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Phenomenology and Consciousness

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  1. P. Sven Arvidson (2008). Attentional Capture and Attentional Character. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).
    Attentional character is a way of thinking about what is relevant in a human life, what is meaningful and how it becomes so. This paper introduces the concept of attentional character through a redefinition of attentional capture as achievement. It looks freshly at the attentional capture debate in the current cognitive sciences literature through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch’s gestalt-phenomenology. Attentional character is defined as an initially limited capacity for attending in a given environment and is located within the sphere (...)
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  2. P. Sven Arvidson (2000). Transformations in Consciousness: Continuity, the Self and Marginal Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (3):3-26.
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  3. Bernard J. Baars (1993). Putting the Focus on the Fringe: Three Empirical Cases. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (2):126-36.
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  4. Hazel E. Barnes (2006). Consciousness and Digestion: Sartre and Neuroscience. Sartre Studies International 11 (1-2):117-132.
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  5. John Barresi (2004). Intentionality, Consciousness and Intentional Relations: From Constitutive Phenomenology to Cognitive Science. In L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevance for Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the (...)
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  6. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Closing the Gap: Some Questions for Neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):349-64.
    In his 1996 paper Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem, Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela''s call hasn''t gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is. What are neurophenomenologists trying to do, and how are they trying to do it? To (...)
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  7. Frithjof Bergmann (1982). Sartre on the Nature of Consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (April):153-162.
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  8. Glenn Braddock (2001). Beyond Reflection in Naturalized Phenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):3-16.
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  9. Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (2005). Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in (...)
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  10. Steven Brown (2008). Must Phenomenology Rest on Paradox?: Implications of Methodology-Limited Theories. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):5-32.
    Husserlian phenomenology depends upon a particular and limited set of related methodologies, which assume not merely abilities and results on the part of phenomenologists which have been severely criticized, but more profoundly, that mental contents are atomistic and independently manipulable. I will show not only that this assumption is mistaken and that questioning it undermines traditional phenomenological method, but that it leads to a paradox when turned upon itself which forces the rejection of a purely Husserlian phenomenology. More generally, any (...)
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  11. Steven Ravett Brown (2004). Structural Phenomenology: An Empirically-Based Model of Consciousness. Dissertation, University of Oregon
    In this dissertation I develop a structural model of phenomenal consciousness that integrates contemporary experimental and theoretical work in philosophy and cognitive science. I argue that phenomenology must be “naturalized” and that it should be acknowledged as a major component of empirical research. I use this model to describe important phenomenal structures, and I then employ it to provide a detailed explication of tip-of-tongue phenomena. The primary aim of “structural phenomenology” is the creation of a general framework within which descriptions (...)
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  12. Steven Ravett Brown (1999). Beyond the Fringe: James, Gurwitsch, and the Conscious Horizon. Journal Of Mind And Behavior 20 (2):211-227.
    All our conscious experiences, linguistic and nonlinguistic, are bound up with and dependent on a background that is vague, unexpressed, and sometimes unconscious. The combination of William JamesÕs concept of "fringes" coupled with Aaron GurwitschÕs analysis of the field of consciousness provides a general structure in which to embed phenomenal descriptions, enabling fringe phenomena to be understood, in part, relative to other experiences. I will argue, drawing on examples from Drew LederÕs book, The Absent Body, that specific and detailed phenomena (...)
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  13. Dorion Cairns (2002). Phenomenology and Present-Day Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):69-77.
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  14. Taylor Carman (2005). On the Inescapability of Phenomenology. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  15. Peter Carruthers, Cartesian Epistemology.
    This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such evidence, (...)
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  16. N. N. Chokr (1992). Mind, Consciousness, and Cognition: Phenomenology Vs Cognitive Science. Husserl Studies 9 (3):179-97.
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  17. Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). Intellectual Gestalts. In Uriah Kriegel & Terry Horgan (eds.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. I argue, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are not purely sensory. The second aim of this paper is (...)
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  18. Joshua W. Clegg (2006). Phenomenology as Foundational to the Naturalized Consciousness. Culture and Psychology 12 (3):340-351.
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  19. Steven G. Crowell (2002). Is There a Phenomenological Research Program? Synthese 131 (3):419-444.
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  20. Christian de Quincey (2000). Intersubjectivity: Exploring Consciousness From the Second-Person Perspective. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 32 (2):135-155.
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  21. Arthur Deikman (1996). 'I' = Awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:350-56.
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  22. Natalie Depraz, F. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (2003). On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins.
