Related categories
Siblings:
76 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 76
  1. Yuri Balashov, Noûs 33 (1999): 644-662.
    I offer an argument in defense of four-dimensionalism, the view that objects are temporally, as well as spatially extended. The argument is of the inference-to-the-best-explanation variety and is based on relativistic considerations. It deals with the situation in which one and the same object has different three-dimensional shapes at the same time and proceeds by asking what sort of thing it must be in order to present itself in such different ways in various “perspectives” (associated with moving reference frames) without (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Yuri Balashov (2009). Pegs, Boards, and Relativistic Perdurance. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):167-175.
    In an earlier work I developed an argument favoring one view of persistence (viz., perdurance) over its rivals, based on considerations of the relativity of three-dimensional spatial shapes of physical objects in Minkowski spacetime. The argument has since come under criticism (in the works of Theodore Sider, Kristie Miller, Ian Gibson, Oliver Pooley, and Thomas Sattig). Two related topics, explanatory virtues and explanatory relevance, are central to these critical discussions. In this paper I deal with these topics directly and respond (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Yuri Balashov (2002). On Stages, Worms, and Relativity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:223-.
    Four-dimensionalism, or perdurantism, the view that temporally extended objects persist through time by having (spatio-)temporal parts or stages, includes two varieties, the worm theory and the stage theory. According to the worm theory, perduring objects are four-dimensional wholes occupying determinate regions of spacetime and having temporal parts, or stages, each of them confined to a particular time. The stage theorist, however, claims, not that perduring objects have stages, but that the fundamental entities of the perdurantist ontology are stages. I argue (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jiri Benovksy (2007). On Presentist Perdurantism. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):79-88.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jiri Benovsky (2013). New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory: Endurantism and Perdurantism. Acta Analytica 28 (2):223-227.
    In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with the view that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple objection that forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not claim that this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means more appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further motivation to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (more (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Jiri Benovsky (2011). Endurance, Perdurance, and Metaontology. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy (2):159-177.
    The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or less classical) answers to questions about "equivalences" between metaphysical theories and to the question whether metaphysical disputes are substantive or merely verbal (i.e. various versions of realism, strong anti-realism, moderate anti-realism, or epistemicism). In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I shall have a close look at one metaphysical debate that has been the target and center of interest of many meta-metaphysicians, namely the problem (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Jiri Benovsky (2009). Eternalist Theories of Persistence Through Time: Where the Differences Really Lie. Axiomathes 19 (1):51-71.
    The eternalist endurantist and perdurantist theories of persistence through time come in various versions, namely the two versions of perdurantism: the worm view and the stage view , and the two versions of endurantism: indexicalism and adverbialism . Using as a starting point the instructive case of what is depicted by photographs, I will examine these four views, and compare them, with some interesting results. Notably, we will see that two traditional enemies—the perdurantist worm view and the endurantist theories—are more (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jiri Benovsky (2006). Persistence Through Time and Across Possible Worlds. Ontos Verlag.
    How do ordinary objects persist through time and across possible worlds ? How do they manage to have their temporal and modal properties ? These are the questions adressed in this book which is a "guided tour of theories of persistence". The book is divided in two parts. In the first, the two traditional accounts of persistence through time (endurantism and perdurantism) are combined with presentism and eternalism to yield four different views, and their variants. The resulting views are then (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Montse Bordes (1998). Abstract Particulars in a Four-Dimensional Frame. Dialectica 52:3-12.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Montse Bordes (1997). Four-Dimensional Remarks: A Defence of Temporal Parts. Theoria (29):343-377.
  11. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). Talking About a Universalist World. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):499 - 534.
    The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Mikel Burley (2008). Harry Silverstein's Four-Dimensionalism and the Purported Evil of Death. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):559 – 568.
    In his article 'The Evil of Death' (henceforth: ED) Harry Silverstein argues that a proper refutation of the Epicurean view that death is not an evil requires the adoption of a particular revisionary ontology, which Silverstein, following Quine, calls 'four-dimensionalism'.1 In 'The Evil of Death Revisited' (henceforth: EDR) Silverstein reaffirms his earlier position and responds to several criticisms, including some targeted at his ontology. There remain, however, serious problems with Silverstein's argument, and I shall highlight five major ones below. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Claudio Calosi & Damiano Costa (forthcoming). Multilocation, Fusions and Confusions. Philosophia:1-9.
    The paper provides a new and detailed critique of Barker and Dowe’s argument against multi-location. This critique is not only novel but also less committal than previous ones in the literature in that it does not require hefty metaphysical assumptions. The paper also provides an analysis of some metaphysical relations between mereological and locational principles.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Ben Caplan & Carl Matheson (2008). Defending 'Defending Musical Perdurantism'. British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (1):80-85.
    British Journal of Aesthetics (forthcoming Jan. 2008).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Ben Caplan & Carl Matheson (2006). Defending Musical Perdurantism. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (1):59-69.
