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Philosophy of Action

Edited by Constantine Sandis (University of Hertfordshire)
Assistant editor: István Zárdai (University of Pécs, Oxford Brookes University, University of Hertfordshire)
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  1. added 2016-12-08
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). Perspectivism and the Argument From Guidance. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
    Perspectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by your perspective, that is, your epistemic position. Objectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by the facts irrespective of your perspective. This paper explores an influential argument for perspectivism which appeals to the thought that the normative is action guiding. The crucial premise of the argument is that you ought to φ only if you are able to φ for the reasons which determine that you ought (...)
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  2. added 2016-12-08
    Markus E. Schlosser (forthcoming). Reasons, Causes, and Chance-Incompatibilism. Philosophia:1-13.
    Libertarianism appears to be incoherent, because free will appears to be incompatible with indeterminism. In support of this claim, van Inwagen offered an argument that is now known as the “rollback argument”. In a recent reply, Lara Buchak has argued that the underlying thought experiment fails to support the first of two key premises. On her view, this points to an unexplored alternative in the free will debate, which she calls “chance-incompatibilism”. I will argue that the rollback thought experiment does (...)
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  3. added 2016-12-07
    Michele Paolini Paoletti (forthcoming). How I (Freely) Raised My Arm. Downward, Structural, Substance Causation. Mind and Matter.
    Downward causation is causation of lower-level effects by higher-level entities. For example, if I am a higher-level entity with respect to my neurons, I can downwardly cause something involving my neurons. Downward causation is associated with emergence. Within an emergentist framework, downward causation is fundamental, irreducible causation of lower-level effects (at the emergence bases) by emergent entities. In this paper, I shall describe and defend a model of downward causation that is based on substance-structural causation: the Downward, Structural, Substance Causation (...)
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  4. added 2016-12-07
    Jessica Pepp (forthcoming). Assertion, Lying, and Falsely Implicating. In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook ofAssertion. OUP
    There is an intuitive and seemingly significant difference between lying and falsely implicating. This difference has received scrutiny both historically and recently, mostly in the context of the following two questions. First, how should lying be defined so as to distinguish it from falsely implicating? Second, is the difference between lying and falsely implicating really significant, and if so, how and why is it significant? Answers to the first question typically invoke assertion, claiming (roughly) that to lie is to assert (...)
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  5. added 2016-12-05
    Jason Shepard & Aneyn O’Grady (2017). What Kinds of Alternative Possibilities Are Required of the Folk Concept of Choice? Consciousness and Cognition 48:138-148.
    Our concept of choice is integral to the way we understand others and ourselves, especially when considering ourselves as free and responsible agents. Despite the importance of this concept, there has been little empirical work on it. In this paper we report four experiments that provide evidence for two concepts of choice—namely, a concept of choice that is operative in the phrase having a choice and another that is operative in the phrase making a choice. The experiments indicate that the (...)
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  6. added 2016-12-05
    Lemaire (2016). Quand Nos Émotions Sont-Elles Raisonnables? Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141 (2):215-234.
    Nous jugeons les réponses émotionnelles comme plus ou moins raisonnables étant donné leur objet et le contexte. Je soutiens que la légitimité de ces jugements repose sur le caractère raisonnable des désirs ou des dispositions émotionnelles qui expliquent ces réponses émotionnelles. Il est déraisonnable d’être triste de ne pas satisfaire un désir déraisonnable. Mais comment un désir peut-il être déraisonnable ? Je rejette l’idée selon laquelle les désirs seraient raisonnables parce que cohérents. Je suggère que nos désirs et nos dispositions (...)
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  7. added 2016-12-02
    Piotr T. Makowski (forthcoming). Tadeusz Kotarbiński's Action Theory - Reinterpretive Studies. Palgrave Macmillan.
    The book introduces Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s philosophy of action into the mainstream of contemporary action-theoretical debates. Piotr Makowski shows that Kotarbiński–Alfred Tarski’s teacher and one of the most important philosophers of the renowned Lvov-Warsaw school—proposed a groundbreaking, original, and (in at least a few respects) still fresh perspective in action theorizing. The book examines and develops Kotarbiński’s ideas in the context of the most recent discussions in the philosophy of action. The main idea behind Kotarbiński’s action theory—and thus, behind this book—is (...)
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  8. added 2016-12-01
    Jonathan Way (forthcoming). Creditworthiness and Matching Principles. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press
    You are creditworthy for φ-ing only if φ-ing is the right thing to do. Famously though, further conditions are needed too – Kant’s shopkeeper did the right thing, but is not creditworthy for doing so. This case shows that creditworthiness requires that there be a certain kind of explanation of why you did the right thing. The reasons for which you act – your motivating reasons – must meet some further conditions. In this paper, I defend a new account of (...)
