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  1. Daniel Alroy (1995). Inner Light. Synthese 104 (1):147-160.
    Neural impulses from the senses to the brain convey information, not sensation. The direct electrical stimulation of the cortex produces sensations. Hence, such sensations are evoked in the brain, and not received from the senses, nor from the outside world through the senses. More specifically, the experience of light is evoked in the brain and not received from the eyes. Consequently, the born blind, too, would experience light in response to electrical brain stimulation. The luminosity of light is not a (...)
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  2. Paul Bach-Y.-Rita & Steven J. Hasse (2001). The Role of the Brain in Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):975-975.
    The recent interest of cognitive- and neuro-scientists in the topic of consciousness (and the dissatisfaction with the present state of knowledge) has revealed deep conceptual differences with Humanists, who have dealt with issues of consciousness for centuries. O'Regan & Noë have attempted (unsuccessfully) to bridge those differences.
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  3. William Bechtel (1988). Studies of Categorization: A Review Essay of Neisser's 'Concepts and Conceptual Development' and Hamad's 'Categorical Perception'. Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):381-389.
    Concepts and Conceptual Development: Ecological and Intellectual Factors in Categorization ULRIC NEISSER, 1987 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press x+384 pp., $39.50 Categorical Perception STEVAN HARNAD, 1987 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press x+599 pp., $59.50.
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  4. John Bickle (ed.) (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience is a state-of-the-art collection of interdisciplinary research spanning philosophy (of science, mind, and ...
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  5. Francois Blanc (2010). Trance and Shamanic Cure on the South American Continent: Psychopharmacological and Neurobiological Interpretations. Anthropology of Consciousness 21 (1):83-105.
    This article examines the neurobiological basis of the healing power attributed to shamanic practices in the Andes and Brazil in light of the pharmacology of neurotransmitters and the new technological explorations of brain functioning. The psychotropic plants used in shamanic psychiatric cures interfere selectively with the intrinsic neuromediators of the brain. Mainly they may alter: (1) the neuroendocrine functioning through the adrenergic system by controlling stressful conditions, (2) the dopaminergic system in incentive learning and emotions incorporation, (3) the serotoninergic system (...)
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  6. W. Russell Brain (1946). The Neurological Approach to the Problem of Perception. Philosophy 21 (July):133-146.
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  7. Bruce Bridgeman (2000). Neuroanatomy and Function in Two Visual Systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):535-536.
    Neuroanatomy and neurophysiology are insufficient to specify function. Modeling is essential to elucidate function, but psychophysics is also required. An example is the cognitive and sensorimotor branches of the visual system: anatomy shows direct cross talk between the branches. Psychophysics in normal humans shows links from cognitive to sensorimotor, but the reverse link is excluded by visual illusions affecting the cognitive system but not the sensorimotor system.
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  8. Robert Briscoe (2011). Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, (...)
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  9. Robert Briscoe (2010). Perceiving the Present: Systematization of Illusions or Illusion of Systematization? Cognitive Science 34 (8):1530-1542.
    Mark Changizi et al. (2008) claim that it is possible systematically to organize more than 50 kinds of illusions in a 7 × 4 matrix of 28 classes. This systematization, they further maintain, can be explained by the operation of a single visual processing latency correction mechanism that they call “perceiving the present” (PTP). This brief report raises some concerns about the way a number of illusions are classified by the proposed systematization. It also poses two general problems—one empirical and (...)
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  10. Robert Briscoe (2009). Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423-460.
    Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the “two visual systems” hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver’s bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources (...)
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  11. Robert Briscoe (2008). Another Look at the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis: The Argument From Illusion Studies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (8):35-62.
    The purpose of this paper is to defend what I call the action-oriented coding theory (ACT) of spatially contentful visual experience. Integral to ACT is the view that conscious visual experience and visually guided action make use of a common subject-relative or 'egocentric' frame of reference. Proponents of the influential two visual systems hypothesis (TVSH), however, have maintained on empirical grounds that this view is false (Milner & Goodale, 1995/2006; Clark, 1999; 2001; Campbell, 2002; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003; Goodale & (...)