    Searches for the sources and means for a disciplined practical approach to exploring human experience.
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  23. Hubert L. Dreyfus (1999). The Primacy of Phenomenology Over Logical Analysis: A Critique of Searle. Philosophical Topics 27 (2):3-24.
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  24. Hubert L. Dreyfus, A Phenomenology of Skill Acquisition as the Basis for a Merleau-Pontian Nonrepresentational Cognitive Science.
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  25. John J. Drummond (2007). Phenomenology: Neither Auto- nor Hetero- Be. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).
    Dennett’s contrast between auto- and hetero-phenomenology is badly drawn, primarily because Dennett identifies phenomenologists as introspective psychologists. The contrast I draw between phenomenology and hetero-phenomenology is not in terms of the difference between a first-person, introspective perspective and a third-person perspective but rather in terms of the difference between two third-person accounts – a descriptive phenomenology and an explanatory psychology – both of which take the first-person perspective into account.
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  26. James M. Edie (1970). William James and Phenomenology. Review of Metaphysics 23 (March):481-526.
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  27. Ralph D. Ellis (1983). Phenomenological Psychology and the Empirical Observation of Consciousness. International Philosophical Quarterly 23 (June):191-204.
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  28. Lester Embree (2004). Gurwitsch's Relevancy for Cognitive Science. Springer.
    He died before cognitive science came together in the 1970s, but his positions on many issues - the self, the other, practical action in situations, the lived ...
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  29. David Galin (1996). The Structure of Subjective Experience: Sharpen the Concepts and Terminology. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  30. Shaun Gallagher (2007). Phenomenological Approaches to Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...)
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  31. Shaun Gallagher (2003). Phenomenology and Neurophenomenology: An Interview with Shaun Gallagher. Aluze 2:92-102.
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  32. Shaun Gallagher, Phenomenological and Experimental Research on Embodied Experience.
    In recent years there has been some hard-won but still limited agreement that phenomenology may be of central importance to the cognitive sciences. This realization comes in the wake of dismissive gestures made by philosophers of mind like Dennett (1991), who mistakenly associates phenomenological method with the worst forms of introspection. For very different reasons, resistance can also be found on the phenomenological side of this issue. There are many thinkers well versed in the Husserlian tradition who do not even (...)
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  33. Shaun Gallagher (1997). Mutual Enlightenment: Recent Phenomenology in Cognitive Science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):195-214.
    The term phenomenology can be used in a generic sense to cover a variety of areas related to the problem of consciousness. In this sense it is a title that ranges over issues pertaining to first-person or subjective experience, qualia, and what has become known as "the hard problem" (Chalmers 1995). The term is sometimes used even more generally to signify a variety of approaches to studying such issues, including contemplative, meditative, and mystical studies, and transpersonal psychology.(1) Within the disciplines (...)
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  34. Shaun Gallagher & F. Varela (2003). Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29.
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  35. Aron Gurwitsch (1966). Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology. Northwestern University Press.
    l / Some Aspects and Developments of Gestalt Psychology1 [I] The Development and Status of the Problem At the basis of the constitution of the physical ...
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  36. Aron Gurwitsch (1955). The Phenomenological and the Psychological Approach to Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (March):303-319.
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  37. Wolfgang Huemer (2004). The Constitution of Consciousness. Routledge.
    This book demonstrates that Husserl's phenomenological analyses of the structure of consciousness can provide fruitful insights for developing an original ...
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  38. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences.
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  39. Edmund G. Husserl (1981). Pure Phenomenology, its Method, and its Field of Investigation. In Peter McCormick & Frederick A. Elliston (eds.), Husserl: Shorter Works. University of Notre Dame Press.
    (...)
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  40. Edmund G. Husserl (1937). The Way Into Phenomenological Transcendental Philosophy From Psychology. In The Crisis of European Sciences.
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  41. Don Ihde (1977). Experimental Phenomenology. Putnam.
    Chapter One Introduction: Doing Phenomenology Many disciplines are better learned by entering into the doing than by mere abstract study. ...
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  42. David A. Jopling (1996). Sub-Phenomenology. Human Studies 19 (2):153-73.
    This paper argues that cognitive psychology's practice of explaining mental processes in terms which avoid invoking phenomenology, and the person-level self-conception with which it is associated in common sense psychology, leads to a hybrid Cartesian dualism. Because phenomenology is considered to be fundamentally irrelevant in any scientific explanation of the mind, the person-level is regarded as scientifically invisible: it is a ghost-like housing for sub-personal computational cognition. The problem of explaining how the sub-personal and sub-phenomenological machinery of mind is related (...)
