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Philosophy of Action

Edited by Constantine Sandis (Oxford Brookes University)
Assistant editor: István Zárdai (University of Pécs, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy, Oxford Brookes University)
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  1. added 2014-09-19
    Caroline T. Arruda (forthcoming). Review: Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. [REVIEW] Ethics 125 (1).
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  2. added 2014-09-19
    Marcus Arvan (forthcoming). How to Rationally Approach Life's Transformative Experiences. Philosophical Psychology.
    In a widely discussed forthcoming article, “What you can’t expect when you’re expecting”, as well as in a forthcoming book, L.A. Paul uses the notion of transformative experience to challenge culturally and philosophically traditional views about how to rationally make major life-decisions, most specifically the decision of whether to have children. The present paper argues that if the problem Paul presents has no direct solution—if there is no way to defend the philosophically and culturally dominant approach to rational decision-making for (...)
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  3. added 2014-09-18
    Arif Ahmed & Adam Caulton (forthcoming). Causal Decision Theory and EPR Correlations. Synthese:1-38.
    The paper argues that on three out of eight possible hypotheses about the EPR experiment we can construct novel and realistic decision problems on which (a) Causal Decision Theory and Evidential Decision Theory conflict (b) Causal Decision Theory and the EPR statistics conflict. We infer that anyone who fully accepts any of these three hypotheses has strong reasons to reject Causal Decision Theory. Finally, we extend the original construction to show that anyone who gives any of the three hypotheses any (...)
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  4. added 2014-09-18
    Carolyn Dicey Jennings & Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Action Without Attention. Analysis.
    Wayne Wu argues that attention is necessary for action: since action requires a solution to the ‘Many-Many Problem’, and since only attention can solve the Many-Many Problem, attention is necessary for action. We question the first of these two steps and argue that it is based on an oversimplified distinction between actions and reflexes. We argue for a more complex typology of behaviors where one important category is action that does not require a solution to the Many-Many Problem, and so (...)
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  5. added 2014-09-18
    Arif Ahmed (2014). Dicing with Death. Analysis:anu084.
    You should rather play hide-and-seek against someone who cannot predict where you hide than against someone who can, as the article illustrates in connection with a high-stakes example. Causal Decision Theory denies this. So Causal Decision Theory is false.
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  6. added 2014-09-17
    Jonathan Birch & James A. R. Marshall (2014). Queller's Separation Condition Explained and Defended. American Naturalist 184 (4):531-540.
    The theories of inclusive fitness and multilevel selection provide alternative perspectives on social evolution. The question of whether these perspectives are of equal generality remains a divisive issue. In an analysis based on the Price equation, Queller argued (by means of a principle he called the separation condition) that the two approaches are subject to the same limitations, arising from their fundamentally quantitative-genetical character. Recently, van Veelen et al. have challenged Queller’s results, using this as the basis for a broader (...)
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  7. added 2014-09-17
    Gianluca Verrucci (2011). Azione Come Autocostituzione. Normatività Ed Agency in Christine Korsgaard. In Mara Meletti Bertolini (ed.), Ragion pratica e immaginazione. Mimesis. 79-103.
  8. added 2014-09-17
    Gianluca Verrucci (2010). Ragion pratica e normatività. Il costruttivismo kantiano di Rawls, Korsgaard e O'Neill. Mimesis.
  9. added 2014-09-16
    Wolfgang Ertl (2004). Schöpfung und Freiheit. Ein kosmologischer Schlüssel zu Kants Kompatibilismus. In Norbert Fischer (ed.), Kants Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie. Meiner. 43-76.
    I examine two recent accounts of Kant's version of compatibilism, i.e., Hudson's reconstruction of Kant as an "anomalous monist" avant la lettre, and Wood's interpretation along the lines of a modified version of Boethius's "eternity solution". To retain the advantages of both strategies, yet avoid their respective shortcomings, I suggest approaching Kant's doctrine from his theology lectures and their concept of universal providence. This (probably Molinist) notion, an integral element of the regulative use of reason, allows Kant to regard, in (...)
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  10. added 2014-09-12
    Ciro De Florio & Aldo Frigerio (forthcoming). In Defense of the Timeless Solution to the Problem of Human Free Will and Divine Foreknowledge. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-24.
    In this paper, we will defend a particular version of the timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Our strategy is grounded on a particular temporal framework, which models the flow of time and a libertarian understanding of freedom. The propositions describing a certain act by an agent have an indeterminate truth value until the agent makes her choice; therefore, they become true or false when a decision is made. In order to account for this change (...)
