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  1. John Eldon Bahde (1989). Are Zygotes Human Beings? Dissertation, Cornell University
    The subject of this dissertation is fetal ontology, not the morality of abortion. I try to show that zygotes are not human beings. ;Unlike many philosophers, I am unwilling to give 'human being' to the biologists. It should not be confused with 'Homo sapiens' or any other taxonomic term of biology. On the other hand, it should not be confused with 'person' either. ;I investigate a number of attempts to fix the point at which we first become human beings. None (...)
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  2. Simon Beck (2010). Morals, Metaphysics and the Method of Cases. South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):332-342.
    In this paper I discuss a set of problems concerning the method of cases as it is used in applied ethics and in the metaphysical debate about personal identity. These problems stem from research in social psychology concerning our access to the data with which the method operates. I argue that the issues facing ethics are more worrying than those facing metaphysics.
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  3. Maren Behrensen (2014). Identity as Convention: Biometric Passports and the Promise of Security. Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 12 (1):44-59.
  4. Maren Behrensen (2013). Born That Way? The Metaphysics of Queer Liberation. APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Issues 12 (2):2-7.
  5. Stephan Blatti (2012). Death's Distinctive Harm. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):317-30.
    Despite widespread support for the claim that death can harm the one who dies, debate continues over how to rescue this harm thesis (HT) from Epicurus’s challenge. Disagreements focus on two of the three issues that any defense of HT must resolve: the subject of death’s harm and the timing of its injury. About the nature of death’s harm, however, a consensus has emerged around the view that death harms a subject (when it does) by depriving her of the goods (...)
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  6. Lisa Bortolotti & John Harris (2005). Stem Cell Research, Personhood and Sentience. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 10:68-75.
    In this paper the permissibility of stem cell research on early human embryos is defended. It is argued that, in order to have moral status, an individual must have an interest in its own wellbeing. Sentience is a prerequisite for having an interest in avoiding pain, and personhood is a prerequisite for having an interest in the continuation of one's own existence. Early human embryos are not sentient and therefore they are not recipients of direct moral consideration. Early human embryos (...)
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  7. Philip Brey (2009). Human Enhancement and Personal Identity. In Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen Friis, Evan Selinger & Søren Riis (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Technology. Palgrave Macmillan 169--185.
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  8. Vanessa Carbonell (2014). Amnesia, Anesthesia, and Warranted Fear. Bioethics 28 (5):245-254.
    Is a painful experience less bad for you if you will not remember it? Do you have less reason to fear it? These questions bear on how we think about medical procedures and surgeries that use an anesthesia regimen that leaves patients conscious – and potentially in pain – but results in complete ‘drug-induced amnesia’ after the fact. I argue that drug-induced amnesia does not render a painful medical procedure a less fitting object of fear, and thus the prospect of (...)
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  9. John F. Crosby (1993). The Personhood of the Human Embryo. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 18 (4):399-417.
    My interlocutor is anyone who denies peisonhood to the embryo on the grounds that a human person can exist only in conscious activity and that in the absence of consciousness a person cannot exist at all. I probe personal consciousness to the point at which the distinction between the being and the consciousness of the human person appears, and argue on the basis of this distinction that the being of a person can exist in the absence of any consciousness. I (...)
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  10. Benjamin L. Curtis (2010). Brain Neoplasm and Strict Identity. American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 1:10-11.
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  11. Ron C. de Weijze, Chiasmic Reflection And Confirmation.
    Epistemological monism and ontological dualism, closely parallel philological Postmodernism and philosophical Modernism. As Social Constructionism seems to be a product of Postmodernism from which roots one of its founders, John Shotter now "backs away", "the edge" brings it closer to Modernism. A model is suggested to describe and explain living chiasmic relations on the edge both in monistic and in dualistic terms.
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  12. David DeGrazia (2005). Human Identity and Bioethics. Cambridge University Press.
    When philosophers address personal identity, they usually explore numerical identity: what are the criteria for a person's continuing existence? When non-philosophers address personal identity, they often have in mind narrative identity: Which characteristics of a particular person are salient to her self-conception? This book develops accounts of both senses of identity, arguing that both are normatively important, and is unique in its exploration of a range of issues in bioethics through the lens of identity. Defending a biological view of our (...)
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  13. E. Furberg (2012). Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What Is the Problem? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (1):60-73.
    Next SectionThe personal identity problem expresses the worry that due to disrupted psychological continuity, one person’s advance directive could be used to determine the care of a different person. Even ethicists, who strongly question the possibility of the scenario depicted by the proponents of the personal identity problem, often consider it to be a very potent objection to the use of advance directives. Aiming to question this assumption, I, in this paper, discuss the personal identity problem’s relevance to the moral (...)
