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  1. María G. Navarro (2014). Fotografía de un método. Revista Cronopio 51 (12 june).
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  2. Sandra Harding (1987). The Method Question. Hypatia 2 (3):19 - 35.
    A continuing concern of many feminists and non-feminists alike has been to identify a distinctive feminist method of inquiry. This essay argues that this method question is misguided and should be abandoned. In doing so it takes up the distinctions between and relationships among methods, methodologies and epistemologies; proposes that the concern to identify sources of the power of feminist analyses motivates the method question; and suggests how to pursue this project.
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Conceptual Analysis
  1. Felicia Ackerman (1990). Analysis, Language, and Concepts: The Second Paradox of Analysis. Philosophical Perspectives 4:535-543.
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  2. Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2009). Intuitions in Epistemology: Towards a Naturalistic Alternative. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):15-34.
    The present paper revisits the main methodological problems with conceptual analysis and considers two attempts to rectify them in terms of prototypes and reflective equilibria, respectively. Finding both wanting for the purposes of epistemological analysis, a naturalistic alternative is then sketched that explores the positive implications of aforementioned problems for the demarcation of the respective roles of intuitions and empirical investigation within three epistemological domains, viz., the evaluation of epistemological hypotheses, the amelioration of epistemic practices, and the construction of a (...)
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  3. Torin Alter & Russell Daw (2001). Free Acts and Robot Cats. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):345-57.
    (H1) ‘Free action’ is subject to the causal theory of reference and thus that (H2) The essential nature of free actions can be discovered only by empirical investigation, not by conceptual analysis. Heller’s proposal, if true, would have significant philosophical implications. Consider the enduring issue we will call the Compatibility Issue (hereafter CI): whether the thesis of determinism is logically compatible with the claim that..
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  4. C. Anthony Anderson (1993). Analyzing Analysis. Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):199 - 222.
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  5. Robert Audi (1983). The Applications of Conceptual Analysis. Metaphilosophy 14 (2):87–106.
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  6. Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (2013). Conceptual Analysis and Epistemic Progress. Synthese 190 (15):3053-3074.
    This essay concerns the question of how we make genuine epistemic progress through conceptual analysis. Our way into this issue will be through consideration of the paradox of analysis. The paradox challenges us to explain how a given statement can make a substantive contribution to our knowledge, even while it purports merely to make explicit what one’s grasp of the concept under scrutiny consists in. The paradox is often treated primarily as a semantic puzzle. However, in “Sect. 1” I argue (...)
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  7. Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2012). Understanding and Philosophical Methodology. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):185-205.
    According to Conceptualism, philosophy is an independent discipline that can be pursued from the armchair because philosophy seeks truths that can be discovered purely on the basis of our understanding of expressions and the concepts they express. In his recent book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson argues that while philosophy can indeed be pursued from the armchair, we should reject any form of Conceptualism. In this paper, we show that Williamson’s arguments against Conceptualism are not successful, and we sketch (...)
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  8. Greg Bamford (1991). Design, Science and Conceptual Analysis. In Jim Plume (ed.), Architectural Science and Design in Harmony: Proceedings of the joint ANZAScA / ADTRA conference, Sydney, 10-12 July, 1990. School of Architecture, University of NSW.
    Philosophers expend considerable effort on the analysis of concepts, but the value of such work is not widely appreciated. This paper principally analyses some arguments, beliefs, and presuppositions about the nature of design and the relations between design and science common in the literature to illustrate this point, and to contribute to the foundations of design theory.
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  9. Konrad Banicki (2012). Connective Conceptual Analysis and Psychology. Theory and Psychology 22 (3):310-323.
    Conceptual analysis, like any exclusively theoretical activity, is far from overrated in current psychology. Such a situation can be related both to the contingent influences of contextual and historical character and to the more essential metatheoretical reasons. After a short discussion of the latter it is argued that even within a strictly empirical psychology there are non-trivial tasks that can be attached to well-defined and methodologically reliable, conceptual work. This kind of method, inspired by the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peter (...)
