The literature on perceptual knowledge—or, more broadly, the epistemology of perception—addresses a wide array of issues that often overlap. Among the most prominent questions in the literature are the following: How should we account for perceptual knowledge and related notions such as perceptual evidence, justification, rationality, and entitlement? Is any perceptual knowledge/justification immediate, or is all perceptual knowledge/justification mediated by other knowledge/justification? Must perceptual experiences be understood as having conceptual content—or as having representational content at all—to justify perceptual beliefs? How should the metaphysics of perception inform the epistemology of perception (or vice versa)? How can we address skeptical threats to the status of our perceptual beliefs? Do we have the same evidence for our perceptual beliefs in good and bad cases of perceptual experience? More broadly, what is the relationship between the epistemic standing of our perceptual beliefs in good and bad cases?
Some central works about the nature of perceptual knowledge are Dretske(1969, 2000), Goldman (1976), McDowell (1994), Williamson (2000), Johnston (2006), and Sosa (2007). Some central works about the nature of perceptual justification, entitlement and rationality are Pryor (2000), Huemer (2001), Burge (2003) and Wright (2004). Important discussions of the relationship between perceptual content and the epistemology of perception include Sellars (1956), Martin (1993), Brewer (1999), Heck (2000), and Silins (2011). Important discussions of the relationship between the metaphysics and epistemology of perception include Fumerton (1985), Martin (2006), McDowell (2008), and Sosa (2011). Pryor (2000), Huemer (2001), and Wright (2002) rank among the most important recent discussions of perception and skepticism. Pritchard (2012) and Schellenberg (2013) have developed accounts of the relationship between the epistemology of the good and the bad cases.
- Knowledge of Consciousness (114)
- Discriminability (53)
- The Given (87)
- Epistemic and Non-epistemic Perception (26)
- Perception and Thought (67)
Dogmatism about Perception
Epistemic and Non-epistemic Perception
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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