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  14. Nada Gligorov, Jody Azzouni, Douglas P. Lackey & Arnold Zweig (2013). Personal Identity. In Rosamond Rhodes, Nada Gligorov & Abraham Schwab (eds.), The Human Microbiome: Ethical, Legal and Social Concerns. Oxford University Press
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  15. Nada Gligorov & Christine Vitrano (2011). The Impact of Personal Identity on Advance Directives. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (2):147-158.
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  16. Stacey Goguen (forthcoming). Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality. In Michael Brownstein Jennifer Saul (ed.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy. OUP
    Though stereotype threat is most well-known for its ability to hinder performance, it actually has a wide range of effects. For instance, it can also cause stress, anxiety, and doubt. These additional effects are as important and as central to the phenomenon as its effects on performance are. As a result, stereotype threat has more far-reaching implications than many philosophers have realized. In particular, the phenomenon has a number of unexplored “epistemic effects.” These are effects on our epistemic lives—i.e., the (...)
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  17. Mark Greene (2008). The Indeterminacy of Loss. Ethics 118 (4):633-658.
    Abstract: This paper argues that continua of both genetic and environmental manipulation give rise to cases in which it is indeterminate whether the non-identity problem arises. In clear non-identity cases, impersonal principles can underwrite intuitions of wrongdoing. In clear cases of ordinary personal harm, ordinary ethical thinking about personal compensation augments or supersedes impersonal considerations. Indeterminate cases raise a special problem because it is indeterminate whether personal ethical considerations apply. Might indeterminacy of identity preclude a determinate and ethically justified resolution (...)
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  18. Chris Heathwood (2011). The Significance of Personal Identity to Abortion. Bioethics 25 (4):230-232.
    In "The Insignificance of Personal Identity to Bioethics," David Shoemaker argues that, contrary to common opinion, considerations of personal identity have no relevance to certain important debates in bioethics. My aim is to show that Shoemaker is mistaken concerning the relevance of personal identity to the abortion debate -– in particular, to Don Marquis’ well-known anti-abortion argument.
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  19. Nils Holtug & Peter Sandøe (1996). Who Benefits?— Why Personal Identity Does Not Matter in a Moral Evaluation of Germ‐Line Gene Therapy. Journal of Applied Philosophy 13 (2):157-166.
  20. Noriaki Iwasa, Karmic Criticism of Abortion and Infanticide.
    Employing both hedonistic and preference utilitarianism, Peter Singer argues for abortion and infanticide. This essay challenges his arguments from the perspective of karma. There is suggestive evidence for karma. Singer's claim that fetuses and newborn infants are not persons is false if they have souls. Abortion and infanticide, if performed on human embryos with souls, fetuses with souls, and infants with souls, temporarily deprive them and possibly potential mothers of their opportunities to decrease their negative karma and increase their positive (...)
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  21. Mark G. Kuczewski (1994). Whose Will is It, Anyway? A Discussion of Advance Directives, Personal Identity, and Consensus in Medical Ethics. Bioethics 8 (1):27–48.
    ABSTRACTI consider objections to the use of living wills based upon the discontinuity of personal identity between the time of the execution of the directive anbd the time the person becomes incompetent. Recent authors, following Derek Parfit's “Complex View” of personal identity, have argued that there is often not sufficient identity interests between the competent person who executes the living will and the incompetent patient to warrant the use of the advance directive. I argue that such critics err by seeking (...)
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  22. Robert Lane (2006). Safety, Identity and Consent: A Limited Defense of Reproductive Human Cloning. Bioethics 20 (3):125–135.
    Some opponents of reproductive human cloning have argued that, because of its experimental nature, any attempt to create a child by way of cloning would risk serious birth defects or genetic abnormalities and would therefore be immoral. Some versions of this argument appeal to the consent of the person to be conceived in this way. In particular, they assume that if an experimental reproductive technology has not yet been shown to be safe, then, before we use it, we are morally (...)
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  23. Bartlomiej Lenart (2014). Shadow People: Relational Personhood, Extended Diachronic Personal Identity, and Our Moral Obligations Toward Fragile Persons. Dissertation, University of Alberta
    This Dissertation argues for a care-centrically grounded account of relational personhood and widely realized diachronic personal identity. The moral distinction between persons and non-persons is arguably one of the most salient ethical lines we can draw since many of our most fundamental rights are delineated via the bounds of personhood. The problem with drawing such morally salient lines is that the orthodox, rationalistic definition of personhood, which is widespread within philosophical, medical, and colloquial spheres, excludes, and thereby de-personifies, a large (...)
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  24. Charles W. Lidz & Lisa S. Parker (2003). Issues of Ethics and Identity in Diagnosis of Late Life Depression. Ethics and Behavior 13 (3):249 – 262.
    Depression is often diagnosed in patients nearing the end of their lives and medication or psychotherapy is prescribed. In many cases this is appropriate. However, it is widely agreed that a health care professional should treat sick persons so as to improve their condition as they define improvement. This raises questions about the contexts in which treatment of depression in late life is appropriate. This article reviews a problematic case concerning the appropriateness of treatment in light of the literature in (...)
