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  1. Liliana Albertazzi (2012). Qualitative Perceiving. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):11-12.
  2. Jan Almäng (2013). Two Kinds of Time-Consciousness and Three Kinds of Content. Axiomathes 23 (1):61-80.
    This paper explores the distinction between perceiving an object as extended in time, and experiencing a sequence of perceptions. I argue that this distinction cannot be adequately described by any present theory of time-consciousness and that in order to solve the puzzle, we need to consider perceptual content as having three distinct constituents: Explicit content, which has a particular phenomenal character, modal content, or the kind of content that is contributed by the psychological mode, and implicit content, which lacks phenomenal (...)
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  3. Connirae Andreas & Tamara Andreas (2009). Aligning Perceptual Positions: A New Distinction in NLP. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (10-12):10-12.
    This article describes and refines an experiential distinction which has been highlighted by neuro-linguistic programming (NLP), perceptual positions. When you are imagining a past or future scene, you may perceive it (usually pre-reflectively) from three different viewpoints or perceptual positions. If you are looking at the world from your own point of view, through your own eyes, you are in the first perceptual position. If you are looking at the scene through another person's eyes, appreciating the other person's point of (...)
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  4. Edward Averill (2012). The Phenomenological Character of Color Perception. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):27-45.
    When an object looks red to an observer, the visual experience of the observer has two important features. The experience visually represents the object as having a property—being red. And the experience has a phenomenological character; that is, there is something that it is like to have an experience of seeing an object as red. Let qualia be the properties that give our sensory and perceptual experiences their phenomenological character. This essay takes up two related problem for a nonreductive account (...)
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  5. Thomas Baldwin (ed.) (2007). Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge.
    In this volume, leading philosophers from Europe and North America examine the nature and extent of Merleau-Ponty's achievement and consider its importance to ...
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  6. Renaud Barbaras (2006). Desire and Distance: Introduction to a Phenomenology of Perception. Stanford University Press.
    Desire and Distance constitutes an important new departure in contemporary phenomenological thought, a rethinking and critique of basic philosophical positions concerning the concept of perception presented by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, though it departs in significant and original ways from their work. Barbaras’s overall goal is to develop a philosophy of what “life” is—one that would do justice to the question of embodiment and its role in perception and the formation of the human subject. Barbaras posits that desire and distance inform (...)
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  7. Rudolph Bauer (2013). Heidegger: On Becoming Self Liberated Through the Manifestation of Appearance. Transmission 6.
    This paper focuses on Heidegger's presentation of becoming self liberated.
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  8. Ansgar Beckermann (1995). Visual Information Processing and Phenomenal Consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
    As far as an adequate understanding of phenomenal consciousness is concerned, representationalist theories of mind which are modelled on the information processing paradigm, are, as much as corresponding neurobiological or functionalist theories, confronted with a series of arguments based on inverted or absent qualia considerations. These considerations display the following pattern: assuming we had complete knowledge about the neural and functional states which subserve the occurrence of phenomenal consciousness, would it not still be conceivable that these neural states (or states (...)
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  9. J. C. Berendzen (2010). Coping Without Foundations: On Dreyfus's Use of Merleau-Ponty. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (5):629-649.
    Hubert Dreyfus has recently invoked the work of Maurice Merleau?Ponty in criticizing the ?Myth of the Mental?. In criticizing that supposed myth, Dreyfus argues for a kind of foundationalism that takes embodied coping to be a self?sufficient layer of human experience that supports our ?higher? mental activities. In turn, Merleau?Ponty?s phenomenology is found, in Dreyfus?s recent writings, to corroborate this foundationalism. While Merleau?Ponty would agree with many of Dreyfus?s points, this paper argues that he would not, in fact, agree with (...)
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  10. Michael Berman (forthcoming). Reflection, Objectivity, and the Love of God, a Passage From Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. Heythrop Journal 51 (5).
    Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (1945) essentially aims at debunking the myth of objectivity. The Phenomenology takes the entire Western tradition to task over its reliance on the objective attitude, showing how this attitude structures the architectonics of idealism and empiricism. These philosophies share the same presuppositions: their metaphysics and epistemologies are inherently dualistic. The problematics that stem from this objectivism have informed the Western understanding of God. This essay undertakes an examination of one of the more extended treatments of God (...)
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  11. Eugene F. Bertoldi (1974). Time in the Phenomenology of Perception. Dialogue 13 (04):773-785.
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  12. Joseph Bien (1972). Perception, Expression, and History: The Social Phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. By John O'Neill. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970. Pp. Xi, 101. $4.50. [REVIEW] Dialogue 11 (01):162-164.
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  13. Luciano Boi (2004). Questions Regarding Husserlian Geometry and Phenomenology. A Study of the Concept of Manifold and Spatial Perception. Husserl Studies 20 (3):207-267.