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  10. George Bealer (2000). A Theory of the a Priori. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):1–30.
    The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why rational intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism -- the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept (...)
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  11. Simon Blackburn (2009). Analysis, Description, and the A Priori? In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press. 23.
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  12. Simon Blackburn (2000). Critical Notice of Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):119 – 124.
    (2000). Critical notice of Frank Jackson, from metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 119-124. doi: 10.1080/00048400012349401.
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  13. Patricia A. Blanchette (2007). Frege on Consistency and Conceptual Analysis. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (3):321-346.
    Gottlob Frege famously rejects the methodology for consistency and independence proofs offered by David Hilbert in the latter's Foundations of Geometry. The present essay defends against recent criticism the view that this rejection turns on Frege's understanding of logical entailment, on which the entailment relation is sensitive to the contents of non-logical terminology. The goals are (a) to clarify further Frege's understanding of logic and of the role of conceptual analysis in logical investigation, and (b) to point out the extent (...)
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  14. Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.
    The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. (Nagel, 1974, Levine, 1983) Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested (...)
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  15. D. Bonevac, J. Dever & D. Sosa (2012). The Counterexample Fallacy. Mind 120 (480):1143-1158.
    Manley and Wasserman (2008) join the chorus of opposition to the possibility of conditional analysis of dispositions. But that score cannot be settled without more careful attention to the implicit philosophical methodology. Some of the opposition to such an analysis badly overestimates the effect of counterexamples, as if the Gettier example were sufficient to refute the possibility of conjunctive analysis of knowledge. A general objection to a form of analysis must satisfy a number of constraints, and Manley and Wasserman join (...)
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  16. David Braddon-Mitchell (2009). Naturalistic Analysis and the a Priori. In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Mit Press.
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  17. David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.) (2009). Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Mit Press.
    A new program of philosophical analysis that reconciles a certain account of analysis with philosophical naturalism is applied to a range of philosophical ...
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  18. Darren Bradley (2011). Justified Concepts and the Limits of the Conceptual Approach to the A Priori. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):267-274.
    Please don't be put off by the journal - I would like people to read this paper. Carrie Jenkins (2005, 2008) has developed a theory of the a priori that she claims solves the problem of how justification regarding our concepts can give us justification regarding the world. She claims that concepts themselves can be justified, and that beliefs formed by examining such concepts can be justified a priori. I object that we can have a priori justified beliefs with unjustified (...)
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  19. Manuel Bremer (2013). Concept and Analysis. Logos.
    The book aims to set out in which respects concepts are properly studied in philosophy, what methodological role the study of concepts has in philoso-phy's study of the world. Many of the considerations in this book nowadays are placed under the headline ‘metaphilosophy’. In contrast to paradigmatic ordinary language philosophy the book endorses a representationalist theory of meaning and concepts, thus agreeing with many of its critics in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. In contrast to many of these critics and (...)
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  20. Ingo Brigandt (2013). A Critique of David Chalmers' and Frank Jackson's Account of Concepts. Protosociology 30:63–88.
    David Chalmers and Frank Jackson have promoted a strong program of conceptual analysis, which accords a significant philosophical role to the a priori analysis of (empirical) concepts. They found this methodological program on an account of concepts using two-dimensional semantics. This paper argues that Chalmers and Jackson’s account of concepts, and the related approach by David Braddon-Mitchell, is inadequate for natural kind concepts as found in biology. Two-dimensional semantics is metaphysically faulty as an account of the nature of concepts and (...)
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  21. H. Brotman & Antony Flew (eds.) (1966/1981). Essays in Conceptual Analysis. Greenwood Press.
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  22. Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.) (forthcoming). New Essays On Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
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  23. Richard Brown (2013). Chalmers' “Unholy Stew”: Review of 'Constructing the World' by David Chalmers. [REVIEW] The Philosophers' Magazine 61 (61):115-118.
