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  1. Donald C. Abel (1993). Western Conceptions of the Individual. Review of Metaphysics 46 (4):863-864.
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  2. Raziel Abelson (1977). Persons: A Study In Philosophical Psychology. London: Macmillan.
  3. E. M. Adams (1985). Theconceptof a Person. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):403-412.
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  4. Frederick Adams (1992). Machine Persons. The Personalist Forum 8 (Supplement):47-55.
  5. Virgil C. Aldrich (1975). Pictures and Persons: An Analogy. Review of Metaphysics 28 (4):599 - 610.
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  6. Barry Allen (1997). The Chimpanzee's Tool. Common Knowledge 6:34-51.
  7. Rayan Alsuwaigh & Lalit K. R. Krishna (2014). The Compensatory Nature of Personhood. Asian Bioethics Review 6 (4):332-342.
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  8. Pedro Amaral, Humanities and the Idea of a Person in the 22nd Century: Kant, Descartes, Sellars.
    Science starts out with the idea of a person as billions of neurons housed in a body that is a cloud of particles. Common sense starts out with the idea of a person having capacities belonging to a single individual. The common sense person does not have parts. Our objectifying science slowly takes over the person as it tends toward physical materialism. Where will it end? What is being gradually pushed out of the world? If science had already taken over, (...)
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  9. Pedro Amaral, About the Author.
    Science starts out with the idea of a person as billions of neurons housed in a body that is a cloud of particles. Common sense starts out with the idea of a person having capacities belonging to a single individual. The common sense person does not have parts. Our objectifying science slowly takes over the person as it tends toward physical materialism. Where will it end? What is being gradually pushed out of the world? If science had already taken over, (...)
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  10. Harald Atmanspacher, Vi. Reflections on Process and Persons.
    This contribution reflects on Nicholas Rescher's discussion of “process and persons” in his book Process Metaphysics. Its main purposes are to offer conceptual commentary on some of Rescher's terms, and to suggest some options for process thinking more radical than Rescher's, partly motivated by recent developments in science and philosophy. First, a brief analysis of the relation between process and time is presented, emphasizing irreversibility and temporal holism as crucial for a processual worldview. Second, instability and transiency are introduced as (...)
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  11. R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.) (2002). The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.
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  12. R. J. B. (1970). Principles and Persons. Review of Metaphysics 24 (2):343-343.
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  13. Roger A. Badham (1996). Conti’s Reclamation of Farrer’s Cosmological Personalism: A Pragmatist’s Response. The Personalist Forum 12 (1):18-34.
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  14. John Eldon Bahde (1989). Are Zygotes Human Beings? Dissertation, Cornell University
    The subject of this dissertation is fetal ontology, not the morality of abortion. I try to show that zygotes are not human beings. ;Unlike many philosophers, I am unwilling to give 'human being' to the biologists. It should not be confused with 'Homo sapiens' or any other taxonomic term of biology. On the other hand, it should not be confused with 'person' either. ;I investigate a number of attempts to fix the point at which we first become human beings. None (...)
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  15. Annette Baier (1991). A Naturalist View of Persons. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 65 (3):5 - 17.
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  16. Andrew M. Bailey (2015). The Priority Principle. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1:163-174.
    I introduce and argue for a Priority Principle, according to which we exemplify certain of our mental properties in the primary or non-derivative sense. I then apply this principle to several debates in the metaphysics and philosophy of mind.
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  17. Andrew M. Bailey (2011). Review Of: The Waning of Materialism. [REVIEW] Mind 120 (478):534-538.
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  18. Mark Bajakian (2011). How to Count People. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):185 - 204.
    How should we count people who have two cerebral hemispheres that cooperate to support one mental life at the level required for personhood even though each hemisphere can be disconnected from the other and support its "own" divergent mental life at that level? On the standard method of counting people, there is only one person sitting in your chair and thinking your thoughts even if you have two cerebral hemispheres of this kind. Is this method accurate? In this paper, I (...)
