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  1. Liliana Albertazzi (2012). Qualitative Perceiving. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):11-12.
    It is difficult to find agreement on what constitutes perceiving.at Rovereto, Italy. The term is used in a wide array of domains ranging from psychology to physiology to aesthetics, and over time it has also acquired diverse connotations within various disciplines. Current perceptual science, however, even when it deals with qualitative aspects of experience, for example phenomena of lightness and colour, almost exclusively explains them in terms of primary qualities or stimuli quantitatively understood. The fact that science treats qualitative experiences (...)
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  2. Bernard Andrieu, Charles Wolf & Brent Robbins (2006). Brains in the Flesh: Prospects for a Neurophenomenology. Janus Head 9 (1).
    The relations between the neurosciences and phenomenology enable us today— thanks to the works of M. Merleau-Ponty, G. Simondon, F. Varela, A.R. Damasio and V.S. Ramachandran—to define the brain as a biosubjective organ: its constitution, its functioning, and its interactions prove that a description of individuation can fit in a cognitive neurophenomenology. In this framework, the mental state acquires a subjective autonomy even if it is an illusion in regard to the determining conditions of brain functioning.
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  3. P. Sven Arvidson (2008). Attentional Capture and Attentional Character. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):539-562.
    Attentional character is a way of thinking about what is relevant in a human life, what is meaningful and how it becomes so. This paper introduces the concept of attentional character through a redefinition of attentional capture as achievement. It looks freshly at the attentional capture debate in the current cognitive sciences literature through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch’s gestalt-phenomenology. Attentional character is defined as an initially limited capacity for attending in a given environment and is located within the sphere (...)
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  4. P. Sven Arvidson (2000). Transformations in Consciousness: Continuity, the Self and Marginal Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (3):3-26.
    The term ‘consciousness’ is usually reserved only for the focus of attention. This restriction empties the phenomenology of consciousness of some of its richness. Rather than conceiving of consciousness as one-dimensional, researchers should consider that consciousness has a three-dimensional organization. Conscious presentations are structured in a focus, context and margin pattern. Inclusion of these other dimensions of consciousness as consciousness is important for an adequate relation between scientific method and phenomenology. The problem becomes especially acute when transformations in consciousness -- (...)
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  5. P. Sven Arvidson (1992). On the Origin of Organization in Consciousness. Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology 23 (1):53-65.
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  6. Bernard J. Baars (1993). Putting the Focus on the Fringe: Three Empirical Cases. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (2):126-36.
    After suggesting an operational definition for fringe experiences—as opposed to clearly conscious and clearly unconscious phenomena—we examine three empirical cases: The tip-of-the-tongue experience, the fringe experience of "wrongness," and the case of conscious focus on abstract, hard-to-image conscious contents. In each case, Mangan′s four major claims are explored in some detail. Most tasks seem to involve a combination of conscious experiences, complex unconscious representations, and multiple fringe experiences. The chief disagreement from this analysis involves vague experiences that are generally believed (...)
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  7. G. William Barnard (2010). The Ever-New Flow of Time: Henri Bergsons View of Consciousnes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (11-12):11-12.
    Henri Bergson created a rich and detailed theory of consciousness beginning with the publication of Time and Free Will in 1889 and continuing through the publication of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion in 1932. His theory had much in common with William James’s views in that both emphasized consciousness as a continuous process. James's famous ‘stream of consciousness’ is strikingly similar to Bergson's early notion of duration (duree), even if Bergson more strongly emphasized the temporal qualities of consciousness. (...)
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  8. Hazel E. Barnes (2006). Consciousness and Digestion: Sartre and Neuroscience. Sartre Studies International 11 (1-2):117-132.
    While Sartre scholars cannot fairly be described as being opposed to science, they have, for the most part, stayed aloof. The field of psychology, of course, has been an exception. Sartre himself felt compelled to present his own existential psychoanalysis by marking the parallels and differences between his position and traditional approaches, particularly the Freudian. The same is true with respect to his concept of bad faith and of emotional behavior. Scholars have followed his lead with richly productive results. But (...)
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  9. John Barresi (2004). Intentionality, Consciousness and Intentional Relations: From Constitutive Phenomenology to Cognitive Science. In L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevance for Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 79--93.
    In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the (...)
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  10. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Closing the Gap: Some Questions for Neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):349-64.
    In his 1996 paper Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem, Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela''s call hasn''t gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is. What are neurophenomenologists trying to do, and how are they trying to do it? To (...)
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  11. M. Beaton, B. Pierce & S. A. J. Stuart (2013). Neurophenomenology – A Special Issue. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):265-268.
