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  1. Liliana Albertazzi (2011). On Seeing: Remarks on Metzger's Laws of Seeing. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 21 (4):581-595.
    Nowadays cognitive science often views sensorial presentations and mental presentations as mutually exclusive, and they are also given separate treatment by neurophysiologists and by cognitive scientists, and some phenomena (like anomalous surfaces or various types of imagery) are reduced to either the former or the latter. Since no adequate methods for its investigation have been developed, the level of perceptual experiences analysed by Gestaltists and magnificently illustrated by Metzger in his Laws of Seeing remains unexplored. Starting from Metzger’s analyses the (...)
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  2. Ralph Baergen (1993). The Influence of Cognition Upon Perception: The Empirical Story. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):13 – 23.
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  3. Rasmus Thybo Jensen (2009). Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):371-388.
    I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general (...)
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Perception and Thought
  1. George Boas (1952). The Perceptual Element in Cognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (June):486-494.
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  2. Robert Briscoe (2014). Review of Christopher Gauker, Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. [REVIEW] Mind 123 (491):902-096.
  3. Casta (1977). Perception, Belief, and the Structure of Physical Objects and Consciousness. Synthese 35 (3).
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  4. Patrick Cavanagh (1999). The Cognitive Impenetrability of Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):370-371.
    Cognitive impenetrability is really two assertions: (1) perception and cognition have access to different knowledge bases; and (2) perception does not use cognitive-style processes. The first leads to the unusual corollary that cognition is itself cognitively impenetrable. The second fails when it is seen to be the claim that reasoning is available only in conscious processing.
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  5. Jonathan Cohen (2010). Perception and Computation. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):96-124.
    Students of perception have long puzzled over a range of cases in which perception seems to tell us distinct, and in some sense conflicting, things about the world. In the cases at issue, the perceptual system is capable of responding to a single stimulus — say, as manifested in the ways in which subjects sort that stimulus — in different ways. This paper is about these puzzling cases, and about how they should be characterized and accounted for within a general (...)
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  6. Tim Crane (1992). The Nonconceptual Content of Experience. In , The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...)
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  7. J. E. Creighton (1906). Experience and Thought. Philosophical Review 15 (5):482-493.
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  8. Jack S. Crumley II (1991). Appearances Can Be Deceiving. Philosophical Studies 64 (3):233-251.
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  9. R. I. Damper (1997). Connecting Perception to Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):744-745.
    Following the “modularity” orthodoxy of some years ago, it has traditionally been assumed that there is a clear and obvious separation between perception and cognition. Close examination of this concept, however, fails to reveal the join. Ballard et al.'s contention that the two “cannot be easily separated” is consistent with nonmodular views of the way that symbol grounding might be achieved in situated systems. Indeed, the traditional separation is viewed as unhelpful.
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  10. Charles B. Daniels (1988). Perception, Thought, and Reality. Noûs 22 (September):455-464.
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  11. Michael R. W. Dawson & C. Darren Piercey (1999). Better Theories Are Needed to Distinguish Perception From Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):374-375.
    Pylyshyn argues that many of the methods used to study perception are too coarse to detect the distinction between perceptual and cognitive processing. We suggest that the reason for this is that the theories used to guide research in perception are at fault. More powerful theories – for instance, computer simulations – will be required to identify where perception ends and where cognition begins.
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  12. Frans A. J. de Haas & Jaap Mansfeld (eds.) (2004). Aristotle on Generation and Corruption, Book 1: Symposium Aristotelicum. Clarendon.
    Jaap Mansfeld and Frans de Haas bring together in this volume a distinguished international team of ancient philosophers, presenting a systematic, chapter-by-chapter study of one of the key texts in Aristotle's science and metaphysics: the first book of On Generation and Corruption. In GC I Aristotle provides a general outline of physical processes such as generation and corruption, alteration, and growth, and inquires into their differences. He also discusses physical notions such as contact, action and passion, and mixture. These notions (...)
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  13. John Dilworth (2006). Perception, Introspection, and Functional Consonance. Theoria 72 (4):299-318.
    What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a _conforming _belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be _red _to oneself--rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems to be (...)
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  14. Fred Dretske (2000). Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years. The two areas combine to lay the groundwork for a naturalistic philosophy of mind. The fifteen essays focus on perception, knowledge, and consciousness. Together, they show the interconnectedness of Dretske's work in epistemology and his more contemporary ideas on philosophy of mind, shedding light on the links which can be made between the two. The first section (...)
