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  1. Tyler Burge (2009). Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes. In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. 246--324.
    I shall propose five theses on de re states and attitudes. To be a de re state or attitude is to bear a peculiarly direct epistemic and representational relation to a particular referent in perception or thought. I will not dress this bare statement here. The fifth thesis tries to be less coarse. The first four explicate and restrict context- bound, singular, empirical representation, which constitutes a significant and central type of de re state or attitude.
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  2. J. Campbell (2004). Reference as Attention. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):265-76.
  3. J. Campbell (1999). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring Term. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):89-104.
  4. John Campbell (2011). Consciousness and Reference. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
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  5. John Campbell (2005). Precis of Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):103-114.
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  6. John Campbell (1998). New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Atlanta: Rodopi.
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  7. John Campbell (1998). Sense and Consciousness. In New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Atlanta: Rodopi. 195-211.
    On a classical conception, knowing the sense of a proposition is knowing its truth-condition, rather than simply knowing how to verify the proposition, or how to find its implications (whether deductive implications or implications for action). But knowing the truth-condition of a proposition is not unrelated to your use of particular methods for verifying the proposition, or finding its implications. Rather, your knowledge of the truth-condition of the proposition has to justify the use of particular methods for verifying it, or (...)
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  8. John Campbell (1997). Sense, Reference and Selective Attention. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):55-98.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin.
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  9. Austen Clark (2006). Attention & Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness for the Pacific APA Meeting, Pasadena, California, 2004. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):167-193.
    We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found in the first five chapters of Reference and Consciousness. The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is admirable in this account, and I am (...)
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  10. Austen Clark, Sensing and Reference.
    When I was revising _Sensory Qualities_ there was a period of about a year when I set the manuscript aside and did other things. When I returned to it I found that certain portions of the argument had collapsed of their own weight, like an old New England barn, and could be carted off the premises without compunction. Other parts were wobbling on their foundation, while some had weathered well and seemed nice and solid. My revision strategy was simple: I (...)
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  11. Adrian Cussins (1999). Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Theories of Reference in Evans' Theory of Thought. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
    This paper explores some problems with Gareth Evans’s theory of the fundamental and non-fundamental levels of thought [1]. I suggest a way to reconceive the levels of thought that overcomes these problems. But, first, why might anyone who was not already struck by Evans’s remarkable theory care about these issues? What’s at stake here?
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  12. Steven Davis (ed.) (1983). Causal Theories Of Mind: Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, And Reference. Ny: De Gruyter.
    INTRODUCTION SECTION I In the last 20 years or so philosophers in the analytic tradition have taken an increasing interest in causal theories of a wide ...
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  13. Robert Hanna (1993). Direct Reference, Direct Perception, and the Cognitive Theory of Demonstratives. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):96-117.
  14. John Hawthorne & Mark Scala (2000). Seeing and Demonstration. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):199-206.
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  15. John Heil (ed.) (1989). Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Norwell: Kluwer.
  16. Dieter Heyer & Rainer Mausfeld (eds.) (2002). Perception and the Physical World. Wiley.
  17. Sean D. Kelly (2004). Reference and Attention: A Difficult Connection. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):277-86.
    I am very much in sympathy with the overall approach of John Campbell’s paper, “Reference as Attention”. My sympathy extends to a variety of its features. I think he is right to suppose, for instance, that neuropsychological cases provide important clues about how we should treat some traditional philosophical problems concerning perception and reference. I also think he is right to suppose that there are subtle but important relations between the phenomena of perception, action, consciousness, attention, and reference. I even (...)
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  18. Jaegwon Kim (1977). Perception and Reference Without Causality. Journal of Philosophy 74 (October):606-620.
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  19. Mohan Matthen (2012). Visual Demonstratives. In Athanasios Raftopoulos & Peter Machamer (eds.), Perception, Realism, and The Problem of Reference. Cambridge University Press.
    When I act on something, three kinds of idea (or representation) come into play. First, I have a non-visual representation of my goals. Second, I have a visual description of the kind of thing that I must act upon in order to satisfy my goals. Finally, I have an egocentric position locator that enables my body to interact with the object. It is argued here that these ideas are distinct. It is also argued that the egocentric position locator functions in (...)