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  43. I. Kern & Eduard Marbach (2001). Understanding the Representational Mind: A Prerequisite for Intersubjectivity Proper. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):69-82.
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  44. Pim Klaassen, Erik Rietveld & Julien Topal (2010). Inviting Complementary Perspectives on Situated Normativity in Everyday Life. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):53-73.
    In everyday life, situations in which we act adequately yet entirely without deliberation are ubiquitous. We use the term “situated normativity” for the normative aspect of embodied cognition in skillful action. Wittgenstein’s notion of “directed discontent” refers to a context-sensitive reaction of appreciation in skillful action. Extending this notion from the domain of expertise to that of adequate everyday action, we examine phenomenologically the question of what happens when skilled individuals act correctly with instinctive ease. This question invites exploratory contributions (...)
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  45. Uriah Kriegel (2007). The Phenomenologically Manifest. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):115-136.
    Disputes about what is phenomenologically manifest in conscious experience have a way of leading to deadlocks with remarkable immediacy. Disputants reach the foot-stomping stage of the dialectic more or less right after declaring their discordant views. It is this fact, I believe, that leads some to heterophenomenology and the like attempts to found Consciousness Studies on purely third-person grounds. In this paper, I explore the other possible reaction to this fact, namely, the articulation of methods for addressing phenomenological disputes. I (...)
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  46. Richard W. Lind (1996). Micro-Phenomenology: Toward a Hypothetico-Inductive Science of Experience. International Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):429-42.
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  47. Richard W. Lind (1986). Does the Unconscious Undermine Phenomenology? Inquiry 29 (September):325-344.
    According to Paul Ricoeur, the Freudian unconscious invalidates the ability of Husserlian phenomenology to explicate human psychology. The stumbling block is said to be the mechanism of repression, which can not only obviate conscious access to certain ideas and motives but also distort consciousness itself. The whole enterprise of phenomenology would seem to be at stake. But we must carefully distinguish being a conscious object from being a conscious process. By means of ?micro?phenomenology?, the reflective analysis of focal dynamics, I (...)
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  48. Dieter Lohmar (2006). Mirror Neurons and the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):5-16.
    The neurological discovery of mirror neurons is of eminent importance for the phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity. G. Rizzolatti and V. Gallese found in experiments with primates that a set of neurons in the premotor cortex represents the visually registered movements of another animal. The activity of these mirror neurons presents exactly the same pattern of activity as appears in the movement of one's own body. These findings may be extended to other cognitive and emotive functions in humans. I show how (...)
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  49. Antoine Lutz (2002). Toward a Neurophenomenology as an Account of Generative Passages: A First Empirical Case Study. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):133-67.
    This paper analyzes an explicit instantiation of the program of neurophenomenology in a neuroscientific protocol. Neurophenomenology takes seriously the importance of linking the scientific study of consciousness to the careful examination of experience with a specific first-person methodology. My first claim is that such strategy is a fruitful heuristic because it produces new data and illuminates their relation to subjective experience. My second claim is that the approach could open the door to a natural account of the structure of human (...)
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  50. Antoine Lutz & Evan Thompson (2003). Neurophenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.
    _sciousness called ‘neurophenomenology’ (Varela 1996) and illustrates it with a_ _recent pilot study (Lutz et al., 2002). At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology_ _pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the_ _neurophysiology of consciousness (Varela 1995; Thompson and Varela 2001;_ _Varela and Thompson 2003). At a methodological level, the neurophenomeno-_ _logical strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about_ _subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale_ _neurodynamics of consciousness (Lutz 2002). The paper (...)
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  51. Paul S. MacDonald (2001). Current Approaches to Phenomenology. Inquiry 44 (1):101-124.
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  52. Bruce J. MacLennan (1995). The Investigation of Consciousness Through Phenomenology and Neuroscience. In Joseph E. King & Karl H. Pribram (eds.), Proceedings Scale in Conscious Experience: Third Appalachian Conference on Behavioral Neurodynamics.
    The principal problem of consciousness is how brain processes cause subjective awareness. Since this problem involves subjectivity, ordinary scientific methods, applicable only to objective phenomena, cannot be used. Instead, by parallel application of phenomenological and scientific methods, we may establish a correspondence between the subjective and the objective. This correspondence is effected by the construction of a theoretical entity, essentially an elementary unit of consciousness, the intensity of which corresponds to electrochemical activity in a synapse. Dendritic networks correspond to causal (...)
