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Philosophy of Action

Edited by Constantine Sandis (Oxford Brookes University)
Assistant editor: István Zárdai (University of Pécs, Oxford Brookes University, University of Hertfordshire)
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  1. added 2016-02-07
    Marieke M. J. W. van Rooij, Luis H. Favela, MaryLauren Malone & Michael J. Richardson (2013). Modeling the Dynamics of Risky Choice. Ecological Psychology 25:293-303.
    Individuals make decisions under uncertainty every day. Decisions are based on in- complete information concerning the potential outcome or the predicted likelihood with which events occur. In addition, individuals’ choices often deviate from the rational or mathematically objective solution. Accordingly, the dynamics of human decision making are difficult to capture using conventional, linear mathematical models. Here, we present data from a 2-choice task with variable risk between sure loss and risky loss to illustrate how a simple nonlinear dynamical system can (...)
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  2. added 2016-02-07
    Marieke M. J. W. van Rooij, Luis H. Favela, MaryLauren Malone & Michael J. Richardson (2013). A Dynamical Model of Risky Choice. Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 35:1510-1515.
    Individuals make decisions under uncertainty every day based on incomplete information concerning the potential outcome of the choice or chance levels. The choices individuals make often deviate from the rational or mathematically objective solution. Accordingly, the dynamics of human decision-making are difficult to capture using conventional, linear mathematical models. Here, we present data from a two-choice task with variable risk between sure loss and risky loss to illustrate how a simple nonlinear dynamical system can be employed to capture the dynamics (...)
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  3. added 2016-02-07
    Gary Hatfield (2005). Force and Mind–Body Interaction. In Juan Jose Saldana (ed.), Science and Cultural Diversity: Proceedings of the XXIst International Congress of the History of Science. Autonomous National University of Mexico 3074-3089.
    This article calls into question the notion that seventeenth-century authors such as Descartes and Leibniz straightforwardly conceived the mind as something "outside" nature. Descartes indeed did regard matter as distinct from mind, but the question then remains as to whether he equated the natural world, and the world of laws of nature, with the material world. Similarly, Leibniz distinguished a kingdom of final causes (pertaining to souls) and a kingdom of efficient causes (pertaining to bodies and motions), but the question (...)
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  4. added 2016-02-04
    Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way (forthcoming). What is Good Reasoning? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    What makes the difference between good and bad reasoning? In this paper we defend a novel account of good reasoning - both theoretical and practical - according to which it preserves fittingness or correctness: good reasoning is reasoning which is such as to take you from fitting attitudes to further fitting attitudes, other things equal. This account, we argue, is preferable to two others that feature in the recent literature. The first, which has been made prominent by John Broome, holds (...)
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  5. added 2016-02-04
    Yitzhak Y. Melamed (forthcoming). The Causes of Our Belief in Free Will: Spinoza on Necessary, ‘Innate,’ yet False Cognition. In Spinoza’s Ethics: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press
    This chapter will discuss Spinoza’s critique of free will, though our brief study of this topic in the first part of the chapter will aim primarily at preparing us to address the main topic of the chapter, which is Spinoza’s explanation of the reasons which force us to believe in free will. At times, Spinoza seems to come very close to asserting the paradoxical claim that we are not free to avoid belief in free will. In the second part of (...)
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  6. added 2016-02-04
    Simon Kittle (2015). Free Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Dissertation, University of Sheffield
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  7. added 2016-02-01
    Benjamin Kiesewetter (forthcoming). How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence. In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press
    In this paper, I develop a theory of how claims about an agent’s normative reasons are sensitive to the epistemic circumstances of this agent, which preserves the plausible ideas that reasons are facts and that reasons can be discovered in deliberation and disclosed in advice. I argue that a plausible theory of this kind must take into account the difference between synchronic and diachronic reasons, i.e. reasons for acting immediately and reasons for acting at some later point in time. I (...)
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  8. added 2016-02-01
    Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette (2015). Recensement: Hyman - Action, Knowledge and Will. [REVIEW] Philosophiques 42 (2):435-440.
