Bookmark and Share

Persons

Edited by David Shoemaker (Tulane University)
About this topic
Summary The metaphysics of personhood primarily addresses two questions: what is the nature of persons and what are their persistence conditions across time?  Addressing the former question prompts investigations into the nature of the self (if distinct from the person), consciousness, mind, and embodiment.  Addressing the latter prompts investigations into theories of personal identity.  Because many view "person"as a thoroughly normative notion, however, its study is often connected closely to investigations into value and practical identity.
Key works Primarily metaphysical investigations into personhood are taken up repeatedly by major figures throughout the history of philosophy, from Plato to Descartes to Kant.  In the contemporary literature, there are clear discussions by Baker 2000, Olson 2007, Shoemaker 1963, and Van Inwagen 2001. Personhood as a normative ("forensic") concept was introduced by John Locke, in "Of Identity and Diversity" (see Perry 1975).  Contemporary normatively-based explorations of personhood include Frankfurt 1971 and Korsgaard 1989
Introductions Gallagher 2011, Martin, Raymond and Barresi, John, eds., Personal Identity (2003).
  Show all references
Related categories
Subcategories:See also:History/traditions: Persons
2236 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 2236
Material to categorize
  1. Yoko Arisaka (2001). The Ontological Co-Emergence Of'self and Other'in Japanese Philosophy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):5-7.
    The coupling of 'self and other' as well as the issues regarding intersubjectivity have been central topics in modern Japanese philosophy. The dominant views are critical of the Cartesian formulation , but the Japanese philosophers drew their conclusions also based on their own insights into Japanese culture and language. In this paper I would like to explore this theme in two of the leading modern Japanese philosophers - Kitaro Nishida and Tetsuro Watsuji . I do not make a causal claim (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Stephen T. Asma (2012). Affective Neuroscience and the Philosophy of Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Bruce Aune (1983). The Identity of the Self. Review of Metaphysics 36 (3):724-726.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. R. J. B. (1970). Principles and Persons. Review of Metaphysics 24 (2):343-343.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Peter A. Bertocci (1961). The Moral Structure of the Person. Review of Metaphysics 14 (3):369 - 388.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Susan Blackmore (1994). Demolishing the Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):280-282.
    [opening paragraph]: Do you believe, deep down, that you exist? Do you feel as though `you' make the decisions and run `your' life? Above all do you think that `you' are conscious? If so, according to Guy Claxton's latest book, you have got it all wrong.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Andreas Blank (2006). Michael Tye, Consciousness and Persons. Unity and Identity. Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (1):188-191.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Michael B. Burke (1997). Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):457 - 467.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. A. S. C. (1971). Bradley's Metaphysics and the Self. Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):373-373.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. A. S. C. (1971). The Problem of the Self. Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):356-356.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. A. S. C. (1971). The Problem of the Self. Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):356-356.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Chris Calvert-Minor (2014). Minimal, Narrative, and Committed Selves. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):74-95.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jonathan Cole (1997). On 'Being Faceless': Selfhood and Facial Embodiment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6):5-6.
    For most people a sense of self includes an embodied component: when describing our selves we describe those aspects of our physical bodies which can be easily codified: height, hair colour, sex, eye colour. Even when we consider ourselves we tend not to consider our intellectual cognitive characteristics but our describable anatomy. Wittgenstein's dictum, ‘the human body is the best picture of the human soul’, is relevant here but I would like to go further: the body-part we feel most embodied (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Katja Crone (2012). Phenomenal Self-Identity Over Time. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):201-216.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Robin S. Dillon (2007). Arrogance, Self-Respect and Personhood. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):101-126.
    This essay aims to show that arrogance corrupts the very qualities that make persons persons. The corruption is subtle but profound, and the key to understanding it lies in understanding the connections between different kinds of arrogance, self-respect, respect for others and personhood. Making these connections clear is the second aim of this essay. It will build on Kant's claim that self-respect is central to living our human lives as persons and that arrogance is, at its core, the failure to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Jonathan Edelmann (2007). Setting Criteria for Ideal Reincarnation Research. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (12):92-101.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Owen Flanagan (2012). Phenomenal and Historical Selves. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):217-240.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Gary Fuller (1992). Functionalism and Personal Identity. The Personalist Forum 8 (Supplement):133-143.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (1997). Models of the Self: Editors' Introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6):5-6.
    There is a long history of inquiry about human nature and the nature of the self. It stretches from the ancient tradition of Socratic self-knowledge in the context of ethical life to contemporary discussions of brain function in cognitive science. At the beginning of the modern era, Descartes was led to the conclusion that self-knowledge provided the single Archimedean point for all knowledge. His thesis that self is a single, simple, continuing, and unproblematically accessible mental substance resonated with common sense, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Adam Green (2012). Perceiving Persons. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4):3-4.
