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Philosophy of Action

Edited by Constantine Sandis (University of Hertfordshire)
Assistant editor: István Zárdai (University of Pécs, Oxford Brookes University, University of Hertfordshire)
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  1. added 2016-08-24
    Swami Narasimhananda (2015). Book Review Truth. [REVIEW] Prabuddha Bharata or Awakened India 120 (3):295-6.
    Professors of philosophy, the authors have done a succinct and critical analysis of some theories of truth: deflationism, indeterminacy, insolubility, realism, and antirealism.
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  2. added 2016-08-23
    Taylor W. Cyr (2016). The Parallel Manipulation Argument. Ethics 126 (4):1075-1089.
    Matt King has recently argued that the manipulation argument against compatibilism does not succeed by employing a dilemma: either the argument infelicitously relies on incompatibilist sourcehood conditions, or the proponent of the argument leaves a premise of the argument undefended. This article develops a reply to King’s dilemma by showing that incompatibilists can accept its second horn. Key to King’s argument for the second horn’s being problematic is “the parallel manipulation argument.” I argue that King’s use of this argument is (...)
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  3. added 2016-08-23
    Renée Bilodeau (2000). Du pouvoir causal des intentions. Actes du XXVIIe Congrès de L’Association des Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française:718-725.
    Je défends l'idée que le seul rôle causal des intentions est d'initier l'action. Elles ont, éventuellement, d’autres fonctions qui se manifestent pendant le déroulement de l’action. Toutefois, ces fonctions sont d’ordre délibératif, non causal.
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  4. added 2016-08-22
    Markus E. Schlosser (forthcoming). Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended. Journal of Philosophical Research.
    Traditional compatibilism about free will is widely considered to be untenable. In particular, the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise appears to be subject to clear counterexamples. I will propose a new version of traditional compatibilism that provides a conditional account of both the ability to do otherwise and the ability to choose to do otherwise, and I will argue that this view withstands the standard objections to traditional compatibilism. For this, I will assume with incompatibilists that the (...)
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  5. added 2016-08-22
    Samy S. Abu Naser & Mazen J. Al Shobaki (2016). Enhancing the Use of Decision Support Systems for Re-Engineering of Operations and Business- Applied Study on the Palestinian Universities. Journal of Multidisciplinary Engineering Science Studies 2 (5):505--512.
    This research aims to identify the use of decision support systems as an entry point for operations of re-engineering in the Palestinian universities in Gaza Strip. The researchers used the method of questionnaire to collect data, and the researchers used a sample stratified random way, were (350) questionnaire distributed on the research sample and (312) questionnaire were collected back (89.1%). The study results showed that the most important ones are: there exists statistically significant impact at the level of significance (α (...)
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  6. added 2016-08-22
    Eric Sampson (2015). Against Scanlon's Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-6.
    We often say that one reason is stronger, or weightier, than another. These are metaphors. What does normative strength or weight really consist in? Scanlon (2014) offers a novel answer to this question. His answer appeals to counterfactuals of various kinds. I argue that appealing to counterfactuals leads to deep problems for his view.
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  7. added 2016-08-21
    Renée Bilodeau (2001). Croyance et justification. Cahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 37:153-165.
    Cet article se propose de montrer que l’éthique de la croyance, si elle permet de clarifier certains problèmes épistémiques, a le tort d’être utilisée à des fins pour lesquelles le réseau conceptuel de l’éthique est inadéquat. Dans ce but, je présente d’abord la thèse de la divergence et les arguments qui militent en sa faveur. J’indique ensuite pourquoi ces arguments ne sont pas concluants en examinant de plus près les rapports existant entre raisons épistémiques et raisons pratiques. Cette discussion se (...)
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  8. added 2016-08-21
    Renée Bilodeau (2000). La philosohie de l'action. In Pascal Engel (ed.), Précis de philosophie analytique. P.U.F. 189-212.
    Introduction à quelques problèmes de philosophie de l'action: la nature de l'action, l'individuation de l'action, la théorie causale, les raisons et les causes, les chaînes causales déviantes, la notion d'intention, la "simple view", les raisonnements pratiques.
