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  1. Joel Anderson (1996). The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators: Identity, Pluralism, and Ontology in Charles Taylor's Value Theory. Constellations 3 (1):17-38.
  2. R. J. B. (1970). Principles and Persons. Review of Metaphysics 24 (2):343-343.
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  3. Samia Bano & Jennifer L. Pierce (2013). Personal Narratives, Social Justice, and the Law. Feminist Legal Studies 21 (3):225-239.
    North American writer Joan Didion’s eloquent testimonial speaks to the significance of storytelling in our lives. Personal storiesmake our lives meaningful. Part of this is because our stories, wittingly or not, become the means through which we fashion our identities for listeners. Or, as scholars from many disciplines have argued, identity and selfhoodare narrative accomplishments. In this formulation, an individual constructs a sense of self by telling stories or “personal narratives,” which describe “the evolution of an individual life over time (...)
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  4. Simon Beck (2013). Am I My Brother's Keeper? On Personal Identity and Responsibility. South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):1-9.
    The psychological continuity theory of personal identity has recently been accused of not meeting what is claimed to be a fundamental requirement on theories of identity - to explain personal moral responsibility. Although they often have much to say about responsibility, the charge is that they cannot say enough. I set out the background to the charge with a short discussion of Locke and the requirement to explain responsibility, then illustrate the accusation facing the theory with details from Marya Schechtman. (...)
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  5. Simon Beck (2009). Martha Nussbaum and the Foundations of Ethics: Identity, Morality and Thought-Experiments. South African Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):261-270.
    Martha Nussbaum has argued in support of the view (supposedly that of Aristotle) that we can, through thought-experiments involving personal identity, find an objective foundation for moral thought without having to appeal to any authority independent of morality. I compare the thought-experiment from Plato’s Philebus that she presents as an example to other thought-experiments involving identity in the literature and argue that this reveals a tension between the sources of authority which Nussbaum invokes for her thought-experiment. I also argue that (...)
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  6. Simon Beck (1989). Parfit and the Russians (Personal Identity and Moral Concepts). Analysis 49 (4):205-209.
  7. Kathy Behrendt (2014). Whole Lives and Good Deaths. Metaphilosophy 45 (3):331-347.
    This article discusses two views associated with narrative conceptions of the self. The first view asserts that our whole life is reasonably regarded as a single unit of meaning. A prominent strand of the philosophical narrative account of the self is the representative of this view. The second view—which has currency beyond the confines of the philosophical narrative account—is that the meaning of a life story is dependent on what happens at the end of it. The article argues that the (...)
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  8. Kathy Behrendt (2013). Illness as Narrative. [REVIEW] Medical Humanities 39 (1):65-66.
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  9. Kathy Behrendt (2007). Reasons to Be Fearful: Strawson, Death and Narrative. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):133-.
    I compare and assess two significant and opposing approaches to the self with respect to what they have to say about death: the anti-narrativist, as articulated by Galen Strawson, and the narrativist, as pieced together from a variety of accounts. Neither party fares particularly well on the matter of death. Both are unable to point towards a view of death that is clearly consistent with their views on the self. In the narrativist’s case this inconsistency is perhaps not as explicit (...)
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  10. Peter A. Bertocci (1961). The Moral Structure of the Person. Review of Metaphysics 14 (3):369 - 388.
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  11. David O. Brink (2011). Prospects for Temporal Neutrality. In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. OUP Oxford
  12. David O. Brink (2003). Prudence and Authenticity: Intrapersonal Conflicts of Value. Philosophical Review 112 (2):215-245.
    Prudence and authenticity are sometimes seen as rival virtues. Prudence,as traditionally conceived, is temporally neutral. It attaches no intrinsic significance to the temporal location of benefits or harms within the agent’s life; the prudent agent should be equally concerned about all parts of her life. But people’s values and ideals often change over time, sometimes in predictable ways, as when middle age and parenthood often temporize youthful radicalism or spontaneity with concerns for comfort,security, and predictability. In situations involving diachronic, intrapersonal (...)
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  13. Peter Cave (2003). Dead People. Think 2 (5):83.