    Ce compte-rendu résume les quatre dimensions de la philosophie de l’action défendue dans Action, Knowledge and Will (Hyman 2015) : physique, éthique, psychologique et intellectuel. Cela dit, les deux contributions principales du livre recensé relèvent de liens entre les différentes dimensions de l’action. Il s’agit d’une distinction et d’une connexion. Premièrement, Hyman croit qu’il faut distinguer la dimension éthique et la dimension physique de l’action. Plus précisément, il pense que le concept de volonté (voluntariness) et le concept de volontaire doivent (...)
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  9. added 2016-02-01
    Maria Alvares (2013). Explaining Actions and Explaining Bodily Movements. In G. D’Oro, A. Laitinen & C. Sandis (eds.), Reasons and Causes. Palgrave Macmillan 141-159.
  10. added 2016-02-01
    Maria Alvarez (2013). Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. In Kinds of Reasons, Maria Alvarez offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. Her account builds on some important recent work in the (...)
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  11. added 2016-01-29
    Fritz J. McDonald (2016). Beyond Objectivism and Subjectivism. In Piotr Makowski, Mateusz Bonecki & Krzysztof Nowak-Posadzy (eds.), Praxiology and the Reasons for Action. Transaction Publishers
    Subjectivism about reasons is the view that a person has a reason to perform act A if she has some motivation to do A, or would have motivation to do A in certain circumstances. In On What Matters, Derek Parfit presents a series of arguments against subjectivism about reasons. In Parfit’s view, if subjectivism were true, nothing would actually matter. Parfit contends that there are only two positions regarding reasons: objectivism and subjectivism. I will argue for an inclusive position on (...)
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  12. added 2016-01-27
    Caroline Arruda (forthcoming). Review Essay: Chant, Sara Rachel, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer, Editors. From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 240. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
    I summarize and evaluate the aims of the collection From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer in the context of the on-going debate about collective intentionality and group agency. I then consider the individual essays contained therein, both from the perspective of how they advance the collection’s goals and the coherence of their individual arguments.
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  13. added 2016-01-26
    Roman Altshuler (forthcoming). Character, Will, and Agency. In Jonathan Webber & Alberto Masala (eds.), From Personality to Virtue: Essays on the Philosophy of Character. Oxford University Press 62-80.
    Character and the will are rarely discussed together. At most, philosophers working on the one mention the other in an eliminativist vein—if character is represented as something chosen, for example, it can be chalked up to the work of the will; if the will consists merely of a certain arrangement of mental states, it can be seen as little more than a manifestation of character. This mutual neglect appears perfectly justified. If both character and will are determinants of action, to (...)
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  14. added 2016-01-26
    Brad Armendt (1988). Conditional Preference and Causal Expected Utility. In William Harper & Brian Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics. Kluwer Academic Publishers 3-24.
    Sequel to Armendt 1986, ‘A Foundation for Causal Decision Theory.’ The representation theorem for causal decision theory is slightly revised, with the addition of a new restriction on lotteries and a new axiom (A7). The discussion gives some emphasis to the way in which appropriate K-partitions are characterized by relations found among the agent’s conditional preferences. The intended interpretation of conditional preference is one that embodies a sensitivity to the agent’s causal beliefs.
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  15. added 2016-01-22
    Jie Gao (forthcoming). Rational Action Without Knowledge (and Vice Versa). Synthese.
    It has been argued recently that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. This norm can be formulated as a bi-conditional: it is appropriate to treat p as a reason for acting if and only if you know that p. Other proposals replace knowledge with warranted or justified belief. This paper gives counter-examples of both directions of any such bi-conditional. To the left-to-right direction: scientists can appropriately treat as reasons for action propositions of a theory they believe to be false (...)
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  16. added 2016-01-22
    Benjamin Kiesewetter (forthcoming). You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper I present an argument for the claim that you ought to do something only if you may believe that you ought to do it. More exactly, I defend the following principle about normative reasons: An agent A has decisive reason to φ only if she also has sufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason to φ. I argue that this principle follows from the plausible assumption that it must be possible for an agent to respond (...)
