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Philosophy of Action

Edited by Constantine Sandis (University of Hertfordshire)
Assistant editor: István Zárdai (University of Pécs, Oxford Brookes University, University of Hertfordshire)
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  1. added 2016-09-23
    Nadine Elzein (forthcoming). Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Acta Analytica:1-23.
    Proponents of modern Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples generally accept that we cannot construct successful FSCs in which there are no alternative possibilities present. But they maintain that we can construct successful FSCs in which there are no morally significant alternatives present and that such examples succeed in breaking any conceptual link between alternative possibilities and free will. I argue that it is not possible to construct an FSC that succeeds even in this weaker sense. In cases where any alternatives are clearly insignificant, (...)
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  2. added 2016-09-23
    Robert Kane (forthcoming). Free Will, Bound and Unbound: Reflections on Shaun Nichols’ Bound. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    Nichols’ Bound presents interesting new angles on traditional debates about free will and moral responsibility, relating them to the latest empirical research in psychology, social sciences and experimental philosophy. In experimental philosophy, he cites numerous recent studies showing that there are strong incompatibilist strands in folk intuitions about free will and responsibility, taking issue with other recent studies claiming that folk intuitions are predominantly compatibilist. But he also argues that incompatibilist folk intuitions are based on faulty reasoning and cannot be (...)
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  3. added 2016-09-23
    Victor Counted (2016). Making Sense of Place Attachment: Towards a Holistic Understanding of People-Place Relationships and Experiences. Environment, Space, Place 8 (1):7-32.
    The article is an attempt to make sense of the different interdisciplinary perspectives associated with people’s attachment to places with a view to construct a holistic template for understanding people-place relationships and experiences. The author took note of the theoretical contributions of Jorgensen & Stedman, Scannell & Gifford, and Seamon to construct an integrative framework for understanding emotional links to places and people’s perception and experience of places. This was done with the intention of illuminating the meaning of place and (...)
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  4. added 2016-09-23
    Antonio Lieto & Fabiana Vernero (2014). Influencing the Others’ Minds: An Experimental Evaluation of the Use and Efficacy of Fallacious-Reducible Arguments in Web and Mobile Technologies. PsychNology Journa 12 (3):87-105.
    The research in Human Computer Interaction (HCI) has nowadays extended its attention to the study of persuasive technologies. Following this line of research, in this paper we focus on websites and mobile applications in the e-commerce domain. In particular, we take them as an evident example of persuasive technologies. Starting from the hypothesis that there is a strong connection between logical fallacies, i.e., forms of reasoning which are logically invalid but psychologically persuasive, and some common persuasion strategies adopted within these (...)
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  5. added 2016-09-23
    Jenann Ismael, Causation, Free Will, and Naturalism.
    This chapter addresses the worry that the existence of causal antecedents to your choices means that you are causally compelled to act as you do. It begins with the folk notion of cause, leads the reader through recent developments in the scientific understanding of causal concepts, and argues that those developments undermine the threat from causal antecedents. The discussion is then used as a model for a kind of naturalistic metaphysics that takes its lead from science, letting everyday concepts be (...)
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  6. added 2016-09-23
    George Wilson & Sam Shpall, Action. SEP.
    http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action/.
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  7. added 2016-09-23
    G. De Grandis (2007). Moral Actors and Political Spectators: On Some Virtues and Vices of Rawls's Liberalism. Journal of International Political Theory 3 (2):217-235.
    The paper defends the theoretical strength and consistency of Rawls’s constructivism, showing its ability to articulate and convincingly weave together several key ethical ideas; yet it questions the political relevance of this admirable normative architecture. After having illustrated Rawls’s conception of moral agency and practical reason, the paper tackles two criticisms raised by Scheffler. First the allegation of naturalism based on Rawls’s disdain of common sense ideas on desert is rebutted. It is then shown that, contrary to Scheffler’s contention, Rawls (...)
