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Persistence, Misc

Edited by A. P. Taylor (North Dakota State University)
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  1. H. E. Baber (1983). The Lifetime Language. Philosophical Studies 43 (1):139 - 146.
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  2. Bassham & Walls (eds.) (2007). Basketball and Philosophy. University of Kentucky Press.
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  3. Jiri Benovsky (2011). Endurance, Perdurance, and Metaontology. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy (2):159-177.
    The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or less classical) answers to questions about "equivalences" between metaphysical theories and to the question whether metaphysical disputes are substantive or merely verbal (i.e. various versions of realism, strong anti-realism, moderate anti-realism, or epistemicism). In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I shall have a close look at one metaphysical debate that has been the target and center of interest of many meta-metaphysicians, namely the problem (...)
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  4. Janet Borgerson (2005). Judith Butler: On Organizing Subjectivities. Sociological Review 53:63-79.
    In this essay, I evoke and explore Butler's potential contribution, providing a broad framework for her work, and, at the same time, focusing on specific concepts from her writings - performativity, iteration, and foreclosure - that have profound implications for researchers. Furthermore, pointing out philosophers working in the phenomenological tradition in which Butler trained, including influential precursors, colleagues, and contemporaries, establishes how issues raised in various fields can be recognized and comprehended in relation to Butler's work more generally. Butler's work (...)
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  5. Michael B. Burke (1992). Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account. Analysis 52 (1):12 - 17.
    On the most popular account of material constitution, it is common for a material object to coincide precisely with one or more other material objects, ones that are composed of just the same matter but differ from it in sort. I argue that there is nothing that could ground the alleged difference in sort and that the account must be rejected.
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  6. Claudio Calosi & Damiano Costa (2015). Multilocation, Fusions and Confusions. Philosophia 43 (1):25-33.
    The paper provides a new and detailed critique of Barker and Dowe’s argument against multi-location. This critique is not only novel but also less committal than previous ones in the literature in that it does not require hefty metaphysical assumptions. The paper also provides an analysis of some metaphysical relations between mereological and locational principles.
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  7. Chad Carmichael (2015). Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Question. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):475-490.
    The special composition question is the question, ‘When do some things compose something?’ The answers to this question in the literature have largely been at odds with common sense, either by allowing that any two things compose something, or by denying the existence of most ordinary composite objects. I propose a new ‘series-style’ answer to the special composition question that accords much more closely with common sense, and I defend this answer from van Inwagen's objections. Specifically, I will argue that (...)
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  8. Hugh S. Chandler (1984). Theseus' Clothes-Pin. Analysis 44 (2):55 - 58.
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  9. Vere Chappell (1973). Matter. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):679-696.
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  10. James Van Cleve (1986). Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Through Time. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):141-156.
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  11. S. Marc Cohen (1984). Aristotle and Individuation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1984 (s.v.):41-65.
    It is traditionally maintained that according to Aristotle, matter provides a principle of individuation. Objections of several sorts have been raised against this interpretation. One objection holds that for Aristotle it is form, rather than matter, that individuates. A more radical objection is that Aristotle does not propose any principle of individuation at all. Any adequate discussion of this issue must make clear precisely what problems such a principle is meant to address. This in turn requires that several important distinctions (...)
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  12. Damiano Costa (forthcoming). The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence. Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper develops a endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic tenet, which concerns existence at a time – the relation between an object and the times at which that object is present. According to this tenet, which I call transcendentism, for an object to exist at a time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. I argue that transcendentism is a semantically grounded and metaphysically fruitful. It is semantically grounded, (...)
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  13. Paolo Dau (1986). Part-Time Objects. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):459-474.
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  14. Frederick Doeke (1982). Spatially Coinciding Objects. Ratio:10--24.
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  15. Frederick Doepke (1987). The Structures of Persons and Artifacts. Ratio (1):36.
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  16. Robert Francescotti (2010). Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-350.
    In attempting to understand personal identity, it is common practice to imagine a person existing at some time t and a person existing at a time t* , and then to ask, What does it take for person x at t to be the same person as person y at t*?The Psychological Continuity Approach answers: there is a relation, R, of psychological continuity such that person x at t is the same person as person y at t* if and only (...)
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  17. Robert Francescotti (2005). Constitution and the Necessity of Identity. Logique Et Analyse 48 (192):311-321.
    It is tempting to think that in the case of complete spatio-temporal coincidence, the statue is identical with the constituent lump of clay. However, some philosophers have thought that accepting constitution as identity in this type of case forces one to reject the necessity of identity. I show that there is no conflict here. By distinguishing between an object's being necessarily an F and an object's being necessity identical with an F, we can see that accepting the necessity of identity (...)