  14. Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetration and the Reach of Phenomenal Content. In Athanassios Raftopoulos & John Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter critically assesses recent arguments that acquiring the ability to categorize an object as belonging to a certain high-level kind can cause the relevant kind property to be represented in visual phenomenal content. The first two arguments, developed respectively by Susanna Siegel (2010) and Tim Bayne (2009), employ an essentially phenomenological methodology. The third argument, developed by William Fish (2013), by contrast, is supported by an array of psychophysical and neuroscientific findings. I argue that while none of these arguments (...)
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  15. Carmelo Calì (2013). Gestalt Models for Data Decomposition and Functional Architecture in Visual Neuroscience. Gestalt Theory 35 (227-264).
    Attempts to introduce Gestalt theory into the realm of visual neuroscience are discussed on both theoretical and experimental grounds. To define the framework in which these proposals can be defended, this paper outlines the characteristics of a standard model, which qualifies as a received view in the visual neurosciences, and of the research into natural images statistics. The objections to the standard model and the main questions of the natural images research are presented. On these grounds, this paper defends the (...)
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  16. Carmelo Calì (2006). A Phenomenological Framework for Neuroscience? Gestalt Theory 28 (1-2):109-122.
    This paper tries to sketch what phenomenological constraints for Neurosciences would be looking like. It maintains that such an adequate phenomenological description as that provided by Gestalt psychology is a condition for the Neurosciences to account for every-day experience opf the world. The explanatory gap in Cognitive sciences is discussed with reference to Jackendoff, Prinz, and Köhler.
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  17. Elof A. Carlson (2002). Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research Vol LXXVII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.
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  18. Elof A. Carlson (2002). Color Perception: An Ongoing Convergence of Reductionism and Phenomenology. In Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research Vol Lxxvii. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.
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  19. Taylor Carman (2008). Review of Thomas Baldwin (Ed.), Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6).
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  20. Taylor Carman & Mark B. N. Hansen (eds.) (2005). The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty. Cambridge University Press.
    Maurice Merleau-Ponty was described by Paul Ricoeur as "the greatest of the French phenomenologists." The new essays in this volume examine the full scope of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, from his central and abiding concern with the nature of perception and the bodily constitution of intentionality to his reflections on science, nature, art, history, and politics. The authors explore the historical origins and context of his thought as well as its continuing relevance to contemporary work in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, (...)
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  21. Elijah Chudnoff (2012). Presentational Phenomenology. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag.
    A blindfolded clairvoyant walks into a room and immediately knows how it is arranged. You walk in and immediately see how it is arranged. Though both of you represent the room as being arranged in the same way, you have different experiences. Your experience doesn’t just represent that the room is arranged a certain way; it also visually presents the very items in the room that make that representation true. Call the felt aspect of your experience made salient by this (...)
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  22. Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Intuitions Are Like. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
    What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The (...)
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  23. Christian Coseru, Taking the Intentionality of Perception Seriously: Why Phenomenology is Inescapable.
    The Buddhist philosophical investigation of the elements of existence and/or experience (or dharmas) provides the basis on which Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their followers deliberate on such topics as the ontological status of external objects and the epistemic import of perceptual states of cognitive awareness. In this essay I will argue that the Buddhist epistemologists, insofar as they accord perception a privileged epistemic status, share a common ground with phenomenologists in the tradition of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, who contend that perception is (...)
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  24. Christian Coseru (forthcoming). “Buddhist ‘Foundationalism’ and the Phenomenology of Perception,” Philosophy East and West 59:4 (October 2009): 409-439. [REVIEW] Philosophy East and West.
    In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist (...)
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  25. Christian Coseru (2009). Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of Perception. Philosophy East and West 59 (4):409-439.
    In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist (...)
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  26. Hubert L. Dreyfus (2002). Samuel Todes's Account of Non-Conceptual Perceptual Knowledge and its Relation to Thought. Ratio 15 (4):392-409.
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  27. John J. Drummond (1979). The Phenomenology of Perceptual Sense. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):139-146.
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  28. Joseph Duchêne (1977). The Concept of 'World' and the Problem of Rationality in Merleau-Ponty's Phénoménologie de la Perception. International Philosophical Quarterly 17 (4):393-413.
  29. Terence Rajivan Edward (2011). Theory-Laden Experience and Illusions. Ethos 4 (2):58-67.
    The persistence of certain illusions has been used to argue that some theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. Learning that one of these illusions is an illusion involves accepting theories. Nevertheless, the illusion does not go away. It seems then that these theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. This paper contests an assumption of this argument: that the only way in which our perceptions can be affected by holding these theories is by the illusion going away.
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  30. Andreas Elpidorou (2009). The Upsurge of Spontaneity and the Rise of Undivided Subject: The Role and Place of Merleau-Ponty in the Dreyfus-McDowell Debate. In Lauren Freeman (ed.), In/visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion. Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.