    This highly technical book is densely packed with arguments and is an important addition to the literature. Even if one ultimately disagrees with Chalmers there is much to be gained in his exhaustive study, and he goes out of his way to show how one can accept limited or modified versions of scrutability. It is impossible for me to do justice to his argumentative rigor and comprehensive coverage of possible views in the space I have here. In the end I (...)
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  24. Tyler Burge (2003). Concepts, Conceptions, Reflective Understanding: Reply to Peacocke. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.
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  25. Tyler Burge (1993). Concepts, Definitions, and Meaning. Metaphilosophy 24 (4):309-25.
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  26. Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett (2013). Conceptual Ethics I. Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.
    Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and social/political philosophy. In (...)
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  27. Tim Button (2013). Truth by Analysis: Games, Names, and Philosophy By Colin McGinn. [REVIEW] Analysis 73 (3):577-580.
    In Truth by Analysis (2012), Colin McGinn aims to breathe new life into conceptual analysis. Sadly, he fails to defend conceptual analysis, either in principle or by example.
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  28. V. C. C. (1956). Essays in Conceptual Analysis. Review of Metaphysics 10 (2):373-374.
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  29. Manuel Campos (2003). Analyticity and Incorrigibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):689-708.
    The traditional point of view on analyticity implies that truth in virtue only of meaning entails a priori acceptability and vice versa. The argument for this claim is based on the idea that meaning as it concerns truth and meaning as it concerns competence are one and the same thing. In this paper I argue that the extensions of these notions do not coincide. I hold that truth in virtue of meaning— truth for semantic reasons—doesn't imply a priori acceptability, and (...)
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  30. Herman Cappelen (forthcoming). X-Phi Without Intuitions? In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions.
    One central purpose of Experimental Philosophy (hereafter, x-phi) is to criticize the alleged reliance on intuitions in contemporary philosophy. In my book Philosophy without Intuitions (hereafter, PWI), I argue that philosophers don’t rely on intuitions. If those arguments are good, experimental philosophy has been engaged in an attack on a strawman. The goal of this paper is to bolster the criticism of x-phi in the light of responses.
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  31. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1974). The Acceptance of Theories, Conceptual Analysis, and Other Minds. Philosophical Studies 26 (December):301-312.
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  32. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1974). The Acceptance of Theories, Conceptual Analysis, and Other Minds. Philosophical Studies 26 (5/6):301 - 312.
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  33. David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson (2001). Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation. Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.
    Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes (Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1994, 1998). Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no (Block and Stalnaker 1999).
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  34. Daniel Cohnitz, Wann Ist Eine Definition von 'Kunst' Gut?
    n diesem Kapitel soll das Problem ›Was genstand dieses Kapitels. Wir werden sehen, ist Kunst?‹, wie es sich für die analytische dass sich diese Adäquatheitsbedingungen aus Kunstphilosophie stellt, erläutert und eine Reiunserer Auffassung von analytischer Philosohe von »Adäquatheitsbedingungen« für seine phie heraus begründen lassen. Dieses zweite möglichen Lösungen formuliert werden. Adä- Kapitel bereitet also gewissermaßen den theoquatheitsbedingungen sind dabei Anforderunretischen Boden für die Folgekapitel. gen, die wir an eine potentielle Problemlösung Wie aus der Charakterisierung der analystellen und die eine Bewertung (...)
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  35. Daniel Cohnitz (2007). Science (of) Fiction: Zur Zukunft des Gedankenexperiments in der Philosophie des Geistes. In P. Spät (ed.), Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes. Mentis.
    Egal was der heutige Tag auch bringen mag, der 1. April 2063 wird zumindest als der Tag in die Geschichte des Wissenschaftsjournalismus eingehen, der die bisher aufwändigste Berichterstattung erfahren hat. So viele Kamerateams, wie hier vor den Toren der Australian National University in Canberra, hat bisher kein wissenschaftliches Experiment anziehen können. Selbst der Knüller des Vorjahres, als es einer 48jährigen Hausfrau in einem Vorort von London gelang, mit einfachsten Küchenutensilien einen kleinen Kalte-Fusion-Reaktor herzustellen, der den Staubsauger und die Mikrowelle zuverlässig (...)
