Bookmark and Share

Philosophy of Action

Edited by Constantine Sandis (University of Hertfordshire)
Assistant editor: István Zárdai (University of Pécs, Oxford Brookes University, University of Hertfordshire)
Most recently added entries found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 79
  1. added 2016-05-23
    Adam Bales (2016). The Pauper’s Problem: Chance, Foreknowledge and Causal Decision Theory. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1497-1516.
    In a letter to Wlodek Rabinowicz, David Lewis introduced a decision scenario that he described as “much more problematic for decision theory than the Newcomb Problems”. This scenario, which involves an agent with foreknowledge of the outcome of some chance process, has received little subsequent attention. However, in one of the small number of discussions of such cases, Huw Price's Causation, Chance and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence it has been argued that cases of this sort pose serious problems (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. added 2016-05-18
    Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (forthcoming). Non-Rational Action in the Face of Disagreement: An Argument Against Non-Conformism. Synthese:1-32.
    Recently there has been a surge of interest in the intersection between epistemology and action theory, especially in principles linking rationality in thought and rationality in action. Recently there has also been a surge of interest in the epistemic significance of perceived peer disagreement: what, epistemically speaking, is the rational response in light of disagreement with someone whom one regards as an epistemic peer? The objective of this paper is to explore these two issues—separately, but also in connection with one (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. added 2016-05-18
    Jonathan Floyd (forthcoming). Raz on Practical Reason and Political Morality. Jurisprudence:1-20.
    This article examines the relationship between Raz's theories of practical reason and political morality. Raz believes the former underpins the latter, when in fact it undermines it. This is because three core features of his theory of practical reason – desires, goals, and competitive pluralism––combine in such a way as to undermine a core feature of his theory of political morality––what Raz calls our autonomy-based duty to provide everyone with what he takes to be an adequate range of valuable life (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. added 2016-05-18
    Sasha Mudd (2016). Rethinking the Priority of Practical Reason in Kant. European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):78-102.
    Throughout the critical period Kant enigmatically insists that reason is a ‘unity’, thereby suggesting that both our theoretical and practical endeavors are grounded in one and the same rational capacity. How Kant's unity thesis ought to be interpreted and whether it can be substantiated remain sources of controversy in the literature. According to the strong reading of this claim, reason is a ‘unity’ because all our reasoning, including our theoretical reasoning, functions practically. Although several prominent commentators endorse this view, it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. added 2016-05-18
    Seena Eftekhari (2016). Aristotle on Woman’s Capacity for Practical Reason. Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1):85-91.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. added 2016-05-18
    Marcus Willaschek (2016). Must We Believe in the Realizability of Our Ends? On a Premise of Kant’s Argument for the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason. In Thomas Höwing (ed.), The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy. De Gruyter 223-244.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. added 2016-05-18
    Federica Basaglia (2016). The Highest Good and the Notion of the Good as Object of Pure Practical Reason. In Thomas Höwing (ed.), The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy. De Gruyter 17-32.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. added 2016-05-18
    Dan Moller (2016). Drunk and in the Mood: Affect and Judgment. Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):318-338.
    _ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 3, pp 318 - 338 This paper spells out the following line of thought: How much we care about various things is in constant flux, even as the world remains as it was. Internal affective shifts due to changes in mood, arousal-states or even hunger cause us to be more or less concerned about something. Further, there often isn't any fact of the matter about how much we ought to care about something. As I argue, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. added 2016-05-18
    Stephan Zimmermann (2016). Kant on “Moral Arguments”: What Does the Objectivity of a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason Consist In? In Thomas Höwing (ed.), The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy. De Gruyter 131-156.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. added 2016-05-18
    Thomas Schmidt (2016). Instrumentalism About Practical Reason: Not by Default. Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):17-27.
    Instrumentalism is the view that all requirements of practical reason can be derived from the instrumental principle, that is, from the claim that one ought to take the suitable means to one's ends. Rationalists, by contrast, hold that there are requirements of practical reason that concern the normative acceptability of ends. To the extent that rationalists put forward these requirements in addition to the instrumental principle, rationalism might seem to go beyond instrumentalism in its normative commitments. This is why it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. added 2016-05-18
    Jens Gillessen (2015). Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):n/a-n/a.
    Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long-term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The article challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action – (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. added 2016-05-18
    Stephen Cohen (2004). The Nature of Moral Reasoning: The Framework and Activities of Ethical: The Framework and Activities of Ethical Deliberation, Argument, and Decision—Making. Oxford University Press Anz.
    The Nature of Moral Reasoning is a discussion about the landscape, or environment, in which moral reasoning occurs. The book engages the reader in an examination of the processes involved in thinking about moral matters. The theoretical underpinnings of moral reasoning are explained carefully in the context of an examination about what it means to engage in the central activity of moral reasoning. The discussion is both theoretical and practical and is about where moral reasoning is located, and how it (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. added 2016-05-17
    Gregg Caruso (forthcoming). Moral Responsibility and the Strike Back Emotion: Comments on Bruce Waller’s The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility. Syndicate Philosophy 1 (1).
    In The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility (2015), Bruce Waller sets out to explain why the belief in individual moral responsibility is so strong. He begins by pointing out that there is a strange disconnect between the strength of philosophical arguments in support of moral responsibility and the strength of philosophical belief in moral responsibility. While the many arguments in favor of moral responsibility are inventive, subtle, and fascinating, Waller points out that even the most ardent supporters of moral responsibility (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. added 2016-05-15
    Ken Levy (2016). Blocking Blockage. Philosophia:1-18.
    The Blockage Argument is designed to improve upon Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities by removing the counterfactual intervener altogether. If the argument worked, then it would prove in a way that Frankfurt’s argument does not that moral responsibility does not require any alternative possibilities whatsoever, not even the weakest “flicker of freedom”. -/- Some philosophers have rejected the Blockage Argument solely on the basis of their intuition that the inability to do otherwise is incompatible with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. added 2016-05-15
    Boris Hennig (2016). Four Causes. Www.Borishennig.De.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. added 2016-05-15
    G. E. M. Anscombe (2011). The Causation of Action. In Mary Geach & Luke Gormally (eds.), Human life, action and ethics: essays by GEM Anscombe. Andrews UK Limited 89-108.
  17. added 2016-05-11
    Neil Sinclair (forthcoming). On the Connection Between Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Acting for Those Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-13.
    According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to Φ then it must be possible that A should Φ for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-called ‘internalist’ theories of reasons. In this paper I rebut an apparent counterexamples to Williams’ claim: Schroeder’s example of Nate. I argue that this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. added 2016-05-09
    Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (forthcoming). Introduction. In Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge 1-18.
    We do things in time. Philosophy of action can capture this phenomenon in at least two ways. On one hand, it might focus on the way that temporal preferences and long-term temporal horizons affect the rationality of decisions in the present (see, e.g., Parfit 1984; Rawls 1971). Such work may focus on the way we discount the distant future, for example, or prioritize the future over the past. Approaches of this kind treat time as, in a sense, something external to (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. added 2016-05-05
    John Pittard (forthcoming). Evil and God's Toxin Puzzle. Noûs.
    I show that Kavka’s toxin puzzle raises a problem for the “Responsibility Theodicy,” which holds that the reason God typically does not intervene to stop the evil effects of our actions is that such intervention would undermine the possibility of our being significantly responsible for overcoming and averting evil. This prominent theodicy seems to require that God be able to do what the agent in Kavka’s toxin story cannot do: stick by a plan to do some action at a future (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. added 2016-05-04
    Johan E. Gustafsson (2016). Consequentialism with Wrongness Depending on the Difficulty of Doing Better. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1).
    Moral wrongness comes in degrees. On a consequentialist view of ethics, the wrongness of an act should depend, I argue, in part on how much worse the act's consequences are compared with those of its alternatives and in part on how difficult it is to perform the alternatives with better consequences. I extend act consequentialism to take this into account, and I defend three conditions on consequentialist theories. The first is consequentialist dominance, which says that, if an act has better (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. added 2016-05-03
    Kim Frost (forthcoming). Antinomy of Basic Action. In Roman Altshuler Michael J. Sigrist (ed.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. added 2016-05-03
    Donald Davidson (1978). Intending. Philosophy of History and Action 11:41-60.
    Someone may intend to build a squirrel house without having decided to do it, deliberated about it, formed an intention to do it, or reasoned about it. And despite his intention, he may never build a squirrel house, try to build one, or do anything whatever with the intention of getting a squirrel house built. Pure intending of this kind, intending that may occur without practical reasoning, action, or consequence, poses a problem if we want to give an account of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. added 2016-05-02
    Bolesław Czarnecki, Knowledge-How (Reference Entry). Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.