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  17. added 2016-01-20
    Mathieu Doucet (forthcoming). What is the Link Between Regret and Weakness of Will? Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    This paper argues (a) that most contemporary accounts of weakness of will either implicitly or explicitly assume that regret is a typical or even necessary element of standard cases of weakness of will and (b) that this assumption is mistaken. I draw on empirical and philosophical work on self-assessment to show that regret need not accompany typical weak-willed behavior, and that we should therefore revise the dominant account of the difference between weakness of will and (mere) changes of mind.
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  18. added 2016-01-20
    Toni Kannisto (forthcoming). Freedom as a Kind of Causality. In Violetta L. Waibel & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Akten des 12. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses “Natur und Freiheit” in Wien vom 21.–25. September 2015.
    Kant’s view that freedom is a “kind of causality” seems to conflict with his claim that the categories of the understanding – including causality – can only be applied objectively to sensible phaenomena, never to supersensible noumena, as freedom is only possible for the latter. I argue that only Kant’s theory of symbolic presentation, according to which the category of cause is applied merely analogically to freedom, can dispel this threatening inconsistency. Unlike it is commonly thought, one cannot here (...)
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  19. added 2016-01-18
    Greg Janzen (forthcoming). 'Brain-Malfunction' Cases and the Dispositionalist Reply to Frankfurt's Attack on PAP. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    Harry Frankfurt has famously argued against the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) by presenting a case in which, apparently, a person is morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. A number of commentators have proposed dispositionalist responses to Frankfurt, arguing that he has not produced a counterexample to PAP because, contrary to appearances, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present but is a disposition that has been ‘masked’ or ‘finked’ by the (...)
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  20. added 2016-01-18
    Abraham Roth (2015). Practical Intersubjectivity and Normative Guidance. Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):39-48.
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  21. added 2016-01-17
    Iskra Fileva & Jon Tresan (2015). Will Retributivism Die and Will Neuroscience Kill It? Cognitive Systems Research 34:54-70.
    In a widely read essay, “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,” Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that the advance of neuroscience will result in the widespread rejection of free will, and with it – of retributivism. They go on to propose that consequentialist reforms are in order, and they predict such reforms will take place. We agree that retributivism should be rejected, and we too are optimistic that rejected it will be. But we don’t think that such (...)
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  22. added 2016-01-16
    Marc-Kevin Daoust (2015). Le désir dans l’approche contractualiste hobbesienne. In Daoust Marc-Kevin (ed.), Le désir et la philosophie. Les Cahiers D'Ithaque 97-109.
    Ce bref commentaire a trois objectifs. La première section vise à présenter au lecteur la philosophie matérialiste et atomiste de Hobbes. Dans la seconde section, nous exposons le rôle des désirs dans l’escalade du conflit entre les agents dans l’état de nature. Au terme de cette analyse, le lecteur disposera de quelques clés interprétatives pour aborder les chapitres VI et XIII du Léviathan.
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  23. added 2016-01-15
    Sara Bernstein & Jessica Wilson (forthcoming). Free Will and Mental Quausation. Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    Free will, if such there be, involves free choosing: the ability to mentally choose an outcome, where the outcome is 'free' in being, in some substantive sense, up to the agent of the choice. As such, it is clear that the questions of how to understand free will and mental causation are connected, for events of seemingly free choosing are mental events that appear to be efficacious vis-a-vis other mental events as well as physical events. Nonetheless, the (...)
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  24. added 2016-01-14
    Julien Deonna, Christine Clavien & Ivo Wallimann-Helmer, Affective Intentionality and Practical Rationality.
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  25. added 2016-01-13
    Brad Armendt (2005). Frank Plumpton Ramsey. In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge 671-681.
    On the work of Frank Ramsey, emphasizing topics most relevant to philosophy of science.
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  26. added 2016-01-12
    Craig K. Agule (2016). Resisting Tracing's Siren Song. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1):1-24.