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  53. Bruce Mangan (2007). Cognition, Fringe Consciousness, and the Legacy of William James. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
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  54. Bruce Mangan (1993). Taking Phenomenology Seriously: The "Fringe" and its Implication for Cognitive Research. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (2):89-108.
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  55. Eduard Marbach (1996). Understanding the Representational Mind: A Phenomenological Perspective. Human Studies 19 (2):137-52.
    This paper reflects on the relationship between Husserlian phenomenology and scientific psychology. It tries to show how phenomenological results have relevance and validity for present-day cognitive developmental psychology by arguing that consciousness matters in the study of the representational mind. The paper presents some methodological remarks concerning empirical or applied phenomenology; it describes the conception of an exploratory developmental study with 3 to 9-year-old children viewing a complex pictorial display; it then illustrates how a phenomenological interpretation of the data works; (...)
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  56. Eduard Marbach (1993). Mental Representation and Consciousness: Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference. Kluwer.
    The book makes a direct contribution to the connection between phenomenology and cognitive science.
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  57. Wayne M. Martin (2005). Bubbles and Skulls: The Phenomenological Structure of Self-Consciousness in Dutch Still-Life Painting. In M. Wrathal & Hubert L. Dreyfus (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism. Blackwell.
    In this paper I investigate the representation of self-consciousness in the still life tradition in the Netherlands around the time of Descartes’ residence there. I treat the paintings of this tradition as both a phenomenological resource and as a phenomenological undertaking in their own right. I begin with an introductory overview of the still life tradition, with particular attention to semiotic structures characteristic of the vanitas still life. I then focus my analysis on the representation of self-consciousness in this tradition, (...)
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  58. James R. Mensch (2000). An Objective Phenomenology: Husserl Sees Colors. Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (January):231-260.
    This paper proposes an explanatory bridge between structures of processing and qualia. It shows how the process of their arising is such that qualia are nonpublic objects, i.e., are only accessible to the person experiencing them. My basic premise is that the subjective “felt” character of qualia is a function of this first-person character. The account I provide is basically Husserlian. Thus, I use Husserl’s analyses to show why qualia always refer to a single point of view, that of a (...)
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  59. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1967). The Structure of Behavior. Beacon Press.
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  60. Gregory Nixon (2011). Editor's Introduction: Transcending Self-Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (7):889-1022.
    What is this thing we each call “I” and consider the eye of consciousness, that which beholds objects in the world and objects in our minds? This inner perceiver seems to be the same I who calls forth memories or images at will, the I who feels and determines whether to act on those feelings or suppress them, as well as the I who worries and makes plans and attempts to avoid those worries and act on those plans. Am I (...)
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  61. Gregory Nixon (2004). Shanon's *The Antipodes of the Mind*. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (5/6).
    What happens when a worldly Israeli cognitive psychologist goes to the Amazon Basin where he ingests the famed psychotropic concoction Ayahuasca (the ‘vine of the dead’) again and again and again? Our intrepid philosophical psychologist is no longer a sprightly youth, maddened for adventure. He is instead an accomplished theoretician with widely published articles (several in this journal) and a noted book (Shanon, 1993) that speak the from the perspective of cognitive (or phenomenological, for Shanon) psychology against the reductive tendency (...)
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  62. Gregory M. Nixon (1999). A 'Hermeneutic Objection': Language and the Inner View. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):257-269.
    In the worlds of philosophy, linguistics, and communications theory, a view has developed which understands conscious experience as experience which is 'reflected' back upon itself through language. This indicates that the consciousness we experience is possible only because we have culturally invented language and subsequently evolved to accommodate it. This accords with the conclusions of Daniel Dennett (1991), but the 'hermeneutic objection' would go further and deny that the objective sciences themselves have escaped the hermeneutic circle. -/- The consciousness we (...)
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  63. Alva Noë (2007). The Critique of Pure Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).
    The topic of this paper is phenomenology. How should we think of phenomenology – the discipline or activity of investigating experience itself – if phenomenology is to be a genuine source of knowledge? This is related to the question whether phenomenology can make a contribution to the empirical study of human or animal experience. My own view is that it can. But only if we make a fresh start in understanding what phenomenology is and can be.
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  64. Morten Overgaard (2004). On the Naturalizing of Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):365-79.