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  9. added 2016-12-01
    David Shoemaker (2015). Review of Derk Pereboom's Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:xxx.
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  10. added 2016-11-28
    Ezio Di Nucci (forthcoming). Habits, Priming, Aliefs and the Explanation of Mindless Action. Minds and Machines.
    There is a growing body of evidence on the influences of automatic and unconscious processes on our actions. Here I introduce some representative examples of this growing body of evidence, chosen so as to form a diverse group of related mindless phenomena: habits, skills, priming and nudges (Section 1). I then argue that this evidence challenges traditional belief-desire-based approaches in the philosophy of action (Sections 2 and 3). I further discuss a recently proposed solution to this challenge, Gendler’s Alief, finding (...)
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  11. added 2016-11-27
    Eckhart Arnold (2008). Explaining Altruism. A Simulation-Based Approach and its Limits. Ontos Verlag.
    Employing computer simulations for the study of the evolution of altruism has been popular since Axelrod's book "The Evolution of Cooperation". But have the myriads of simulation studies that followed in Axelrod's footsteps really increased our knowledge about the evolution of altruism or cooperation? This book examines in detail the working mechanisms of simulation based evolutionary explanations of altruism. It shows that the "theoretical insights" that can be derived from simulation studies are often quite arbitrary and of little use for (...)
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  12. added 2016-11-23
    Italo Testa (2016). Dewey’s Social Ontology: A Pragmatist Alternative to Searle’s Approach to Social Reality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua second nature that offers us an account of intentionality, social statuses, institutions, and norms in terms of habituations. Such an account offers us a promising alternative to contemporary intentionalist and deontic approaches to social ontology such as Searle’s. Furthermore, it could be the basis of a social ontology better suited to explain both the maintenance and the transformation of social reality. In the first part I (...)
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  13. added 2016-11-23
    Ben Eggleston (2015). The Number of Preference Orderings: A Recursive Approach. The Mathematical Gazette 99 (544):21-32.
    This article discusses approaches to the problem of the number of preference orderings that can be constructed from a given set of alternatives. After briefly reviewing the prevalent approach to this problem, which involves determining a partitioning of the alternatives and then a permutation of the partitions, this article explains a recursive approach and shows it to have certain advantages over the partitioning one.
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  14. added 2016-11-21
    David K. Chan (2008). After Anscombe. In Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer 141-154.
    In "After Anscombe," I argue that, although Bratman's account of intention "has provided a conceptual tool for many directions of research in philosophy and cognitive psychology," it cannot do the work in ethics that moral philosophers, especially Kantians, use it for. This can be shown by considering the problems in using intention to make a moral distinction in cases of double effect. If so, Bratman's is not the same concept of intention that Anscombe had in mind when she wrote her (...)
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  15. added 2016-11-21
    David K. Chan (2008). Introduction: Moral Psychology Today. In Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer 1-13.
    This introduction by the editor to the essays in Moral Psychology Today describes what philosophy of action is about, followed by brief synopses of each essay in the volume.
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  16. added 2016-11-20
    Brian Hedden (2016). Does MITE Make Right? Decision-Making Under Normative Uncertainty. In Russ Schafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 11. 102-128.
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  17. added 2016-11-18
    Peter Baumann (2016). “Part of That Force That Always Wills the Evil and Always Produces the Good”. On a Devilish Incoherence. S.Ph. Essays and Explorations 1 (2):25-33.
    This paper analyzes and discusses Mephisto's famous remark in Goethe's FAUST. It turns out that he is being incoherent in interesting ways.
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  18. added 2016-11-18
    Matthew McGrath (2016). Defeating Pragmatic Encroachment? Synthese:1-14.
    This paper examines the prospects of a prima facie attractive response to Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic encroachment. The response concedes that if one knows a proposition to be true then that proposition is warranted enough for one to have it as a reason for action. But it denies pragmatic encroachment, insofar as it denies that whether one knows a proposition to be true can vary with the practical stakes, holding fixed strength of warrant. This paper explores two ways (...)
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  19. added 2016-11-18
    Michael R. Starks (2016). Language Games of Philosophy, Psychology, Science and Religion-- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 by Michael Starks 648p (2016). Michael Starks.
    This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and the most important and longest within the last year. Also I have edited them to bring them up to date (2016). All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as (...)
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  20. added 2016-11-17
    Nevin Climenhaga (forthcoming). Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. Therefore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value-bearers, and sustaining and perfecting the value-bearers he has already created. (...)
