This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
122 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 122
  1. Lynne Rudder Baker (2001). Philosophy in Mediis Rebus. Metaphilosophy 32:378-394.
    How should philosophy be pursued? I want to defend a conception of philosophy in mediis rebus—philosophy in the middle of things. The more familiar Latin phrase is ‘in medias res,’ but Latin distinguishes two readings of ‘in the middle of things.’ There’s the middle of things from which one starts, and there’s the middle of things into which one jumps. ‘In medias res’ is the middle of things into which one jumps; I, however, mean to invoke the middle of things (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Aaron Barth (2013). Anti- Naturalism: The Role of Non-Empirical Methods in Philosophy. History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):196-206.
    Some naturalistic conceptions of philosophical methodologies interpret the doctrine that philosophy is continuous with science to mean that philosophical investigations must implement empirical methods and must not depart from the experimental results that the scientific application of those methods reveal. In this paper, I argue that while our answers to philosophical questions are certainly constrained by empirical considerations, this does not imply that the methods by which these questions are correctly settled are wholly captured by empirical methods. Many historical cases (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Matthew A. Benton (2014). Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):n/a-n/a.
    Expert testimony figures in recent debates over how best to understand the norm of assertion and the domain-specific epistemic expectations placed on testifiers. Cases of experts asserting with only isolated second-hand knowledge (Lackey 2011, 2013) have been used to shed light on whether knowledge is sufficient for epistemically permissible assertion. I argue that relying on such cases of expert testimony introduces several problems concerning how we understand expert knowledge, and the sharing of such knowledge through testimony. Refinements are needed to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. D. Bonevac, J. Dever & D. Sosa (2012). The Counterexample Fallacy. Mind 120 (480):1143-1158.
    Manley and Wasserman (2008) join the chorus of opposition to the possibility of conditional analysis of dispositions. But that score cannot be settled without more careful attention to the implicit philosophical methodology. Some of the opposition to such an analysis badly overestimates the effect of counterexamples, as if the Gettier example were sufficient to refute the possibility of conjunctive analysis of knowledge. A general objection to a form of analysis must satisfy a number of constraints, and Manley and Wasserman join (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. David Braddon-Mitchell (2012). Review of 'An Introduction to Philosophical Methods', by Chris Daly. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):608 - 611.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 3, Page 608-611, September 2012.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Wesley Buckwalter (2014). Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2).
    Experimental philosophers have empirically challenged the connection between intuition and philosophical expertise. This paper reviews these challenges alongside other research findings in cognitive science on expert performance and argues for three claims. First, evidence taken to challenge philosophical expertise may also be explained by the well-researched failures and limitations of genuine expertise. Second, studying the failures and limitations of experts across many fields provides a promising research program upon which to base a new model of philosophical expertise. Third, a model (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett (2013). Conceptual Ethics I. Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.
    Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and social/political philosophy. In (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Tom Burke (1994). Dewey's New Logic: A Reply to Russell. University of Chicago Press.
    John Dewey is celebrated for his work in the philosophy of education and acknowledged as a leading proponent of American pragmatism. His philosophy of logic, on the other hand, is largely unheard of. In Dewey's New Logic, Burke analyzes portions of the debate between Dewey and Bertrand Russell that followed the 1938 publication of Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Burke shows how Russell failed to understand Dewey, and how Dewey's philosophy of logic is centrally relevant to contemporary developments in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Herman Cappelen (forthcoming). X-Phi Without Intuitions? In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions.
    One central purpose of Experimental Philosophy (hereafter, x-phi) is to criticize the alleged reliance on intuitions in contemporary philosophy. In my book Philosophy without Intuitions (hereafter, PWI), I argue that philosophers don’t rely on intuitions. If those arguments are good, experimental philosophy has been engaged in an attack on a strawman. The goal of this paper is to bolster the criticism of x-phi in the light of responses.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Ulrika Carlsson (2014). Kierkegaard's Phenomenology of Spirit. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2).