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  8. added 2016-09-23
    Ted Honderich (2002). How Free Are You?: The Determinism Problem. Oxford University Press Uk.
    'Review from previous edition 'the arguments for free will and determinism are lucidly laid out... A primer that is serviceable, enjoyable and rather mischievous.'' - The Observer 1993 ''refreshing, provocative and original work'' - Times Literary Supplement 1994 ''a readable and engaging introduction to the determinism controversy... Honderich's book is well worth reading... the view he presents is provocative and he has written a very challenging and enlightening introduction to 'the determinism problem' that should be widely read.'' - Times Educational (...)
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  9. added 2016-09-23
    John Martin Fischer & Paul Hoffman (1994). Alternative Possibilities: A Reply To Lamb. Journal of Philosophy 91 (6):321-326.
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  10. added 2016-09-23
    Harry G. Frankfurt (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
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  11. added 2016-09-23
    Philippa Foot (1957). Free Will Involving Determinism. Philosophical Review 66 (4):439.
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  12. added 2016-09-22
    Adam Bales (forthcoming). Richness and Rationality: Causal Decision Theory and the WAR Argument. Synthese:1-9.
    Causal decision theory is one of our most prominent theories of rational choice and the “why ain’cha rich?” argument is one of the most prominent objections to this theory. According to WAR, CDT is not an adequate theory of rational choice because it leads agents to make decisions that foreseeably leave them less well off than agents that decide in some other manner. Some philosophers take WAR to decisively undermine CDT. On the other hand, others take WAR to fail to (...)
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  13. added 2016-09-20
    C. D. Broad (2016). Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism: An Inaugural Lecture. Cambridge University Press.
    Originally published in 1934, this book presents the content of an inaugural lecture delivered by the British philosopher Charles Dunbar Broad, upon taking up the position of Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge University. The text presents a discussion of the relationship between determinism, indeterminism and libertarianism. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the writings of Broad and the history of philosophy.
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  14. added 2016-09-20
    Penelope Mackie, Mumford and Anjum on Incompatibilism, Powers and Determinism.
    Mumford and Anjum present a new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism. Although their argument depends on the assumption that free will is, or is the exercise of, a causal power, it does not appeal to any special features of this power. Their new argument does, however, depend upon a general thesis of the incompatibility of causal powers with causal determinism. I argue that Mumford and Anjum have provided no justification for this general thesis. As a (...)
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  15. added 2016-09-20
    Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, Florian Cova, Maxime Bertoux & Bruno Dubois, Judgments About Moral Responsibility and Determinism in Patients with Behavioural Variant of Frontotemporal Dementia: Still Compatibilists.
    Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others suggest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers, Nichols and Knobe have advanced a 'performance error model' according to which people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, we investigated (...)
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  16. added 2016-09-20
    Carlos J. Moya (2007). Moral Responsibility Without Alternative Possibilities? Journal of Philosophy 104 (9):475-486.
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  17. added 2016-09-20
    H. W. S. & C. D. Broad (1934). Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism. Journal of Philosophy 31 (12):330.
  18. added 2016-09-19
    Florian Cova & Hichem Naar (forthcoming). Do Intuitions About Frankfurt-Style Cases Rest on an Internalist Prejudice? Philosophical Explorations:1-16.
    “Frankfurt-style cases” (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy has recently argued that FSCs fail because (i) our intuitions about cases involving counterfactual interveners (CIs) are inconsistent (we accept that the mere presence of CIs is enough to make us gain but not lose responsibility-underwriting capacities), and (ii) this inconsistency is best explained by (...)
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  19. added 2016-09-19
    Daniel J. Miller (forthcoming). Reasonable Foreseeability and Blameless Ignorance. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    This paper draws attention to a fundamental problem for a version of the tracing strategy defended by a number of theorists in the current literature :295–313, 2004; Fischer and Tognazzini in Noûs, 43:531–556, 2009). I argue that versions of the tracing strategy that require reasonable foreseeability are in tension with the view that blameless ignorance excuses. A stronger version of the tracing strategy is consistent with the view that blameless ignorance excuses and is therefore preferable for those tracing theorists who (...)