    The entry is intended as an advanced introduction to the topic of knowledge-how. It starts with a list of overviews, monographs and collections, followed by selected 20th century discussions. The last two sections contain sources pertaining to Ryle's own work on the topic as well as work by other influential thinkers, and themes that are sometimes associated with knowledge-how. The remaining seven sections survey the contemporary literature on knowledge-how from three perspectives: (i) generic desiderata for accounts of knowledge-how, (ii) specific (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. added 2016-05-02
    Michael D. Doan (2016). Responsibility for Collective Inaction and the Knowledge Condition. Social Epistemology 30.
    When confronted with especially complex ecological and social problems such as climate change, how are we to think about responsibility for collective inaction? Social and political philosophers have begun to consider the complexities of acting collectively with a view to creating more just and sustainable societies. Some have recently turned their attention to the question of whether more or less formally organized groups can ever be held morally responsible for not acting collectively, or else for not organizing themselves (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. added 2016-05-01
    Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Two Thesis About the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity. In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Practical and Theoretical. Oxford University Press
    In tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, many contemporary philosophers treat practical and theoretical normativity as two genuinely distinct domains of normativity. In this paper I consider the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct. I suggest that there are two different ways that the distinctness thesis might be understood and consider the different implications of the two different distinctness theses.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. added 2016-04-30
    Nathan Stout (forthcoming). Reasons-Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility: The Case of Autism. Journal of Ethics:1-18.
    In this paper, I consider a novel challenge to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s reasons-responsiveness theory of moral responsibility. According to their view, agents possess the control necessary for moral responsibility if their actions proceed from a mechanism that is moderately reasons-responsive. I argue that their account of moderate reasons-responsiveness fails to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for moral responsibility since it cannot give an adequate account of the responsibility of individuals with autism spectrum disorder. Empirical evidence suggests that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. added 2016-04-28
    Leslie Allan, The Principle of Double Effect.
    Absolutist systems of ethics have come in for harsh criticism on a number of fronts. The Principle of Double Effect was formulated by Catholic ethicists to overcome such objections. In this essay, Leslie Allan addresses four of the most prominent problems faced by an absolutist ethic and evaluates the extent to which the Principle of Double Effect is successful in avoiding or mitigating these criticisms.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. added 2016-04-27
    Machiel Keestra, How Do Narratives and Brains Mutually Influence Each Other? Taking Both the ‘Neuroscientific Turn’ and the ‘Narrative Turn’ in Explaining Bio-Political Orders.
    Introduction: the neuroscientific turn in political science The observation that brains and political orders are interdependent is almost trivial. Obviously, political orders require brain processes in order to emerge and to remain in place, as these processes enable action and cognition. Conversely, every since Aristotle coined man as “by nature a political animal” (Aristotle, Pol.: 1252a 3; cf. Eth. Nic.: 1097b 11), this also suggests that the political engagements of this animal has likely consequences for its natural development, including the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. added 2016-04-27
    Mikko Salmela & Michiru Nagatsu (forthcoming). How Does It Really Feel to Act Together? Shared Emotions and the Phenomenology of We-Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    Research on the phenomenology of agency for joint action has so far focused on the sense of agency and control in joint action, leaving aside questions on how it feels to act together. This paper tries to fill this gap in a way consistent with the existing theories of joint action and shared emotion. We first reconstruct Pacherie’s account on the phenomenology of agency for joint action, pointing out its two problems, namely the necessary trade-off between the sense of self- (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. added 2016-04-26
    Vincenzo De Florio, Interpretations of the Concepts of Resilience and Evolution in the Philosophy of Leibniz.
    In this article I interpret resilience and evolution in view of the philosophy of Leibniz. First, I discuss resilience as a substance’s or a monad’s “quantity of essence” — its “degree of perfection” — which I express as the quality of the Whole with respect to the sum of the qualities of the Parts. Then I discuss evolution, which I interpret here as the autopoietic Principle that sets Itself in motion and creates all reality, including Itself. This Principle may be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. added 2016-04-26
    Luca Ferrero, Intending, Acting, and Doing.