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  19. Lynne Baker (2008). Persons: Natural, Yet Ontologically Unique. Encyclopaideia 23.
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  20. Lynne Rudder Baker, “What Does It Mean to Be One of Us?” A Response to Bransen.
    Bransen takes the first question to pose “the problem of man’s uniqueness,” and his ultimate aim is to dissolve that problem. His method of dissolving it is by way of a detailed answer to the second question, which is the most fundamental. I want to show that Bransen’s answer to the second question actually provides an answer to each of the other questions, and that instead of dissolving the problem of man’s uniqueness (posed by question #1), what he offers is (...)
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  21. Lynne Rudder Baker (2013). Technology and the Future of Persons. The Monist 96 (1):37-53.
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  22. Lynne Rudder Baker (2009). Persons and the Extended-Mind Thesis. Zygon 44 (3):642-658.
    The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take "extended selves" be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of (...)
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  23. Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). What Does It Mean to Be One of Us? Journal of Anthropological Psychology 10:9-11.
    Bransen takes the first question to pose ―the problem of man‘s uniqueness,‖ and his ultimate aim is to dissolve that problem. His method of dissolving it is by way of a detailed answer to the second question, which is the most fundamental. I want to show that Bransen‘s answer to the second question actually provides an answer to each of the other questions, and that instead of dissolving the problem of man‘s uniqueness (posed by question #1), what he offers is (...)
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  24. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Persons and Other Things. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):5-6.
    In the large recent literature on the nature of human persons, persons are usually studied in isolation from the world in which they live. What persons are most fundamentally, philosophers say, are human animals, or brains, or perhaps souls -- without any consideration of the social and physical environments without which persons would not exist. In this article, I want to compensate for such overly narrow focus. Instead of beginning with the nature of persons cut off from any environment, I (...)
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  25. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism. Cambridge University Press.
    Lynne Rudder Baker presents and defends a unique account of the material world: the Constitution View. In contrast to leading metaphysical views that take everyday things to be either non-existent or reducible to micro-objects, the Constitution View construes familiar things as irreducible parts of reality. Although they are ultimately constituted by microphysical particles, everyday objects are neither identical to, nor reducible to, the aggregates of microphysical particles that constitute them. The result is genuine ontological diversity: people, bacteria, donkeys, mountains and (...)
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  26. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Persons and the Natural Order. In Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press.
    We human persons have an abiding interest in understanding what kind of beings we are. However, it is not obvious how to attain such an understanding. Traditional analytic metaphysicians start with a priori accounts of the most general, abstract features of the world— e.g., accounts of properties and particulars—features that, they claim, in no way depend upon us or our activity.1 Such accounts are formulated in abstraction from what is already known about persons and other things, and are used as (...)
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  27. Lynne Rudder Baker (2005). When Does a Person Begin? Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48.
    According to the Constitution View of persons, a human person is wholly constituted by (but not identical to) a human organism. This view does justice both to our similarities to other animals and to our uniqueness. As a proponent of the Constitution View, I defend the thesis that the coming-into-existence of a human person is not simply a matter of the coming-into-existence of an organism, even if that organism ultimately comes to constitute a person. Marshalling some support from developmental psychology, (...)
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  28. Lynne Rudder Baker (2004). On Being One's Own Person. In M. Sie, Marc Slors & B. van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
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  29. Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). Review: A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (445):148-151.
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  30. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):623–635.
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  31. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on My "the Ontological Status of Persons". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):394-396.
    1. Primary-kind properties. Rosenkrantz does not see how a single primary-kind property can be had by x essentially and by y contingently . He offers a reductio ad absurdum of the view that a primary can be had accidentally or derivatively. The reductio has as a premise the following: “[S]omething has a primarykind property, F-ness, derivatively only if the primary-kind property of a nonderivative F, i.e., the property which determines what a nonderivative F most fundamentally is, is nonderivative F-ness .” (...)
