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  1. Joel Anderson (1996). The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators: Identity, Pluralism, and Ontology in Charles Taylor's Value Theory. Constellations 3 (1):17-38.
  2. Sam Black (2001). Altruism and the Separateness of Persons. Social Theory and Practice 27 (3):361-385.
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  3. Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.) (forthcoming). Essays on Animalism: Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
    Arguably the most significant development in the recent history of the personal identity debate has been the emergence of the view known as "animalism." This volume brings together original contributions on this topic written by both well-known and emerging philosophers. Contributors: Lynne Rudder Baker, Stephan Blatti, David Hershenov, Jens Johansson, Mark Johnston, Rory Madden, Jeff McMahan & Tim Campbell, Eric Olson, Derek Parfit, Mark Reid, Denis Robinson, David Shoemaker, Sydney Shoemaker, Paul Snowdon.
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  4. Judith Bradford (forthcoming). Amelioration and Expansion: Borden Parker Bowne on Moral Theory and Moral Change. The Personalist Forum.
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  5. David Brink (1993). The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms, and Moral Theory. In R. G. Frey & Christopher Morris (eds.), Value, Welfare, and Morality. Cambridge University Press. 252-289.
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  6. David O. Brink (2011). Prospects for Temporal Neutrality. In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oup Oxford.
  7. David O. Brink (1997). Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons. In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell. 96--134.
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  8. Rufus Burrow (forthcoming). Moral Laws in Borden P. Bowne's Principles of Ethics. The Personalist Forum.
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  9. Daniel Cohnitz & Barry Smith (2003). Assessing Ontologies: The Question of Human Origins and Its Ethical Significance. In E. Runggaldier & C. Kanzian (eds.), Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. öbv&hpt.
    In their paper “Sixteen Days” Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard try to answer the question: when does a human being begin to exist? In this paper we will address some methodological issues connected with this exercise in ontology. We shall begin by sketching the argument of “Sixteen Days”. We shall then attempt to characterize what is special about the ontological realism of “Sixteen Days” as contrasted to the linguistic constructivism which represents the more dominant current in contemporary analytic philosophy. This (...)
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  10. Bronwyn Finnigan (2014). Examining the Bodhisattva's Brain. Zygon 49 (1):231-241.
    Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain aims to introduce secular-minded thinkers to Buddhist thought and motivate its acceptance by analytic philosophers. I argue that Flanagan provides a compelling caution against the hasty generalizations of recent “science of happiness” literature, which correlates happiness with Buddhism on the basis of certain neurological studies. I contend, however, that his positive account of Buddhist ethics is less persuasive. I question the level of engagement with Buddhist philosophical literature and challenge Flanagan's central claim, that a Buddhist (...)
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  11. Mark Greene (2008). The Indeterminacy of Loss. Ethics 118 (4):633-658.
    Abstract: This paper argues that continua of both genetic and environmental manipulation give rise to cases in which it is indeterminate whether the non-identity problem arises. In clear non-identity cases, impersonal principles can underwrite intuitions of wrongdoing. In clear cases of ordinary personal harm, ordinary ethical thinking about personal compensation augments or supersedes impersonal considerations. Indeterminate cases raise a special problem because it is indeterminate whether personal ethical considerations apply. Might indeterminacy of identity preclude a determinate and ethically justified resolution (...)
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  12. Nils Holtug (2010). Persons, Interests, and Justice. Oxford University Press.
    In our lives, we aim to achieve welfare for ourselves, that is, to live good lives. But we also have another, more impartial perspective, where we aim to balance our concern for our own welfare against a concern for the welfare of others. This is a perspective of justice. Nils Holtug examines these two perspectives and the relations between them. -/- The first part of the book is concerned with prudence; more precisely, with what the necessary and sufficient conditions are (...)
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  13. Dennis McKerlie (1988). Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):205 - 225.
  14. Alastair Norcross (2006). Aggregation, Rights, and the Separateness of Persons. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):1-15.
  15. Derek Parfit (1986). Comments. Ethics 96 (4):832-872.
  16. Theron Pummer (2014). Does Division Multiply Desert? Philosophical Review 123 (1):43-77.
    It seems plausible that (i) how much punishment a person deserves cannot be affected by the mere existence or nonexistence of another person. We might have also thought that (ii) how much punishment is deserved cannot increase merely in virtue of personal division. I argue that (i) and (ii) are inconsistent with the popular belief that, other things being equal, when people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they ought to be punished for this—even if they have repented, are (...)