    In the attempt to construct a scientific approach to consciousness, it has been proposed that transcendental phenomenology or phenomenological psychology be introduced into the framework of cognitive neuroscience. In this article, the consequences of such an approach in terms of basic assumptions, methods for the collection of data, and evaluation of the collected data are discussed. Especially, the proposed notions of mutual constraint and the second perso are discussed. It is concluded that even though naturalising of phenomenology might not prove (...)
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  65. Ronald J. Pekala & Levine R. L. Wenger C. F. (1985). Individual Differences in Phenomenological Experience: States of Consciousness as a Function of Absorption. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48:125-32.
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  66. Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (1999). Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press.
    This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of ...
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  67. Rolf Reber, P. Wurtz & Thomas E. Zimmermann (2004). Exploring "Fringe" Consciousness: The Subjective Experience of Perceptual Fluency and its Objective Bases. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):47-60.
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  68. Oliver L. Reiser (1927). A Phenomenological Interpretation of Physico-Chemical Configurations and Conscious Structures. Journal of Philosophy 24 (14):373-385.
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  69. Oliver L. Reiser (1927). A Phenomenological Interpretation of Physicochemical Configurations and Conscious Structures: Part II. Journal of Philosophy 24 (15):404-415.
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  70. Erik Rietveld (2008). Situated Normativity: The Normative Aspect of Embodied Cognition in Unreflective Action. Mind 117 (468):973-1001.
    In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such ‘situated normativity’ by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein’s examples of craftsmen (...)
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  71. Erik Rietveld (2008). The Skillful Body as a Concernful System of Possible Actions: Phenomena and Neurodynamics. Theory & Psychology 18 (3):341-361.
    For Merleau-Ponty,consciousness in skillful coping is a matter of prereflective ‘I can’ and not explicit ‘I think that.’ The body unifies many domain-specific capacities. There exists a direct link between the perceived possibilities for action in the situation (‘affordances’) and the organism’s capacities. From Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions it is clear that in a flow of skillful actions, the leading ‘I can’ may change from moment to moment without explicit deliberation. How these transitions occur, however, is less clear. Given that Merleau-Ponty suggested (...)
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  72. David Roden (2005). Naturalising Deconstruction. Continental Philosophy Review 38 (1-2).
    Most contemporary readings of Derrida’s work situate it within a transcendental tradition of philosophical enquiry explicitly critical of naturalistic accounts of knowledge and mind. I argue that Derrida provides the naturalist with some of the philosophical resources needed to rebut transcendental critiques of naturalism, in particular the phenomenological critiques which derive from Husserl’s philosophy. I do this by showing: a) that Derrida’s account of temporality as differance undermines phenomenological accounts of the meaning of naturalistic theories and assumptions; and b) that (...)
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  73. John Schwenkler (forthcoming). Does Visual Spatial Awareness Require the Visual Awareness of Space? Mind and Language.
    Many philosophers have held that it is not possible to experience a spatial object, property, or relation except against the background of an intact awareness of a space that is somehow ‘absolute’. This paper challenges that claim, by analyzing in detail the case of a brain-damaged subject whose visual experiences seem to have violated this condition: spatial objects and properties were present in his visual experience, but space itself was not. I go on to suggest that phenomenological argumentation can give (...)
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  74. John R. Searle (2000). Limits of Phenomenology. In Mark A. Wrathall & Jeff E. Malpas (eds.), Heidegger Coping and Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
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  75. Charles Siewert (2007). In Favor of (Plain) Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).
    Plain phenomenology explains theoretically salient mental or psychological distinctions with an appeal to their first-person applications. But it does not assume (as does heterophenomenology) that warrant for such first-person judgment is derived from an explanatory theory constructed from the third-person perspective. Discussions in historical phenomenology can be treated as plain phenomenology. This is illustrated by a critical consideration of Brentano’s account of consciousness, drawing on some ideas in early Husserl. Dennett’s advocacy of heterophenomenology on the grounds of its supposed “neutrality” (...)
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  76. David Woodruff Smith (2005). Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and (...)
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  77. David Woodruff Smith (2004). Mind World : Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection explores the structure of consciousness and its place in the world, or inversely the structure of the world and the place of consciousness in it. Amongst the topics covered are: the phenomenological aspects of experience (inner awareness, self-awareness), dependencies between experience and the world (the role of the body in experience, the role of culturally formed background ideas) and the basic ontological categories found in the world at large (unity, state-of-affairs, connectedness, dependence and intentionality). Developing ideas drawn from (...)