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  36. Daniel Cohnitz (2003). Personal Identity and the Methodology of Imaginary Cases. In Klaus Petrus (ed.), Human Persons. Ontos.
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  37. John Collins (2012). McGinn, Colin. Truth Truth by Analysis: Games, Names, and Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 66 (2):377-378.
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  38. Chris Daly (2010). An Introduction to Philosophical Methods. Broadview Press.
    An Introduction to Philosophical Methods is the first book to survey the various methods that philosophers use to support their views. Rigorous yet accessible, the book introduces and illustrates the methodological considerations that are involved in current philosophical debates. Where there is controversy, the book presents the case for each side, but highlights where the key difficulties with them lie. While eminently student-friendly, the book makes an important contribution to the debate regarding the acceptability of the various philosophical methods, and (...)
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  39. Nic Damnjanovic (2011). Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):735 - 738.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 735-738, December 2011.
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  40. M. R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.) (1998). Rethinking Intuition. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
    Students and scholars in both fields will find this book to be of great value.
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  41. John Divers (1997). The Analysis of Possibility and the Possibility of Analysis. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2):141–160.
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  42. Janice Dowell, J. L. (forthcoming). The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford.
  43. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2008). Serious Metaphysics and the Vindication of Reductions. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):91 - 110.
    What would be sufficient to show of some apparently higher-level property that it is ‘nothing over and above’ some complex configuration of more basic properties? This paper defends a new method for justifying reductions by demonstrating its comparative advantages over two methods recently defended in the literature. Unlike its rivals, what I’ll call “the semantic method” makes a reduction’s truth epistemically transparent without relying on conceptual analyses.
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  44. Antony Eagle (2008). Mathematics and Conceptual Analysis. Synthese 161 (1):67–88.
    Gödel argued that intuition has an important role to play in mathematical epistemology, and despite the infamy of his own position, this opinion still has much to recommend it. Intuitions and folk platitudes play a central role in philosophical enquiry too, and have recently been elevated to a central position in one project for understanding philosophical methodology: the so-called ‘Canberra Plan’. This philosophical role for intuitions suggests an analogous epistemology for some fundamental parts of mathematics, which casts a number of (...)
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  45. Dennis Earl (2010). Vague Analysis. Metaphysica 11 (2):223-233.
    It might be thought that vagueness precludes the possibility of classical conceptual analysis and, thus, that the classical or definitional view of the nature of complex concepts is incorrect. The present paper argues that classical analysis can be had for concepts expressed by vague language since (1) all of the general theories of vagueness are compatible with the thesis that all complex concepts have classical analyses and also that (2) the meaning of vague expressions can be analyzed by having the (...)
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  46. Crawford L. Elder (2003). Kripkean Externalism Versus Conceptual Analysis. Facta Philosophica 5 (1):75-86.
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  47. Mark Fedyk (2009). Philosophical Intuitions. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):54-80.
    What exactly is a philosophical intuition? And what makes such an intuition reliable, when it is reliable? This paper provides a terminological framework that is able answer to the first question, and then puts the framework to work developing an answer to the second question. More specifically, the paper argues that we can distinguish between two different "evidential roles" which intuitions can occupy: under certain conditions they can provide information about the representational structure of an intuitor's concept, and under different (...)
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  48. Justin C. Fisher, The Authority of Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis.
    This paper defends Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis , a proposed empirical methodology for explicating philosophical concepts. This methodology attributes to our shared concepts whatever application conditions they would need to have in order best to continue delivering benefits in the ways they have regularly delivered benefits in the past. In the first stage of my argument I argue that Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis has what I call normative authority : we have practical and epistemic reason to adopt the explications that it delivers (...)
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