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  25. John P. Lizza (ed.) (2009). Defining the Beginning and End of Life: Readings on Personal Identity and Bioethics. Johns Hopkins University Press.
  26. J. P. Moreland (1995). Humanness, Personhood, and the Right to Die. Faith and Philosophy 12 (1):95-112.
    A widely adopted approach to end-of-life ethical questions fails to make explicit certain crucial metaphysical ideas entailed by it and when those ideas are clarified, then it can be shown to be inadequate. These metaphysical themes cluster around the notions of personal identity, personhood and humanness, and the metaphysics of substance. In order to clarify and critique the approach just mentioned, I focus on the writings of Robert N. Wennberg as a paradigm case by, first, stating his views of personal (...)
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  27. Peter Nichols (2012). Abortion, Time-Relative Interests, and Futures Like Ours. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):493-506.
    Don Marquis ( 1989 ) has argued most abortions are immoral, for the same reason that killing you or me is immoral: abortion deprives the fetus of a valuable future (FLO). Call this account the FLOA. A rival account is Jeff McMahan’s ( 2002 ), time-relative interest account (TRIA) of the wrongness of killing. According to this account, an act of killing is wrong to the extent that it deprives the victim of future value and the relation of psychological unity (...)
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  28. David S. Oderberg, The Metaphysical Status of the Embryo: Blackwell Publishing Ltd Oxford, Uk.
    This paper re-examines some well-known and commonly accepted arguments for the non-individuality of the embryo, due mainly to the work of John Harris. The first concerns the alleged non-differentiation of the embryoblast from the trophoblast. The second concerns monozygotic twinning and the relevance of the primitive streak. The third concerns the totipotency of the cells of the early embryo. I argue that on a proper analysis of both the empirical facts of embryological development, and the metaphysical importance or otherwise of (...)
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  29. Andrea Ott (2009). Personal Identity and the Moral Authority of Advance Directives. The Pluralist 4 (2):38 - 54.
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  30. Shelley M. Park (2005). Real (M)Othering: The Metaphysics of Maternity in Children's Literature. In Sally Haslanger & Charlotte Witt (eds.), Real (M)othering: The Metaphysics of Maternity in Children's Literature. In Sally Haslanger and Charlotte Witt, eds. Adoption Matters: Philosophical and Feminist Essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 171-194. Cornell University Press 171-194.
    This paper examines the complexity and fluidity of maternal identity through an examination of narratives about "real motherhood" found in children's literature. Focusing on the multiplicity of mothers in adoption, I question standard views of maternity in which gestational, genetic and social mothering all coincide in a single person. The shortcomings of traditional notions of motherhood are overcome by developing a fluid and inclusive conception of maternal reality as authored by a child's own perceptions.
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  31. David Shoemaker (2010). Personal Identity and Bioethics: The State of the Art. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):249-257.
    In this introduction to the special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics on the topic of personal identity and bioethics, I provide a background for the topic and then discuss the contributions in the special issue by Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan, James Delaney and David Hershenov, and David DeGrazia.
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  32. David Shoemaker (2008). Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction. Broadview Press.
    Personal Identity and Ethics provides a lively overview of the relationship between the metaphysics of personal identity and ethics. How does personal identity affect our ethical judgments? It is a commonplace to hold that moral responsibility for past actions requires that the responsible agent is in some relevant respect identical to the agent who performed the action. Is this true? On the other hand, can ethics constrain our account of personal identity? Do the practical requirements of moral theory commit us (...)
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  33. J. S. Swindell Blumenthal-Barby (2007). Facial Allograft Transplantation, Personal Identity, and Subjectivity. Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (8):449-453.
    An analysis of the identity issues involved in facial allograft transplantation is provided in this paper. The identity issues involved in organ transplantation in general, under both theoretical accounts of personal identity and subjective accounts provided by organ recipients, are examined. It is argued that the identity issues involved in facial allograft transplantation are similar to those involved in organ transplantation in general, but much stronger because the face is so closely linked with personal identity. Recipients of facial allograft transplantation (...)
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  34. Cheng-Chih Tsai (2013). The Unbearable Lightness of Personal Identity — Messages From Bioethics. In Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy (ed.), Applied Ethics: Risk, Justice and Liberty: 39-51. Hokkaido University
    With the advancement of bio-science and bio-technology come nasty new bioethical dilemmas, and some bioethicists have resorted to metaphysics, in particular, the notion of personal identity, to resolve them. I claim, however, that metaphysical accounts of personal identity at present are incapable of withstanding the impact of bioethical dilemmas. Bioethical issues such as criteria of death, brain transplantation, and dementia with/without advance directives invite us to deconstruct three shaky metaphysical notions concerning personal identity so that we can tackle ethical problems (...)
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