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  20. added 2016-09-19
    Markus E. Schlosser (forthcoming). Reasons, Causes, and Chance-Incompatibilism. Philosophia.
    Libertarianism appears to be incoherent, because free will appears to be incompatible with indeterminism. In support of this claim, van Inwagen offered an argument that is now known as the "rollback argument". In a recent reply, Lara Buchak has argued that the underlying thought experiment fails to support the first of two key premises. On her view, this points to an unexplored alternative in the free will debate, which she calls "chance-incompatibilism". I will argue that the rollback thought experiment does (...)
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  21. added 2016-09-19
    Neal A. Tognazzini (forthcoming). Free Will and Miracles. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    The Consequence Argument is sound only if no one has a choice about the laws of nature, and one prominent compatibilist reply to the argument – championed by David Lewis (1981) – begins by claiming that there is a sense in which we do have such a choice, and a sense in which we don’t. Lewis then insists that the sense in which we do have such a choice is the only sense required by compatibilism. Peter van Inwagen (2004) has (...)
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  22. added 2016-09-19
    Brian Embry (2016). Descartes on Free Will and Moral Possibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):n/a-n/a.
    An early modern scholastic conception of moral possibility helps make sense of Descartes's own perplexing use of that concept and solves the exegetical puzzles surrounding Descartes's conflicting remarks about free will.
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  23. added 2016-09-14
    Zsolt Ziegler, A Relational Theory of Moral Responsibility.
    This paper introduces a new theory of moral responsibility that does not rely on any concept of human control. Since an understanding of determinism shapes the possible set of views one can take regarding control, and there is no account of control that could be held simultaneously by both compatibilists and libertarians, the “relational theory of responsibility” is meant to create a common ground between compatibilism and libertarianism which are held to be mutually exclusive. Since the relational account of responsibility (...)
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  24. added 2016-09-13
    Matthew Kopec & Seumas Miller, Shared Intention Is Not Joint Commitment.
    Margaret Gilbert defends the view that, roughly speaking, agents will share the intention to perform an action if and only if they jointly commit to performing that action. In this essay, we use counterexamples to show that joint commitment is neither necessary nor sufficient for shared intention.
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  25. added 2016-09-12
    Jordan Howard Sobel (1994). Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice. Cambridge University Press.
    J. Howard Sobel has long been recognized as an important figure in philosophical discussions of rational decision. He has done much to help formulate the concept of causal decision theory. In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Newcomb's Problem and The Prisoner's Dilemma are discussed, and Allais-type puzzles are viewed from the perspective of (...)
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  26. added 2016-09-11
    Mark Alfano, The Topology of Communities of Trust.
    Hobbes emphasized that the state of nature is a state of war because it is characterized by fundamental and generalized distrust. Exiting the state of nature and the conflicts it inevitably fosters is therefore a matter of establishing trust. Extant discussions of trust in the philosophical literature, however, focus either on isolated dyads of trusting individuals or trust in large, faceless institutions. In this paper, I fill the gap between these extremes by analyzing what I call the topology of communities (...)
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  27. added 2016-09-09
    Ulas Kaplan (2016). Moral Motivation as a Dynamic Developmental Process: Toward an Integrative Synthesis. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 46 (3).
    The real-life complexity of moral motivation can be examined and explained by reintegrating time and development into moral inquiry. This article is one of the possible integrative steps in this direction. A dynamic developmental conception of moral motivation can be a useful bridge toward such integration. A comprehensive view of moral motivation is presented. Moral motivation is reconceptualized as a developmental process of self-organization and self-regulation out of which moral judgment and action emerge through the interplay of dynamically intertwined cognitive (...)