    If musical works are abstract objects, which cannot enter into causal relations, then how can we refer to musical works or know anything about them? Worse, how can any of our musical experiences be experiences of musical works? It would be nice to be able to sidestep these questions altogether. One way to do that would be to take musical works to be concrete objects. In this paper, we defend a theory according to which musical works are concrete objects. In (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Maureen Donnelly (2011). Endurantist and Perdurantist Accounts of Persistence. Philosophical Studies 154 (1):27 - 51.
    In this paper, I focus on three issues intertwined in current debates between endurantists and perdurantists—(i) the dimension of persisting objects, (ii) whether persisting objects have timeless, or only time-relative, parts, and (iii) whether persisting objects have proper temporal parts. I argue that one standard endurantist position on the first issue is compatible with standard perdurantist positions on parthood and temporal parts. I further argue that different accounts of persistence depend on the claims about objects' dimensions and not on the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Mauro Dorato (2012). Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: Why the Unsubstantiality of the First Debate Implies That of the Second. Philosophia Naturalis 49 (1):25-41.
    The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By “logical equivalence” I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and Dorato (2006) have cast (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Antony Eagle (2010). Duration in Relativistic Spacetime. In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 5. Oxford University Press. 113-17.
    In ‘Location and Perdurance’ (2010), I argued that there are no compelling mereological or sortal grounds requiring the perdurantist to distinguish the molecule Abel from the atom Abel in Gilmore’s original case (2007). The remaining issue Gilmore originally raised concerned the ‘mass history’ of Adam and Abel, the distribution of ‘their’ mass over spacetime. My response to this issue was to admit that mass histories needed to be relativised to a way of partitioning the location of Adam/Abel, but that did (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Antony Eagle (2010). Location and Perdurance. In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 5. Oxford Univerity Press. 53-94.
    Recently, Cody Gilmore has deployed an ingenious case involving backwards time travel to highlight an apparent conflict between the theory that objects persist by perduring, and the thesis that wholly coincident objects are impossible. However, careful attention to the concepts of location and parthood that Gilmore’s cases involve shows that the perdurantist faces no genuine objection from these cases, and that the perdurantist has a number of plausible and dialectically appropriate ways to avoid the supposed conflict.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Antony Eagle (2007). Reply to Stone on Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism. Analysis 67 (2):159 - 162.
    Recently, Jim Stone has argued that counterpart theory is incompatible with the existence of temporal parts. I demonstrate that there is no such incompatibility.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. M. Eddon (2010). Why Four-Dimensionalism Explains Coincidence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):721-728.
    In ?Does Four-Dimensionalism Explain Coincidence?? Mark Moyer argues that there is no reason to prefer the four-dimensionalist (or perdurantist) explanation of coincidence to the three-dimensionalist (or endurantist) explanation. I argue that Moyer's formulations of perdurantism and endurantism lead him to overlook the perdurantist's advantage. A more satisfactory formulation of these views reveals a puzzle of coincidence that Moyer does not consider, and the perdurantist's treatment of this puzzle is clearly preferable.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Nikk Effingham, The Inelegance of Perdurantist Universalism.
    Universalism (the thesis that for any ys, those ys compose a further object) is an answer to the Special Composition Question. In the literature there are three arguments (the arguments from elegance) that are often relied upon, but rarely examined in-depth. I argue that these motivations cannot be had by the perdurantist, for to avoid a commitment to badly behaved superluminal objects perdurantists must answer the Proper Continuant Question. Any answer to that question necessarily ensures that there is a restricted (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Nikk Effingham (2012). Endurantism and Perdurantism. In Robert Barnard Neil Manson (ed.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. 170.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Robert Francescotti (2010). Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-350.
  25. Alessandro Giordani & Damiano Costa (2013). From Times to Worlds and Back Again: A Transcendentist Theory of Persistence. Thought 2 (1):210-220.
    Until recently, an almost perfect parallelism seemed to hold between theories of identity through time and across possible worlds,as every account in the temporal case(endurantism,perdurantism, exdurantism) was mirrored by a twin account in the modal case (trans-world identity, identity-via-parts, identity-via-counterparts). Nevertheless, in the recent literature, this parallelism has been broken because of the implementation in the debate of the relation of location. In particular, endurantism has been subject to a more in-depth analysis, and different versions of it, corresponding to different (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Geoffrey Gorham (2010). Descartes on Persistence and Temporal Parts. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Mariusz Grygianiec (2007). 'Four-Dimensionalism' - analiza i interpretacja. Filozofia Nauki 1.
    There are several faces of Four-Dimensionalism. Sometimes 4D-ism is formulated as the thesis that the material world is composed of spatial as well as temporal parts. Another version of 4D-ism states that persisting objects are extended over time in the same way that they are extended over space. Some Four-Dimensionalists defend the thesis that all objects persist by perduring i.e. by having different temporal parts at different times. Sometimes 4D-ism means the same as eternalism - the thesis that past and (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Steven D. Hales & Timothy A. Johnson (2003). Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):524–539.