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  17. Jacob Ross, Any Way You Slice It: On Fission, Fusion and the Weighing of Welfare.
    It is generally thought that there are certain persons to whose welfare we should give special weight. It is commonly held, for example, that we should give special weight to our own welfare. On the strongest version of this view, we should always give overriding weight to our own welfare, and so, in considering any set of alternatives, we should always prefer the one in which we fare best. Many people would reject this strong view, for two reasons. First, many (...)
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  18. Carol Rovane (2004). Alienation and the Alleged Separateness of Persons. The Monist 87 (4):554-572.
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  19. Robert Schroer (2013). Reductionism in Personal Identity and the Phenomenological Sense of Being a Temporally Extended Self. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):339-356.
    The special and unique attitudes that we take towards events in our futures/pasts—e.g., attitudes like the dread of an impeding pain—create a challenge for “Reductionist” accounts that reduce persons to aggregates of interconnected person stages: if the person stage currently dreading tomorrow’s pain is numerically distinct from the person stage that will actually suffer the pain, what reason could the current person stage have for thinking of that future pain as being his? One reason everyday subjects believe they have a (...)
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  20. David Shoemaker (2008). Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction. Broadview Press.
    Personal Identity and Ethics provides a lively overview of the relationship between the metaphysics of personal identity and ethics. How does personal identity affect our ethical judgments? It is a commonplace to hold that moral responsibility for past actions requires that the responsible agent is in some relevant respect identical to the agent who performed the action. Is this true? On the other hand, can ethics constrain our account of personal identity? Do the practical requirements of moral theory commit us (...)
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  21. David Shoemaker (2000). Reductionist Contractualism: Moral Motivation and the Expanding Self. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):343-370.
    According to a popular contemporary contractualist account of moral motivation, the most plausible explanation for why those who are concerned with morality take moral reasons seriously — why these reasons strike those who are moved by them with a particular inescapability — is that they stem from, and are grounded by, a desire to be able to justify one’s actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject.1 My.
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  22. David W. Shoemaker (2002). Disintegrated Persons and Distributive Principles. Ratio 15 (1):58–79.
    In this paper I consider Derek Parfit’s attempt to respond to Rawls’ charge that utilitarianism ignores the distinction between persons. I proceed by arguing that there is a moderate form of reductionism about persons, one stressing the importance of what Parfit calls psychological connectedness, which can hold in different degrees both within one person and between distinct persons. In terms of this form of reductionism, against which Parfit’s arguments are ineffective, it is possible to resuscitate the Rawlsian charge that the (...)
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  23. David W. Shoemaker (1999). Selves and Moral Units. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):391-419.
    offers each of these as a possible moral unit at various points.1 It is the aim of this paper, however, to suggest that, if Parfit’s two key arguments about the indeterminacy of identity and what matters in our identity are correct, we should take selves to be the significant moral units in any metaphysically-grounded ethical theory. Furthermore, because Parfit’s own explanation of what the concept of the self involves is problematic in important respects, I hope to point out a few (...)
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  24. A. P. Taylor (2013). The Frustrating Problem For Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1097-1115.
    I argue that four-dimensionalism and the desire satisfaction account of well-being are incompatible. For every person whose desires are satisfied, there will be many shorter-lived individuals (‘person-stages’ or ‘subpersons’) who share the person’s desires but who do not exist long enough to see those desires satisfied; not only this, but in many cases their desires are frustrated so that the desires of the beings in whom they are embedded as proper temporal parts may be fulfilled. I call this the frustrating (...)
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  25. Larry S. Temkin (1999). Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle: A Response. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777-784.
    In "Intrzmsitivity and thc Person-Affecting Principlc,"‘ (IPAP) Alastair Norcross attacks several key claims of my "Intransitivity and thc Merc Addition Paradox" (IMAP).2 This article suggests that N0rcross’s arguments despite: their appca1——lcavc IMAP’s claims mostly intact. Bcforc assessing N0rcross’s arguments, lct mc characterize two key notions distinguished in IMAP: an essentially comparative view of moral ideals and an intrinsic aspect view. On an essentially comparative view (ECU, different factors might bc relevant for comparing diffcrcnt alternatives regarding a given idcal. On such (...)
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  26. Larry S. Temkin (1999). Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777 - 784.
  27. Matt Zwolinski (2003). Person-Neutrality and the Separateness of Persons. Southwest Philosophical Studies 25:95.
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