    Drunk drivers and other culpably incapacitated wrongdoers are often taken to pose a problem for reasons-responsiveness accounts of moral responsibility. These accounts predicate moral responsibility upon an agent having the capacities to perceive and act upon moral reasons, and the culpably incapacitated wrongdoers lack exactly those capacities at the time of their wrongdoing. Many reasons-responsiveness advocates thus expand their account of responsibility to include a tracing condition: The culpably incapacitated wrongdoer is blameworthy despite his incapacitation precisely because he is responsible (...)
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  27. added 2016-01-11
    Godehard Brüntrup, Was uns wirklich bewegt - Gedanken zur Philosophie der Motivation.
    Précis of the overall research conveyed by the Chair for Philosophy and Motivation at Munich School of Philosophy.
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  28. added 2016-01-11
    Godehard Brüntrup (2012). Motivation und Verwirklichung des autonomen Selbst. In Godehard Brüntrup & Maria Schwartz (eds.), Warum wir handeln - Philosophie der Motivation. Kohlhammer 2012.
    Dieser Text will versuchen, Philosophie und psychologische Motivationsforschung wieder miteinander ins Gespräch zu bringen. Innerhalb der Philosophie herrscht bis heute oft eine sehr vereinfachte Auffassung der Motivation vor. Vor allem die Humesche Konzeption dominiert (vgl. Smith 2010), nach der Motivation als Zusammenhang von intrinsischen Wünschen und Zweck-Mittel-Überzeugungen verstanden wird. Ein motivierter Mensch hat also das Bedürfnis, das die Welt auf eine bestimmte Art verändert werde und sein Handeln genau in dieser Veränderung resultieren kann. Das ist eine sehr verkürzte Auffassung, wenn (...)
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  29. added 2016-01-11
    Godehard Brüntrup & Ruben Schneider (2011). How Molinists Can Have Their Cake and Eat It Too. In Christian Kanzian Kanzian, Winfried Löffler & Josef Quitterer (eds.), The Ways Things Are: Studies in Ontology. Ontos 221-240.
    Paper on divine foreknowledge and human freedom.
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  30. added 2016-01-11
    Godehard Brüntrup (2008). Selbstbestimmung und Gehirn. Eine Rede über die Freiheit an die Gebildeten unter ihren Leugnern. Glauben Und Denken 21:33-55.
    Article on the defense of libertarian freedom.
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  31. added 2016-01-11
    Godehard Brüntrup (2007). Das moralisch Böse im Spannungsfeld zwischen menschlicher und göttlicher Freiheit - ein kurzer Blick in die aktuelle Metaphysik. Zur Debatte 7:11-12.
    A critical evaluation of Plantinga's Free Will Defense.
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  32. added 2016-01-11
    Godehard Brüntrup (2006). Selbstbestimmung und Gehirn. Eine Rede über die Freiheit an die Gebildeten unter ihren Leugnern. Munich School of Philosophy - Annual Report 2006:4-21.
    Article on the debate about libertarian freedom.
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  33. added 2016-01-11
    Godehard Brüntrup (2000). Der metaphysische Begriff der Willensfreiheit und das Transferprinzip des Keine-Wahl-Habens. In Dirk Greiman & Constanze Peres (eds.), Wahrheit - Sein - Struktur. Auseinandersetzungen mit Metaphysik. Georg Olms 102-120.
    Article on the problem of free will and determinism. A defense of the so-called "consequence argument" arguing that free will and determinism are incompatible.
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  34. added 2016-01-06
    Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). Checking the Neighborhood: A Reply to DiPaolo & Behrends on Promotion. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    In previous work I argued that purely probabilistic accounts of what it takes to promote a desire are mistaken. This is because, I argued, there are desires that it is possible to promote but impossible to probabilistically promote. In a recent article critical of my account, Joshua DiPaolo and Jeffrey Behrends articulate a methodological principle -- Check the Neighborhood -- and claim that respecting this principle rescues pure probabilism from my argument. In this reply, I accept the methodological principle and (...)
