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  1. Raziel Abelson (1977). Persons: A Study In Philosophical Psychology. London: Macmillan.
  2. Pedro Amaral, Humanities and the Idea of a Person in the 22nd Century: Kant, Descartes, Sellars.
    Science starts out with the idea of a person as billions of neurons housed in a body that is a cloud of particles. Common sense starts out with the idea of a person having capacities belonging to a single individual. The common sense person does not have parts. Our objectifying science slowly takes over the person as it tends toward physical materialism. Where will it end? What is being gradually pushed out of the world? If science had already taken over, (...)
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  3. Harald Atmanspacher, Vi. Reflections on Process and Persons.
    This contribution reflects on Nicholas Rescher's discussion of “process and persons” in his book Process Metaphysics. Its main purposes are to offer conceptual commentary on some of Rescher's terms, and to suggest some options for process thinking more radical than Rescher's, partly motivated by recent developments in science and philosophy. First, a brief analysis of the relation between process and time is presented, emphasizing irreversibility and temporal holism as crucial for a processual worldview. Second, instability and transiency are introduced as (...)
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  4. R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.) (2002). The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.
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  5. Roger A. Badham (forthcoming). Conti's Reclamation of Farrer's Cosmological Personalism: A Pragmatist's Response. The Personalist Forum.
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  6. Mark Bajakian (2011). How to Count People. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):185 - 204.
    How should we count people who have two cerebral hemispheres that cooperate to support one mental life at the level required for personhood even though each hemisphere can be disconnected from the other and support its "own" divergent mental life at that level? On the standard method of counting people, there is only one person sitting in your chair and thinking your thoughts even if you have two cerebral hemispheres of this kind. Is this method accurate? In this paper, I (...)
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  7. Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons: Natural, yet Ontologically Unique.
    The question—Are Persons More than Social Objects?—is an important one, and my answer is somewhat complicated. What I shall talk about here is the way in which persons are natural objects, but I do not want to deny that we are also social objects. I believe that to be a person in the way that I shall describe—as a natural object—is a necessary condition for various enterprises that may be thought of as the social construction of persons. For example, one (...)
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  8. Lynne Rudder Baker, “What Does It Mean to Be One of Us?” A Response to Bransen.
    Bransen takes the first question to pose “the problem of man’s uniqueness,” and his ultimate aim is to dissolve that problem. His method of dissolving it is by way of a detailed answer to the second question, which is the most fundamental. I want to show that Bransen’s answer to the second question actually provides an answer to each of the other questions, and that instead of dissolving the problem of man’s uniqueness (posed by question #1), what he offers is (...)
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  9. Lynne Rudder Baker (2013). Technology and the Future of Persons. The Monist 96 (1):37-53.
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  10. Lynne Rudder Baker (2009). Persons and the Extended-Mind Thesis. Zygon 44 (3):642-658.
    The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take "extended selves" be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of (...)
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  11. Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). What Does It Mean to Be One of Us? Journal of Anthropological Psychology 10:9-11.
    Bransen takes the first question to pose ―the problem of man‘s uniqueness,‖ and his ultimate aim is to dissolve that problem. His method of dissolving it is by way of a detailed answer to the second question, which is the most fundamental. I want to show that Bransen‘s answer to the second question actually provides an answer to each of the other questions, and that instead of dissolving the problem of man‘s uniqueness (posed by question #1), what he offers is (...)
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  12. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Persons and Other Things. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):5-6.
  13. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism. Cambridge University Press.
    Lynne Rudder Baker presents and defends a unique account of the material world: the Constitution View. In contrast to leading metaphysical views that take everyday things to be either non-existent or reducible to micro-objects, the Constitution View construes familiar things as irreducible parts of reality. Although they are ultimately constituted by microphysical particles, everyday objects are neither identical to, nor reducible to, the aggregates of microphysical particles that constitute them. The result is genuine ontological diversity: people, bacteria, donkeys, mountains and (...)
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  14. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Persons and the Natural Order. In Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press.