  31. Jesús González Fisac (2011). Forma (estructura) y fenomenología en Ortega. Un análisis del “campo visual” en el entorno de las Meditaciones / (Form (structure) and Phenomenology in Ortega. An analysis of “visual field” in the surroundings in the 'Meditations [on Quixote]'. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 36 (1):117-137.
    Los estudios sobre la fenomenología de Ortega apenas han atendido al víncunlo entre forma o estructura y campo del fenómeno. Ortega ha insistido en la formalidad del ámbito de aparición de los fenómenos, que ha vinculado con su radicalidad. La forma del ámbito emerge dentro del campo como un juego de diferencias, de la que el par superficie/ profundidad es el fundamental. En este trabajo vamos a mostrar que la formalidad del ámbito tiene un ejemplo señalado en los análisis del (...)
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  32. Lauren Freeman & Andreas Elpidorou (eds.) (2009). In/Visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion. Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.
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  33. J. M. Fritzman (2009). A Guide to Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. Teaching Philosophy 32 (4):409-410.
  34. S. Gallagher (2010). Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception, Edited by Thomas Baldwin. [REVIEW] Mind 118 (472):1105-1111.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  35. Shaun Gallagher (2010). Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. [REVIEW] Topoi 29 (2):183-185.
    Issue Title: Logic, Meaning, and Truth-Making States of Affairs in Philosophical Semantics/Guest Edited by Dale Jacquette.
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  36. Raphaël GÉLY (1997). La possibilité d'une phénoménologie de la perception chez Heidegger. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 95 (4):731-737.
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  37. Philip A. Glotzbach & Harry Heff (1982). Ecological and Phenomenological Contributions to the Psychology of Perception. Noûs 16 (March):108-121.
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  38. Ḥayim Gordon (2004). Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Basis for Sharing the Earth. Praeger.
    Presents the basis of Merleau-Ponty's ontology, as presented in his book Phenomology of Perception, and shows how it can help provide humans with a foundation ...
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  39. Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (2008). Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
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  40. Sara Heinämaa (2013). Merleau-Ponty: A Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind and Body. In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum. 59-83.
  41. Sara Heinämaa (2003). Merleau-Ponty’s Dialogue with Descartes: The Living Body and its Position in Metaphysics. In Dan Zahavi, Sara Heinämaa & Hans Ruin (eds.), Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation: Phenomenology in the Nordic Countries. Kluwer. 23–48.
  42. Jakob Hohwy, The Sense of Self in the Phenomenology of Agency and Perception.
    The phenomenology of agency and perception is probably underpinned by a common cognitive system based on generative models and predictive coding. I defend the hypothesis that this cognitive system explains core aspects of the sense of having a self in agency and perception. In particular, this cognitive model explains the phenomenological notion of a minimal self as well as a notion of the narrative self. The proposal is related to some influential studies of overall brain function, and to psychopathology. These (...)
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  43. Richard Hudson & Henri Pallard (1991). La question ontologique et la ``phénoménologie de la perception''. Man and World 24 (4):373-393.
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  44. Ernest Joos (1976). Remarks on Bertoldi's Time in the Phenomenology of Perception. Dialogue 15 (01):113-117.
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  45. Carol A. Kates (1970). Perception and Temporality in Husserl's Phenomenology. Philosophy Today 14 (2):89-100.
    The article is an explication of husserl's theory of perception. In particular, The meaning of 'constitution' is analyzed, With the result that traditional realistic or idealistic readings of husserl are discarded. Examination of passive and active synthesis and the meaning of 'hyle' within the framework of husserl's theory of inner time-Consciousness clarifies in turn the nature of phenomenological intuition and the significance of reduction.
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  46. Sean D. Kelly (2005). Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty. In C. Tarman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty. Cambridge. 74-110.
    The passage above comes from the opening pages of Merleau-Ponty’s essay on Edmund Husserl. It proposes a risky interpretive principle. The main feature of this principle is that the seminal aspects of a thinker’s work are so close to him that he is incapable of articulating them himself. Nevertheless, these aspects pervade the work, give it its style, its sense and its direction, and therefore belong to it essentially. As Martin Heidegger writes, in a passage quoted by Merleau-Ponty:
    The (...)
    The goal of Merleau-Ponty’s essay, he says, is “to evoke this un-thought-of element in Husserl’s thought”.3. (shrink)
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  47. Sean D. Kelly (2001). The Relevance of Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Language and Mind. New York: Garland Publishing.
    Through discussion of phenomenological and analytic traditions such as the philosophical problems of perceptual content, the content of demonstrative thoughts and the unity of proposition, Kelly explains that these concepts are not as alien to one another as most people believe.
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  48. Sean Dorrance Kelly, Perceptual Normativity and Human Freedom.
  49. Sean Dorrance Kelly (2008). Content and Constancy: Phenomenology, Psychology, and the Content of Perception. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):682–690.
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  50. Joel Krueger (2012). Seeing Mind in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
    Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view (...)
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