    Peter Cave explains why he believes we can and should treat people well, even after they have ceased to exist. We should treat people well; therefore, we should treat dead people well.
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  14. A. E. Denham & Franklin Worrell (2013). Identity, Agency & Tragedy. In Zina Giannopoulos (ed.), The Philosophy of Film: David Lynch. Routledge
  15. Matti Eklund (2004). Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy. The Monist 87 (4):489-511.
    Let the moral question of personal identity be the following: what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and ascriptions of responsibility around? (If indeed we should structure these things around any entities at all.) Let the semantic question of personal identity be the question of what is the nature of the entities that ‘person’ is true of. A naive (in the sense of simple and intuitive) view would have it that the two questions are (...)
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  16. Brian J. Garrett (1992). Persons and Values. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):337-44.
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  17. Mark Greene (2008). The Indeterminacy of Loss. Ethics 118 (4):633-658.
    Abstract: This paper argues that continua of both genetic and environmental manipulation give rise to cases in which it is indeterminate whether the non-identity problem arises. In clear non-identity cases, impersonal principles can underwrite intuitions of wrongdoing. In clear cases of ordinary personal harm, ordinary ethical thinking about personal compensation augments or supersedes impersonal considerations. Indeterminate cases raise a special problem because it is indeterminate whether personal ethical considerations apply. Might indeterminacy of identity preclude a determinate and ethically justified resolution (...)
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  18. Daniel Hart, Robert Atkins & Debra Ford (1999). Family Influences on the Formation of Moral Identity in Adolescence: Longitudinal Analyses. Journal of Moral Education 28 (3):375-386.
    A model of moral identity formation is presented. According to the model, family influences have a direct effect on moral identity development in adolescence, independent of the effects of personality, income and other factors. The model is tested using longitudinal data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (Child Sample), which is constituted of the children born to a representative sample of American women who were between the ages of 14 and 21 in 1979. In general, the results provide support (...)
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  19. Katherine Hawley (2014). Persistence and Time. In Steven Luper (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Life and Death. Cambridge University Press 47-63.
    In this chapter I outline some metaphysical views about time, and about persistence, and discuss how they can help us clarify our thinking about life and death.
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  20. Mark Johnston (1992). Reasons and Reductionism. Philosophical Review 3 (3):589-618.
  21. F. M. Kamm (2005). Moral Status and Personal Identity: Clones, Embryos, and Future Generations. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):283-307.
    In the first part of this article, I argue that even those entities that in their own right and for their own sake give us reason not to destroy them and to help them are sometimes substitutable for the good of other entities. In so arguing, I consider the idea of being valuable as an end in virtue of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. I also conclude that entities that have claims to things and against others are especially nonsubstitutable. In the (...)
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  22. Amy Kind (2009). Review of David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2).
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  23. Larisa Kiyashchenko (2008). Body Parts and Human Identity. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 5:41-47.
    Bioethics originated as a specific collective response of representatives of biomedical sciences, humanities and the public to the complexity of moral, anthropological and ontological problems (often in situations bordering on life and death) caused by the constant development of biomedical technologies. Because of this complexity ‐ these problems escape simple, universal (eternal) solutions. This makes them “finite”, multiple, dependent on the “here and now” circumstances of the choice of cognitive and communicative transdisciplinary strategies. In other words bioethics is a specific (...)
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  24. Laura Klaming & Pim Haselager (2013). Did My Brain Implant Make Me Do It? Questions Raised by DBS Regarding Psychological Continuity, Responsibility for Action and Mental Competence. Neuroethics 6 (3):527-539.
    Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a well-accepted treatment for movement disorders and is currently explored as a treatment option for various neurological and psychiatric disorders. Several case studies suggest that DBS may, in some patients, influence mental states critical to personality to such an extent that it affects an individual’s personal identity, i.e. the experience of psychological continuity, of persisting through time as the same person. Without questioning the usefulness of DBS as a treatment option for various serious and treatment (...)