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  12. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Color Synesthesia. In Kimberly A. Jameson (ed.), Cognition & Language, Encyclopedia of Color Science and Technology. Springer.
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  13. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Vision for Action and the Contents of Perception. Journal of Philosophy.
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  14. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Varieties of Synesthetic Experience. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library.
    In her response to my "Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case from Synesthesia and Visual Imagery" Ophelia Deroy presents an argument for an interesting new account of synesthesia. On this account, synesthesia can be thought of as "a perceptual state (e.g. of a letter)" that is "changed or enriched by the incorporation of a conscious mental image (e.g. a color)." I reply that while this is a plausible account of some types of synesthesia, some forms cannot be accounted (...)
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  15. Berit Brogaard (2012). Non-Visual Consciousness and Visual Images in Blindsight. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):595-596.
    In a recent response paper to Brogaard (2011a), Morten Overgaard and Thor Grünbaum argue that my case for the claim that blindsight subjects are not visually conscious of the stimuli they correctly identify rests on a mistaken necessary criterion for determining whether a conscious experience is visual or non-visual. Here I elaborate on the earlier argu- ment while conceding that the question of whether blindsight subjects are visually con- scious of the visual stimuli they correctly identify largely is an empirical (...)
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  16. Berit Brogaard (2011). Are There Unconscious Perceptual Processes? Consciousness and Cognition 20:449-63.
    Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of uncon- scious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and col- leagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come under (...)
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  17. Berit Brogaard, Kristian Marlow & Kevin Rice (forthcoming). Unconscious Influences on Decision Making in Blindsight. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    Newell and Shanks (2012) argue that an explanation for blindsight need not appeal to unconscious brain processes, citing research indicating that the condition merely reflects degraded visual experience. We reply that other evidence suggests that blindsighters’ predictive behavior under forced choice reflects cognitive access to low-level visual information that does not correlate with visual consciousness. Thus, while we grant that visual consciousness may be required for full visual experience, we argue that it may not be needed for decision making and (...)
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  18. Berit Brogaard, Simo Vanni & Juha Silvanto (forthcoming). Seeing Mathematics: Perception and Brain Activity in a Case of Acquired Synesthesia. Neurocase.
    We studied the patient JP who has exceptional abilities to draw complex geometrical images by hand and a form of acquired synesthesia for mathematical formulas and objects, which he perceives as geometrical figures. JP sees all smooth curvatures as discrete lines, similarly regardless of scale. We carried out two preliminary investigations to establish the perceptual nature of synesthetic experience and to investigate the neural basis of this phenomenon. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, image-inducing formulas produced larger fMRI (...)
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  19. Hermann Burchard (2011). The Role of Conscious Attention in Perception. Foundations of Science 16 (1):67-99.
    Impressions, energy radiated by phenomena in the momentary environmental scene, enter sensory neurons, creating in afferent nerves a data stream. Following Kant, by our inner sense the mind perceives its own thoughts as it ties together sense data into an internalized scene. The mind, residing in the brain, logically a Language Machine, processes and stores items as coded grammatical entities. Kantian synthetic unity in the linguistic brain is able to deliver our experience of the scene as we appear to see (...)
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  20. Andy Calder, Gillian Rhodes, Mark Johnson & Jim Haxby (eds.) (2011). Oxford Handbook of Face Perception. OUP Oxford.
    The human face is unique among social stimuli in conveying such a variety of different characteristics. A person's identity, sex, race, age, emotional state, focus of attention, facial speech patterns, and attractiveness are all detected and interpreted with relative ease from the face. Humans also display a surprising degree of consistency in the extent to which personality traits, such as trustworthiness and likeability, are attributed to faces. In the past thirty years, face perception has become an area of major interest (...)
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  21. Carmelo Calì (2006). A Phenomenological Framework for Neuroscience? Gestalt Theory 28 (1-2):109-122.
    This paper tries to sketch what phenomenological constraints for Neurosciences would be looking like. It maintains that such an adequate phenomenological description as that provided by Gestalt psychology is a condition for the Neurosciences to account for every-day experience opf the world. The explanatory gap in Cognitive sciences is discussed with reference to Jackendoff, Prinz, and Köhler.