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  20. Mohan P. Matthen (2006). On Visual Experience of Objects: Comments on John Campbell's Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):195-220.
    John Campbell argues that visual attention to objects is the means by which we can refer to objects, and that this is so because conscious visual attention enables us to retrieve information about a location. It is argued here that while Campbell is right to think that we visually attend to objects, he does not give us sufficient ground for thinking that consciousness is involved, and is wrong to assign an intermediary role to location. Campbell’s view on sortals is also (...)
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  21. Rainer Mausfeld (2002). The Physicalistic Trap in Perception Theory. In Dieter Heyer & Rainer Mausfeld (eds.), Perception and the Physical World. Wiley.
  22. Brian P. McLaughlin (1989). Why Perception is Not Singular Reference. In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Norwell: Kluwer.
  23. Izchak Miller (1984). Perceptual Reference. Synthese 61 (October):35-60.
    Philosophical interest in the structure of perception is motivated by questions such as these: How does perception function to constrain and justify our empirical theories? How is it possible to perceive an extended process, when at any given moment of our perceiving it only one of its temporal phases is impinging on our senses? What determines the object or objects of perception - those things our experiences are about? The need to answer these and other questions about perception in a (...)
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  24. Kevin Mulligan (1997). Language and Thought. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  25. Kevin Mulligan (1997). How Perception Fixes Reference. In Language and Thought. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
    The answer I shall sketch is not mine. Nor, as far as I can tell, is it an answer to be found in the voluminous literature inspired by Kripke’s work. Many of the elements of the answer are to be found in the writings of Wittgenstein and his Austro-German predecessors, Martinak, Husserl, Marty, Landgrebe and Bühler. Within this Austro-German tradition we may distinguish between a strand which is Platonist and anti-naturalist and a strand which is nominalist and naturalist. Thus Husserl’s (...)
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  26. Walter Ott (2014). Malebranche and the Riddle of Sensation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):689-712.
    Like their contemporary counterparts, early modern philosophers find themselves in a predicament. On one hand, there are strong reasons to deny that sensations are representations. For there seems to be nothing in the world for them to represent. On the other hand, some sensory representations seem to be required for us to experience bodies. How else could one perceive the boundaries of a body, except by means of different shadings of color? I argue that Nicolas Malebranche offers an extreme -- (...)
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  27. Olga Prat Fernández (1999). La Filosofia Analitica En El Cambio de Milenio. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U.
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  28. Olga Prat Fernández (1999). Perceptual Consciousness and the Reflexive Character of Attention. In La Filosofia Analitica En El Cambio de Milenio. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U.
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  29. Susanna Schellenberg (2008). The Situation-Dependency of Perception. Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.
    I argue that perception is necessarily situation-dependent. The way an object is must not just be distinguished from the way it appears and the way it is represented, but also from the way it is presented given the situational features. First, I argue that the way an object is presented is best understood in terms of external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent properties of objects. Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and ontologically dependent on the intrinsic properties of objects, such as their (...)
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  30. David Woodruff Smith (1982). What's the Meaning of 'This'? Noûs 16 (May):181-208.
    "This is a sea urchin", I declare while strolling the beach with a friend. What do I refer to by uttering the demonstrative pronoun "this"? The object immediately before me, of course. As it happens on this occasion, the object in the sand at my feet. I may point at it to aid my hearer - or I may not. BUt now , if the meaning of the term is distinguished from the referent, what is the meaning of this, or (...)
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  31. Keith A. Wilson (2013). Reid's Direct Realism and Visible Figure. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):783-803.
    In his account of visual perception, Thomas Reid describes visible figure as both ‘real and external’ to the eye and as the ‘immediate object of sight’. These claims appear to conflict with Reid's direct realism, since if the ‘immediate’ object of vision is also its direct object, then sight would be perceptually indirect due to the role of visible figure as a perceptual intermediary. I argue that this apparent threat to Reid's direct realism may be resolved by understanding visible figure (...)
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