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  11. added 2014-09-12
    Heidi M. Ravven (forthcoming). Free Will Skepticism: Current Arguments and Future Directions. [REVIEW] Neuroethics:1-4.
    Offered here is a review of Gregg D. Caruso’s edited volume, Exploring the Illusion of Free will and Moral Responsibility [1]. Assembled here are essays by nearly all the major contributors to the philosophical free will debate on the denial and skeptical side. The volume tells us where the field currently is and also gives us a sense of how the free will debate is actually advancing toward greater understanding. Perhaps we can even discern some glimmer of hope for a (...)
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  12. added 2014-09-12
    Charles Devellennes (forthcoming). Choice, Blind Spots and Free Will An Autopoietic Critique of Isaiah Berlin's Liberalism. Philosophy and Social Criticism:0191453714545339.
    This article shows that the concept of choice is central to Isaiah Berlin’s liberalism. It argues that his valuing of choice is anchored in a particular conception of human nature, one that assumes and presupposes free will. Berlin’s works sketch a metaphysics of choice, and his reluctance to situate himself openly in the debate on free will is unconvincing. By introducing the theory of autopoiesis, this article further suggests that there is a way to take Berlin’s value pluralism seriously, by (...)
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  13. added 2014-09-12
    Oisín Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey (forthcoming). Defending the Free-Will Intuitions Scale: Reply to Stephen Morris. Philosophical Psychology:1-7.
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  14. added 2014-09-12
    António Zilhão (forthcoming). Free Will and Rationality. Axiomathes:1-14.
    In this paper I analyse different justifications for the claim that the minor premise of the libertarian argument is true, namely, intuition, van Inwagen’s argument from moral responsibility and an argument from rationality. I claim none of these is satisfactory. I conclude by suggesting a possible way of interpreting the meaning of the free will intuition libertarians claim we have.
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  15. added 2014-09-12
    Yair Schlein (2014). Fatalism, Determinism and Free Will as the Axiomatic Foundations of Rival Moral World Views. Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism 22 (1):53-62.
    One of the prominent questions of moral thought throughout history is the question of moral responsibility. In other words, to what measure do human actions result from free will rather than from being subordinate to a common “predetermined” law. In ancient Greece, this question was associated with mythical figures like Moira and Ananke while in recent times it is connected with concepts such as determinism and compatibilism. The argument between these two world views crosses cultures and historical periods, giving the (...)
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  16. added 2014-09-12
    Alfred Mele (2014). Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Does Either Require the Other? :1-13.
    Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2014.940061.
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  17. added 2014-09-11
    Eddy Nahmias, Jason Shepard & Shane Reuter (2014). It's OK If 'My Brain Made Me Do It': People's Intuitions About Free Will and Neuroscientific Prediction. Cognition 133 (2):502-516.
    In recent years, a number of prominent scientists have argued that free will is an illusion, appealing to evidence demonstrating that information about brain activity can be used to predict behavior before people are aware of having made a decision. These scientists claim that the possibility of perfect prediction based on neural information challenges the ordinary understanding of free will. In this paper we provide evidence suggesting that most people do not view the possibility of neuro-prediction as a threat to (...)
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  18. added 2014-09-07
    C. G. Pulman (ed.) (forthcoming). Hart on Responsibility. Palgrave Macmillan.
  19. added 2014-09-07
    Derek Baker (forthcoming). The Abductive Case for Humeanism Over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    A number of philosophers have offered quasi-perceptual theories of desire, according to which to desire something is roughly to “see” it as having value or providing reasons. These are offered as alternatives to the more traditional Humean Theory of Motivation, which denies that desires have a representational aspect. This paper examines the various considerations offered by advocates to motivate quasi-perceptualism. It argues that Humeanism is in fact able to explain the same data that the quasi-perceptualist can explain, and in one (...)
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  20. added 2014-09-06
    Brian Kim (forthcoming). The Locality and Globality of Instrumental Rationality: The Normative Significance of Preference Reversals. Synthese.
    When we ask a decision maker to express her preferences, it is typically assumed that we are eliciting a pre-existing set of preferences. However, empirical research has suggested that our preferences are often constructed on the fly for the decision problem at hand. This paper explores the ramifications of this empirical research for our understanding of instrumental rationality. First, I argue that these results pose serious challenges for the traditional decision-theoretic view of instrumental rationality, which demands global coherence amongst all (...)