    We human persons have an abiding interest in understanding what kind of beings we are. However, it is not obvious how to attain such an understanding. Traditional analytic metaphysicians start with a priori accounts of the most general, abstract features of the world— e.g., accounts of properties and particulars—features that, they claim, in no way depend upon us or our activity.1 Such accounts are formulated in abstraction from what is already known about persons and other things, and are used as (...)
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  15. Lynne Rudder Baker (2005). When Does a Person Begin? Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48.
    According to the Constitution View of persons, a human person is wholly constituted by (but not identical to) a human organism. This view does justice both to our similarities to other animals and to our uniqueness. As a proponent of the Constitution View, I defend the thesis that the coming-into-existence of a human person is not simply a matter of the coming-into-existence of an organism, even if that organism ultimately comes to constitute a person. Marshalling some support from developmental psychology, (...)
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  16. Lynne Rudder Baker (2004). On Being One's Own Person. In M. Sie, Marc Slors & B. van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
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  17. Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). Review: A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (445):148-151.
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  18. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). The Emergent Self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):734-736.
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  19. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). The Ontological Status of Persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388.
    Throughout his illustrious career, Roderick Chisholm was concerned with the nature of persons. On his view, persons are what he called ‘entia per se.’ They exist per se, in their own right. I too have developed an account of persons—I call it the ‘Constitution View’—an account that is different in important ways from Chisholm’s. Here, however, I want to focus on a thesis that Chisholm and I agree on: that persons have ontological significance in virtue of being persons. Although I’ll (...)
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  20. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Précis of Persons and Bodies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):592-598.
  21. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):623–635.
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  22. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on My "the Ontological Status of Persons&Quot;. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):394-396.
    1. Primary-kind properties. Rosenkrantz does not see how a single primary-kind property can be had by x essentially and by y contingently (where x ≠ y). He offers a reductio ad absurdum of the view that a primary can be had accidentally or derivatively. The reductio has as a premise the following: “[S]omething has a primarykind property, F-ness, derivatively only if the primary-kind property of a nonderivative F, i.e., the property which determines what a nonderivative F most fundamentally is, is (...)
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  23. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Review: Précis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):592 - 598.
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  24. Lynne Rudder Baker (2001). Materialism with a Human Face. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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  25. Lynne Rudder Baker, Precis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
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  26. Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.
    What is a human person, and what is the relation between a person and his or her body? In her third book on the philosophy of mind, Lynne Rudder Baker investigates what she terms the person/body problem and offers a detailed account of the relation between human persons and their bodies. Baker's argument is based on the 'Constitution View' of persons and bodies, which aims to show what distinguishes persons from all other beings and to show how we can be (...)
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  27. Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). What Am I? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151 - 159.
  28. Lynne Rudder Baker, Philosophy in Mediis Rebus.
    So, let us begin in the middle of things. There are two senses in which I think that philosophy must begin in the middle of things: The first is epistemological: I think that the Cartesian ideal of finding an absolute starting point without any presuppositions is illusory. The most that we can do is to be aware of our presuppositions; we cannot eliminate them. Wherever we choose to start, we are in the middle of things epistemologically. The second way in (...)
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  29. Victor H. Balowitz (1972). Persons as Subjects of Perception. Personalist 53:102-103.
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  30. John Barresi (1999). On Becoming a Person. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98.
    How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through (...)
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  31. Timothy J. Bayne (2005). Divided Brains and Unified Phenomenology: A Review Essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512.
    In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to (...)
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  32. Richard A. Beauchamp (forthcoming). Personhood and Communities of Interpretation: A Phenomenological Foray. The Personalist Forum.
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  33. Richard A. Beauchamp (forthcoming). Towards a Personalist Posture: Resuming an Aborted Conversation. The Personalist Forum.
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  34. Chantal Beauvais (1999). Personne Et Sujet Selon Husserl. Dialogue 38 (1):192-193.
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  35. Kathy Behrendt (2005). Impersonal Identity and Corrupting Concepts. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):159-188.
