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  1. Robert P. Amico (1994). Pascal's Wager Revisited. International Studies in Philosophy 26 (2):1-11.
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  2. Robert Anderson (2008). Review: Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God - by Jeff Jordan. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 49 (1):94-96.
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  3. Robert Anderson (1995). Recent Criticisms and Defenses of Pascal's Wager. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 37 (1):45 - 56.
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  4. Leslie Armour (1993). "Infini Rien": Pascal's Wager and the Human Paradox. Southern Illinois University.
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  5. Bradley Armour-Garb (1999). Betting on God: Why Considerations of Simplicity Won't Help. Religious Studies 35 (2):119-138.
    In his famous Wager, Blaise Pascal attempted to adduce prudential grounds on which to base a belief in God. His argument founders, however, on the notorious 'Many Gods Problem', the problem of selecting among the many equiprobable gods on offer. Lycan and Schlesinger try to treat the Many Gods Problem as a problem of empirical over-determination, attempting to overcome it using methodologies familiar from empirical science. I argue that their strategy fails, but that the Many Gods Problem can be solved (...)
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  6. Antony Aumann (2014). On the Validity of Pascal's Wager. Heythrop Journal 55 (1):86-93.
    Recent scholarship has shown that the success of Pascal’s wager rests on precarious grounds. To avoid notorious problems, it must appeal to considerations such as what probability we assign to the existence of various gods and what religion we think provides the greatest happiness in this life. Rational judgments concerning these matters are subject to change over time. Some claim that the wager therefore cannot support a steadfast commitment to God. I argue that this conclusion does not follow. By drawing (...)
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  7. Sam Baron & Christina Dyke (2014). Animal Interrupted, or Why Accepting Pascal's Wager Might Be the Last Thing You Ever Do. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):109-133.
    According to conventionalist accounts of personal identity, persons are constituted in part by practices and attitudes of certain sorts of care. In this paper, we concentrate on the most well-developed and defended version of conventionalism currently on offer (namely, that proposed by David Braddon-Mitchell, Caroline West, and Kristie Miller) and discuss how the conventionalist appears forced either (1) to accept arbitrariness concerning from which perspective to judge one's survival or (2) to maintain egalitarianism at the cost of making “transfiguring” decisions (...)
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  8. Paul Bartha (2012). Pascal's Wager Meets the Replicator Dynamics. In Jake Chandler Victoria S. Harrison (ed.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford. 187.
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  9. Paul Bartha (2008). Review: Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God – Jeff Jordan. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):571–574.
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  10. Paul Bartha (2007). Taking Stock of Infinite Value: Pascal's Wager and Relative Utilities. Synthese 154 (1):5 - 52.
    Among recent objections to Pascal’s Wager, two are especially compelling. The first is that decision theory, and specifically the requirement of maximizing expected utility, is incompatible with infinite utility values. The second is that even if infinite utility values are admitted, the argument of the Wager is invalid provided that we allow mixed strategies. Furthermore, Hájek (Philosophical Review 112, 2003) has shown that reformulations of Pascal’s Wager that address these criticisms inevitably lead to arguments that are philosophically unsatisfying and historically (...)
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  11. Alfred W. Benn (1905). Pascal's Wager. International Journal of Ethics 15 (3):305-323.
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  12. Gregor Betz (2012). Pascals Wette. In Georg Bertram (ed.), Philosophische Gedankenexperimente – ein Lese- und Studienbuch. Reclam.
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  13. Simon Blackburn (2009). Pascal's Wager. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  14. Nick Bostrom (2009). Pascal's Mugging. Analysis 69 (3):443-445.
    In some dark alley. . . Mugger: Hey, give me your wallet. Pascal: Why on Earth would I want to do that? Mugger: Otherwise I’ll shoot you. Pascal: But you don’t have a gun. Mugger: Oops! I knew I had forgotten something. Pascal: No wallet for you then. Have a nice evening. Mugger: Wait! Pascal: Sigh. Mugger: I’ve got a business proposition for you. . . . How about you give me your wallet now? In return, I promise to come (...)
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  15. Geoffrey Brown (1984). A Defence of Pascal's Wager. Religious Studies 20 (3):465 - 479.
    Pascal's Wager, and the issues raised by it, have, despite a few notable exceptions, been an object of some neglect in recent Philosophy of Religion. Whether this neglect is from an assumption that the argument requires no comment, or from a feeling that there is something not quite academically respectable about it, I have come to believe that it is undeserved. One reason why the argument is deserving of attention from the theologian is that Pascal has managed to put his (...)
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  16. Leslie Burkholder (2011). Pascal's Wager. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  17. Elizabeth Burns (2011). What Happens After Pascal's Wager: Living Faith and Rational Belief – Daniel Garber. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):218-220.