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  9. added 2016-08-19
    Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (forthcoming). Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief. In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press
    Epistemic instrumentalists seek to understand the normativity of epistemic norms on the model practical instrumental norms governing the relation between aims and means. Non-instrumentalists often object that this commits instrumentalists to implausible epistemic assessments. I argue that this objection presupposes an implausibly strong interpretation of epistemic norms. Once we realize that epistemic norms should be understood in terms of permissibility rather than obligation, and that evidence only occasionally provide normative reasons for belief, an instrumentalist account becomes available that delivers the (...)
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  10. added 2016-08-19
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2016). Luck’s Extended Reach. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):191-218.
    Something is a matter of luck if it is beyond our control. In this paper, I argue for the primary thesis that luck can undermine varieties of obligation, such as moral and prudential obligation, as well as judgments that are best from an agent’s own point of view. Among the considerations invoked to defend this thesis is a prevalent form of libertarianism, event-causal libertarianism. Arguments for the primary thesis that call on event-causal libertarianism raise concerns with this variety of libertarianism.
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  11. added 2016-08-19
    Dana Kay Nelkin (2016). Accountability and Desert. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):173-189.
    In recent decades, participants in the debate about whether we are free and responsible agents have tended with increasing frequency to begin their papers or books by fixing the terms “free” and “responsible” in clear ways to avoid misunderstanding. This is an admirable development, and while some misunderstandings have certainly been avoided, and positions better illuminated as a result, new and interesting questions also arise. Two ways of fixing these terms and identifying the underlying concepts have emerged as especially influential, (...)
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  12. added 2016-08-19
    Robert Kane (2016). Moral Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Freedom of Will. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):229-246.
    In his influential paper, “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson argued that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible and related reactive attitudes were wholly “internal” to the practices themselves and could be insulated from traditional philosophical and metaphysical concerns, including concerns about free will and determinism. This “insulation thesis” is a controversial feature of Strawson’s influential paper; and it has had numerous critics. The first purpose of this paper is to explain my own reasons for thinking that our (...)
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  13. added 2016-08-19
    Carolina Sartorio (2016). A Partial Defense of the Actual-Sequence Model of Freedom. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):107-120.
    Over the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model and the actual-sequence model. This paper is a partial defense of the actual-sequence model. My defense relies on two strategies. The first strategy consists in de-emphasizing the role of examples in arguing for a model of freedom. Imagine that, as some people think, Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine the alternative-possibilities model. What follows from this? Not much, I argue. In particular, I note that the counterparts of (...)
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  14. added 2016-08-19
    Michael McKenna (2016). A Modest Historical Theory of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):83-105.
    Is moral responsibility essentially historical? Consider two agents qualitatively identical with respect to all of their nonhistorical properties just prior to the act of A-ing. Is it possible that, due only to differences in their respective histories, when each A-s only one A-s freely and is morally responsible for doing so? Nonhistorical theorists say “no.” Historical theorists say “yes.” Elsewhere, I have argued on behalf of philosophers like Harry G. Frankfurt that nonhistorical theorists can resist the historical theorists’ case against (...)
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  15. added 2016-08-19
    Alfred R. Mele (2016). Moral Responsibility: Radical Reversals and Original Designs. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):69-82.
    This article identifies and assesses a way of thinking that might help to explain why some compatibilists are attracted to what is variously called an internalist, structuralist, or anti-historicist view of moral responsibility—a view about the bearing of agents’ histories on their moral responsibility. Scenarios of two different kinds are considered. Several scenarios feature heavy-duty manipulation that radically changes an agent’s mature moral personality from admirable to despicable or vice versa. These “radical reversal” scenarios are contrasted with a scenario featuring (...)
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  16. added 2016-08-19
    John Martin Fischer (2016). How Do Manipulation Arguments Work? Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):47-67.
    Alfred Mele has presented the Zygote Argument as a challenge to compatibilism. In previous work I have offered a critique of Mele’s first premise. Patrick Todd, Neal Tognazzini, and Derk Pereboom have offered an alternative interpretation of the argument, substituting for. Here I offer a critical evaluation of this strategy, and in the process I seek to understand the deep structure of the Zygote Argument.