    There are two main theories about the persistence of objects through time: endurantism and perdurantism. Endurantists hold that objects are three-dimensional, have only spatial parts, and wholly exist at each moment of their existence. Perdurantists hold that objects are four-dimensional, have temporal parts, and only partly exist at each moment of their existence. In this paper we argue that endurantism is poorly suited to describe the persistence of objects in a world governed by Special Relativity, and can accommodate a relativistic (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2009). Objects in Time: Studies of Persistence in B-Time. Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis is about the conceptualization of persistence of physical, middle-sized objects within the theoretical framework of the revisionary ‘B-theory’ of time. According to the B-theory, time does not flow, but is an extended and inherently directed fourth dimension along which the history of the universe is ‘laid out’ once and for all. It is a widespread view among philosophers that if we accept the B-theory, the commonsensical ‘endurance theory’ of persistence will have to be rejected. The endurance theory says (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Katherine Hawley, Temporal Parts.
    Temporal parts are analogous to spatial parts: just as the conference has one spatial part which occupies the seminar room, and another which occupies the lecture hall, it has one temporal part which ‘occupies’ Friday and another which ‘occupies’ Saturday. These temporal parts of the conference have half-hour coffee-breaks as temporal parts of their own; these coffee-breaks are also temporal parts of the whole conference.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Katherine Hawley (1999). Persistence and Non-Supervenient Relations. Mind 108 (429):53-67.
    I claim that, if persisting objects have temporal parts, then there are non-supervenient relations between those temporal parts. These are relations which are not determined by intrinsic properties of the temporal parts. I use the Kripke-Armstrong 'rotating homogeneous disc' argument in order to establish this claim, and in doing so I defend and develop that argument. This involves a discussion of instantaneous velocity, and of the causes and effects of rotation. Finally, I compare alternative responses to the rotating disc argument, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Mark Heller (1993). Varieties of Four Dimensionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):47 – 59.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Mark Heller (1992). Things Change. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):695-704.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Frank Hofmann (2009). An Alternative to Endurantism and Perdurantism: Doing Without Occupants. In Ludger Honnefelder, Benedikt Schick & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. Walter de Gruyter Inc. 134.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Hud Hudson (2004). Temporally Incongruent Counterparts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):337–343.
    Despite its first page this paper is not yet another piece on Kant! Rather, the paper is a contribution to the literature on incongruent counterparts. Specifically, it concerns the question of whether we can construct a temporal version of the puzzle of incongruent counterparts--a question which (as far as I can tell) has been thoroughly neglected. I maintain that we can construct such a version of the puzzle, and that this temporal variant on the phenomenon has something to teach us (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Ingvar Johansson (2010). Review: Tobias Hansson Wahlberg, Objects in Time. Studies of Persistence in B-Time (2009). [REVIEW] Metaphysica 11 (1):93-94.
  37. Frederick W. Kroon (2001). Parts and Pretense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):543-560.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Frederick W. Kroon (2001). Parts and Pretense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):543 - 560.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. S. Langford (2010). Reply to Roache. Analysis 70 (4):676-681.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Simon Langford (2007). How to Defend the Cohabitation Theory. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):212–224.
    David Lewis's cohabitation theory suffered damaging criticism from Derek Parfit. Though many have defended versions of Lewis's theory Parfit's criticism has not been answered. This paper shows how to defend the cohabitation theory against Parfit's criticism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. N. McKinnon (2002). The Endurance/Perdurance Distinction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):288 – 306.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. J. W. Meiland (1966). Temporal Parts and Spatio-Temporal Analogies. American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1):64 - 70.
    To what extent is time similar to space? in this paper it is shown that the claim, Made by richard taylor among others, That time and space are "radically alike" is unfounded. This claim can be supported only by employing the notion of temporal parts. It is shown that if objects are regarded as having temporal parts as well as spatial parts, Then serious disanalogies exist between time and space. Furthermore, If objects are said to have temporal parts, Then it (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Trenton Merricks (2000). Perdurance and Psychological Continuity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):195-199.
  44. Trenton Merricks (2000). Perdurance and Psychological Continuity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):195 - 198.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Trenton Merricks (1999). Persistence, Parts, and Presentism. Noûs 33 (3):421-438.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Trenton Merricks (1995). On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Entities. Mind 104 (415):521-531.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Kristie Miller (2009). Ought a Four-Dimensionalist to Believe in Temporal Parts? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 619-646.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. H. W. Noonan (1985). A Note on Temporal Parts. Analysis 45 (3):151 - 152.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Harold W. Noonan (2009). Perdurance, Location and Classical Mereology. Analysis 69 (3):448-452.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Harold W. Noonan (2005). A Flawed Argument for Perdurance – Reply to Braddon-Mitchell and Miller. Analysis 65 (286):164–166.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 76