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  18. John Byl (1994). On Pascal's Wager and Infinite Utilities. Faith and Philosophy 11 (3):467-473.
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  19. James Cargile (1982). Pascal's Wager. In Steven M. Cahn & David Shatz (eds.), Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 250-.
    A. Pascal's statement of his wager argument is couched in terms of the theory of probability and the theory of games, and the exposition is unclear and unnecessarily complicated. The following is a ‘creative’ reformulation of the argument designed to avoid some of the objections which have been or might be raised against the original.
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  20. Alan Carter (2000). On Pascal's Wager, or Why All Bets Are Off. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):22-27.
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  21. Joann P. Cobb (1979). Pascal's Wager and Two Modern Losers. Philosophy and Literature 3 (2):187-198.
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  22. Peter C. Dalton (1976). Pascal's Wager: The First Argument. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (2):346 - 368.
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  23. Peter C. Dalton (1975). Pascal's Wager: The Second Argument. Southern Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):31-46.
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  24. Volker Dieringer (2009). Is a Jamesian Wager the Only Safe Bet? On Jeff Jordan's New Book on Pascal's Wager. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91 (2):237-247.
    In his new book on Pascal's Wager, Jeff Jordan argues that only the ‘Jamesian’ version of the wager argument, as he sees it presented in William James' essay The Will to Believe , constitutes a sound pragmatic argument in favour of theism, whereas Pascal's original wager argument is doomed to fail on various grounds. This article argues that Jordan's theory is untenable. The many-gods objection is used as an example: it is demonstrated that the Jamesian Wager argument too is powerless (...)
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  25. Antony Duff (1986). Pascal's Wager and Infinite Utilities. Analysis 46 (2):107 - 109.
  26. Craig Duncan (2013). Religion and Secular Utility: Happiness, Truth, and Pragmatic Arguments for Theistic Belief. Philosophy Compass 8 (4):381-399.
    This article explores “pragmatic arguments” for theistic belief – that is, arguments for believing in God that appeal, not to evidence in favor of God’s existence, but rather to alleged practical benefits that come from belief in God. Central to this exploration is a consideration of Jeff Jordan’s recent defense of “the Jamesian wager,” which portrays itself as building on the case for belief presented in William James’s essay “The Will to Believe.” According to Jordan, religious belief creates significant gains (...)
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  27. Craig Duncan (2008). Review: Jeff Jordan: Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (468):1082-1086.
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  28. Craig Duncan (2007). The Persecutor's Wager. Philosophical Review 116 (1):1-50.
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  29. Craig Duncan (2003). Do Vague Probabilities Really Scotch Pascal's Wager? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):279 - 290.
    Alan Hájek has recently argued that certain assignments of vague probability defeat Pascals Wager. In particular, he argues that skeptical agnostics – those whose probability for God''s existence is vague over an interval containing zero – have nothing to fear from Pascal. In this paper, I make two arguments against Hájek: (1) that skeptical agnosticism is a form of dogmatism, and as such should be rejected; (2) that in any case, choice situations with vague probability assignments ought to be treated (...)
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  30. Kenny Easwaran & Bradley Monton (2012). Mixed Strategies, Uncountable Times, and Pascal's Wager: A Reply to Robertson. Analysis 72 (4):681-685.
    Pascal’s Wager holds that one has pragmatic reason to believe in God, since that course of action has infinite expected utility. The mixed strategy objection holds that one could just as well follow a course of action that has infinite expected utility but is unlikely to end with one believing in God. Monton (2011. Mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager. Analysis 71: 642–45.) has argued that mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager, while Robertson (2012. Some mixed strategies can evade Pascal’s (...)
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  31. Daniel Eaton & Timothy Pickavance (forthcoming). Wagering on Pragmatic Encroachment. In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford.
    Lately, there has been an explosion of literature exploring the the relationship between one’s practical situation and one’s knowledge. Some involved in this discussion have suggested that facts about a person’s practical situation might affect whether or not a person knows in that situation, holding fixed all the things standardly associated with knowledge (like evidence, the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties, and so on). According to these “pragmatic encroachment” views, then, one’s practical situation encroaches on one’s knowledge. Though we won’t (...)
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  32. Nick Ergodos (2014). The Enigma Of Probability. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (1):37-71.
    Using “brute reason” I will show why there can be only one valid interpretation of probability. The valid interpretation turns out to be a further refinement of Popper’s Propensity interpretation of probability. Via some famous probability puzzles and new thought experiments I will show how all other interpretations of probability fail, in particular the Bayesian interpretations, while these puzzles do not present any difficulties for the interpretation proposed here. In addition, the new interpretation casts doubt on some concepts often taken (...)
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  33. Arthur Falk (2005). A Pascal-Type Justification of Faith in a Scientific Age. Philosophy 80 (4):543-563.