    I argue that intending and acting belong to the same genus: intending is a kind of doing continuous in structure with intentional acting. Future-directed intending is not a truly separate phenomenon from either the intending in action or the acting itself. Ultimately, all intentions are in action, or better still, in extended courses of action. I show how the intuitive distinction between intending and acting is based on modeling the two phenomena on the extreme and limiting cases of an otherwise (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. added 2016-04-17
    Wayne Christensen, Kath Bicknell, Doris McIlwain & John Sutton (2015). The Sense of Agency and its Role in Strategic Control for Expert Mountain Bikers. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2 (3):340-353.
    Much work on the sense of agency has focused either on abnormal cases, such as delusions of control, or on simple action tasks in the laboratory. Few studies address the nature of the sense of agency in complex natural settings, or the effect of skill on the sense of agency. Working from 2 case studies of mountain bike riding, we argue that the sense of agency in high-skill individuals incorporates awareness of multiple causal influences on action (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. added 2016-04-14
    Alexander Stathopoulos (forthcoming). Knowing Achievements. Philosophy:1-14.
    Anscombe claims that whenever a subject is doing something intentionally, this subject knows that they are doing it. This essay defends Anscombe's claim from an influential set of counterexamples, due to Davidson. It argues that Davidson's counterexamples are tacit appeals to an argument, on which knowledge can't be essential to doing something intentionally, because some things that can be done intentionally require knowledge of future successes, and because such knowledge can't ever be guaranteed when someone is doing something intentionally. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. added 2016-04-14
    Herivelto Pereira de Souza (2010). A vida e as fontes da normatividade: por uma história natural do conceito. Dissertation, Universidade de São Paulo
    A posição filosófica chamada de externismo semântico caracteriza-se pela tese segundo a qual a individuação do conteúdo de estados mentais deve recorrer a fatores que não podem ser localizados na região geralmente circunscrita pela noção mesma de mente. Tal tese implica, em todo caso, que a suposta interioridade da vida psicológica não se basta para tornar inteligível as condições de possibilidade que o pensamento conceitual requer. Assim, se fatores externos aos indivíduos são vistos como desempenhando uma contribuição decisiva na própria (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. added 2016-04-12
    Lavinia Marin (2013). The Appeal to Expert Opinion in Contexts of Political Deliberation and the Problem of Group Bias. Annals of the University of Bucharest - Philosophy Series 62 (2):91-106.
    In this paper, I will try to answer the question: How are we supposed to assess the expert’s opinion in an argument from the position of an outsider to the specialized field? by placing it in the larger context of the political status of epistemic authority. In order to do this I will first sketch the actual debate around the problem of expertise in a democracy and relate this to the issue of the status of science in society. Secondly, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. added 2016-04-11
    Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). Outsourcing the Deep Self: Deep Self Discordance Does Not Explain Away Intuitions in Manipulation Arguments. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
    According to manipulation arguments for incompatibilism, manipulation might undermine an agent’s responsibility even when the agent satisfies plausible compatibilist conditions on responsibility. According to Sripada, however, empirical data suggest that people take manipulation to undermine responsibility largely because they think that the manipulated act is in discord with the agent’s “deep self,” thus violating the plausible compatibilist condition of deep self concordance. This paper defends Sripada’s general methodological approach but presents data that strongly suggest that, contrary to Sripada’s contention, most (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. added 2016-04-11
    Benj Hellie (forthcoming). Praxeology, Imperatives, and Shifts of View. In Rowland Stout (ed.), Process, action, and experience. Oxford UP
    I outline a radically `first-personal' program in praxeology (aka 'philosophy of practical reason'): embrace of non-propositional imperatival content is what is characteristically practical; this embrace connects to agentive behavior 'transcendentally'---through a constraint on shifts of view, inaccessible within any single viewpoint.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. added 2016-04-11
    Subhasis Chattopadhyay (2016). Review of Giorgio Agamben's Pilate and Jesus. [REVIEW] Prabuddha Bharata or Awakened India 121 (4):431-33.
    This review shows Agamben as (mis)reading Dante and misunderstanding the Jesus event.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. added 2016-04-10
    Douglas W. Portmore, Maximalism Vs. Omnism About Reasons.
    The performance of one option can entail the performance of another. For instance, I have the option of baking a pumpkin pie as well as the option of baking a pie, and the former entails the latter. Now, suppose that I have both reason to bake a pie and reason to bake a pumpkin pie. This raises the question: Which, if either, is more fundamental than the other? Do I have reason to bake a pie because I have reason to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. added 2016-04-10
    Sofia Jeppsson (forthcoming). Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-16.