    Context: Seventeen years ago Francisco Varela introduced neurophenomenology. He proposed the integration of phenomenological approaches to first-person experience – in the tradition of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty – with a neuro-dynamical, scientific approach to the study of the situated brain and body. Problem: It is time for a re-appraisal of this field. Has neurophenomenology already contributed to the sciences of the mind? If so, how? How should it best do so in future? Additionally, can neurophenomenology really help to resolve or (...)
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  12. Frithjof Bergmann (1982). Sartre on the Nature of Consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (April):153-162.
  13. Reinaldo Bernal Velásquez (2012). E-Physicalism. A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Ontos Verlag.
    This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with (...)
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  14. Glenn Braddock (2001). Beyond Reflection in Naturalized Phenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):3-16.
    In this paper, I defend a pluralistic view of phenomenological method which will provide evidence for particular accounts of experience without relying exclusively on the reflective method or on intuition as a criterion for truth. To this end, I discuss the prospects for indirect phenomenology. I argue that phenomenology ought to be defined by its object of investigation, first-person experience, and not by any particular method of gaining access to this object of investigation. On this view, an integration of naturalized (...)
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  15. Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.) (2005). Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in (...)
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  16. Steven Brown (2008). Must Phenomenology Rest on Paradox?: Implications of Methodology-Limited Theories. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):5-32.
    Husserlian phenomenology depends upon a particular and limited set of related methodologies, which assume not merely abilities and results on the part of phenomenologists which have been severely criticized, but more profoundly, that mental contents are atomistic and independently manipulable. I will show not only that this assumption is mistaken and that questioning it undermines traditional phenomenological method, but that it leads to a paradox when turned upon itself which forces the rejection of a purely Husserlian phenomenology. More generally, any (...)
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  17. Steven Ravett Brown (2004). Structural Phenomenology: An Empirically-Based Model of Consciousness. Dissertation, University of Oregon
    In this dissertation I develop a structural model of phenomenal consciousness that integrates contemporary experimental and theoretical work in philosophy and cognitive science. I argue that phenomenology must be “naturalized” and that it should be acknowledged as a major component of empirical research. I use this model to describe important phenomenal structures, and I then employ it to provide a detailed explication of tip-of-tongue phenomena. The primary aim of “structural phenomenology” is the creation of a general framework within which descriptions (...)
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  18. Steven Ravett Brown (1999). Beyond the Fringe: James, Gurwitsch, and the Conscious Horizon. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (2):211-227.
    All our conscious experiences, linguistic and nonlinguistic, are bound up with and dependent on a background that is vague, unexpressed, and sometimes unconscious. The combination of William JamesÕs concept of "fringes" coupled with Aaron GurwitschÕs analysis of the field of consciousness provides a general structure in which to embed phenomenal descriptions, enabling fringe phenomena to be understood, in part, relative to other experiences. I will argue, drawing on examples from Drew LederÕs book, The Absent Body, that specific and detailed phenomena (...)
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  19. Dorion Cairns (2002). Phenomenology and Present-Day Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):69-77.
  20. Taylor Carman (2005). On the Inescapability of Phenomenology. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 67.
  21. Glenn Carruthers (2015). Who Am I in Out of Body Experiences? Implications From OBEs for the Explanandum of a Theory of Self-Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):183-197.
    Contemporary theories of self-consciousness typically begin by dividing experiences of the self into types, each requiring separate explanation. The stereotypical case of an out of body experience may be seen to suggest a distinction between the sense of oneself as an experiencing subject, a mental entity, and a sense of oneself as an embodied person, a bodily entity. Point of view, in the sense of the place from which the subject seems to experience the world, in this case is tied (...)
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  22. Peter Carruthers, Cartesian Epistemology.
    This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such evidence, (...)
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  23. N. N. Chokr (1992). Mind, Consciousness, and Cognition: Phenomenology Vs Cognitive Science. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 9 (3):179-97.
  24. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Gurwitsch's Phenomenal Holism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):559-578.
    Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theoretical ideas into Husserl’s framework of constitutive phenomenology. And he explored the light this move sheds on both the overall structure of experience and on particular kinds of experience, especially perceptual experiences and conscious shifts in attention. The primary focus of this paper is the overall structure of experience. I show how Gurwitsch’s Gestalt theoretically informed phenomenological investigations provide a basis for defending what I will call (...)
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  25. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intellectual Gestalts. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 174.
    Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. I argue, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are not purely sensory. The second aim of this paper is (...)
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  26. Philip Clayton (ed.) (forthcoming). The Oxford Handbook of Science and Religion. Oup.
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  27. Joshua W. Clegg (2006). Phenomenology as Foundational to the Naturalized Consciousness. Culture and Psychology 12 (3):340-351.
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  28. G. Colombetti (2013). Some Ideas for the Integration of Neurophenomenology and Affective Neuroscience. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):288-297.