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  22. Thierry Chaminade & Jean Decety (2001). A Common Framework for Perception and Action: Neuroimaging Evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):879-882.
    In recent years, neurophysiological evidence has accumulated in favor of a common coding between perception and execution of action. We review findings from recent neuroimaging experiments in the action domain with three complementary perspectives: perception of action, covert action triggered by perception, and reproduction of perceived action (imitation). All studies point to the parietal cortex as a key region for body movement representation, both observed and performed.
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  23. Mark A. Changizi (2010). Response to Briscoe (2010). Cognitive Science 34 (8):1543-1547.
    In an earlier paper my colleagues and I put forth a theory called “perceiving-the-present” that predicts a systematic pattern across a large variety of illusions, and we presented evidence that the systematic pattern exists. Briscoe puts forth arguments against the theory and the existence of the systematic pattern. Here I provide counterarguments to his criticisms of the theory, and I explain why his arguments do not bear on the existence of the systematic pattern.
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  24. M. Chirimuuta & I. Gold (2009). The Embedded Neuron, the Enactive Field? In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    The concept of the receptive field, first articulated by Hartline, is central to visual neuroscience. The receptive field of a neuron encompasses the spatial and temporal properties of stimuli that activate the neuron, and, as Hubel and Wiesel conceived of it, a neuron’s receptive field is static. This makes it possible to build models of neural circuits and to build up more complex receptive fields out of simpler ones. Recent work in visual neurophysiology is providing evidence that the classical receptive (...)
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  25. Mazviita Chirimuuta (2008). Reflectance Realism and Colour Constancy: What Would Count as Scientific Evidence for Hilbert's Ontology of Colour? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):563 – 582.
    Reflectance realism is an important position in the philosophy of colour. This paper is an examination of David R. Hilbert’s case for there being scientific support for the theory. The specific point in question is whether colour science has shown that reflectance is recovered by the human visual system. Following a discussion of possible counter-evidence in the recent scientific literature, I make the argument that conflicting interpretations of the data on reflectance recovery are informed by different theoretical assumptions about the (...)
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  26. Paul M. Churchland (2005). Chimerical Colors: Some Phenomenological Predictions From Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):527-560.
    The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the (...)
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  27. Daniel Collerton & Elaine Perry (2004). Thalamocortical Dysfunction and Complex Visual Hallucinations in Brain Disease – Are the Primary Disturbances in the Cerebral Cortex? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):789-790.
    Applying Behrendt & Young's (B&Y's) model of thalamocortical synchrony to complex visual hallucinations in neurodegenerative disorders, such as dementia with Lewy bodies and progressive supranuclear palsy, leads us to propose that the primary pathology may be cortical rather than thalamic. Additionally, the extinction of active hallucinations by eye closure challenges their conception of the role of reduced sensory input.
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  28. M. Colombo & P. Series (2012). Bayes in the Brain--On Bayesian Modelling in Neuroscience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):697-723.
    According to a growing trend in theoretical neuroscience, the human perceptual system is akin to a Bayesian machine. The aim of this article is to clearly articulate the claims that perception can be considered Bayesian inference and that the brain can be considered a Bayesian machine, some of the epistemological challenges to these claims; and some of the implications of these claims. We address two questions: (i) How are Bayesian models used in theoretical neuroscience? (ii) From the use of Bayesian (...)
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  29. Dirk de Ridder (2007). Brain and Nerve Stimulation for Mood Enhancement. Philosophica 79.
    Enhancing brain activity and function is a very ancient practice which is usually accomplished by taking illegal drugs. Prescription medication is becoming more commonly used as a means of enhancing mood, and recently, it has become possible to modulate mood by applying magnetic (TMS) or electrical current to the brain (tDCS, implanted electrodes) or by training the brain to work at predetermined oscillations (neurofeedback). A summary of the available neuromodulation techniques will be presented associated with data from human subjects implanted (...)
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  30. Zoe Drayson (2011). Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neuroscience Inform Philosophy? [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8):242-249.