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  18. Robert Francescotti (2003). Statues and Their Constituents: Whether Constitution is Identity. Metaphysica 4 (2):59-77.
    This paper examines two popular arguments for the nonidentity of the statue and its constituent material. An essentialist response is provided to one of the arguments; that response is then shown to undermine the other argument as well. It is also shown that even if we accept these arguments and concede nonidentity, we can still avoid the further conclusion that constitution is not identity. These ideas are then extended to other applications of the arguments for nonidentity (specifically, their application to (...)
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  19. Christopher Frey (2007). Organic Unity and the Matter of Man. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (summer):167-204.
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  20. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2014). Institutional Objects, Reductionism and Theories of Persistence. Dialectica 68 (4):525-562.
    Can institutional objects be identified with physical objects that have been ascribed status functions, as advocated by John Searle in The Construction of Social Reality (1995)? The paper argues that the prospects of this identification hinge on how objects persist – i.e., whether they endure, perdure or exdure through time. This important connection between reductive identification and mode of persistence has been largely ignored in the literature on social ontology thus far.
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  21. Eli Hirsch (1999). Identity in the Talmud. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):166–180.
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  22. Eli Hirsch (1982). The Concept of Identity. Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Eli Hirsch focuses on identity through time, first with respect to ordinary bodies, then underlying matter, and eventually persons.
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  23. Eli Hirsch (1976). Physical Identity. Philosophical Review 85 (3):357-389.
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  24. Hud Hudson (2001). A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person. Cornell University Press.
    Introduction In the first four chapters of this book, I develop and defend a monistic account of human persons according to which human persons are highly ...
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  25. Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (2009). Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):79-99.
    It has been argued that the tenseless view of time is incompatible with endurantism. This has been disputed, perhaps most famously by Hugh Mellor and Peter Simons. They argue that things can endure in tenseless time, and indeed must endure if tenseless time is to contain change. In this paper I will point out some difficulties with Mellor’s and Simons’ claims that in tenseless time a particular can be ‘wholly present’ at various times, and therefore endure, as well as have (...)
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  26. Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (2009). Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time. SATS 10 (1).
    It has been argued that the tenseless view of time is incompatible with endurantism. This has been disputed, perhaps most famously by Hugh Mellor and Peter Simons. They argue that things can endure in tenseless time, and indeed must endure if tenseless time is to contain change. In this paper I will point out some difficulties with Mellor’s and Simons’ claims that in tenseless time a particular can be ‘wholly present’ at various times, and therefore endure, as well as have (...)
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  27. Evan K. Jobe (1976). Temporal Predication and Identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):65 – 71.
    The article attempts to resolve the problem raised by richard sharvey's arguments supporting the thesis that temporal contexts present difficulties for quantification similar to those presented by alethic modal contexts. to this end a concept of temporally relativized identity for physical objects is introduced and explicated within a four-dimensional space-time view of the world. this in turn permits the introduction of the notion of "restricted" physical objects and the notion of "extended" physical objects. it is then shown how the use (...)
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  28. Marvin E. Kirsh, Where the Shape of the Egg Comes From?
    The shape of the egg is proposed to be the consequence of synergistic actions from the transmission of forces derived from instinctual motions and energy matter conversions that act to obstruct the grounding and neutralization of energy emissions by limiting in size the physical domain of self witness. A philosophy and theory associating, atemporal in nature, form and emergence is evolved from logical considerations for the construction of a mathematical/geometrical model of the egg that is generated from a template construed (...)
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  29. Kathrin Koslicki (2007). Review of Henry Laycock, Words Without Objects: Semantics, Ontology, and Logic for Non-Singularity. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):160-163.
  30. Kathrin Koslicki (2003). The Crooked Path From Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):107 - 134.
    The main goal of Sider’s book, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, is to show why his version of four- dimensionalism, the stage-theory, on balance, should be preferred over its main competitors: it is, in his view, the theory which presents the best unified treatment of a wide range of central metaphysical puzzles; the theory which has, on balance, “the most important advantages and the least serious drawbacks” (ibid., p. 140). I argue in this paper that, when we add (...)
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  31. Kathrin Koslicki (2003). Review of Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 112 (1):110-113.
  32. Simon Langford (2007). How to Defend the Cohabitation Theory. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):212–224.
    David Lewis's cohabitation theory suffered damaging criticism from Derek Parfit. Though many have defended versions of Lewis's theory Parfit's criticism has not been answered. This paper shows how to defend the cohabitation theory against Parfit's criticism.
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  33. B. N. Langtry (1972). Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):184-189.
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  34. Ken Levy (2005). Is Descartes a Temporal Atomist? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (4):627 – 674.