    It has been argued that in a deterministic universe, no one has any reason to do anything. Since we ought to do what we have most reason to do, no one ought to do anything either. Firstly, it is argued that an agent cannot have reason to do anything unless she can do otherwise; secondly, that the relevant ‘can’ is incompatibilist. In this paper, I argue that even if the first step of the argument for reason incompatibilism succeeds, the second (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. added 2016-04-10
    Yishai Cohen (forthcoming). Fischer's Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Argument. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    According to the Dilemma Defense, it is question-begging against the incompatibilist defender of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) to assume that the agent in a deterministic Frankfurt-style case (FSC) cannot do otherwise in light of causal determinism, but is nevertheless morally responsible. As a result, Fischer (Philos Rev 119:315–336, 2010; Analysis 73:489–496, 2013) attempts to undermine PAP in a different manner via a deterministic FSC. More specifically, Fischer attempts to show that if causal determinism rules out an agent’s moral (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. added 2016-04-10
    Arto Laitinen (2016). Review of Hegel's Theory of Responsibility by Mark Alznauer. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2016.
  43. added 2016-04-10
    Arto Laitinen (2015). Practices as ‘Actual’ Sources of Goodness of Actions. Philosophy and Public Issues 2015:57-70.
    This is a contribution to a special issue of "Philosophy and Public Issues" focussing on Michael Thompson's Life and Action. I first discuss the nature of actuality, then the distinction between acting on a first-order consideration and a second-order consideration, and the possibly related distinction between expressing a practice and merely simulating it. Then I turn to the topic of varieties of goodness.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. added 2016-04-09
    Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Maximalism and Moral Harmony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Maximalism is the view that an agent is permitted to perform a certain type of action (say, baking) if and only if she is permitted to perform some instance of this type (say, baking a pie), where φ-ing is an instance of ψ-ing if and only if φ-ing entails ψ-ing but not vice versa. Now, the aim of this paper is not to defend maximalism, but to defend a certain account of our options that when combined with maximalism results in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. added 2016-04-08
    Matthew Owen (2015). Physicalism's Epistemological Incompatibility with A Priori Knowledge. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):123-139.
    The aim of the present work is to demonstrate that physicalism and a priori knowledge are epistemologically incompatible. The possibility of a priori knowledge on physicalism will be considered in the light of Edmund Gettier’s insight regarding knowledge. In the end, it becomes apparent that physicalism entails an unavoidable disconnect between a priori beliefs and their justificatory grounds; thus precluding the possibility of a priori knowledge. Consequently, a priori knowledge and physicalism are epistemologically incompatible.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. added 2016-04-07
    Errol Lord (forthcoming). On the Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In this paper I'm interested in the prospects for the Right Reasons theory of creditworthiness. The Right Reasons theory says that what it is for an agent to be creditworthy for X-ing is for that agent to X for the right reasons. The paper has a negative goal and a positive goal. The negative goal is to show that a class of Right Reasons theories are doomed. These theories all have a Conceptualization Condition on acting for the right reasons. Conceptualization (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. added 2016-03-31
    Errol Lord (forthcoming). The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism About Practical Reason. In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Practical and Epistemic.
    Cognitivists about practical reason hold that we can explain why certain wide-scope requirements of practical rationality are true by appealing to certain epistemic requirements. Extant discussions of cognitivism focus solely on two claims. The first is the claim that intentions involve beliefs. The second is that whenever your intentions are incoherent in certain ways, you will be epistemically irrational (given that intentions involve beliefs). Even if the cognitivist successfully defends these claims, she still needs to show that they entail (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. added 2016-03-31
    Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (forthcoming). Hard-Incompatbilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life. In Gregg D. Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press
  49. added 2016-03-31
    Michael Cholbi (2016). The Denial of Moral Dilemmas as a Regulative Ideal. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):268-289.
    The traditional debate about moral dilemmas concerns whether there are circumstances in which an agent is subject to two obligations that cannot both be fulfilled. Realists maintain there are. Irrealists deny this. Here I defend an alternative, methodologically-oriented position wherein the denial of genuine moral dilemmas functions as a regulative ideal for moral deliberation and practice. That is, moral inquiry and deliberation operate on the implicit assumption that there are no genuine moral dilemmas. This view is superior to both realism (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. added 2016-03-31
    Johan Brännmark, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 79