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  28. added 2016-09-09
    Chris Tucker (2016). Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):127-143.
    In replying to certain objections to the existence of God, Robert Adams, Bruce Langtry, and Peter van Inwagen assume that God can appropriately choose a suboptimal world, a world less good than some other world God could have chosen. A number of philosophers, such as Michael Slote and Klaas Kraay, claim that these theistic replies are therefore committed to the claim that satisficing can be appropriate. Kraay argues that this commitment is a significant liability. I argue, however, that the relevant (...)
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  29. added 2016-09-09
    Jennifer Nagel (2014). II—Jennifer Nagel: Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):219-241.
    Action is not always guided by conscious deliberation; in many circumstances, we act intuitively rather than reflectively. Tamar Gendler contends that because intuitively guided action can lead us away from our reflective commitments, it limits the power of knowledge to guide action. While I agree that intuition can diverge from reflection, I argue that this is not always a bad thing, and that it does not constitute a restriction on the power of knowledge. After explaining my view of the contrast (...)
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  30. added 2016-09-09
    Cynthia S. W. Crysdale (2007). Risk, Gratitude, and Love: Grounding Authentic Moral Deliberation. In David S. Liptay & John J. Liptay (eds.), The Importance of Insight: Essays in Honour of Michael Vertin. University of Toronto Press 151-171.
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  31. added 2016-09-09
    Hendrik Lorenz (2006). Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Hendrik Lorenz presents a comprehensive study of Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of non-rational desire. They see this as something that humans share with animals, and which aims primarily at the pleasures of food, drink, and sex. Lorenz explores the cognitive resources that both philosophers make available for the explanation of such desires, and what they take rationality to add to the motivational structure of human beings. In doing so, he exposes a remarkable degree of continuity between Plato's and Aristotle's thought (...)
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  32. added 2016-09-09
    David Sussman & Daniel Guevara (2002). Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation. Philosophical Review 111 (1):116.
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  33. added 2016-09-09
    Sarah Buss & Elijah Millgram (1999). Practical Induction. Philosophical Review 108 (4):571.
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  34. added 2016-09-09
    Jeffrey Hause & Daniel Westberg (1996). Right Practical Reason. Philosophical Review 105 (2):243.
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  35. added 2016-09-09
    J. David Velleman & Michael E. Bratman (1991). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Philosophical Review 100 (2):277.
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  36. added 2016-09-09
    Marcia L. Homiak & Norman O. Dahl (1986). Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will. Philosophical Review 95 (3):467.
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  37. added 2016-09-09
    David Levin & Rex Martin (1984). Historical Explanation: Re-Enactment and Practical Inference. Philosophical Review 93 (1):118.
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  38. added 2016-09-09
    Alan Ryan & Rex Martin (1980). Historical Explanation. Re-Enactment and Practical Inference. History and Theory 19 (1):93.
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  39. added 2016-09-09
    Stephen P. Schwartz & Stephan Korner (1976). Practical Reason. Philosophical Review 85 (2):236.
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  40. added 2016-09-09
    Charles A. Baylis, Arthur Edward Murphy & A. I. Melden (1967). The Theory of Practical Reason. Philosophical Review 76 (4):511.
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  41. added 2016-09-09
    A. H. Hastorf & A. L. Knutson (1949). Motivation, Perception and Attitude Change. Psychological Review 56 (2):88-94.
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  42. added 2016-09-08
    Allard Tamminga & Hein Duijf (forthcoming). Collective Obligations, Group Plans, and Individual Actions. Economics and Philosophy.
    If group members aim to fulfill a collective obligation, they must act in such a way that the composition of their individual actions amounts to a group action that fulfills the collective obligation. We study a strong sense of joint action in which the members of a group design and then publicly adopt a group plan that coordinates the individual actions of the group members. We characterize the conditions under which a group plan successfully coordinates the group members' individual actions, (...)