    The author argues that faith survives as a rational option, despite science rendering improbable distinctively theological claims about the world and history. After rejecting justifications of faith from natural theology and natural law, he defends a seemingly weaker strategy, a corrected version of Pascal's wager argument. The wager lets one's desires count toward showing one's faith to be rational, and the faith requires that oneÕs desires undergo radical transformation to protect the faith, making the wager argument really quite strong. As (...)
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  34. James Franklin (1998). Two Caricatures, I: Pascal's Wager. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (2):109 - 114.
    Pascal’s wager and Leibniz’s theory that this is the best of all possible worlds are latecomers in the Faith-and-Reason tradition. They have remained interlopers; they have never been taken as seriously as the older arguments for the existence of God and other themes related to faith and reason.
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  35. Brian J. Gibbs (2014). Winning Counterterrorism's Version of Pascal's Wager, but Struggling to Open the Purse. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (4):368-369.
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  36. Joshua L. Golding (2007). The Wager Argument. In P. Copan & C. Meister (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Routledge.
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  37. Joshua L. Golding (1994). Pascal's Wager. Modern Schoolman 71 (2):115-143.
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  38. D. Groothuis (1994). Wagering Belief: Examining Two Objections to Pascal's Wager. Religious Studies 30 (4):479 - 486.
    This paper concerns two objections to Pascal's wager. The first claims that Pascal's recommendation to habituate oneself to believe in God is tantamount to religious brainwashing. I argue that this construal misses important aspects of what Pascal had in mind, which may render the habituation process a legitimate means to acquire new understanding. The second objection is based on the idea that a key assumption of the wager -- that theistic belief is required for eternal felicity -- is morally absurd. (...)
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  39. Douglas Groothuis (2004). Pascal Speaks From the Grave. Think 3 (8):47-52.
    In Think 7, Nigel Warburton attacked Pascal's famous wager on the existence of God. Here, Douglas Groothuis resurrects Pascal to defend the wager.
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  40. Kevin Shaun Grumball, Pascal's Wager.
    Pascal's Wager, discussed in his Pensées, has provoked discussion and strong views ever since its publication. In it, he proposes: Either God is or he is not. But to which view shall we be inclined? Reason cannot decide this question.ⁱ In this thesis I hope to make a contribution to the ongoing debate by setting Pascal's Wager into a modern decision-making context, providing a taxonomy of objections to the Wager and developing a critical framework which can be used to systematically (...)
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  41. William Gustason (1998). Pascal's Wager and Competing Faiths. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1):31-39.
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  42. Ian Hacking (1972). The Logic of Pascal's Wager. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (2):186 - 192.
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  43. Alan Hájek, Pascal's Wager. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    “Pascal's Wager” is the name given to an argument due to Blaise Pascal for believing, or for at least taking steps to believe, in God. The name is somewhat misleading, for in a single paragraph of his Pensées, Pascal apparently presents at least three such arguments, each of which might be called a ‘wager’ — it is only the final of these that is traditionally referred to as “Pascal's Wager”. We find in it the extraordinary confluence of several important strands (...)
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  44. Alan Hájek (2003). Waging War on Pascal's Wager. Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56.
    Pascal’s Wager is simply too good to be true—or better, too good to be sound. There must be something wrong with Pascal’s argument that decision-theoretic reasoning shows that one must (resolve to) believe in God, if one is rational. No surprise, then, that critics of the argument are easily found, or that they have attacked it on many fronts. For Pascal has given them no dearth of targets.
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  45. Alan Hájek (2000). Objecting Vaguely to Pascal's Wager. Philosophical Studies 98 (1-16):1 - 16.
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  46. Stephen Haller (2000). A Prudential Argument for Precaution Under Uncertainty and High Risk. Ethics and the Environment 5 (2):175-189.
    Some models of global systems predict catastrophe if certain human activities continue. Unfortunately, these models are less than certain. Despite this uncertainty, some argue for precaution on the grounds that we have an ethical obligation to avoid catastrophe, whatever the practical costs. There is much to say in favor of ethical arguments. Still, some people will remain unmoved by them. Using arguments parallel to those of Pascal and James, I will argue that there are prudential reasons for precaution that should (...)
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  47. Frederik Herzberg (2011). Hyperreal Expected Utilities and Pascal's Wager. Logique Et Analyse 213:69-108.
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  48. Joel Hodge (2014). From Desire to Conversion: Pascal's Wager and Girard's Mimetic Theory. Heythrop Journal 56 (3):n/a-n/a.
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  49. Harmon Holcomb (1994). To Bet the Impossible Bet. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 36 (2):65 - 79.
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  50. Richard Hull (2005). Living Without Religion - Pascal’s Wager: Not a Good Bet. Free Inquiry 25.
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