    Kierkegaard's preoccupation with a separation between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ runs through his work and is widely thought to belong to his rejection of Hegel's idealist monism. Focusing on The Concept of Irony and Either/Or, I argue that although Kierkegaard believes in various metaphysical distinctions between inside and outside (the inwardness of faith and the outwardness of ethics and language; the inwardness of emotion and the outwardness of behavior), he nonetheless understands the task of the philosopher as that of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Roderick M. Chisholm (1973). The Problem of the Criterion. Milwaukee,Marquette University Press.
  12. Elijah Chudnoff, Where Are The Intuitions?
    These are comments on Jennifer Nagel's paper "Distinctively Intuitive Judgments" delivered at the Central APA 2014. In opposition to Williamson, Cappelen, and various experimental philosophers, Jennifer Nagel and I agree on the following (1) Intuitive judgments form a distinct natural kind, (2) Intuitive judgments play a role in philosophical methodology, and (3) This philosophical methodology is OK. In this paper I explore the contrast between: (4) Starting Points: if intuitive judgments play a role in OK philosophical methodology then it is (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. R. G. Collingwood (2005/2000). An Essay on Philosophical Method. Oxford University Press.
    James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro present a revised edition of R. G. Collingwood's classic work of 1933, supplementing the original text with important related writings from Collingwood's manuscripts which appear here for the first time. The editors also contribute a substantial new introduction, and the volume will be welcomed by all historians of twentieth-century philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Johannes Czermak, Georg J. W. Dorn, Peter Kaliba, Edward Nieznanski, Christine Pühringer & Christian Zwickl-Bernhard (1982). Über die ersten sechs Sätze der Monadologie. Conceptus 16 (38):89–96.
    This is, to the best of my knowledge, the first published attempt at a rigorous logical formalization of a passage in Leibniz's Monadology. The method we followed was suggested by Johannes Czermak.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Chris Daly (2010). An Introduction to Philosophical Methods. Broadview Press.
    An Introduction to Philosophical Methods is the first book to survey the various methods that philosophers use to support their views. Rigorous yet accessible, the book introduces and illustrates the methodological considerations that are involved in current philosophical debates. Where there is controversy, the book presents the case for each side, but highlights where the key difficulties with them lie. While eminently student-friendly, the book makes an important contribution to the debate regarding the acceptability of the various philosophical methods, and (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Chris Daly & David Liggins (2013). Animalism and Deferentialism. Dialectica 67 (4):605-609.
    Animalism is the theory that we are animals: in other words, that each of us is numerically identical to an animal. An alternative theory maintains that we are not animals but that each of us is constituted by an animal. Call this alternative theory neo-Lockean constitutionalism or Lockeanism for short. Stephan Blatti (2012) offers to advance the debate between animalism and Lockeanism by providing a new argument for animalism. In this note, we present our own objection to Blatti's argument, and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Chris Daly & David Liggins (2011). Deferentialism. Philosophical Studies 156 (3):321-337.
    There is a recent and growing trend in philosophy that involves deferring to the claims of certain disciplines outside of philosophy, such as mathematics, the natural sciences, and linguistics. According to this trend— deferentialism , as we will call it—certain disciplines outside of philosophy make claims that have a decisive bearing on philosophical disputes, where those claims are more epistemically justified than any philosophical considerations just because those claims are made by those disciplines. Deferentialists believe that certain longstanding philosophical problems (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Oisin Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey (forthcoming). The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism. Philosophical Psychology:1-26.
    Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants’ being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will—the ‘natural’ compatibilism debate—is mistaken in assuming that folk intuitions (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Daniel C. Dennett (2006). Higher-Order Truths About Chmess. Topoi 25 (1-2):39-41.
    Abstract Many projects in contemporary philosophy are artifactual puzzles of no abiding significance, but it is treacherously easy for graduate students to be lured into devoting their careers to them, so advice is proffered on how to avoid this trap.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Richard Double (2002). Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, and Free Will Subjectivism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
  21. Janice Dowell, J. L. (forthcoming). The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford.
  22. C. J. Ducasse (1936). Mr. Collingwood on Philosophical Method. Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):95-106.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. George Duke, Elena Walsh, Jack Reynolds & James Chase (2010). Post-Analytic Philosophy : Overcoming the Divide. In James Williams, Jack Reynolds, James Chase & Edwin Mares (eds.), Postanalytic and Metacontinental: Crossing Philosophical Divides. Continuum.