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  17. added 2016-08-19
    Matthé Scholten (2013). Geen verwijt zonder fout: een kantiaans-strawsoniaanse visie op morele uitkomstenverantwoordelijkheid. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 105 (4):249-253.
  18. added 2016-08-18
    Ken Levy (forthcoming). Review of Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov's Philosophy of Criminal Attempts: The Subjective Approach. [REVIEW] Jurisprudence.
    Issues include attempts generally; the problem of outcome luck; the impossibility defense; physical movement and intent; and reckless attempts, attempted rape, and attempted theft. In the final section, I offer a hypothetical that challenges Prof. Donnelly-Lazarov's theory.
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  19. added 2016-08-18
    Patricia Greenspan (2016). Responsible Psychopaths Revisited. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):265-278.
    This paper updates, modifies, and extends an account of psychopaths’ responsibility and blameworthiness that depends on behavioral control rather than moral knowledge. Philosophers mainly focus on whether psychopaths can be said to grasp moral rules as such, whereas it seems to be important to their blameworthiness that typical psychopaths are hampered by impulsivity and other barriers to exercising self-control. I begin by discussing an atypical case, for contrast, of a young man who was diagnosed as a psychopath at one point (...)
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  20. added 2016-08-18
    Randolph Clarke (2016). Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):121-137.
    This paper defends a minimal desert thesis, according to which someone who is blameworthy for something deserves to feel guilty, to the right extent, at the right time, because of her culpability. The sentiment or emotion of guilt includes a thought that one is blameworthy for something as well as an unpleasant affect. Feeling guilty is not a matter of inflicting suffering on oneself, and it need not involve any thought that one deserves to suffer. The desert of a feeling (...)
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  21. added 2016-08-18
    Gideon Yaffe (2016). Desert for Wrongdoing. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):149-171.
    Much government and personal conduct is premised on the idea that a person made thereby to suffer deserves that suffering thanks to prior wrongdoing by him. Further, it often appears that one kind of suffering is more deserved than another and, in light of that, conduct inflicting the first is superior, or closer to being justified than conduct inflicting the second. Yet desert is mysterious. It is far from obvious what, exactly, it is. This paper offers and argues for a (...)
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  22. added 2016-08-18
    Saul Smilansky (2016). Parfit on Free Will, Desert, and the Fairness of Punishment. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):139-148.
    In his recent monumental book On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues for a hard determinist view that rejects free will-based moral responsibility and desert. This rejection of desert is necessary for his main aim in the book, the overall reconciliation of normative ethics. In Appendix E of his book, however, Parfit claims that it is possible to mete out fair punishment. Parfit’s position on punishment here seems to be inconsistent with his hard determinism. I argue that Parfit is mistaken here, (...)
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  23. added 2016-08-18
    Keith Lehrer (2016). Freedom of Preference: A Defense of Compatiblism. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):35-46.
    Harry G. Frankfurt has presented a case of a counterfactual intervener CI with knowledge and power to control an agent so he will do A. He concludes that if the agent prefers to do A and there is no intervention by CI, the agent has acted of his own free will and is morally responsible for doing A, though he lacked an alternative possibility. I consider the consequences for freedom and moral responsibility of CI having a complete plan P for (...)
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  24. added 2016-08-17
    Neri Marsili (2016). Lying by Promising. International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2):271-313.
    This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as “I promise that Φ ” can count as an assertion of its content Φ . Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a (...)
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  25. added 2016-08-17
    Henry Clarke (2016). Wiggins on Practical Knowledge. Disputatio 8 (42):113-124.
    Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argued that the knowledge needed for participation in an ethos cannot be codified in propositional form so as to let it be imparted to someone who did not already have it. This is because any putative codification would be incomplete, and require that knowledge in order to extend it to novel cases. On a reasonable interpretation of his (...)
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  26. added 2016-08-17
    Piotr T. Makowski (2016). Intention Inertia and the Plasticity of Planning. Philosophical Psychology:1-12.