    I argue that Descartes' Second Causal Proof of God in the Third Meditation evidences, and commits him to, the belief that time is "strongly discontinuous" -- that is, that there is actually a gap between each consecutive moment of time. Much of my article attempts to reconcile this interpretation, the "received view," with Descartes' statements about time, space, and matter in his other writings, including his correspondence with various philosophers.
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  35. E. J. Lowe (1983). On the Identity of Artifacts. Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):220-232.
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  36. Penelope Mackie (1998). Identity, Time, and Necessity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):59–78.
    The paper offers an explanation of the intuitive appeal of Saul Kripke's necessity of origin thesis, exhibiting it as the consequence of a temporally asymmetrical 'branching model' of possibilities which, in turn, rests on two plausible principles concerning possibility, time, and identity. Unlike some other accounts, my explanation dissociates the necessity of origin thesis from a commitment to individual essences or other sufficient conditions for identity across possible worlds. I conclude that although the branching model is not irresistible, its rejection (...)
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  37. D. H. Mellor (1980). The Self From Time to Time. Analysis 40 (1):59 - 62.
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  38. Kristie Miller (2016). Persisting Particulars and Their Properties. In Francesco Federico Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong. De Gruyter 139-160.
    My present inclination is to say that both identity and relational analyses are intelligible hypotheses. I reject the identity analysis, looking rather to relations between different phases to secure the unity of a particular over time. But I do not think that the identity view can be rejected as illogical. If it is to be rejected, then I think it must be rejected for Occamist reasons. The different phases exist, and so do their relations. These phases so related, it seems, (...)
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  39. Kristie Miller (2013). Times, Worlds and Locations. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):221-227.
    In ‘from times to worlds and back again: a transcendentist theory of persistence’ (henceforth TTP) Alessandro Giordani outlines five competitor views regarding the manner in which objects occupy regions along a dimension. These are: (1) classical uni-location (2) bare uni-location (3) multi-location (4) counterpart presence and (5) transcendent presence. Each view comes in both a temporal and modal version and Giordani argues that one ought to prefer transcendentism (i.e. 5) along both dimensions. According to temporal transcendentism, necessarily, no object is (...)
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  40. Kristie Miller (2005). A New Definition of Endurance. Theoria 71 (4):309-332.
    In this paper I present a new definition of endurance. I argue that the three-dimensionalist ought to adopt a different understanding from the four-dimensionalist, of what it is to have a part simpliciter. With this new understanding it becomes possible to define endurance in a manner that both preserves the central endurantist intuitions, whilst avoiding commitment to any controversial metaphysical theses. Furthermore, since this endurantist definition is a mereological one, there is an elegant symmetry between the definitions of endurance and (...)
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  41. George Myro (1986). Time and Essence. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):331-341.
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  42. Jack Nelson (1972). Logically Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Identity Through Time. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (2):177 - 185.
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  43. Gregory M. Nixon (2010). Editorial: Time & Experience: Twins of the Eternal Now? Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (5):482-489.
    In what follows, I suggest that, against most theories of time, there really is an actual present, a now, but that such an eternal moment cannot be found before or after time. It may even be semantically incoherent to say that such an eternal present exists since “it” is changeless and formless (presumably a dynamic chaos without location or duration) yet with creative potential. Such a field of near-infinite potential energy could have had no beginning and will have no end, (...)
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  44. Douglas Odegard (1972). Identity Through Time. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (1):29 - 38.
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  45. Eric T. Olson (1997). Dion's Foot. Journal of Philosophy 94 (5):260-265.
    Suppose a certain man, Dion, has his foot amputated, and lives to tell the tale. That tale involves a well-known metaphysical puzzle, for most of us assume that there was, before the operation, an object made up of all of Dion’s parts except those that overlapped with his foot-- ”all of Dion except for his foot”, we might say, or Dion’s “foot-complement”. Call that object Theon. (Anyone who doubts that there is such a thing as Dion’s undetached foot-complement may imagine (...)
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  46. D. E. Over (1986). Is There a Temporal Slippery Slope Paradox? Analysis 46 (4):197 - 200.
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  47. D. E. Over (1986). On a Temporal Slippery Slope Paradox. Analysis 46 (1):15 - 18.
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  48. Gilbert Plumer (1984). Why Time is Extensive. Mind 93 (370):265-270.
    I attempt to show, via considering Schlesinger’s device of putting the word ‘now’ in capitals, that the transient view of time can explicate temporal extensivity without presupposing it, and the static view can’t. The argument hinges on the point that duration is generated by continuance of the present—such that ‘the present’ here is used in a nontechnical, nonindexical, and nonreflexive sense, which Schlesinger and others unknowingly give to the word ‘now’ (by “NOW” or “Now” or “’now’”).
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  49. Marjorie S. Price (1977). Identity Through Time. Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):201-217.
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  50. A. N. Prior (1965). Time, Existence and Identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:183 - 192.
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