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  21. added 2014-09-06
    Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Favoring. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    It has become common to take reasons to form a basic normative category that is not amenable to non-circular analysis. This paper offers a novel characterization of reasons in terms of how we ought or it would be good for us to think in response to our awareness of facts, and thus rejects such Reason Primitivism. It also responds to six potential challenges to the view and argues it has certain advantages over competing reductionist proposals.
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  22. added 2014-09-02
    Amber Griffioen (2014). Regaining the 'Lost Self': A Philosophical Analysis of Survivor's Guilt. In Altered Self and Altered Self Experience. 43-57.
  23. added 2014-09-02
    Timothy Lane (2014). When Actions Feel Alien: An Explanatory Model. In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer Science+Business. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  24. added 2014-08-31
    Moti Gorin (2014). Towards a Theory of Interpersonal Manipulation. In Michael Weber Christian Coons (ed.), Manipulation: Theory and Practice. Oxford University Press.
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  25. added 2014-08-31
    Moti Gorin (2014). Do Manipulators Always Threaten Rationality? American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1).
  26. added 2014-08-27
    Olle Blomberg (forthcoming). Shared Goals and Development. Philosophical Quarterly.
    In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a "shared goal"—a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations—then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a role in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents to choose means that are (...)
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  27. added 2014-08-26
    Terence Rajivan Edward, Astrology, Fate and Causation.
    Some philosophers assert that astrology is a false theory. The simplest way to argue against all astrology is to identify a proposition that any kind of astrology must be committed to and then show that this proposition is false. In this paper I draw attention to some misconceptions regarding which propositions any kind of astrology is committed to.
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  28. added 2014-08-25
    Nada Gligorov (2014). Undermining Retributivism. APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine 13 (2):7-12.
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  29. added 2014-08-25
    Timothy Lane (2014). When Actions Feel Alien: An Explanatory Model. In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer Science+Business. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  30. added 2014-08-23
    Adam Feltz & Florian Cova (forthcoming). Moral Responsibility and Free Will: A Meta-Analysis. Consciousness and Cognition.
    Fundamental beliefs about free will and moral responsibility are often thought to shape our ability to have healthy relationships with others and ourselves. Emotional reactions have also been shown to have an important and pervasive impact on judgments and behaviors. Recent research suggests that emotional reactions play a prominent role in judgments about free will, influencing judgments about determinism’s relation to free will and moral responsibility. However, the extent to which affect influences these judgments is unclear. We conducted a metaanalysis (...)
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  31. added 2014-08-22
    Hilary Greaves, Antiprioritarianism.
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  32. added 2014-08-22
    Christoph Jedan (2010). Philosophy Superseded? The Doctrine of Free Will in the Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions. In Jan N. Bremmer (ed.), The Pseudo-Clementines. Peeters. 200-216.
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  33. added 2014-08-22
    Christoph Jedan (2000). Willensfreiheit bei Aristoteles? Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
    ein späteres Konstrukt. Dementsprechend sei es, wenn schon kein Willensbegriff bei Aristoteles vorliege, trivialerweise unmöglich, bei Aristoteles eine Willensfreiheit zu entdecken.2 Dieser Einwand könnte sich etwa, wie A. Dihle es getan hat, ...
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  34. added 2014-08-21
    Richard Rowland (2014). Dissolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    According to fitting-attitude (FA) accounts of value, X is of final value if and only if there are reasons for us to have a certain pro-attitude towards it. FA accounts supposedly face the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem. The WKR problem is the problem of revising FA accounts to exclude so called wrong kind of reasons. And wrong kind of reasons are reasons for us to have certain pro-attitudes towards things that are not of value. I argue that the (...)
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  35. added 2014-08-20
    Daniel Nica (2013). Narrative and Justification in Moral Particularism. Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy (2):22-32.
    In this paper I will discuss the problem of justification in moral particularism. The first part is concerned with Jonathan Dancy’s account of justification, which is a narrative one. To justify one’s choice is to present a persuasive description of the context in a narrative fashion, not to subordinate singular cases to universal rules. Since it dismisses arguments and employs persuasiveness, this view seems irrational, so the second part of my paper will consist of a personal reconstruction and reformulation of (...)
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  36. added 2014-08-20
    Daniel Nica (2011). Originile Disputei Etice Dintre Particularism Şi Generalism: Platon Şi Aristotel. Annals of Philosophy. University of Bucharest:51-63.