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  15. Fred Dretske (1993). Conscious Experience. Mind 102 (406):263-283.
  16. Michael Dummett (1990). Thought and Perception: The Views of Two Philosophical Innovators. In The Analytic Tradition: Philosophical Quarterly Monographs, Volume 1. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  17. Marvin Farber (1948). Modes of Reflection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8 (4):589-600.
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  18. Richard Fumerton (2013). Siegel on the Epistemic Impact of “Checkered” Experience. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):733-739.
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  19. Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Perception, Generality, and Reasons. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. 131--57.
    During the last fifteen years or so there has been much debate, among philosophers interested in perception, on the question of whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or nonconceptual. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have challenged the terms of this debate, arguing that one of its most basic assumptions is mistaken. Experience, they claim, does not have representational content at all. On the kind of approach they suggest, having a perceptual experience is not to be understood (...)
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  20. Gl (2004). On Perceiving That. Theoria 70 (2-3):197-212.
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  21. Anil Gomes (2013). Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience. Kant-Studien 104 (3):277-300.
    We are able to think of empirical objects as capable of existing unperceived. What explains our grasp of this conception of objects? In this paper I examine the claim that experience explains our understanding of objects as capable of existing unperceived with reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that standard accounts of experience’s explanatory role are unsatisfactory, but that an alternative account can be extracted from the first Critique – one which relies on Kant’s transcendental idealism.
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  22. Dominic Gregory (2013). Showing, Sensing, and Seeming: Distinctively Sensory Representations and Their Contents. Oxford University Press.
    Certain representations are bound in a special way to our sensory capacities. Many pictures show things as looking certain ways, for instance, while auditory mental images show things as sounding certain ways. What do all those distinctively sensory representations have in common, and what makes them different from representations of other kinds? Dominic Gregory argues that they are alike in having meanings of a certain special type. He employs a host of novel ideas relating to kinds of perceptual states, sensory (...)
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  23. Michael Huemer (2013). Epistemological Asymmetries Between Belief and Experience. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):741-748.
  24. John Kulvicki (2005). Perceptual Content, Information, and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):103-131.
    Our perceptual systems make information about the world available to our cognitive faculties. We come to think about the colors and shapes of objects because we are built somehow to register the instantiation of these properties around us. Just how we register the presence of properties and come to think about them is one of the central problems with understanding perceptual cognition. Another problem in the philosophy of perception concerns the nature of the properties whose presence we register. Among the (...)
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  25. Joseph A. Leighton (1906). Cognitive Thought and 'Immediate' Experience. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (7):174-180.
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  26. Don Locke (1968). Perceiving and Thinking, Part I. Aristotelian Society 173:173-190.
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  27. Jack C. Lyons (2005). Clades, Capgras, and Perceptual Kinds. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):185-206.
    Perceptual states represent the world as being certain ways, as having certain properties. Which ways and properties are these? When I hold out my hand and look at it, it seems that I have a visual experience of a hand. One traditional view has held that my perceptual state is not of a hand but merely of an array of color patches, or the like, which disposes me to believe that there’s a hand without itself actually representing anything as being (...)
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  28. Jack C. Lyons (2005). Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256.
    How things look (or sound, taste, smell, etc.) plays two important roles in the epistemology of perception.1 First, our perceptual beliefs are episte- mically justified, at least in part, in virtue of how things look. Second, whether a given belief is a perceptual belief, as opposed to, say, an infer- ential belief, is also at least partly a matter of how things look. Together, these yield an epistemically significant sense of looks. A standard view is that how things look, in (...)
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  29. Fiona Macpherson (2012). Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen (at least in certain ways that are identified in the paper) then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies (...)
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  30. M. T. McClure (1916). Perception and Thinking. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (13):345-354.
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  31. Dennis J. McFarland & Anthony T. Cacace (1999). Defining Perception and Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):385-385.
    Discussions of the relationship between perception and cognition often proceed without a definition of these terms. The sensory-modality specific nature of low-level perceptual processes provides a means of distinguishing them from cognitive processes. A more explicit definition of terms provides insight into the nature of the evidence that can resolve questions about the relationship between perception and cognition.