    Context: Affective neuroscience has not developed first-person methods for the generation of first-person data. This neglect is problematic, because emotion experience is a central dimension of affectivity. Problem: I propose that augmenting affective neuroscience with a neurophenomenological method can help address long-standing questions in emotion theory, such as: Do different emotions come with unique, distinctive patterns of brain and bodily activity? How do emotion experience, bodily feelings and brain and bodily activity relate to one another? Method: This paper is theoretical. (...)
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  29. Roberto Cordeschi, Guglielmo Tamburrini & Giuseppe Trautteur (1999). The Notion of Loop in the Study of Consciousness. In Proceedings of the International School of Biocybernetics. World Scientific.
    The notion of loop seems to be ubiquitous in the study of organisms, the human mind and symbolic systems. With the possible exception of quantum-mechanical approaches, the treatments of consciousness we are acquainted with crucially appeal to the concept of loop. The uses of loops in this context fall within two broad classes. In the first one, loops are used to express the control of the organism’s interaction with the environment; in the second one, they are used to express self-reference. (...)
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  30. Steven G. Crowell (2002). Is There a Phenomenological Research Program? Synthese 131 (3):419-444.
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  31. R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.) (1997). Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge.
    NATURALLY. DEVELOPED. THOUGHT. Figure i these two construcrs to define a sprctrum of modes of thought, ranging ftom analytical (inrensive checking and nattow focus) to intuitive (minimal checking and btoad focus). He develops the ...
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  32. Christian de Quincey (2000). Intersubjectivity: Exploring Consciousness From the Second-Person Perspective. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 32 (2):135-155.
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  33. Oisín Deery (2014). Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism? Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):2-19.
    Many philosophers think not only that we are free to act otherwise than we do, but also that we experience being free in this way. Terry Horgan argues that such experience is compatibilist: it is accurate even if determinism is true. According to Horgan, when people judge their experience as incompatibilist, they misinterpret it. While Horgan's position is attractive, it incurs significant theoretical costs. I sketch an alternative way to be a compatibilist about experiences of free agency that avoids these (...)
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  34. Arthur Deikman (1996). 'I' = Awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):350-56.
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  35. N. Depraz (2003). The Philosophic Challenge. In Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (eds.), On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. Advances in Consciousness Research. 169-203.
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  36. Natalie Depraz, F. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (2003). On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins.
    Searches for the sources and means for a disciplined practical approach to exploring human experience.
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  37. Natalie Depraz, F. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (2000). The Gesture of Awareness: An Account of its Structural Dynamics. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins. 13--121.
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  38. Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (eds.) (2003). On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. Advances in Consciousness Research.
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  39. Natalie Depraz, Francisco Varela & Pierre Vermersch (2003). The Basic Cycle. In Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (eds.), On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins. 15-63.
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  40. Hubert L. Dreyfus (2001). Phenomenological Description Versus Rational Reconstruction. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55 (216):181-196.
  41. Hubert L. Dreyfus (1999). The Primacy of Phenomenology Over Logical Analysis: A Critique of Searle. Philosophical Topics 27 (2):3-24.
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  42. Hubert L. Dreyfus, A Phenomenology of Skill Acquisition as the Basis for a Merleau-Pontian Nonrepresentational Cognitive Science.
  43. John J. Drummond (2007). Phenomenology: Neither Auto- nor Hetero- Be. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):57-74.
    Dennett’s contrast between auto- and hetero-phenomenology is badly drawn, primarily because Dennett identifies phenomenologists as introspective psychologists. The contrast I draw between phenomenology and hetero-phenomenology is not in terms of the difference between a first-person, introspective perspective and a third-person perspective but rather in terms of the difference between two third-person accounts – a descriptive phenomenology and an explanatory psychology – both of which take the first-person perspective into account.
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  44. James M. Edie (1970). William James and Phenomenology. Review of Metaphysics 23 (March):481-526.
    This is a study of all the recent literature on william james written from a phenomenological perspective with the purpose of showing that william james made fundamental contributions to the phenomenological theory of the intentionality of consciousness, To the phenomenological theory of self-Identity, And to the phenomenological conception of noetic freedom as the basic concept of ethical theory.
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  45. Ralph D. Ellis (1986). An Ontology of Consciousness. Kluwer.
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  46. Ralph D. Ellis (1983). Phenomenological Psychology and the Empirical Observation of Consciousness. International Philosophical Quarterly 23 (June):191-204.
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  47. Lester Embree (2006). Direct and Indirect Consciousness. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 37 (1):1-8.
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  48. Lester Embree (ed.) (2004). Gurwitsch's Relevancy for Cognitive Science. Springer.
    He died before cognitive science came together in the 1970s, but his positions on many issues - the self, the other, practical action in situations, the lived ...
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  49. Denis Fisette (2003). Descriptive Phenomenology and the Problem of Consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):33-61.
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  50. David Galin (1996). The Structure of Subjective Experience: Sharpen the Concepts and Terminology. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press. 121--140.
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