  31. Walter H. Ehrenstein, Lothar Spillmann & Viktor Sarris (2003). Gestalt Issues in Modern Neuroscience. Axiomathes 13 (3-4):433-458.
    We present select examples of how visual phenomena can serve as tools to uncoverbrain mechanisms. Specifically, receptive field organization is proposed as a Gestalt-like neural mechanism of perceptual organization. Appropriate phenomena, such as brightness and orientation contrast, subjective contours, filling-in, and aperture-viewed motion, allow for a quantitative comparison between receptive fields and their psychophysical counterparts, perceptive fields. Phenomenology might thus be extended from the study of perceptual qualities to their transphenomenal substrates, including memory functions. In conclusion, classic issues of Gestalt (...)
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  32. Jeffrey E. Foss (1988). The Percept and Vector Function Theories of the Brain. Philosophy of Science 55 (December):511-537.
    Physicalism is an empirical theory of the mind and its place in nature. So the physicalist must show that current neuroscience does not falsify physicalism, but instead supports it. Current neuroscience shows that a nervous system is what I call a vector function system. I provide a brief outline of the resources that empirical research has made available within the constraints of the vector function approach. Then I argue that these resources are sufficient, indeed apt, for the physicalist enterprise, by (...)
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  33. Sergei Gepshtein (2010). Two Psychologies of Perception and the Prospect of Their Synthesis. Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):217 – 281.
    Two traditions have had a great impact on the theoretical and experimental research of perception. One tradition is statistical, stretching from Fechner's enunciation of psychophysics in 1860 to the modern view of perception as statistical decision making. The other tradition is phenomenological, from Brentano's “empirical standpoint” of 1874 to the Gestalt movement and the modern work on perceptual organization. Each tradition has at its core a distinctive assumption about the indivisible constituents of perception: the just-noticeable differences of sensation in the (...)
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  34. Grant R. Gillett (1989). Perception and Neuroscience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (March) 83 (March):83-103.
    Perception is often analysed as a process in which causal events from the environment act on a subject to produce states in the mind or brain. The role of the subject is an increasing feature of neuroscientific and cognitive literature. This feature is linked to the need for an account of the normative aspects of perceptual competence. A holographic model is offered in which objects are presented to the subject classified according to rules governing concepts and encoded in brain function (...)
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  35. Daniel Gilman (1996). Optimization and Simplicity: Computational Vision and Biological Explanation. Synthese 107 (3):293 - 323.
    David Marr's theory of vision has been a rich source of inspiration, fascination and confusion. I will suggest that some of this confusion can be traced to discrepancies between the way Marr developed his theory in practice and the way he suggested such a theory ought to be developed in his explicit metatheoretical remarks. I will address claims that Marr's theory may be seen as an optimizing theory, along with the attendant suggestion that optimizing assumptions may be inappropriate for cognitive (...)
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  36. Daniel Gilman (1994). Simplicity, Cognition and Adaptation: Some Remarks on Marr's Theory of Vision. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:454 - 464.
    A large body of research in computational vision science stems from the pioneering work of David Marr. Recently, Patricia Kitcher and others have criticized this work as depending upon optimizing assumptions, assumptions which are held to be inappropriate for evolved cognitive mechanisms just as anti-adaptationists (e.g., Lewontin and Gould) have argued they are inappropriate for other evolved physiological mechanisms. The paper discusses the criticism and suggests that it is, in part, misdirected. It is further suggested that the criticism leads to (...)
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  37. Daniel Gilman (1992). What's a Theory to Do... With Seeing? Or Some Empirical Considerations for Observation and Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):287-309.
    it to be an empirical fact that even the most basic human perception is heavily theory–laden. I offer critical examination of experimental evidence cited by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Churchland on behalf of this supposition. I argue that the empirical evidence cited is inadequate support for the claims in question. I further argue that we have empirical grounds for claiming that the Kuhnian discussion of perception is developed within an inadequate conceptual framework and that a version of the observation/theory distinction (...)
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  38. Daniel J. Gilman (1991). The Neurobiology of Observation. Philosophy of Science 58 (3):496-502.