    In this article, I examine Michael Bratman’s account of stability in his planning theory of intention. Future-directed intentions should be stable, or appropriately resistant to change, over time. Bratman claims that the norm of stability governs both intentions and plans. The aim of this article is to critically enrich Bratman’s account of stability by introducing plasticity as an additional norm of planning. I construct plasticity as a kind of stability of intentions which supplements Bratman’s notion of “reasonable stability.” Unlike the (...)
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  27. added 2016-08-16
    Chris Tucker (forthcoming). How to Think About Satisficing. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    An agent submaximizes with motivation when she aims at the best but chooses a less good option because of a countervailing consideration. An agent (radically) satisfices when she rejects the better for the good enough, and does so because the mere good enough gets her what she really wants. Motivated submaximization and satisficing, so construed, are different ways of choosing a suboptimal option, but this difference is easily missed. Putative proponents of satisficing tend to argue only that motivated submaximization can (...)
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  28. added 2016-08-15
    Jan Scheffel, The Unsolvability of the Mind-Body Problem Frees the Will.
    The mind-body problem is analyzed in a reductionist perspective. By combining the concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment employing a basic nonlinear process, it is shown that epistemically strongly emergent properties may develop. A comparison with the significantly more complex neural network of the brain shows that also consciousness is epistemically emergent in a strong sense. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness is not possible; the mind-body problem does not have a reductionist solution. The ontologically emergent (...)
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  29. added 2016-08-15
    Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias (forthcoming). Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    We use recent interventionist theories of causation to develop a compatibilist account of causal sourcehood, which provides a response to Manipulation Arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Our account explains the difference between manipulation and determinism, against the claim of Manipulation Arguments that there is no relevant difference. Interventionism allows us to see that causal determinism does not mean that variables outside of the agent causally explain her actions better than variables within the agent, whereas the causal (...)
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  30. added 2016-08-15
    Eddy Nahmias (forthcoming). Your Brain as the Source of Free Will Worth Wanting: Understanding Free Will in the Age of Neuroscience. In Gregg Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press
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  31. added 2016-08-15
    Eddy Nahmias (2016). Free Will as a Psychological Accomplishment. In David Schmidtz & Carmen Pavel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. OUP
    I offer analyses of free will in terms of a complex set of psychological capacities agents possess to varying degrees and have varying degrees of opportunities to exercise effectively, focusing on the under-appreciated but essential capacities for imagination. For an agent to have free will is for her to possess the psychological capacities to make decisions—to imagine alternatives for action, to select among them, and to control her actions accordingly—such that she is the author of her actions and can deserve (...)
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  32. added 2016-08-14
    Andrés-Francisco Contreras (2015). ¿Quién soy yo y quién eres tú? La reformulación gadameriana de la aperturidad de la existencia. Alea Revista Internacional de Fenomenología y Hermenéutica 12:39-63.
    Por medio de un contraste con el pensamiento heideggeriano, el estudio desarrolla la concepción gadameriana de la alteridad, el lugar que ocupa este tema en la propuesta hermenéutica de Verdad y Método y la reformulación que ello supone de la manera como Heidegger concibe la aperturidad de la existencia humana y el acontecimiento mismo del ser. El trabajo inicia planteando la crítica de Gadamer al reconocimiento ontológico del otro por parte de Heidegger; muestra enseguida la oposición que se presenta entre (...)
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  33. added 2016-08-12
    Panos Theodorou (2013). Ἁμαρτiα, Verfall, Pain. Plato's and Heidegger's Philosophies of Politics and Beyond. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy:189-205.
    Two seemingly opposing philosophies, Plato’s and Heidegger’s, are brought together by reading the philosophy of politics in the Republic through the existential-analytic lenses of Being and Time and also by using the former in order to explore the philosophico-political potential of the latter. Plato’s thematic of errancy (αμαρτία) is shown to interlock harmoniously with Ηeidegger’s thematic of the fall (Verfall). This provides a single, penetrating interpretation of how philosophy thinks humans are supposed to respond to the predicament of their original (...)
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  34. added 2016-08-11
    Caroline T. Arruda (forthcoming). Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement. Philosophia.