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  35. added 2016-01-04
    Danny Frederick, Decisions, Facts, Fictions and a Spurious Miners Paradox.
    Kolodny and MacFarlane claim to identify a deontic paradox in a case of some threatened miners. They propose to avoid the paradox by rejecting modus ponens. Other authors concur that a remedy requires rejection of classical logical principles. Graham considers a structurally similar case concerning a doctor, but he thinks that the appearance of paradox arises out of a confusion between acting rightly and not being blameworthy. I explain why Graham’s solution fails. I show that an assault on classical logical (...)
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  36. added 2016-01-04
    Todd Jones (2015). Our Conception of Competitiveness: Unified but Useless? Our Conception of Competitiveness: Unified but Useless? 42 (3):365-378.
    ‘Competitive’ is one of the most commonly and confidently used words in sports. I argue that, while this term does have necessary and sufficient conditions, it is still a fairly useless one. Knowing someone is competitive does not tell one about the type of desire to win, the type of quantity of that desire, and the precise way in which one wants to be better. We also don’t know who a person feels a desire to beat, when winning actually becomes (...)
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  37. added 2016-01-04
    Peter A. Sutton (2015). "Weeping Angels and Many Worlds". In Courtland Lewis Paula Smithka (ed.), More Doctor Who and Philosophy. Open Court Press 69-76.
    The Doctor, like many time-travelers, often finds himself in the midst of a causal loop. Events in the future cause events in the past, which in turn cause the future events. There is a worry that a person in this situation could never have true libertarian freedom: facts about the past entail their future actions, so they couldn't do otherwise than they in fact do. -/- In this paper, I argue that there are logically coherent (though perhaps unlikely!) ways of (...)
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  38. added 2016-01-04
    Lorenzo Greco (2011). Claudia Portioli (ed.), Natura e libertà (Perugia: Morlacchi, 2009). [REVIEW] Rivista di Filosofia 102 (2):322-23.
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  39. added 2016-01-02
    Matthew Mandelkern, Ginger Schultheis & David Boylan (2015). I Believe I Can Φ. In Thomas Brochhagen, Floris Roelofsen & Nadine Theiler (eds.), Proceedings of the 20th Amsterdam Colloquium. 256-265.
    We propose a new analysis of ability modals. After briefly criticizing extant approaches, we turn our attention to the venerable but vexed conditional analysis of ability ascriptions. We give an account that builds on the conditional analysis, but avoids its weaknesses by incorporating a layer of quantification over a contextually supplied set of actions.
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  40. added 2015-12-29
    Benj Hellie (forthcoming). Rationalization and the Ross Paradox. In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. Oxford UP
    'Post this letter!' does not entail 'Post this letter or drink up my wine!' (the Ross Paradox) because one can be in a state with the content of the former without being in a state with the content of the latter; in turn, because the latter can rationalize drinking up my wine but the former cannot; in turn, because practical rationalization flows toward one's present situation, in contrast with the flow of theoretical rationalization from one's present situation. Formally, this is (...)
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  41. added 2015-12-29
    Brendan Hogan (2015). Imagination, Imaginaries, and Emancipation. Pragmatism Today 6 (2):48-61.
    This reflection on the topic of emancipation stems from an ongoing project in tune with a wider development in pragmatic philosophy. Specifically, the project aims to piece together some of the consequences of pragmatism’s reconstruction of the tradition of philosophical inquiry, from the angle of human imagination. More recently this project has taken a different direction, in light of our critical situation under intensifying anti-democratic forces in the US, but also in many parliamentary democracies. Emancipation from forces that undermine democratic (...)
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  42. added 2015-12-26
    John Brunero (2013). Rational Akrasia. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):546-566.
    It is commonly thought that one is irrationally akratic when one believes one ought to F but does not intend to F. However, some philosophers, following Robert Audi, have argued that it is sometimes rational to have this combination of attitudes. I here consider the question of whether rational akrasia is possible. I argue that those arguments for the possibility of rational akrasia advanced by Audi and others do not succeed. Specifically, I argue that cases in which an akratic agent (...)