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  32. Matthew McGrath (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification.
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  33. Matthew McGrath (2013). Siegel and the Impact for Epistemological Internalism. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):723-732.
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  34. Aleksandra Mroczko-Wąsowicz & Markus Werning (2012). Synesthesia, Sensory-Motor Contingency, and Semantic Emulation: How Swimming Style-Color Synesthesia Challenges the Traditional View of Synesthesia. Frontiers in Psychology / Research Topic Linking Perception and Cognition in Frontiers in Cognition 3 (279):1-12.
    Synesthesia is a phenomenon in which an additional nonstandard perceptual experience occurs consistently in response to ordinary stimulation applied to the same or another modality. Recent studies suggest an important role of semantic representations in the induction of synesthesia. In the present proposal we try to link the empirically grounded theory of sensory-motor contingency and mirror system based embodied simulation to newly discovered cases of swimming-style color synesthesia. In the latter color experiences are evoked only by showing the synesthetes a (...)
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  35. Anders Nes (2006). Content in Thought and Perception. Dissertation, Oxford University
    The dissertation addresses a debate in the philosophy of perception between conceptualists and nonconceptualists. Its principal thesis is that the intentional content of a perceptual experience is the content of a thought that a reflective subject is in a position to think if she has the experience. I call this claim, endorsed by conceptualists, the thesis of content congruence. Two principal lines of argument are put forward for it. The first, ‘simple’ argument contends that a perceptual experience is a state (...)
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  36. John M. Nicholas (1979). Leibniz: Apperception, Perception, and Thought. Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (1):96-98.
  37. Alva Noe (1999). Thought and Experience. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3):257-65.
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  38. Catherine Osborne (1998). Perceiving White and Sweet (Again): Aristotle, De Anima 3.7, 431a20-B1. Classical Quarterly 48 (02):433-446.
    In chapter 7 of the third book of De anima Aristotle is concerned with the activity of the intellect (nous), which, here as elsewhere in the work, he explores by developing parallels with his account of sense-perception. In this chapter his principal interest appears to be the notion of judgement, and in particular intellectual judgements about the value of some item on a scale of good and bad. In this paper I shall argue, firstly that there is in fact a (...)
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  39. Elisabeth Pacherie (2000). Levels of Perceptual Content. Philsophical Studies 100 (3):237-54.
    My main thesis is this paper is that, although Dretske's distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either side of the divide. I argue that what is needed in order to give a more accurate account of perceptual phenomena is not a twofold distinction of the kind advocated by Dretske but a threefold (...)
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  40. Costas Pagondiotis (forthcoming). COGNITIVE (IM)PENETRABILITY OF VISION: RESTRICTING VISION Vs. RESTRICTING COGNITION. In J. Zeimbekis & A. Raftopoulos (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. OUP.
    Pylyshyn restricts cognitively penetrable vision to late vision, whereas he does not make any distinction between different kinds of penetrating cognition. I argue that this approach disconnects early vision content from late vision content and blurs the distinction between the latter and the content of thought. To overcome this problem I suggest that we should not distinguish between different kinds of visual content but instead introduce a restriction on the kind of cognition that can directly penetrate visual experience. In particular, (...)
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  41. Anna Papafragou, Space and the Language‐Cognition Interface.
    According to classical theories of language and cognition, human cognition is characterized by strong universal commonalities built around notions such as object, space, agency, number, time, and event (Clark, 1973; Miller & Johnson‐Laird, 1976). Languages select from this prelinguistic conceptual repertoire the concepts that become encoded in their lexical and grammatical stock. Language acquisition, on this view, is a mapping process in which the learner needs to figure out which sounds in the language spoken in the environment correspond to which (...)
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  42. Michael J. Pendlebury (1999). Sensibility and Understanding in Perceptual Judgments. South African Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):356-369.
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  43. Anthony Pitson (1990). Perception: Belief and Experience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):55-76.
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  44. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1999). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, Psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, (...)
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  45. Keith Quillen (1989). Perceptual Belief and Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (July):276-293.
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  46. Anthony M. Quinton (1968). Perceiving and Thinking, Part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 191:191-208.
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  47. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2009). Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neural Science Inform Philosophy? Mit Press.
    An argument that there are perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in cognitively and conceptually unmediated ways and that this sheds light on various ...
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