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  43. added 2016-09-08
    Olivier Roy, Allard Tamminga & Malte Willer (eds.) (2016). Deontic Logic and Normative Systems. College Publications.
    The biennial DEON conferences are designed to promote interdisciplinary cooperation amongst scholars interested in linking the formal-logical study of normative concepts and normative systems with computer science, artificial intelligence, linguistics, philosophy, organization theory and law. In addition to these general themes, DEON 2016 encouraged a special focus on the topic "Reasons, Argumentation and Justification.".
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  44. added 2016-09-06
    Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch's Analogy. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    In a crucial chapter of his important book "Taking Morality Seriously", David Enoch offers a highly inventive argument for metanormative realism, the view that there are objective irreducibly normative truths. The argument appeals to the idea that irreducibly normative truths are indispensable for deliberation. This, Enoch claims, justifies us in believing in irreducibly normative truths. In making this argument, Enoch draws upon an analogy with the indispensability of other entities for explanation, and the idea that we are justified in believing (...)
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  45. added 2016-09-06
    Florian Cova (forthcoming). Intentional Action and the Frame-of-Mind Argument: New Experimental Challenges to Hindriks. Philosophical Explorations.
    Based on a puzzling pattern in our judgments about intentional action, Knobe (2003) has claimed that these judgments are shaped by our moral judgments and evaluations. However, this claim goes directly against a key conceptual intuition about intentional action – the ‘frame-of-mind condition’, according to which judgments about intentional action are about the agent’s frame-of-mind and not about the moral value of his action. To preserve this intuition, Hindriks (2008, 2014) has proposed an alternate account of the Knobe Effect. According (...)
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  46. added 2016-09-06
    Matthew Silverstein (2016). Teleology and Normativity. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:214-240.
    Constitutivists seek to locate the metaphysical foundations of ethics in nonnormative facts about what is constitutive of agency. For most constitutivists, this involves grounding authoritative norms in the teleological structure of agency. Despite a recent surge in interest, the philosophical move at the heart of this sort of constitutivism remains underdeveloped. Some constitutivists—Foot, Thomson, and Korsgaard (at least in her recent *Self-Constitution*)—adopt a broadly Aristotelian approach. They claim that the functional nature of agency grounds normative judgments about agents in much (...)
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  47. added 2016-09-06
    Matthew Silverstein (2016). Reducing Reasons. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1):1-22.
    Reasons are considerations that figure in sound reasoning. This is considered by many philosophers to be little more than a platitude. I argue that it actually has surprising and far-reaching metanormative implications. The view that reasons are linked to sound reasoning seems platitudinous only because we tend to assume that soundness is a normative property, in which case the view merely relates one normative phenomenon (reasons) to another (soundness). I argue that soundness is also a descriptive phenomenon, one we can (...)
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  48. added 2016-09-06
    Jeremy Byrd (2010). Agnosticism About Moral Responsibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):411-432.
    Traditionally, much of the discussion of free will and moral responsibility has focused on whether an agent can do otherwise if her actions are causally determined. The Direct Argument, however, seeks to show that an agent cannot be morally responsible for causally determined actions independently of whether she could have done otherwise. I examine the three main types of response to the Direct Argument, and I argue that the result is a dialectical stalemate. While others have reached a similar conclusion, (...)
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  49. added 2016-09-05
    Alex Gregory (2016). Normative Reasons as Good Bases. Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.
    In this paper, I defend a new theory of normative reasons called reasons as good bases, according to which a normative reason to φ is something that is a good basis for φing. The idea is that the grounds on which we do things—bases—can be better or worse as things of their kind, and a normative reason—a good reason—is something that is just a good instance of such a ground. After introducing RGB, I clarify what it is to be a (...)
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  50. added 2016-09-05
    Matteo Bianchin & Italo Testa (2015). Introduction. Philosophy and Public Issues – Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche:3-6.
    Introduction to a Forum on Michael's Thompson "Life and Action".
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