    Paul Churchland has recently argued that empirical evidence strongly suggests that perception is penetrable to the beliefs or theories held by individual perceivers (1988). While there has been much discussion of the sorts of psychological cases he presents, little has been said about his arguments from neurology. I offer a critical examination of his claim that certain efferents in the brain are evidence against perceptual encapsulation. I argue that his neurological evidence is inadequate to his philosophical goals, both by itself (...)
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  39. Ian Gold (2002). Interpreting the Neuroscience of Imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):190-191.
    Pylyshyn rightly argues that the neuroscientific data supporting the involvement of the visual system in mental imagery is largely irrelevant to the question of the format of imagistic representation. The purpose of this commentary is to support this claim with a further argument.
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  40. Jessica A. Grahn (forthcoming). Neural Mechanisms of Rhythm Perception: Current Findings and Future Perspectives. Topics in Cognitive Science.
    Perception of temporal patterns is fundamental to normal hearing, speech, motor control, and music. Certain types of pattern understanding are unique to humans, such as musical rhythm. Although human responses to musical rhythm are universal, there is much we do not understand about how rhythm is processed in the brain. Here, I consider findings from research into basic timing mechanisms and models through to the neuroscience of rhythm and meter. A network of neural areas, including motor regions, is regularly implicated (...)
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  41. L. W. Hahn (1998). Revising Locus of the Bridge Between Neuroscience and Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):759-760.
    This commentary proposes keeping the bridge locus construct with a revised definition which requires the bridge locus to be dynamic, representation-independent and influenced by top-down processes. The denial of the uniformity of content thesis is equivalent to dualism. The active perception perspective is a valuable one.
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  42. Everett W. Hall (1959). The Adequacy of a Neurological Theory of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (September):75-84.
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  43. V. Harcastle (ed.) (1999). Where Biology Meets Psychology.
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  44. Gary Hatfield (1999). Mental Functions as Constraints on Neurophysiology: Biology and Psychology of Vision. In V. Harcastle (ed.), Where Biology Meets Psychology.
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  45. Jaakko Hintikka & John Symons (2003). Systems of Visual Identification in Neuroscience: Lessons From Epistemic Logic. Philosophy of Science 70 (1):89-104.
    The following analysis shows how developments in epistemic logic can play a nontrivial role in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that the striking correspondence between two modes of identification, as distinguished in the epistemic context, and two cognitive systems distinguished by neuroscientific investigation of the visual system (the "where" and "what" systems) is not coincidental, and that it can play a clarificatory role at the most fundamental levels of neuroscientific theory.
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  46. Jakob Hohwy & Vivek Rajan (2012). Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences. Neuroethics 5 (1):5-11.
    Bortolotti’s Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs defends the view that delusions are beliefs on a continuum with other beliefs. A different view is that delusions are more like illusions, that is, they arise from faulty perception. This view, which is not targeted by the book, makes it easier to explain why delusions are so alien and disabling but needs to appeal to forensic aspects of functioning.
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  47. Henning Holle, Michael Banissy, Thomas Wright, Natalie Bowling & Jamie Ward (2011). “That's Not a Real Body”: Identifying Stimulus Qualities That Modulate Synaesthetic Experiences of Touch. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):720-726.
  48. David Michael Kaplan (2012). Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):463-468.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-6, Ahead of Print.
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  49. Joel Krueger (2011). Doing Things with Music. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):1-22.
    This paper is an exploration of how we do things with music—that is, the way that we use music as an esthetic technology to enact micro-practices of emotion regulation, communicative expression, identity construction, and interpersonal coordination that drive core aspects of our emotional and social existence. The main thesis is: from birth, music is directly perceived as an affordance-laden structure. Music, I argue, affords a sonic world, an exploratory space or nested acoustic environment that further affords possibilities for, among other (...)
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  50. Daniel Krüger, Susan Klapötke & Uwe Mattler (2011). PRP-Paradigm Provides Evidence for a Perceptual Origin of the Negative Compatibility Effect. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):866-881.