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  43. added 2015-12-21
    Matthew Noah Smith (forthcoming). One Dogma of Philosophy of Action. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    An oft-rehearsed objection to the claim that an intention can give one reasons is that if an intention could give us reasons that would allow an agent to bootstrap herself into having a reason where she previously lacked one. Such bootstrapping is utterly implausible. So, intentions to φ cannot be reasons to φ. Call this the bootstrapping objection against intentions being reasons. This essay considers four separate interpretations of this argument and finds they all fail to establish that non-akratic, nonevil, (...)
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  44. added 2015-12-21
    Tom Dougherty (2015). Future-Bias and Practical Reason. Philosophers' Imprint 15 (30).
    Nearly everyone prefers pain to be in the past rather than the future. This seems like a rationally permissible preference. But I argue that appearances are misleading, and that future-biased preferences are in fact irrational. My argument appeals to trade-offs between hedonic experiences and other goods. I argue that we are rationally required to adopt an exchange rate between a hedonic experience and another type of good that stays fixed, regardless of whether the hedonic experience is in the past or (...)
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  45. added 2015-12-21
    R. Jay Wallace (2006). Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Normativity and the Will collects fourteen important papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working in these areas. The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Themes that are addressed include reason, desire, and the will; responsibility, identification, and emotion; and the relation between morality and other normative domains. Wallace's treatments of these topics are at (...)
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  46. added 2015-12-18
    Sven Nyholm (forthcoming). Do We Always Act on Maxims? Kantian Review.
    It is commonly thought that on Kant’s view of action, ‘everyone always acts on maxims.’ Call this the ‘descriptive reading.’ This reading faces two important problems: first, the idea that people always act on maxims offends against common sense: it clashes with our ordinary ideas about human agency. Second, there are various passages in which Kant says that it is ‘rare’ and ‘admirable’ to firmly adhere to a set of basic principles that we adopt for ourselves. This article offers an (...)
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  47. added 2015-12-16
    Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson (2015). Decision Theory. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  48. added 2015-12-15
    Thadeu Weber & Ítalo da Silva Alves (2014). Justiça e Punição na Filosofia do Direito de Hegel. Direitos Fundamentais and Justiça 28:153-164.
    In this paper, we attempt to reconstruct Hegel’s theory of punishment through its development on the levels of abstract right and civil society, incorporating to the latter the concepts of contingency and arbitrariness. We demonstrate how the unjust is anulled and how right is restored under a retributive foundation of the penalty. We approach the issue of the death penalty and conclude that a retibutivist argument is insufficient to serve as its foundation.
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  49. added 2015-12-14
    Martina Sauer, Bildkraft und Tatkraft: Zum Verhältnis von ästhetischer Erfahrung und Technik im Anschluss an Cassirer, Langer und Krois. Kongress-Akten, Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Ästhetik, Bd. 3.
    The ability to form „images“ of our experiences with the world (imaging effect) and to adjust our drive and determination in accordance with those images (action effect) is what characterises men, as stipulated by Cassirer and subsequently confirmed by Langer and Krois. Special techniques are required to communicate to others the images of life and how we interpret them. The art as a technique does this masterly by presenting us the views of others on their experiences and wishes through aesthetic (...)
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  50. added 2015-12-10
    Peter Morosoff, Ron Rudnicki, Jason Bryant, Robert Farrell & Barry Smith (2015). Joint Doctrine Ontology: A Benchmark for Military Information Systems Interoperability. In Semantic Technology for Intelligence, Defense and Security (STIDS). CEUR Vol. 1325 2-9.
    When the U.S. conducts warfare, elements of a force are drawn from different Services and work together as a single team to accomplish an assigned mission on the basis of joint doctrine. To achieve such unified action, it is necessary that specific Service doctrines be both consistent with and subservient to joint doctrine. But there are two further requirements that flow from the ways in which unified action increasingly involves not only live forces but also automated systems. First, the information (...)
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