    This paper is a critical investigation about the historical origins of two contemporary approaches in ethics: moral particularism and moral generalism. Moral particularism states that there are no defensible moral principles and that moral thought doesn’t consist in the application of moral principles to cases, but in understanding the morally relevant features of an action, which vary from case to case. In opposition, moral generalism is the traditional claim that moral decisions are made by applying general rules to particular actions. (...)
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  37. added 2014-08-19
    Eddy Nahmias (2012). Free Will and Responsibility. WIREs Cognitive Science 3 (4):439-449.
    Free will is a set of capacities for conscious choice and control of actions and is essential for moral responsibility. While determinism is traditionally discussed as the main potential challenge to free will and responsibility, other potential challenges exist and need to be considered by philosophers and scientists. The cognitive sciences are relevant to free will both to study how people understand free will and potential challenges to it, and to study whether these challenges are supported by relevant scientific evidence.
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  38. added 2014-08-18
    Charles Hermes, Truthmakers and the Consequence Argument.
    Recent work in the truthmakers literature demonstrates that the logic of truthmaking is distinct from classical logic. Since free will is an ontological issue, and not merely a semantic issue, arguments about free will ought to be sensitive to these developments. In Truthmakers and the Direct Argument, Hermes argues that one of the main arguments for incompatibiilsm fails precisely where the truthmakers literature would predict. Here, I argue that similar problems make the Consequence Argument untenable.
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  39. added 2014-08-18
    Campbell Brown (2005). Matters of Priority. Dissertation, Australian National University
  40. added 2014-08-16
    Ann Pang-White (1994). Augustine on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will. Revue Des Études Augustiniennes 40:417-431.
  41. added 2014-08-15
    Dean Zimmerman (2010). The A-Theory of Time, Presentism, and Open Theism. In Science and Religion in Dialogue. Wiley-Blackwell. 789--809.
    This chapter contains sections titled: * I Introduction * II A-Theories and B-Theories * III Competing Versions of the A-Theory * IV Presentism a Trivial Truth? * V Open Theism and the A-Theory of Time * VI The “Truthmaker” Argument * VII Conclusion * Notes.
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  42. added 2014-08-13
    Ariela Tubert (forthcoming). Sound Advice and Internal Reasons. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Reasons internalism holds that reasons for action contain an essential connection with motivation. I defend an account of reasons internalism based on the advisor model. The advisor model provides an account of reasons for action in terms of the advice of a more rational version of the agent. Contrary to Pettit and Smith's proposal and responding to Sobel and Johnson's objections, I argue that the advisor model can provide an account of internal reasons and that it is too caught up (...)
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  43. added 2014-08-12
    Andrew Sepielli, Moral Uncertainty and the "Fetishism" Objection.
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  44. added 2014-08-12
    Andrew Sepielli (2014). Should You Look Before You Leap? The Philosophers' Magazine 66:89-93.
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  45. added 2014-08-11
    Martina Sauer (2014-03-15). Lambert Wiesing, Sehen lassen. Die Praxis des Zeigens, Berlin 2013. [REVIEW] Sehepunkte. Rezensionsjournal für Geschichtswissenschaften 14 (3).
  46. added 2014-08-11
    Lubomira Radoilska (2014). Belief and Agency. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):377-380.
  47. added 2014-08-08
    Benjamin Kiesewetter (forthcoming). Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle. Ethics.
    If you ought to perform a certain act, and some other action is a necessary means for you to perform that act, then you ought to perform that other action as well – or so it seems plausible to say. This transmission principle is of both practical and theoretical significance. The aim of this paper is to defend this principle against a number of recent objections, which (as I show) are all based on core assumptions of the view called actualism. (...)
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  48. added 2014-08-01
    Ezio Di Nucci (forthcoming). Eight Arguments Against Double Effect. In Proceedings of the XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie.
    I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.
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  49. added 2014-08-01
    Benjamin Bagley (forthcoming). Loving Someone in Particular. Ethics.
    People loved for their beauty and cheerfulness are not loved as irreplaceable, yet people loved for “what their souls are made of” are. Or so literary romance implies; leading philosophical accounts, however, deny the distinction, holding that reasons for love either do not exist or do not include the beloved’s distinguishing features. In this, I argue, they deny an essential species of love. To account for it while preserving the beloved’s irreplaceability, I defend a model of agency on which people (...)
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  50. added 2014-08-01
    Tom O'Shea (2014). Autonomy and Orthonomy. Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-19.
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