    Since their discovery, mirror neurons have played a critical role in the interdisciplinary debate over how we come to understand other people, a topic often labelled 'mind-reading'. The philosopher Alvin Goldman argues that mirror neurons provide critical evidence that we come to understand others by simulating them. In this paper, I demonstrate that mirror neurons should be thought of as facilitating the perception of persons but should not be thought of as simulators. Our basic understanding of others does not come (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Robert van Gulick (2013). Phenomenal Unity, Representation and the Self. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):209 - 214.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Richard Hallam (2012). A Mind-Less Self Ontogenesis and Phylogenesis. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4):3-4.
    Recent literature on the development of self in child development and in human social evolution is examined in the light of Gilbert Ryle's critique of the concept of mind. As an alternative to the currently popular theory-of-mind approach, it is proposed that a better conceptual foundation for theories of self can be built around a human capacity for higher-order relational reasoning about categories of human being, loosely 'persons' and their attributes, and a capacity to generate figurative conceptual entities such as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Kenneth Einar Himma (2003). What Philosophy of Mind Can Tell Us About the Morality of Abortion. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (1):89-109.
    I attempt to show that, under materialist assumptions about the nature of mind, it is a necessary condition for fetal personhood that electrical activity has begun in the brain. First, I argue that it is a necessary condition for a thing to be a moral person that it is (or has) a self—understood as something that is capable of serving as the subject of a mental experience. Second, I argue that it is a necessary condition for a fetus to be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Heikki Ikaheimo & A. Laitinen (2007). Dimensions of Personhood. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):6-16.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. A. E. J. (1966). Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. Review of Metaphysics 19 (3):601-601.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. G. Jeff (1999). Lenore Thomson, Personality Type. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:122-122.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Raya Jones (2006). The Person Still Comes First: The Continuing Musical Self in Dementia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (3):73-93.
    It is well known anecdotally that, for many people in dementia, the appreciation of music outlasts other faculties. Could the residual musicality constitute a 'musical self', an enduring fragment of the person that the sufferer used to be? The question, as far we know, has not been raised before. Towards formulating the hypothesis, this article examines some of the available research and theorizing concerning the self and the neurology of music and dementia. A unified neurocognitive 'musical self' system seems plausible, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. L. Kall & K. Zeiler (2014). Bodily Relational Autonomy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):100-120.
    Conceptions of autonomy in western philosophy and ethics have often centred on self-governance and self-determination. However, a growing bulk of literature also questions such conceptions, including the understanding of the autonomous self as a self-governing independent individual that chooses, acts, and lives in accordance with her or his own values, norms, or sense of self. This article contributes to the critical interrogation of selfhood, autonomy, and autonomous decision making by combining a feminist focus on relational dimensions of selfhood and autonomy (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Peter R. King (2009). B. Dainton: The Phenomenal Self. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 71 (2):283-288.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Gyula Klima, The Distinction of Substance and Accident and the Analogy of Being.
    Of those that exist, some are said of a subject, but are in no subject: as man is said of some subject, namely of some man, but is in no subject. Others, however, are in a subject, but are said of no subject. And I say that to be in a subject which, while it is in something not as a part, cannot exist apart from the thing in which it is. For example, some particular literacy is in a subject, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Bernard Kobes (2005). The "One-Experience" Account of Phenomenal Unity: A Review of Michael Tye's "Consciousness and Persons". [REVIEW] Psyche 11.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. D. M. Kovacs (2012). The Phenomenal Self, by Barry Dainton. Mind 120 (480):1242-1247.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Arto Laitinen (2007). Sorting Out Aspects of Personhood:Capacities, Normativity and Recognition. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):248-270.
    This paper examines how three central aspects of personhood -- the capacities of individuals, their normative status, and the social aspect of being recognized -- are related, and how personhood depends on them. The paper defends first of all a 'basic view' that while actual recognition is among the constitutive elements of full personhood, it is the individual capacities (and not full personhood) which ground the basic moral and normative demands concerning treatment of persons. Actual recognition depends analytically on such (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Drew Leder & Daniel J. Martino (eds.) (2003). Phenomenology of the Body: The Twentieth Annual Symposium of the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center. Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Duquesne University, Gumberg Library.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Maria Legerstee (1998). Mental and Bodily Awareness in Infancy: Consciousness of Self-Existence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):5-6.
