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Epistemic and Non-epistemic Perception
- Emmanuel Alloa (2011). Seeing-in, Seeing-as, Seeing-With: Looking Through Pictures. In Elisabeth Nemeth, Richard Heinrich, Wolfram Pichler & Wagner David (eds.), Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science, and the Arts. Volume I. Proceedings of the 33rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Ontos: 179-190.
- Nicolas Bullot, Attention, Information and Epistemic Perception.
- Daryl Close (1980). More on Non-Epistemic Seeing. Mind 89 (January):99-105.
- Daryl Close (1976). What is Non-Epistemic Seeing? Mind 85 (April):161-170.
- Russell B. Goodman (1976). Two Concepts of Perceptual Relativity. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):45-52.
- Susan L. Hurley (2001). Overintellectualizing the Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):423-431.
- Michael G. F. Martin (2001). Epistemic Openness and Perceptual Defeasibility. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):441-448.
- J. Barry Maund (1976). The Non-Sensuous Epistemic Account of Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):57-62.
- William E. S. McNeill (forthcoming). On Seeing That Someone is Angry. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):no-no.
- Sofia Miguens (2002). Qualia or Non Epistemic Perception: D. Dennett's and F. Dretske's Representational Theories of Consciousness. Agora 21 (2):193-208.
- Snjezana Prijic-Samarzija (2004). Some Epistemological Consequences of the Dual-Aspect Theory of Visual Perception. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):273-290.
- John Turri (2008). Practical and Epistemic Justification in Alston's Perceiving God. Faith and Philosophy 25 (3):290 - 299.
- Michel Weber (2006). Whitehead's Onto-Epistemology of Perception and its Significance for Consciousness Studies. New Ideas in Psychology 24 (2):117-132.
- Tine Wilde (2008). Remodel[L]Ing Reality. Wittgenstein's Uebersichtliche Darstellung & the Phenomenon of Installation in Visual Art. Dissertation, University of Amsterdam
- Edmond Wright, Perception as Epistemic: 'We Perceive Only What We Have Motivationally Selected as Entities'.
- Edmond L. Wright (1986). Ben-Zeev on the Non-Epistemic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (September):351-359.
- Edmond L. Wright (1981). Yet More on Non-Epistemic Seeing. Mind 90 (October):586-591.
- Edmond L. Wright (1977). Perception: A New Theory. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (October):273-286.
- Edmond Leo Wright, Sensing as Non-Epistemic.
Perceptual Justification
- Keith Allen (2010). Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World * By JACK C. LYONS. Analysis 70 (2):391-393.
- William P. Alston (1993). The Reliability of Sense Perception. Cornell University Press.
- Jon Altschul, Epistemic Entitlement. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Ralph Baergen (1992). Perceptual Consciousness and Perceptual Evidence. Philosophical Papers 21 (2):107-119.
- Andrew R. Bailey (1998). Phenomenal Properties: The Epistemology and Metaphysics of Qualia. Dissertation, University of Calgary
- Selim Berker (2011). Gupta's Gambit. Philosophical Studies 152:17-39.
- Tim Black (2011). Review of John McDowell, Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
- Bill Brewer (1999/2002). Perception and Reason. Oxford University Press.
- Bill Brewer (1998). Experience and Reason in Perception. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Robert Briscoe (2007). Communication and Rational Responsiveness to the World. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88:135-159.
- Anthony Brueckner (2009). Internalism and Evidence of Reliability. Philosophia 37 (1):47-54.
- Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-548.
- Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.
- Alex Byrne (1996). Spin Control: Comment on McDowell's Mind and World. Philosophical Issues 7:261-73.
- Cheryl K. Chen (2006). Empirical Content and Rational Constraint. Inquiry 49 (3):242 – 264.
- Jiaming Chen (2008). The Empirical Foundation and Justification of Knowledge. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (1):67-82.
- Philippe Chuard, Perceptual Reasons.
- Stewart Cohen (2010). Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, and a Priori Justification. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):141-159.
- Juan Comesana (2005). Justified Vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.
- Earl Conee, Opposing Skepticism Disjunctively.
- Dan D. Crawford (1991). On Having Reasons for Perceptual Beliefs: A Sellarsian Perspective. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:107-123.
- Matthew Davidson & Gordon Barnes (forthcoming). Internalism and Properly Basic Belief. In David Werther Mark Linville (ed.), Philosophy and the Christian Worldview : Analysis, Assessment and Development. Continuum.
- Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Perception, Generality, and Reasons. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
- Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Reasons for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286–318.
- Alan H. Goldman (2004). Epistemological Foundations: Can Experiences Justify Beliefs? American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4):273-285.
- Alan H. Goldman (1981). Epistemology and the Psychology of Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (January):43-51.
- A. Gupta (2006). Empiricism and Experience. Harvard University Press.
- A. Gupta (2006). Experience and Knowledge. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
- Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (2008). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
- Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (2008). Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
- Benj Hellie (2011). There It Is. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):110-164.
- Kenneth Hobson (2008). Foundational Beliefs and the Structure of Justification. Synthese 164 (1):117 - 139.
- Max O. Hocutt (1968). The Difference Between the Psychology and the Epistemology of Perception. Tulane Studies in Philosophy 17:61-81.
- Emmett L. Holman (1977). Sensory Experience, Perceptual Evidence and Conceptual Frameworks. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (April):99-108.
- Michael Huemer (2006). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):147-158.
- Michael Huemer (1998). A Direct Realist Account of Perceptual Awareness. Dissertation, Rutgers University
- Matthew Kotzen (forthcoming). Silins's Liberalism. Philosophical Studies.
- Jack Lyons (forthcoming). Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
- Jack Lyons (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
- Jack Lyons (2010). Precis of Perception and Basic Beliefs. Philosophical Studies.
- Jack Lyons (2010). Response to Critics. Philosophical Studies.
- Jack Lyons (2009). Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules and the Problem of the External World. OUP USA.
- Jack Lyons (2008). Evidence, Experience, and Externalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):461 – 479.
- Jack C. Lyons (2009). Perception and Virtue Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 24 (4):249-261.
- Jack C. Lyons (2005). Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256.
- Peter J. Markie (2005). The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification. Philosophical Studies 126 (3):347-373.
- Peter J. Markie (2004). Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):530-553.
- Michael W. Martin (1993). The Rational Role of Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:71-88.
- Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). How To Be Sure: Sensory Exploration and Empirical Certainty. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
- Alan Millar (1989). Experience and the Justification of Belief. Ratio 2 (2):138-152.
- George Edward Moore (1918). Some Judgements of Perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 19:1--29.
- Ram Neta (2004). Perceptual Evidence and the New Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):199-214.
- Anthony O'Hear (1998). Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
- Daniel OBrien, The Epistemology of Perception. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- George S. Pappas (1982). Non-Inferential Knowledge. Philosophia 12 (December):81-98.
- Christopher Peacocke (2009). Perception, Content and Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):475-481.
- Christopher Peacocke, Explaining Perceptual Entitlement.
- James Pryor, Is There Non-Inferential Justification?
- Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2011). Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
- Steven L. Reynolds (1991). Knowing How to Believe with Justification. Philosophical Studies 64 (3):273-292.
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