transactions of the Peirce Society 17 (2):158-70.
  45. Georg Franck (2008). Presence and Reality: An Option to Specify Panpsychism ? Mind and Matter 6 (1):123-140.
    Panpsychism is the doctrine that mind is a fundamental feature of the world existing throughout the universe. One problem with panpsychism is that it is a purely theoretical concept so far. For progress towards an operationalization of the idea, this paper suggests to make use of an ontological difference involved in the mind-matter distinction. The mode in which mental phenomena exist is called presence. The mode in which matter and radiation exist is called reality Physical theory disregards presence in both (...)
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  46. Anthony Freeman (2006). Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism? Exeter: Imprint Academic.
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  47. Warren G. Frisina (1997). Minds, Bodies, Experience, Nature: Is Panpsychism Really Dead? In Donald A. Crosby & Charley D. Hardwick (eds.), Pragmatism, Neo-Pragmatism, and Religion: Conversations with Richard Rorty. Peter Lang.
    In a paper titled "Dewey between Hegel and Darwin," Richard Rorty argued that while it is appropriate to describe John Dewey as a radical empiricist and panpsychist, it would be better if we allowed those aspects of his thought to atrophy and eventually disappear. This paper challenges that claim, arguing that properly understood, radical empiricism and panpsychism continue to have a role in a world newly fascinated by the way bodies, minds, experience and nature are all interwoven into a complex (...)
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  48. Shan Gao (2013). A Quantum Physical Argument for Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):1 - 2.
    It has been widely thought that consciousness has no causal efficacy in the physical world. However, this may be not the case. In this paper, we show that a conscious being can distinguish definite perceptions and their quantum superpositions, while a physical measuring system without consciousness cannot distinguish such nonorthogonal quantum states. The possible existence of this distinct quantum physical effect of consciousness may have interesting implications for the science of consciousness. In particular, it suggests that consciousness is not emergent (...)
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  49. Shan Gao (2008). A Quantum Theory of Consciousness. Minds and Machines 18 (1):39-52.
    The relationship between quantum collapse and consciousness is reconsidered under the assumption that quantum collapse is an objective dynamical process. We argue that the conscious observer can have a distinct role from the physical measuring device during the process of quantum collapse owing to the intrinsic nature of consciousness; the conscious observer can know whether he is in a definite state or a quantum superposition of definite states, while the physical measuring device cannot “know”. As a result, the consciousness observer (...)
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  50. Shan Gao (2003). A Possible Quantum Basis of Panpsychism. Neuroquantology 1 (1):4-9.
    We show that consciousness may violate the basic quantum principle, according to which the nonorthogonal quantum states can't be distinguished. This implies that the physical world is not causally closed without consciousness, and consciousness is a fundamental property of matter.
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