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  1. Tista Bagchi, Cognition, Modules, and Modes of Perception.
    Perceptual and recursion-based faculties have long been recognized to be vital constituents of human (and, in general, animal) cognition. However, certain faculties such as the visual and the linguistic faculty have come to receive far more academic and experimental attention, in recent decades, than other recognized categories of faculties. This paper seeks to highlight the imbalance in these studies and bring into sharper focus the need for further in-depth philosophical treatments of faculties such as especially hearing, touch, and proprioception, besides (...)
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  2. Alon Chasid (2014). Pictorial Experience: Not so Special After All. Philosophical Studies 171 (3):471-491.
    The central thesis (CT) that this paper upholds is that a picture depicts an object by generating in those who view the picture a visual experience of that object. I begin by presenting a brief sketch of intentionalism, the theory of perception in terms of which I propose to account for pictorial experience. I then discuss Richard Wollheim’s twofoldness thesis and explain why it should be rejected. Next, I show that the socalled unique phenomenology of pictorial experience is simply an (...)
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  3. Jonathan Cohen (2010). Perception and Computation. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):96-124.
    Students of perception have long puzzled over a range of cases in which perception seems to tell us distinct, and in some sense conflicting, things about the world. In the cases at issue, the perceptual system is capable of responding to a single stimulus — say, as manifested in the ways in which subjects sort that stimulus — in different ways. This paper is about these puzzling cases, and about how they should be characterized and accounted for within a general (...)
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  4. Jonathan Cohen (2009/2011). The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology. Oxford.
    The space of options -- The argument from perceptual variation -- Variation revisited : objections and responses -- Relationism defended : linguistic and mental representation of color -- Relationism defended : ontology -- Relationism defended : phenomenology -- A role functionalist theory of color -- Role functionalism and its relationalist rivals.
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  5. Marina Folescu (2015). Perceptual and Imaginative Conception: The Distinction Reid Missed. In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value. Oxford University Press 52-74.
    The present investigation concerns Reid’s explanation of how objects (be they real or nonexistent) are conceived. This paper shows that there is a deep-rooted tension in Reid’s understanding of conception: although the type of conception employed in perception is closely related to the one employed in imagination, three fundamental features distinguish perceptual conception (as the former will be referred to throughout this paper) from imaginative conception (as the latter will be called henceforth). These features would have been ascribed by Reid (...)
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  6. Todd Ganson & Dorit Ganson (2010). Everyday Thinking About Bodily Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):523-534.
    In the opening section of this paper we spell out an account of our na ve view of bodily sensations that is of historical and philosophical significance. This account of our shared view of bodily sensations captures common ground between Descartes, who endorses an error theory regarding our everyday thinking about bodily sensations, and Berkeley, who is more sympathetic with common sense. In the second part of the paper we develop an alternative to this account and discuss what is at (...)
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  7. Johannes Haag (ed.) (2001). Der Blick nach innen. Wahrnehmung und Introspektion. Mentis.
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  8. Gary Hatfield (2004). Sense-Data and the Mind–Body Problem. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis 305--331.
  9. Fiona Macpherson (2004). Review of The Problem of Perception By A.D. Smith. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 45 (3):255-257.
  10. Arvan Marcus, Something Mental is Just in the Head, and What the Mental Out of the Head is Like.
    In, “Why Nothing Mental is Just in The Head,” Justin Fisher (Noȗs, 2007) uses a novel thought-experiment to argue that every form of mental internalism is false. This paper shows that Fisher fails to refute mental internalism, and that a new variant of his example actually (a) confirms a form of mental internalism, as well as (b) John Locke's “resemblance thesis,” thereby (c) disconfirming all externalist theories of mental content (the type of theory Fisher takes his original example to prove).
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  11. Rainer Mausfeld (2010). Color Within an Internalist Framework : The Role of Color in the Structure of the Perceptual System. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press
  12. Rainer Mausfeld (2003). The Dual Coding of Colour. In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press 381--430.
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  13. Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.) (2003). Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.
    Colour has long been a source of fascination to both scientists and philosophers. In one sense, colours are in the mind of the beholder, in another sense they belong to the external world. Colours appear to lie on the boundary where we have divided the world into 'objective' and 'subjective' events. They represent, more than any other attribute of our visual experience, a place where both physical and mental properties are interwoven in an intimate and enigmatic way. -/- The last (...)
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  14. Carlos Montemayor & Harry H. Haladjian (2015). Consciousness, Attention, and Conscious Attention. MIT Press.
    In this book, Carlos Montemayor and Harry Haladjian consider the relationship between consciousness and attention. The cognitive mechanism of attention has often been compared to consciousness, because attention and consciousness appear to share similar qualities. But, Montemayor and Haladjian point out, attention is defined functionally, whereas consciousness is generally defined in terms of its phenomenal character without a clear functional purpose. They offer new insights and proposals about how best to understand and study the relationship between consciousness and attention by (...)
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  15. Gregory Nixon (ed.) (2010). Time & Consciousness: Two Faces of One Mystery. QuantumDream, Inc..
    In what follows, I suggest that, against most theories of time, there really is an actual present, a now, but that such an eternal moment cannot be found before or after time. It may even be semantically incoherent to say that such an eternal present exists since “it” is changeless and formless (presumably a dynamic chaos without location or duration) yet with creative potential. Such a field of near-infinite potential energy could have had no beginning and will have no end, (...)
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  16. Francois-Igor Pris (forthcoming). Reality and Concepts (in French). AL-MUKHATABAT المخاطبات Revue Philosophique de Logique Et d'Epistémologie مجلّة فلسفية في المنطق و الإبستمولوجيا Philosophical Journal For Logic and Epistemology.
    I present the new realist philosophy by Jocelyn Benoist, in particular, his solution to the problem of the explanatory gap in the philosophy of mind.
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  17. Stephen E. Robbins (2013). Form, Qualia and Time: The Hard Problem Reformed. Mind and Matter 2:153-181.
    The hard problem – focusing essentially on vision here – is in fact the problem of the origin of our image of the external world. This formulation in terms of the “image” is never seen stated, for the forms populating our image of the world are considered computable, and not considered qualia – the “redness” of the cube is the problem, not the cube as form. Form, however, cannot be divorced from motion and hence from time. Therefore we must examine (...)
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  18. Wilfrid Sellars (1981). Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process: The Carus Lectures of Wilfrid Sellars. The Monist 64:3-90.
  19. A. D. Smith (2006). In Defence of Direct Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):411-424.