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  78. Joel Smith (2005). Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenological Reduction. Inquiry 48 (6):553-571.
    _reduction in favour of his existentialist account of être au monde. I show that whilst Merleau-Ponty _ _rejected, what he saw as, the transcendental idealist context in which Husserl presents the _ _reduction, he nevertheless accepts the heart of it, the epoché, as a methodological principle. _ _Contrary to a number of Merleau-Ponty scholars, être au monde is perfectly compatible with the _ _epoché and Merleau-Ponty endorses both. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that Merleau-_ _Ponty’s (...)
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  79. Evan Thompson (forthcoming). Neurophenomenology and Contemplative Experience. In Philip Clayton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Science and Religion. Oup.
    Scientific investigation of the mind, known since the nineteen-seventies as ‘cognitive science’, is an interdisciplinary field of research comprising psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of mind. The presence of philosophy in this list is telling. Cognitive science, although institutionally well established, is not a theoretically settled field, unlike molecular biology or high-energy physics. Rather, it includes a variety of competing research programmes - the computational theory of mind (also known as classical cognitive science), connectionism, and dynamical (...)
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  80. Evan Thompson (2004). Life and Mind: From Autopoiesis to Neurophenomenology. A Tribute to Francisco Varela. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):381-398.
    This talk, delivered at De l''autopoièse à la neurophénoménologie: un hommage à Francisco Varela; from autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: a tribute to Francisco Varela, June 18–20, at the Sorbonne in Paris, explicates several links between Varela''s neurophenomenology and his biological concept of autopoiesis.
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  81. Evan Thompson (2001). Empathy and Consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):1-32.
    This article makes five main points. (1) Individual human consciousness is formed in the dynamic interrelation of self and other, and therefore is inherently intersubjective. (2) The concrete encounter of self and other fundamentally involves empathy, under- stood as a unique and irreducible kind of intentionality. (3) Empathy is the precondi- tion (the condition of possibility) of the science of consciousness. (4) Human empathy.
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  82. Evan Thompson, A. Lutz & D. Cosmelli (2005). Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.
    • An adequate conceptual framework is still needed to account for phenomena that (i) have a first-person, subjective-experiential or phenomenal character; (ii) are (usually) reportable and describable (in humans); and (iii) are neurobiologically realized.2 • The conscious subject plays an unavoidable epistemological role in characterizing the explanadum of consciousness through first-person descriptive reports. The experimentalist is then able to link first-person data and third-person data. Yet the generation of first-person data raises difficult epistemological issues about the relation of second-order awareness (...)
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  83. Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (2007). Phenomenology. In P.D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.
    Current scientific research on consciousness aims to understand how consciousness arises from the workings of the brain and body, as well as the relations between conscious experience and cognitive processing. Clearly, to make progress in these areas, researchers cannot avoid a range of conceptual issues about the nature and structure of consciousness, such as the following: What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between self-awareness and consciousness? What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? What (...)
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  84. Max Velmans (2000). Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.
  85. R. Fox Vernon (2005). Peering Into the Foundations of Inquiry: An Ontology of Conscious Experience Along Husserlian Lines. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):280-300.
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  86. David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (2005). Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current ...
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  87. Jeffrey Yoshimi (2007). Mathematizing Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3).
    Husserl is well known for his critique of the “mathematizing tendencies” of modern science, and is particularly emphatic that mathematics and phenomenology are distinct and in some sense incompatible. But Husserl himself uses mathematical methods in phenomenology. In the first half of the paper I give a detailed analysis of this tension, showing how those Husserlian doctrines which seem to speak against application of mathematics to phenomenology do not in fact do so. In the second half of the paper I (...)
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  88. Dan Zahavi (2008). The Mind Without, the World Within. Synthese 160 (3).
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  89. Dan Zahavi (2007). Killing the Straw Man: Dennett and Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).
    Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative (...)
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  90. Dan Zahavi (2004). Phenomenology and the Project of Naturalization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):331-47.
    In recent years, more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciling phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? Given the transcendental philosophically motivated anti-naturalism found in many phenomenologists such a naturalization proposal might seem doomed from the very start, but in this paper I will examine and evaluate some possible alternatives.
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  91. Dan Zahavi (2002). First-Person Thoughts and Embodied Self-Awareness: Some Reflections on the Relation Between Recent Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):7-26.
    The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange.
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  92. Dan Zahavi (2002). The Three Concepts of Consciousness in the Logische Untersuchungen. Husserl Studies 18 (1):51-64.
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