  51. Yunfeng Li & Zygmunt Pizlo (2011). Depth Cues Versus the Simplicity Principle in 3D Shape Perception. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (4):667-685.
    Two experiments were performed to explore the mechanisms of human 3D shape perception. In Experiment 1, the subjects’ performance in a shape constancy task in the presence of several cues (edges, binocular disparity, shading and texture) was tested. The results show that edges and binocular disparity, but not shading or texture, are important in 3D shape perception. Experiment 2 tested the effect of several simplicity constraints, such as symmetry and planarity on subjects’ performance in a shape constancy task. The 3D (...)
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  52. Warren Mansell (2011). Control of Perception Should Be Operationalized as a Fundamental Property of the Nervous System. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):257-261.
    This commentary proposes that “cognitive control” is neither componential nor emergent, but a fundamental feature of behavior. The term “control” requires an operational definition. This is best provided by the negative feedback loop that utilizes behavior to control perception; it does not control behavior per se. In order to model complex cognitive control, Perceptual Control Theory proposes that loops are organized into a dissociable hierarchical network (PCT; Powers, Clark, & McFarland, 1960; Powers, 1973a, 2008). In this way, behavior is dynamically (...)
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  53. Rainer Mausfeld (2012). On Some Unwarranted Tacit Assumptions in Cognitive Neuroscience. Frontiers in Cognition 3 (67):1-13.
    The cognitive neurosciences are based on the idea that the level of neurons or neural networks constitutes a privileged level of analysis for the explanation of mental phenomena. This paper brings to mind several arguments to the effect that this presumption is ill-conceived and unwarranted in light of what is currently understood about the physical principles underlying mental achievements. It then scrutinizes the question why such conceptions are nevertheless currently prevailing in many areas of psychology. The paper argues that corresponding (...)
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  54. P. L. McKee (1971). Perception and Physiology. Mind 80 (October):594-596.
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  55. Ken Mogi (1997). Response Selectivity, Neuron Doctrine, and Mach's Principle in Perception. Austrian Soc. For Cognitive Science Tech Report.
    manner. The construction of the space-time structure that describes the dynamics of the neural network in a causal manner is a non-trivial problem. I critically review the idea of response selectivity as is applied to.
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  56. Adrian C. Moulyn (1952). Reflections on the Problem of Time in Relation to Neurophysiology and Psychology. Philosophy of Science 19 (1):33-49.
  57. Liad Mudrik, Leon Y. Deouell & Dominique Lamy (2011). Scene Congruency Biases Binocular Rivalry. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):756-767.
  58. Bence Nanay (2011). Perceiving Pictures. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):461-480.
    I aim to give a new account of picture perception: of the way our visual system functions when we see something in a picture. My argument relies on the functional distinction between the ventral and dorsal visual subsystems. I propose that it is constitutive of picture perception that our ventral subsystem attributes properties to the depicted scene, whereas our dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the picture surface. This duality elucidates Richard Wollheim’s concept of the “twofoldness” of our experience of pictures: (...)
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  59. Jean-Luc Petit (2003). On the Relation Between Recent Neurobiological Data on Perception (and Action) and the Husserlian Theory of Constitution. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):281-298.
    The phenomenological theory of constitution promises a solution for the problem of consciousness insofar as it changes the traditional terms of this problem by systematically correlating subject and object in the unifying context of intentional acts. I argue that embodied constitution must depend upon the role of kinesthesia as a constitutive operator. In pursuing the path of intentionality in its descent from an idealistic level of pure constitution to this fully embodied kinesthetic constitution, we are able to gain access to (...)
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  60. Jean-Luc Petit (1999). Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
  61. Jean-Luc Petit (1999). Constitution by Movement: Husserl in Light of Recent Neurobiological Findings. In Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
  62. Ulrike Pompe (2011). Perception and Cognition: The Analysis of Object Recognition. Mentis.
  63. John Preston (2008). Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement - Edited by Andrew Brook and Kathleen Akins. Philosophical Books 49 (1):68-71.
  64. Henry Railo, Mika Koivisto & Antti Revonsuo (2011). Tracking the Processes Behind Conscious Perception: A Review of Event-Related Potential Correlates of Visual Consciousness. [REVIEW] Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):972-983.
