This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
20 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Jan Almäng (2014). Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy. Husserl Studies 30 (1):1-19.
    A central topic in discussions about qualia concerns their purported transparency. According to transparency theorists, an experience is transparent in the sense that the subject having the experience is aware of nothing but the intended object of the experience. In this paper this notion is criticized for failing to account for the dynamical aspects of perception. A key assumption in the paper is that perceptual content has a certain temporal depth, in the sense that each act of perception can present (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. D. J. Bennett (2012). Seeing Shape: Shape Appearances and Shape Constancy. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):487-518.
    A coin rotating back in depth in some sense presents a changing, elliptical shape. How are we to understand such (in this case) ‘appearances of ellipticality’? How is the experiential sense of such shifting shape appearances related to the experiential sense of enduring shape definitive of perceived shape constancy? Is the experiential recovery of surface shape based on the prior (perhaps more fundamental) recovery of point or element 3D spatial locations?—or is the perception of shape a largely independent perceptual achievement? (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Peter Bradley (2008). Constancy, Categories and Bayes: A New Approach to Representational Theories of Color Constancy. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):601 – 627.
    Philosophers have long sought to explain perceptual constancy—the fact that objects appear to remain the same color, size and shape despite changes in the illumination condition, perspective and the relative distance—in terms of a mechanism that actively categorizes variable stimuli under the same pre-formed conceptual categories. Contemporary representationalists, on the other hand, explain perceptual constancy in terms of a modular mechanism that automatically discounts variation in the visual field to represent the stable properties of objects. In this paper I argue (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Robert Briscoe & John Schwenkler (forthcoming). Conscious Vision in Action. Cognitive Science.
    Conscious visual experience is a source of fine-grained and highly accurate information about the spatial properties of nearby objects. It is thus natural to assume that the spatial information present in visual experience is often used for purposes of intentional, object-directed visuomotor control. Yet this assumption, which we here call the Control Thesis, has been criticized on empirical grounds by proponents of the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis (TVSH) [Clark 2007, 2009; Goodale & Milner 1992, 2004a, 2008; Milner & Goodale 1995/2006]. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jonathan Cohen (2008). Colour Constancy as Counterfactual. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.
    There is nothing in this World constant but Inconstancy. [Swift 1711: 258] In this paper I argue that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, I contend, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on the shortcomings of these characterizations. After critically reviewing the standard characterizations, I provide a novel counterfactualist understanding of colour constancy, argue that it avoids difficulties of its traditional rivals, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Todd Ganson (2013). Are Color Experiences Representational? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
    The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr (2014). Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):556-573.
    A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is problematic in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Gary Hatfield (2012). Phenomenal and Cognitive Factors in Spatial Perception. In Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.), Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oup Oxford. 35.
  9. Gary Hatfield (2003). Representation and Constraints: The Inverse Problem and the Structure of Visual Space. Acta Psychologica 114:355-378.
    Visual space can be distinguished from physical space. The ?rst is found in visual experi- ence, while the second is de?ned independently of perception. Theorists have wondered about the relation between the two. Some investigators have concluded that visual space is non- Euclidean, and that it does not have a single metric structure. Here it is argued (1) that visual space exhibits contraction in all three dimensions with increasing distance from the observer, (2) that experienced features of this contraction (including (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Gary C. Hatfield (2009). Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception -- Representation in perception and cognition : task analysis, psychological functions, and rule instantiation -- Perception as unconscious inference -- Representation and constraints : the inverse problem and the structure of visual space -- On perceptual constancy -- Getting objects for free (or not) : the philosophy and psychology of object perception -- Color perception and neural encoding : does metameric matching entail a loss of information? -- Objectivity and subjectivity revisited (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.) (2012). Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oup Oxford.
    Many of us have been fascinated by visual illusions at some point, and have asked ourselves why something can look like one thing when it is fact something else. How can we perceive two different things, when the light coming into our eyes stays constant? This book brings together psychologists and philosophers to explore this aspect of vision.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Gary Hatfield & William Epstein (2012). Epilogue: Advances and Open Questions. In Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.), Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oup Oxford. 232.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. David R. Hilbert (2005). Color Constancy and the Complexity of Color. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):141-158.
    We can start with a definition. “[C]olour constancy is the constancy of the perceived colours of surfaces under changes in the intensity and spectral composition of the illumination.” (Foster et al. 1997) Given the definition we can now ask a question: Does human color vision exhibit color constancy?1 The answer to the question depends in part on how we interpret it. If the question is understood as asking whether human color vision displays constancy for every possible scene across every possible (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Michael Madary (2010). The Puzzle of Perception. Think 9 (25):57-63.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. John O'Dea (forthcoming). Art and Ambiguity: A Gestalt-Shift Approach to Elusive Appearances. In Fabian Dorsch, Fiona Macpherson & Martine Nida-Rümelin (eds.), Phenomenal Presence.
    I defend a solution to a long-standing problem with perceptual appearances, brought about by the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. The problem is that in conditions which are non-ideal, yet within the range that perceptual constancy works, we see things veridically despite an “appearance” which is traditionally taken to be non-veridical. For example, a tilted coin is often taken to have an “elliptical appearance”, shadowed surfaces a “darker appearance”. These appearances are puzzling for a number of reasons. I defend and elaborate (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Susanna Schellenberg (2010). Perceptual Experience and the Capacity to Act. In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 145.
    This paper develops and defends the capacity view, that is, the view that the ability to perceive the perspective-independent or intrinsic properties of objects depends on the perceiver’s capacity to act. More specifically, I argue that self-location and spatial know-how are jointly necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. Representing one’s location allows one to abstract from one’s particular vantage point to perceive the perspective-independent properties of objects. Spatial know-how allows one to perceive objects as the kind of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Susanna Schellenberg (2008). The Situation-Dependency of Perception. Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.
    I argue that perception is necessarily situation-dependent. The way an object is must not just be distinguished from the way it appears and the way it is represented, but also from the way it is presented given the situational features. First, I argue that the way an object is presented is best understood in terms of external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent properties of objects. Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and ontologically dependent on the intrinsic properties of objects, such as their (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Susanna Schellenberg (2007). Action and Self-Location in Perception. Mind 115 (463):603-632.
    I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Brad J. Thompson (2006). Color Constancy and Russellian Representationalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.
    Representationalism, the view that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content, has attracted a wide following in recent years. Most representationalists have also endorsed what I call 'standard Russellianism'. According to standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. I argue that standard Russellianism conflicts with the everyday experience of colour constancy. Due to colour constancy, standard Russellianism is unable to simultaneously give a proper account of the phenomenal content of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Keith Wilson (2013). Perception and Reality. New Philosopher 1 (2):104-107.
    Taken at face value, the picture of reality suggested by modern science seems radically opposed to the world as we perceive it through our senses. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear scientists and others claim that much of our perceptual experience is a kind of pervasive illusion rather than a faithful presentation of various aspects of reality. On this view, familiar properties such as colours and solidity, to take just two examples, do not belong to external objects, but are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation