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Summary Phenomenal intentionality is an alleged type of intentionality that is grounded in phenomenal consciousness. 
Key works Key works include Strawson 1994, Horgan & Tienson 2002Loar 2003, and Pitt 2004
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  1. Liliana Albertazzi (2007). At the Roots of Consciousness: Intentional Presentations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):94-114.
    The Author argues for a non-semantic theory of intentionality, i.e. a theory of intentional reference rooted in the perceptive world. Specifically, the paper concerns two aspects of the original theory of intentionality: the structure of intentional objects as appearance (an unfolding spatio-temporal structure endowed with a direction), and the cognitive processes involved in a psychic act at the primary level of cognition. Examples are given from the experimental psychology of vision, with a particular emphasis on the relation between phenomenal space (...)
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  2. Andrew R. Bailey & Bradley Richards (2014). Horgan and Tienson on Phenomenology and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):313-326.
    Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the (...)
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  3. David Bain (2011). The Imperative View of Pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.
    Pain, crucially, is unpleasant and motivational. It can be awful; and it drives us to action, e.g. to take our weight off a sprained ankle. But what is the relationship between pain and those two features? And in virtue of what does pain have them? Addressing these questions, Colin Klein and Richard J. Hall have recently developed the idea that pains are, at least partly, experiential commands—to stop placing your weight on your ankle, for example. In this paper, I reject (...)
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  4. T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.) (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press, USA.
    This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology.
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  5. David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
    Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: I argue that they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional states are phenomenal states. I clarify these claims and argue for each of them. I also address objections which touch on a range (...)
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  6. Glenn Braddock (2003). The First-Person Approach and the Nature of Consciousness. Charles Siewert, the Significance of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2):149-158.
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  7. Tyler Burge (2003). Phenomenality and Reference: Reply to Loar. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.
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  8. Alex Byrne (2009). Experience and Content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
    The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the content view are (...)
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  9. Elijah Chudnoff (2015). Cognitive Phenomenology. Routledge.
    Phenomenology is about subjective aspects of the mind, such as the conscious states associated with vision and touch, and the conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation or sadness. These states have a distinctive first-person ‘feel’ to them, called their phenomenal character. In this respect they are often taken to be radically different from mental states and processes associated with thought. This is the first book to fully question this orthodoxy and explore the prospects of (...)
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  10. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Gurwitsch's Phenomenal Holism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):559-578.
    Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theoretical ideas into Husserl’s framework of constitutive phenomenology. And he explored the light this move sheds on both the overall structure of experience and on particular kinds of experience, especially perceptual experiences and conscious shifts in attention. The primary focus of this paper is the overall structure of experience. I show how Gurwitsch’s Gestalt theoretically informed phenomenological investigations provide a basis for defending what I will call (...)
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  11. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intellectual Gestalts. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 174.
    Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. I argue, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are not purely sensory. The second aim of this paper is (...)
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  12. Sean Crawford (2013). Review of The Sources of Intentionality by Uriah Kriegel. [REVIEW] Analysis 73 (1):190-193.
  13. Arnaud Dewalque (2013). Brentano and the Parts of the Mental: A Mereological Approach to Phenomenal Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):447-464.
    In this paper, I explore one particular dimension of Brentano’s legacy, namely, his theory of mental analysis. This theory has received much less attention in recent literature than the intentionality thesis or the theory of inner perception. However, I argue that it provides us with substantive resources in order to conceptualize the unity of intentionality and phenomenality. My proposal is to think of the connection between intentionality and phenomenality as a certain combination of part/whole relations rather than as a supervenience (...)
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  14. John Dilworth (2008). Imaginative Versus Analytical Experiences of Wines. In Fritz Allhoff (ed.), Wine and Philosophy. Blackwell.
    The highly enjoyable experiences associated with drinking good wines have been widely misunderstood. It is common to regard wine appreciation as an analytical or quasi-scientific kind of activity, in which wine experts carefully distinguish the precise sensory qualities of each wine, and then pass on their accumulated factual knowledge to less experienced wine enthusiasts. However, this model of wine appreciation is seriously defective. One good way to show its defects is to provide a better and more fundamental scientific account of (...)
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  15. John Dilworth (2007). Conscious Perceptual Experience as Representational Self-Prompting. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 (2007), pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their function is that of imperatively (...)
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  16. Katalin Farkas (2013). Constructing a World for the Senses. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. OUP. 99.
    It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences (...)
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  17. Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We (...)
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  18. Ivan Fox (1989). On the Nature and Cognitive Function of Phenomenal Content -- Part One. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):81-103.
  19. Nicholas Georgalis (2003). The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
    This paper argues that there is no such thing as ?phenomenal intentionality?. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to ?what it is like? (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one?s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of ?phenomenal intentionality? fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of (...)
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  20. Brie Gertler (2001). The Relationship Between Phenomenality and Intentionality: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 7 (17).
    Charles Siewert offers a persuasive argument to show that the presence of certain phenomenal features logically suffices for the presence of certain intentional ones. He claims that this shows that (some) phenomenal features are inherently intentional. I argue that he has not established the latter thesis, even if we grant the logical sufficiency claim. For he has not ruled out a rival alternative interpretation of the relevant data, namely, that (some) intentional features are inherently phenomenal.
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  21. George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 468--484.
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  22. Terence Horgan (2013). Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality. The Monist 96 (2):232-251.
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  23. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2004). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter De Gruyter.
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  24. Terence M. Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
    We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but (we argue) highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
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  25. Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. 520--533.