  65. Rupert Read (2012). Iain McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010). Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (1):119-124.
    Iain McGilchrist, The master and his emissary: the divided brain and the making of the Western world (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010) Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 119-124 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9235-x Authors Rupert Read, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759 Journal Volume Volume 11 Journal Issue Volume 11, Number 1.
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  66. Oliver L. Reiser (1928). Light, Wave-Mechanics, and Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 25 (12):309-317.
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  67. John Schwenkler (2012). On the Matching of Seen and Felt Shape by Newly Sighted Subjects. I-Perception 3 (3):186-188.
    How do we recognize identities between seen shapes and felt ones? Is this due to associative learning, or to intrinsic connections these sensory modalities? We can address this question by testing the capacities of newly sighted subjects to match seen and felt shapes, but only if it is shown that the subjects can see the objects well enough to form adequate visual representations of their shapes. In light of this, a recent study by R. Held and colleagues fails to demonstrate (...)
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  68. John Schwenkler (2012). Does Visual Spatial Awareness Require the Visual Awareness of Space? Mind and Language 27 (3):308-329.
    Many philosophers have held that it is not possible to experience a spatial object, property, or relation except against the background of an intact awareness of a space that is somehow ‘absolute’. This paper challenges that claim, by analyzing in detail the case of a brain-damaged subject whose visual experiences seem to have violated this condition: spatial objects and properties were present in his visual experience, but space itself was not. I go on to suggest that phenomenological argumentation can give (...)
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  69. J. R. Smythies (1993). The Impact of Contemporary Neuroscience and Introspection Psychology on the Philosophy of Perception. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury.
  70. Michael Sollberger (2012). Causation in Perception: A Challenge to Naïve Realism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):581-595.
    Defending a form of naïve realism about visual experiences is quite popular these days. Those naïve realists who I will be concerned with in this paper make a central claim about the subjective aspects of perceptual experiences. They argue that how it is with the perceiver subjectively when she sees worldly objects is literally determined by those objects. This way of thinking leads them to endorse a form of disjunctivism, according to which the fundamental psychological nature of seeings and hallucinations (...)
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  71. Mog Stapleton (2013). Steps to a "Properly Embodied" Cognitive Science. Cognitive Systems Research 22 (June):1-11.
    Cognitive systems research has predominantly been guided by the historical distinction between emotion and cognition, and has focused its efforts on modelling the “cognitive” aspects of behaviour. While this initially meant modelling only the control system of cognitive creatures, with the advent of “embodied” cognitive science this expanded to also modelling the interactions between the control system and the external environment. What did not seem to change with this embodiment revolution, however, was the attitude towards affect and emotion in cognitive (...)
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  72. Paul Thagard (forthcoming). The Self as a System of Multilevel Interacting Mechanisms. Philosophical Psychology:1-19.
    This paper proposes an account of the self as a multilevel system consisting of social, individual, neural, and molecular mechanisms. It argues that the functioning of the self depends on causal relations between mechanisms operating at different levels. In place of reductionist and holistic approaches to cognitive science, I advocate a method of multilevel interacting mechanisms. This method is illustrated by showing how self-concepts operate at several different levels.
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  73. Gabriel Vacariu (2012). Cognitive Neuroscience Versus Epistemologically Different Worlds. University of Bucharest Press.
    From the “epistemologically different worlds” perspective, I analyze the status of cognitive neuroscience today. I investigate the main actual topics in cognitive neuroscience: localization and the brain imaging, the binding problem (Treisman’s feature integration theory and synchronized oscillations approach), differentiation and integration, optimism versus skepticism approaches, perception and object recognition, space and the mind, crossmodal interactions, and the holistic view against localization. I want to show that these problems are pseudo-problems and this “science” has “No ontology landscape”.
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  74. Neil Van Leeuwen (2011). Review of Sleights of Mind: What the Neuroscience of Magic Reveals About Our Brains. [REVIEW] Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 16 (5):473-478.