    This essay uses citational analyses to argue that most of the philosophers considered "postanalytic" - Wittgenstein, McDowell, Davidson, and Rorty - are not, in fact, genuine figures of rapprochement, since the particular essays cited, and/or the background literature that is cited, are not shared in common between the standard-bearing analytic and continental journals.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Terence Rajivan Edward (2014). Deferentialism and the Territory of Philosophy. Ethos 7 (1):56-62.
    David Liggins and Chris Daly have argued against a recent trend in which some philosophical debate or other is said to be settled by claims from a discipline other than philosophy, because claims from that discipline entail a position on the debate and any claims from that discipline have greater authority than any philosophical claims when the aim is to extend our knowledge. They label this trend deferentialism. This paper presents a dilemma for their argument.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Robert M. Ellis (2011). Truth on the Edge: A Brief Western Philosophy of the Middle Way. Lulu.com.
    This book is a briefer and updated account of the Middle Way Philosophy developed in 'A Theory of Moral Objectivity'. Its starting point is the argument that we are not justified in making any claims about truth, whether moral or scientific, but the idea of truth is still meaningful. Instead of making or denying metaphysical claims about truth, we need to think in terms of incrementally objective justification within experience. This standpoint is related to an account of objectivity as psychological (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Mark Fedyk (2009). Philosophical Intuitions. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):54-80.
    What exactly is a philosophical intuition? And what makes such an intuition reliable, when it is reliable? This paper provides a terminological framework that is able answer to the first question, and then puts the framework to work developing an answer to the second question. More specifically, the paper argues that we can distinguish between two different "evidential roles" which intuitions can occupy: under certain conditions they can provide information about the representational structure of an intuitor's concept, and under different (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Eugen Fischer (2014). Verbal Fallacies and Philosophical Intuitions: The Continuing Relevance of Ordinary Language Analysis. In Brian Garvey (ed.), Austin on Language. Palgrave Macmillan. 124-140.
    The paper builds on a methodological idea from experimental philosophy and on findings from psycholinguistics, to develop and defend ordinary language analysis (OLA) as practiced in J.L. Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia. That attack on sense-datum theories of perception focuses on the argument from illusion. Through a case-study on this paradoxical argument, the present paper argues for a form of OLA which is psychologically informed, seeks to expose epistemic, rather than semantic, defects in paradoxical arguments, and is immune to the main (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Eugen Fischer (2011). Diseases of the Understanding and the Need for Philosophical Therapy. Philosophical Investigations 34 (1):22-54.
    The paper develops and addresses a major challenge for therapeutic conceptions of philosophy of the sort increasingly attributed to Wittgenstein. To be substantive and relevant, such conceptions have to identify “diseases of the understanding” from which philosophers suffer, and to explain why these “diseases” need to be cured in order to resolve or overcome important philosophical problems. The paper addresses this challenge in three steps: With the help of findings and concepts from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, it redevelops the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Eugen Fischer (2011). How to Practise Philosophy as Therapy: Philosophical Therapy and Therapeutic Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):49-82.
    Abstract: The notion that philosophy can be practised as a kind of therapy has become a focus of debate. This article explores how philosophy can be practised literally as a kind of therapy, in two very different ways: as philosophical therapy that addresses “real-life problems” (e.g., Sextus Empiricus) and as therapeutic philosophy that meets a need for therapy which arises in and from philosophical reflection (e.g., Wittgenstein). With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive and clinical psychology, and from cognitive (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Eugen Fischer (2011). Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy: Outline of a Philosophical Revolution. Routledge.
    Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy provides new foundations and methods for the revolutionary project of philosophical therapy pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The book vindicates this currently much-discussed project by reconstructing the genesis of important philosophical problems: With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, the book analyses how philosophical reflection is shaped by pictures and metaphors we are not aware of employing and are prone to misapply. Through innovative case-studies on the genesis of classical problems about (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Eugen Fischer (2009). Philosophical Pictures and Secondary Qualities. Synthese 171 (1):77 - 110.
    The paper presents a novel account of nature and genesis of some philosophical problems, which vindicates a new approach to an arguably central and extensive class of such problems: The paper develops the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘philosophical pictures’ with the help of some notions adapted from metaphor research in cognitive linguistics and from work on unintentional analogical reasoning in cognitive psychology. The paper shows that adherence to such pictures systematically leads to the formulation of unwarranted claims, ill-motivated problems, and pointless (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Eugen Fischer (2008). Wittgenstein's 'Non-Cognitivism' – Explained and Vindicated. Synthese 162 (1):53 - 84.
    The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result from (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Bryan Frances, Why I Think Research in Non-Applied, Non-Interdisciplinary, Non-Historical Philosophy is Worthwhile.
    On occasion, someone will ask you why you’re a philosopher and not a scientist or some other, more obviously respectable, intellectual. Or a high and mighty philosopher will dismiss all of philosophy with the exception of the history of philosophy. Others will restrict philosophy’s importance to applied philosophy or philosophy with obvious interdisciplinary features. Or someone from a different discipline might be respectful of the philosophical profession but in need of an explanation of why research in philosophy that is not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) (2007). Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell Pub. Inc..
    This collection of essays focuses on a current issue of central important in contemporary philosophy, the relationship between philosophy and empirical studies. Explores in detail a range of examples which demonstrate how the older paradigm – philosophy as conceptual analysis – is giving way to a more varied set of models of philosophical work Each of the featured papers is a previously unpublished contribution by a major scholar.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Ann Garry (1995). A Minimally Decent Philosophical Method? Analytic Philosophy and Feminism. Hypatia 10 (3):7-30.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Ann Garry & Marilyn Pearsall (eds.) (1996). Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy, 2nd Ed. Routledge.
    This second edition of Women, Knowledge and Reality continues to exhibit the ways in which feminist philosophers enrich and challenge philosophy. Essays by twenty-five feminist philosophers, seventeen of them new to the second edition, address fundamental issues in philosophical and feminist methods, metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophies of science, language, religion and mind/body. This second edition expands the perspectives of women of color, of postmodernism and French feminism, and focuses on the most recent controversies in feminist theory and philosophy. The (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium. In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell Pub. Inc.. 68-89.
    It is a commonplace that contemplation of an imaginary particular may have cognitive and motivational effects that differ from those evoked by an abstract description of an otherwise similar state of affairs. In his Treatise on Human Nature, Hume ([1739] 1978) writes forcefully of this.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Mikkel Gerken (2013). The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):n/a-n/a.
    Knowledge norms of action are sometimes said to be motivated by the fact that they align with natural assessments of action in ordinary language. Competent and rational speakers normally use ‘knowledge’ and its cognates when they assess action. In contrast, competing accounts in terms of evidence, warrant or reliability do not straightforwardly align with ordinary language assessments of action. In response to this line of reasoning, I argue that a warrant account of action may explain the prominence of ‘knowledge’ in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Mikkel Gerken (2012). On the Cognitive Bases of Knowledge Ascriptions. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
    I develop an epistemic focal bias account of certain patterns of judgments about knowledge ascriptions by integrating it with a general dual process framework of human cognition. According to the focal bias account, judgments about knowledge ascriptions are generally reliable but systematically fallible because the cognitive processes that generate them are affected by what is in focus. I begin by considering some puzzling patters of judgments about knowledge ascriptions and sketch how a basic focal bias account seeks to account for (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Gary Gutting (2009). What Philosophers Know: Case Studies in Recent Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    Part I : how does that go? : the limits of philosophical argument -- Quine's "Two dogmas" : argument or imagination? -- Argument and intuition in Kripke's Naming and necessity -- The rise and fall of counterexamples : Gettier, Goldman, and Lewis -- Reflection : pictures, intuitions, and philosophical knowledge -- Part II : arguments and convictions -- Turning the tables : Plantinga and the rise of philosophy of religion -- Materialism and compatibilism : two dogmas of analytic philosophy? -- (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Gilbert Harman, Naturalism in Moral Philosophy.