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  32. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Review: Précis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):592 - 598.
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  33. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). The Emergent Self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):734-736.
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  34. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). The Ontological Status of Persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388.
    Throughout his illustrious career, Roderick Chisholm was concerned with the nature of persons. On his view, persons are what he called ‘entia per se.’ They exist per se, in their own right. I too have developed an account of persons—I call it the ‘Constitution View’—an account that is different in important ways from Chisholm’s. Here, however, I want to focus on a thesis that Chisholm and I agree on: that persons have ontological significance in virtue of being persons. Although I’ll (...)
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  35. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Précis of Persons and Bodies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):592-598.
  36. Lynne Rudder Baker (2001). Materialism with a Human Face. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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  37. Lynne Rudder Baker, Precis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  38. Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.
    What is a human person, and what is the relation between a person and his or her body? In her third book on the philosophy of mind, Lynne Rudder Baker investigates what she terms the person/body problem and offers a detailed account of the relation between human persons and their bodies. Baker's argument is based on the 'Constitution View' of persons and bodies, which aims to show what distinguishes persons from all other beings and to show how we can be (...)
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  39. Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). What Am I? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151 - 159.
    Eric T. Olson has argued that any view of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity has a consequence that he considers untenable—namely, that I was never an early-term fetus. I have several replies. First, the psychological-continuity view of personal identity does not entail the putative consequence; the appearance to the contrary depends on not distinguishing between de re and de dicto theses. Second, the putative consequence is not untenable anyway; the appearance to the contrary depends on not taking seriously (...)
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  40. Lynne Rudder Baker, Philosophy in Mediis Rebus.
    So, let us begin in the middle of things. There are two senses in which I think that philosophy must begin in the middle of things: The first is epistemological: I think that the Cartesian ideal of finding an absolute starting point without any presuppositions is illusory. The most that we can do is to be aware of our presuppositions; we cannot eliminate them. Wherever we choose to start, we are in the middle of things epistemologically. The second way in (...)
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  41. David Bakhurst (2005). Wiggins on Persons and Human Nature. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):462–469.
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  42. Erik Baldwin (2013). Putting Uninstantiated Human Person Essences to Work: A Comment on Davis and Craig on The Grounding Objection. Philosophia Christi 15 (2):221-225.
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  43. Victor Balowitz (1975). More on Persons and Their Bodies. Philosophical Studies 27 (1):63 - 64.
  44. Victor H. Balowitz (1972). Persons as Subjects of Perception. Personalist 53 (1):102-103.
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  45. Y. Michael Barilan (2002). Head-Counting Vs. Heart-Counting: An Examination of the Recent Case of the Conjoined Twins From Malta. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 45 (4):593-603.
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  46. Joe Barnhardt (1998). Dissociation. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (2/3):33-37.
    My hypothesis is that human personhood has ancient biological roots which make it possible for social reinforcers to contribute to the gradual construction of real persons who are always deeper than the stories about them. Multiple persons do sometimes emerge from one human organism. Rather than try to prove they are real, I explore the consequences of assuming them to be genuine emergentsthat become social environment to one another. I suggest that the multiple-persons phenomenon has profoundly influenced the development of (...)
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  47. John Barresi, On Seeing Our Selves and Others as Persons.
    Human beings may be the only organisms capable of thinking of self and other in equivalent ways – as selves and persons. Most organisms think about their own activities differently than they do the activities of others. A few large-brained organisms like chimps and dolphins sometimes think of the activities of self and other in the same way. But, only humans think quite generally in this manner. In this paper I give a description of our commonsense notions of self and (...)
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  48. John Barresi (1999). On Becoming a Person. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98.
    How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through (...)
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  49. Timothy J. Bayne (2005). Divided Brains and Unified Phenomenology: A Review Essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512.
    In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to (...)
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  50. Richard A. Beauchamp (1999). Personhood and Communities of Interpretation: A Phenomenological Foray. The Personalist Forum 15 (2):274-283.
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