    The book I review, _Sleights of Mind_, aims to illuminate properties of perceptual systems by discussing human susceptibility to magical illusions. I describe how the authors use psychological principles to explain two tricks, spoon bending and the Miser's Dream. I also argue that the book is congenial to the following view of illusions: susceptibility to illusion is the result of evolutionary trade-offs; perceptual systems must make assumptions in order to function at all, but susceptibility to illusion is the byproduct of (...)
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  75. Carlo Volf (forthcoming). Light and the Aesthetics of Perception. Nordic Journal of Aesthetics 22.
    Light seems to be a very changeable size in our build environment. Being an immaterial building stone, light takes a very liquid shape in our design-vocabulary. It consists of an invisible material – photons – and therefore it takes no specific form in itself but is only articulated through the meeting with form. Therefore, since form has been the major theme for the aesthetics up until now, giving form to light is a complex and challenging task and reducing it to (...)
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  76. Rebekah C. White, Anne M. Aimola Davies & Martin Davies (2011). Two Hands Are Better Than One: A New Assessment Method and a New Interpretation of the Non-Visual Illusion of Self-Touch. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):956-964.
  77. Carlo Wilke, Matthis Synofzik & Axel Lindner (forthcoming). The Valence of Action Outcomes Modulates the Perception of One's Actions. Consciousness and Cognition.
  78. Rob Withagen & Anthony Chemero (2011). Affordances and Classification: On the Significance of a Sidebar in James Gibson's Last Book. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):521 - 537.
    This article is about a sidebar in James Gibson's last book, The ecological approach to visual perception. In this sidebar, Gibson, the founder of the ecological perspective of perception and action, argued that to perceive an affordance is not to classify an object. Although this sidebar has received scant attention, it is of great significance both historically and for recent discussions about specificity, direct perception, and the functions of the dorsal and ventral streams. It is argued that Gibson's acknowledgment of (...)
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  79. Wayne Wu (forthcoming). Against Division: Consciousness, Information and the Visual Streams. Mind and Language.
    Milner and Goodale’s influential account of the primate cortical visual streams involves a division of consciousness between them, for it is the ventral stream that has the responsibility for visual consciousness. Hence, the dorsal visual stream is a “zombie” stream. In this paper, I argue that certain information carried by the dorsal stream likely plays a central role in the egocentric spatial content of experience, especially the experience of visual spatial constancy. Thus, the dorsal stream contributes to a pervasive feature (...)
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  80. Wayne Wu (forthcoming). Being in the Workspace, From a Neural Point of View. Philosophical Studies.
    This is a comment on Peter Carruthers' "On Central Cognition", both originally presented at the 2011 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy. The comment discusses working memory, attention and the global workspace, and empirical evidence from neuroscience that Carruthers' adduces to argue for the claim that central cognition is sensory based because only sensory systems have direct access to working memory and the global workspace. I raise some questions about the empirical evidence for this claim.
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  81. Wayne Wu (forthcoming). Visual Spatial Constancy and Modularity: Does Intention Penetrate Vision? Philosophical Studies.
    Is vision informationally encapsulated from cognition or is it cognitively penetrated? I shall argue that intentions penetrate vision in the experience of visual spatial constancy: the world appears to be spatially stable despite our frequent eye movements. I first explicate the nature of this experience and critically examine and extend current neurobiological accounts of spatial constancy, emphasizing the central role of motor signals. I then provide a sufficient condition for failure of informational encapsulation that emphasizes a computational condition for cognitive (...)
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  82. Wayne Wu (2008). Visual Attention, Conceptual Content, and Doing It Right. Mind 117 (468):1003-1033.
    Reflection on the fine-grained information required for visual guidance of action has suggested that visual content is non-conceptual. I argue that in a common type of visually guided action, namely the use of manipulable artefacts, vision has conceptual content. Specifically, I show that these actions require visual attention and that concepts are involved in directing attention. In acting with artefacts, there is a way of doing it right as determined by the artefact’s conventional use. Attention must reflect our understanding of (...)
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  83. Stephen L. Zegura (1997). Color Categories and Biology: Considerations From Molecular Genetics, Neurobiology, and Evolutionary Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):211-212.