    What is the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality? A common picture in recent philosophy of mind has been that the phenomenal aspects and the intentional aspects of mentality are independent of one another. According to this view, the phenomenal character of certain mental states or processes”states for which there is "something it is like" to undergo them—is not intentional. Examples that are typically given of states with inherent phenomenal character are sensations, such as pains, itches, and color sensations. This view (...)
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  26. Terence Horgan, John Tienson & Graham George (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness. In Kriegel Uriah & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-representational Approaches to Consciousness. Bradford.
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  27. Terry Horgan (2011). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Evidential Role of Perceptual Experience: Comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):447 - 455.
    Phenomenal intentionality and the evidential role of perceptual experience: comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9604-2 Authors Terry Horgan, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  28. Terry Horgan & George Graham (2012). Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy. In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. De Gruyter.
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  29. Uriah Kriegel, The Intentionality of Conscious Experience and Mind-Relative Content.
    This is a paper I wrote at the end of my first year in grad school. I'm not sure why it's online and don't remember what I say in it. Just thought I'd mention...
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  30. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present: Introductory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):437-444.
  31. Uriah Kriegel (ed.) (2013). Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    Phenomenal intentionality is supposed to be a kind of directedness of the mind onto the world that is grounded in the conscious feel of mental life. This book of new essays explores a number of issues raised by the notion of phenomenal intentionality.
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  32. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Two Notions of Mental Representation. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. 161-179.
    The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.
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  33. Uriah Kriegel (2013). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 1.
    We review some of the work already done around the notion of phenomenal intentionality and propose a way of turning this body of work into a self-conscious research program for understanding intentionality.
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  34. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion. European Journal of Philosophy (3):n/a-n/a.
  35. Uriah Kriegel (2011). The Sources of Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    This book attempts a synthesis of both approaches, developing an account of the sources of such directedness that grounds it both in reliable tracking and in ...
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  36. Uriah Kriegel (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 79--102.
    Since the seventies, it has been customary to assume that intentionality is independent of consciousness. Recently, a number of philosophers have rejected this assumption, claiming intentionality is closely tied to consciousness, inasmuch as non- conscious intentionality in some sense depends upon conscious intentionality. Within this alternative framework, the question arises of how to account for unconscious intentionality, and different authors have offered different accounts. In this paper, I compare and contrast four possible accounts of unconscious intentionality, which I call potentialism, (...)
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  37. Uriah Kriegel (2010). Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
    One of the most enduring elements of Davidson’s legacy is the idea that intentionality is inherently normative. The normativity of intentionality means different things to different people and in different contexts, however. A subsidiary goal of this paper is to get clear on the sense in which Davidson means the thesis that intentionality is inherently normative. The central goal of the paper is to consider whether the thesis is true, in light of recent work on intentionality that insists on an (...)
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  38. Uriah Kriegel (2008). The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.
    The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
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  39. Uriah Kriegel (2007). Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
    How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving (first) an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal inten- tionality, and (second) the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation (all intentionality derives from phenomenal intentionality). The solution is correspondingly two-part: (...)
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  40. Uriah Kriegel (2003). Is Intentionality Dependent Upon Consciousness? Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.
    It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, however, I am (...)
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  41. Uriah Kriegel (2002). Phenomenal Content. Erkenntnis 57 (2):175-198.
    This paper defends a version of Sheomaker-style representationalism about qualitative character.
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  42. Uriah Kriegel & Terence Horgan (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
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  43. Brian Loar (2003). Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press. 229--258.
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  44. William Lycan (2008). Phenomenal Intentionalities. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):233 - 252.
    There is now a considerable literature that goes under the heading of “phenomenal intentionality.” But it features a number of distinct issues. What they have in common is the claim that intentionality bears a closer relation to phenomenology than had previously been recognized. There is a basic thesis, which is controversial, and there are further arguments attempting to draw more exciting morals from the basic thesis. My purpose in this paper is to survey these issues, see what may be at (...)
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  45. Napoleon M. Mabaquiao (2005). Husserl's Theory of Intentionality. Philosophia 34 (1):24-49.
    This essay is a critical examination of how Edmund Husserl, in his appropriation of Franz Brentano’s concept of intentionality into his phenomenology, deals with the very issues that shaped Brentano’s theory of intentionality. These issues concern the proper criterion for distinguishing mental from physical phenomena and the right explanation for the independence of the intentionality of mental phenomena from the existence or non-existence of their objects. Husserl disagrees with Brentano’s views that intentionality is the distinguishing feature of all mental phenomena (...)
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  46. Patrick Madigan (2009). The History of Intentionality: Theories of Consciousness From Brentano to Husserl. By Ryan Hickerson. [REVIEW] Heythrop Journal 50 (3):555-556.
  47. Chauncey Maher (2012). Kriegel, Uriah. The Sources of Intentionality. Review of Metaphysics 66 (1):153-154.
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  48. Mohan Matthen (2014). Debunking Enactivism: A Critical Notice of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism. [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):118-128.
    In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice (...)
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  49. Douglas B. Meehan (2002). Qualitative Character and Sensory Representation. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):630-641.
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  50. Uwe Meixner (2006). Classical Intentionality. Erkenntnis 65 (1):25-45.
    In the first part, the paper describes in detail the classical conception of intentionality which was expounded in its most sophisticated form by Edmund Husserl. This conception is today largely eclipsed in the philosophy of mind by the functionalist and by the representationalist account of intentionality, the former adopted by Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, the latter by John Searle and Fred Dretske. The very considerable differences between the classical and the modern conceptions are pointed out, and it is argued (...)
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