    How does the concept of a person affect our beliefs about ourselves and the world? In an intriguing recent addition to his established Reductionist view of personal identity, Derek Parfit speculates that there could be beings who do not possess the concept of a person. Where we talk and think about persons, selves, subjects, or agents, they talk and think about sequences of thoughts and experiences related to a particular brain and body. Nevertheless their knowledge and experience of the world (...)
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  36. Bernard Berofsky (1964). Determinism and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 61 (September):461-475.
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  37. Peter A. Bertocci (1978). The Essence of a Person. The Monist 61 (January):28-41.
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  38. Henk Bij de Weg, Can a Person Break a World Record?
    Most philosophers in the analytical philosophy answer the question what personal identity is in psychological terms. Arguments for substantiating this view are mainly based on thought experiments of brain transfer cases and the like in which persons change brains. However, in these thought experiments the remaining part of the body plays only a passive part. In this paper I argue that the psychological approach of personal identity cannot be maintained, if the whole body is actively involved in the analysis, and (...)
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  39. John I. Biro (1981). Persons as Corporate Entities and Corporations as Persons. Nature and System 3 (September):173-80.
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  40. David Bloor (1970). Explanation and Analysis in Strawson's Persons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (May):2-9.
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  41. Lisa Bortolotti & John Harris (2005). Stem Cell Research, Personhood and Sentience. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 10:68-75.
    In this paper the permissibility of stem cell research on early human embryos is defended. It is argued that, in order to have moral status, an individual must have an interest in its own wellbeing. Sentience is a prerequisite for having an interest in avoiding pain, and personhood is a prerequisite for having an interest in the continuation of one's own existence. Early human embryos are not sentient and therefore they are not recipients of direct moral consideration. Early human embryos (...)
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  42. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2004). How to Be a Conventional Person. The Monist 87 (4):457 - 474.
    Recent work in personal identity has emphasized the importance of various conventions, or ‘person directed practices’ in the determination of personal identity. An interesting question arises as to whether we should think that there are any entities that have, in some interesting sense, conventional identity conditions. We think that the best way to understand such work about practices and conventions is the strongest and most radical. If these considerations are correct, persons are, on our view, conventional constructs: they are in (...)
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  43. Rufus Burrow (forthcoming). Authorship: The Personalism of George Holmes Howison and Borden Parker Bowne. The Personalist Forum.
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  44. Rufus Burrow (forthcoming). Moral Laws in Borden P. Bowne's Principles of Ethics. The Personalist Forum.
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  45. Scott Campbell (2006). The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):339–358.
    It is argued that those who accept the psychological criterion of personal identity, such as Parfit and Shoemaker, should accept what I call the 'series' view of a person, according to which a person is a unified aggregate of mental events and states. As well as defending this view against objections, I argue that it allows the psychological theorist to avoid the two lives objection which the 'animalist' theorists have raised against it, an objection which causes great difficulties for the (...)
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  46. Scott Campbell (2001). Persons and Substances. Philosophical Studies 104 (3):253-67.
    I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion of personalidentity entails that a person is not an object, but a series ofpsychological events. As this is somewhat counter-intuitive,I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to theway that substances exist. I develop ten criteria that such a`quasi-substance' should meet, and I argue that a reasonablecase can be made to show that the psychological theorist's conception of a (...)
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  47. W. R. Carter (2002). Many Minds, No Persons. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):55-70.
    Four non-Cartesian conceptions of a person are considered. I argue tor one of these, a position called animalism. I reject the idea that a (human) person coincides with, but is numerically distinct from, a certain human animal. Coinciding physical beings would both be psychological subjects. I argue that such subjects could not engage in self-reference. Since self-reference (or the capacity tor self-reference) is a necessary condition for being a person, no physical subject coincident with another such subject can be a (...)
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  48. F. F. Centore (1979). Persons: A Comparative Account Of The Six Possible Theories. Westport: Greenwood Press.
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  49. Gary L. Cesarz (forthcoming). Howison's Pluralistic Idealism: A Fifth Conception of Being? The Personalist Forum.
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  50. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Minds.
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