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  25. Bartlomiej Lenart (2014). Shadow People: Relational Personhood, Extended Diachronic Personal Identity, and Our Moral Obligations Toward Fragile Persons. Dissertation, University of Alberta
    This Dissertation argues for a care-centrically grounded account of relational personhood and widely realized diachronic personal identity. The moral distinction between persons and non-persons is arguably one of the most salient ethical lines we can draw since many of our most fundamental rights are delineated via the bounds of personhood. The problem with drawing such morally salient lines is that the orthodox, rationalistic definition of personhood, which is widespread within philosophical, medical, and colloquial spheres, excludes, and thereby de-personifies, a large (...)
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  26. Ulrich Meyer (2011). Review of Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, Harry Silverstein (Eds.), Time and Identity. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (1).
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  27. David Neuburger (2013). Emergence and the Problem of Personal Identity. Dissertation, San Diego State University
    Philosophical theories of personal identity often tacitly assume that either the properties which make us Persons are easily divorced from our bodies, or, that our being Persons is one-and-the-same with our being human beings. While there is broad support both scientifically and philosophically for the contention that our being Persons is at least in part contingent on the proper development and functioning of our brains, the lack of consensus as to the manner in which the brain and mind relate to (...)
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  28. Ferdinand Santos (2007). Personal Identity, the Self, and Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Going beyond the present controversy surrounding personhood in various non-philosophical contexts, this book seeks to defend the renewed philosophical interest in issues connected with this topic and the need for a more credible philosophical conception of the person. Taking the theory of John Locke as a starting point and in dialogue with contemporary philosophers such as Derek Parfit and P.F. Strawson, the authors develop an original philosophical anthropology based on the writings of Charles Hartshorne and A.N. Whitehead. The authors then (...)
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  29. George Sher (1979). Compensation and Transworld Personal Identity. The Monist 62 (3):378-391.
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  30. David Shoemaker (2012). Responsibility Without Identity. Harvard Revieiw of Philosophy 18 (1):109-132.
    It is taken to be platitude that I can be responsible only for my own actions. Many have taken this to entail the slogan that responsibility presupposes personal identity. In this paper, I show that even if we grant the platitude, the slogan is not entailed and is at any rate false. I then suggest what the relevant non-identity relation grounding the ownership of actions consists in instead.
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  31. David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    What justifies our holding a <span class='Hi'>person</span> morally responsible for some past action? Why am I justified in having a special prudential concern for some future persons and not others? Why do many of us think that maximizing the good within a single life is perfectly acceptable, but maximizing the good across lives is wrong? In these and other normative questions, it looks like any answer we come up with will have to make an essential reference to personal identity. So, (...)
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  32. David W. Shoemaker (2007). Personal Identity and Practical Concerns. Mind 116 (462):317-357.
    Many philosophers have taken there to be an important relation between personal identity and several of our practical concerns (among them moral responsibility, compensation, and self-concern). I articulate four natural methodological assumptions made by those wanting to construct a theory of the relation between identity and practical concerns, and I point out powerful objections to each assumption, objections constituting serious methodological obstacles to the overall project. I then attempt to offer replies to each general objection in a way that leaves (...)
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  33. A. P. Taylor (2013). The Frustrating Problem For Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1097-1115.
    I argue that four-dimensionalism and the desire satisfaction account of well-being are incompatible. For every person whose desires are satisfied, there will be many shorter-lived individuals (‘person-stages’ or ‘subpersons’) who share the person’s desires but who do not exist long enough to see those desires satisfied; not only this, but in many cases their desires are frustrated so that the desires of the beings in whom they are embedded as proper temporal parts may be fulfilled. I call this the frustrating (...)
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  34. Chang Tzuli (2015). Personal Identity, Moral Agency and Liangzhi: A Comparative Study of Korsgaard and Wang Yangming. Comparative Philosophy 6 (1):03-23.
    Christine Korsgaard bases her interpretation of personal identity upon the notion of moral agency and thereby refutes the Reductionist thesis of Derek Parfit. Korsgaard indicates that actions and choices, from the practical standpoint, must be viewed as having agents and choosers. This is what makes them our own actions and choices as well as contributes to the process of self-constitution. Personal identity manifested as the chooser of our desires and author of our actions can be viewed as the common denominator (...)
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  35. David Wiggins (1987). The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of Experience, and as Locus of Value. In Arthur R. Peacocke & Grant R. Gillett (eds.), Persons and Personality. Blackwell
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