    Constitutivists explicitly emphasize the importance of self-reflection in a variety of ways. For Korsgaard (1996: Lecture 3; 2009: 25-ff), it is a necessary feature of the process of deciding which principles we want to guide our actions and to comprise the kinds of agents that we become. For Velleman (1989: 32; 2000a: 193), it is a product of the constitutivist aim of autonomy (or, later (2006a), the aim of intelligibility) that we have in action. Interestingly enough, however, there is no (...)
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  35. added 2016-08-11
    Facundo M. Alonso (2016). A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention. Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):271–302.
    In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose (...)
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  36. added 2016-08-09
    Gabriel Marco (forthcoming). ‘Determinism’ Is Just Fine: A Reply to Scott Sehon. Philosophia:1-9.
    Scott Sehon recently argued that the standard notion of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument makes it so that, if our world turns out to be deterministic, then an interventionist God is logically impossible. He further argues that because of this, we should revise our notion of determinism. In this paper I show that Sehon’s argument for the claim that the truth of determinism, in this sense, would make an interventionist God logically impossible ultimately fails. I then offer and respond (...)
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  37. added 2016-08-09
    Björn Petersson (forthcoming). Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    Different versions of the idea that individualism about agency is the root of standard game theoretical puzzles have been defended by Regan 1980, Bacharach, Hurley, Sugden :165–181, 2003), and Tuomela 2013, among others. While collectivistic game theorists like Michael Bacharach provide formal frameworks designed to avert some of the standard dilemmas, philosophers of collective action like Raimo Tuomela aim at substantive accounts of collective action that may explain how agents overcoming such social dilemmas would be motivated. This paper focuses on (...)
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  38. added 2016-08-04
    Susanne Mantel (forthcoming). Three Cheers for Dispositions: A Dispositional Approach to Acting for a Normative Reason. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Agents sometimes act for normative reasons—for reasons that objectively favor their actions. Jill, for instance, calls a doctor for the normative reason that Kate is injured. In this article I explore a dispositional approach to acting for a normative reason. I argue for the need of epistemic, motivational, and executional dispositional elements of a theory of acting for a normative reason. Dispositions play a mediating role between, on the one hand, the normative reason and its normative force, and the action (...)
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  39. added 2016-08-04
    Jumana Morciglio, Overcoming Diminished Motivation.
    Self-control is required when an agent encounters some opposition to acting on her better judgments. One such opposition is diminished motivation, that is, a lack of desire to act on a better judgment. Thomas Connor compares two views of successful self-control, actional and non-actional, and argues that non-actional views are better at explaining successful self-control in cases of diminished motivation. I reject Connor’s suggestion that successful self-control is likely to be non-actional by presenting two arguments: non-actional views do not possess (...)
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  40. added 2016-08-04
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  41. added 2016-08-04
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  42. added 2016-08-04
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  43. added 2016-08-04
    David S. Oderberg, All for the Good.
    The Guise of the Good thesis has received much attention since Anscombe's brief defence in her book Intention. I approach it here from a less common perspective - indirectly, via a theory explaining how it is that moral behaviour is even possible. After setting out how morality requires the employment of a fundamental test, I argue that moral behaviour involves orientation toward the good. Immoral behaviour cannot, however, involve orientation to evil as such, given the theory of evil as privation. (...)
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  44. added 2016-08-04
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  45. added 2016-08-04
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  46. added 2016-08-04
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  47. added 2016-08-04
    Paulus Esterhazy, Reasons for Action.
    Reasons for action are considerations in the light of which we act. But just what is it that we attribute to a person when we credit her with a good reason? What sort of entity is on our minds when we deliberate about what we have reason to do? This book examines this question and evaluates a number of approaches to the philosophy of reasons, including normative realism, psychologism and Humeanism. The second half of the book contains the defense of (...)
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  48. added 2016-08-04
    Philip Stratton-Lake, Moral Motivation in Kant.
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  49. added 2016-08-04
    Bradford Hooker & Bart Streumer, Procedural Versus Substantive Practical Reason.
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  50. added 2016-08-02
    Terrance Tomkow & Kadri Vihvelin, Determinism.
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