    In this article, I will draw on my own work and related publications to present some intuitions and hypotheses about the nature of the self and the mechanisms that lead to the development of consciousness or self awareness in human infants during the first 6 months of life. My main purpose is to show that the origins of a concept of self include the physical and the mental selves. I believe that it is essential when trying to understand what a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Casimir Lewy (1943). Is the Notion of Disembodied Existence Self-Contradictory? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 43:59-78.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Kym Maclaren (2008). Embodied Perceptions of Others as a Condition of Selfhood? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (8):63-93.
    Against recent claims that infants begin with a sense of themselves as distinct selves, I propose that the infant's initial sense of self is still indeterminate and ambiguous, and is only progressively consolidated, beginning with embodied perceptions of others. Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception and Hegel's notion of mutual recognition, and with reference to empirical studies in developmental psychology, I argue that perceiving other persons is significantly different from perceiving inanimate things. Until sufficient motor capacities have developed for exploring (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Henry Rutgers Marshall (1904). Of Noetic Stability; and Belief. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (19):505-512.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Jack Martin (2012). Agent Causation and Compatibilism Reconsidered The Evolutionary and Developmental Emergence of Self-Determining Persons. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):5-6.
    The central argument of this paper is that compatibilist theories that understand human agent causation as self-determination are consistent with, and can accommodate, important insights from evolutionary and developmental psychology. Agent causation is nothing more than the non-mysterious self-determining capability of persons, understood as embodied, emergent ontological entities whose nature is not fixed due to their uniquely evolved and developed capabilities of language use, cultural construction, self-consciousness and self-understanding, and moral concern. Relevant arguments of Dennett and Searle are adapted to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Brian Massumi (2002). Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Duke University Press.
    Replacing the traditional opposition of literal and figural with new distinctions between stasis and motion and between actual and virtual,Parables for the ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Wallace I. Matson (1995). Human Nature Preserved. [REVIEW] Behavior and Philosophy 23 (1):43 - 47.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Arnold Mindell (1982). Dreambody, the Body's Role in Revealing the Self. Sigo Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. N. M. L. Nathan (1997). Self and Will. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):81 – 94.
    When do two mental items belong to the same life? We could be content with the answer -just when they have certain volitional qualities in common. An affinity is noted between that theory and Berkeley's early doctrine of the self. Some rivals of the volitional theory invoke a spiritual or physical owner of mental items. They run a risk either of empty formality or of causal superstition. Other rivals postulate a non-transitive and symmetrical relation in the set of mental items. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Cathal O'Madagain (2012). Group Agents: Persons, Mobs, or Zombies? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):271-287.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 271-287, May 2012.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Douglas Odegard (1989). The Body in the Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):299-308.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Frederick A. Olafson (1995). What is a Human Being?: A Heideggerian View. Cambridge University Press.
    This broad, ambitious study is about human nature, but human nature treated in a way quite different from the scientific account that influences so much of contemporary philosophy. Drawing on certain basic ideas of Heidegger the author presents an alternative to the debate waged between dualists and materialists in the philosophy of mind that involves reconceiving the way we usually think about 'mental' life. Olafson argues that familiar contrasts between the 'physical' and the 'psychological' break down under closer scrutiny. They (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Jaak Panksepp (1998). The Periconscious Substrates of Consciousness: Affective States and the Evolutionary Origins of the SELF. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):5-6.
    An adequate understanding of ‘the self’ and/or ‘primary-process consciousness’ should allow us to explain how affective experiences are created within the brain. Primitive emotional feelings appear to lie at the core of our beings, and the neural mechanisms that generate such states may constitute an essential foundation process for the evolution of higher, more rational, forms of consciousness. At present, abundant evidence indicates that affective states arise from the intrinsic neurodynamics of primitive self-centred emotional and motivational systems situated in subcortical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Alessia Pannese & Joy Hirsch (2013). Unconscious Neural Specificity for Self and the Brainstem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):1-2.
    The self/non-self distinction is essential for survival, but its neural bases are poorly understood. Studies have sought neural specificity for 'self ' in cortical regions. However, behavioural evidence showing that humans are able to single out self-relevant information in the absence of awareness suggests that the cognitive self/non-self distinction might be rooted in subcortical structures involved in automatic, unconscious functions. Here we employ subliminal presentation of self and non-self faces and repetition suppression to show neural specificity for 'self ' in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Philip Pettit (2005). Group Agency and Supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (Supplement):85-105.
    Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must “supervene” on the group members’ contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members’ individual judgments on that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. John Pickering (2010). Review of Virtual Selves, Real Persons: A Dialogue Across Disciplines, by Hallam, RS. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):259-262.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 2236