    For philosophical naturalism, as I understand it, philosophy is continuous with natural science. It takes the methods of philosophy to be continuous with those of the natural sciences and is sceptical of allegedly apriori intuitions which it claims need to be tested against one’s other beliefs and, ideally, against the world.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Devonya N. Havis (2014). “Now, How You Sound”: Considering a Different Philosophical Praxis. Hypatia 29 (1):237-252.
    This paper is a tentative attempt to set out some of the basic points for articulating an alternative philosophical praxis derived from some Black women's lives and experiences. It begins with an explanation of delegitimating processes and the importance of not dividing theory from practice. The essay offers six practices that outline the unique critical attitude that constitutes philosophical practices rooted in Black women's lived experience and asks “How we sound” when doing academic philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Frank J. Hoffman (2000). “Buddhology”. In William M. Johnston (ed.), Encyclopedia of Monasticism. Fitzroy Dearborn.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Frank J. Hoffman (1998). “Satisfactions and Obstacles in Philosophizing Across Cultures”. In D. P. Chattopadaya and C. Gupta (ed.), Cultural Otherness and Beyond. E.J. Brill.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Paul Horwich (1993). Meaning and Metaphilosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Issues 4 (1):153-158.
  46. Daniel D. Hutto (2009). Philosophical Clarification, its Possibility and Point. Philosophia 37 (4):629–652.
    It is possible to pursue philosophy with a clarificatory end in mind. Doing philosophy in this mode neither reduces to simply engaging in therapy or theorizing. This paper defends the possibility of this distinctive kind of philosophical activity and gives an account of its product—non-theoretical insights—in an attempt to show that there exists a third, ‘live’ option for understanding what philosophy has to offer. It responds to criticisms leveled at elucidatory philosophy by defenders of extreme therapeutic readings and clearly demonstrates (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Jonathan Ichikawa (2011). Experimentalist Pressure Against Traditional Methodology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):743 - 765.
    According to some critics, traditional armchair philosophical methodology relies in an illicit way on intuitions. But the particular structure of the critique is not often carefully articulated?a significant omission, since some of the critics? arguments for skepticism about philosophy threaten to generalize to skepticism in general. More recently, some experimentalist critics have attempted to articulate a critique that is especially tailored to affect traditional methods, without generalizing too widely. Such critiques are more reasonable, and more worthy of serious consideration, than (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Jeff Johnson (2010). Grice's Unspeakable Truths. Essays in Philosophy 11 (2):168-180.
    Grice is often taken to have delivered a decisive blow against the tendency on the part of ordinary language philosophers to suspect that the presence of particular circumstances is requisite for philosophically interesting expressions to be in order, even to make sense, when deployed in particular cases. Grice’s attack has three parts. He argues that the presence of those particular circumstances isn’t bound up with the meaning of the expressions in question—the suggestion that those circumstances are present is merely a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Jeff Johnson (2000). Knowing and Saying We Know. Essays in Philosophy 1 (2):4.
    In these pages I resurrect a dispute that has, sadly I think, now gone by the wayside in current thinking about knowledge, among other things. I mean the dispute that we find Wittgenstein entertaining in certain sections of _On Certainty_ and the dispute that led John Searle to argue that there is such a thing as the assertion fallacy. The dispute turns on what lessons we can draw from the fact that in certain examples it would be fishy or odd (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Felicity Joseph & Jack Reynolds (2011). Existentialism, Phenomenology and Philosophical Method. In Felicity Joseph, Jack Reynolds & Ashley Woodward (eds.), Continuum Companion to Existentialism. Continuum.
    This chapter explores some of the similarities and differences in the philosophical methods of five philosophers often considered existentialists: Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir and Marcel. The relationship between existentialism and phenomenological methods, as well as transcendental reasoning in general, is examined.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 122