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  21. added 2016-11-15
    Adina Roskies & Eddy Nahmias (2016). “Local Determination”, Even If We Could Find It, Does Not Challenge Free Will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn. Philosophical Psychology:1-9.
    Marcelo Fischborn discusses the significance of neuroscience for debates about free will. Although he concedes that, to date, Libet-style experiments have failed to threaten “libertarian free will” (free will that requires indeterminism), he argues that, in principle, neuroscience and psychology could do so by supporting local determinism. We argue that, in principle, Libet-style experiments cannot succeed in disproving or even establishing serious doubt about libertarian free will. First, we contend that “local determination”, as Fischborn outlines it, is not a coherent (...)
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  22. added 2016-11-14
    Gregg D. Caruso & Stephen G. Morris (forthcoming). Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance. Erkenntnis:1-19.
    Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense :5–24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144:45–62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom (...)
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  23. added 2016-11-14
    Andrew Youpa (2016). Doing Without Free Will: Spinoza and Contemporary Moral Problems Eds. By Ursula Goldenbaum and Christopher Kluz. Journal of the History of Philosophy 54 (4):676-677.
    Spinoza’s moral philosophy is trending. This is the fourth book written in English in six years devoted to various aspects of it; that may not qualify as viral, but it is progress. The volume’s five essays cover moral responsibility, akrasia, moral realism, and Spinoza’s model of human nature: the free man. Hence its subtitle is misleading. There is nothing uniquely contemporary about the issues discussed, as is evident from the essays themselves. Also, the moral problems are not the type one (...)
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  24. added 2016-11-13
    Julian Fink (2013). Editorial. Organon F 20 (4):422-424.
    Within the debate concerning reason and rationality, instrumental incoherence was for a long time conceived of as the paradigm of irrationality. However, with the emergence of the so-called ‘bootstrapping objection’ and the debate concerning the ‘scope’ of rational requirements, the innocuous status of the normative significance of (instrumental) coherence became subject to. This led to a paradigmatic shift in how to understand the relationship between rational requirements and normativity. While there now exists considerable doubt that rational requirements are normative, it (...)
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  25. added 2016-11-08
    Daniel Fogal & Kurt Sylvan (forthcoming). Contextualism About Epistemic Reasons. In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge
  26. added 2016-11-08
    Rune Lines & Marcus Selart (2013). Participation and Organizational Commitment During Change: From Utopist to Realist Perspectives. In Skipton Leonard, Rachel Lewis, Arthur Freedman & Jonathan Passmore (eds.), Handbook of the psychology of leadership, change, and organizational development. Wiley-Blackwell 289-313.
    Trust has a great potential for furthering our understanding of organizational change and learning. This potential however remains largely untapped. It is argued that two reasons as for why this potential remains unrealized are: (i) A narrow conceptualization of change as implementation and (ii) an emphasis on direct and aggregated effects of individual trust to the exclusion of other effects. It is further suggested that our understanding of the effects of trust on organizational change, should benefit from including effects of (...)
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  27. added 2016-11-08
    Marcus Selart, Thomas Nordström, Bård Kuvaas & Kazuhisa Takemura (2008). Effects of Reward on Self-Regulation, Intrinsic Motivation and Creativity. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 52 (5):439-458.
    This article evaluates the effects of two types of rewards (performance-contingent versus engagement-contingent) on self-regulation, intrinsic motivation and creativity. Forty-two undergraduate students were randomly assigned to three conditions; i.e. a performance-contingent reward group, an engagement-contingent reward group and a control group. Results provide little support for the negative effects of performance rewards on motivational components. However, they do indicate that participants in the engagement-contingent reward group and the control group achieved higher rated creativity than participants in the performance-contingent reward group. (...)
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  28. added 2016-11-06
    Christophe Menant (forthcoming). Constraint Satisfaction, Agency and Meaning Generation as an Evolutionary Framework for a Constructive Biosemiotics. Biosemiotics.
    A constructivist perspective on biosemiotics brings to the forefront meaning generation by biological agents for constraint satisfaction in an evolutionary background. Biosemiotics deal with the study of signs and meaning in biological entities. One of its main challenges is to attempt to naturalize biological meaning (Sharov & all 2015). Constructivism is an epistemological perspective that considers knowledge as constructed by agents which are sense makers. So a constructive approach on biosemiotics addresses meanings as constructed by biological agents as sense makers. (...)
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  29. added 2016-11-04
    Abraham Sesshu Roth (2016). Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation. Ethics 127:88-115.
    Accepting a promise is normatively significant in that it helps to secure promissory obligation. But what is it for B to accept A’s promise to φ? It is in part for B to intend A’s φ-ing. Thinking of acceptance in this way allows us to appeal to the distinctive role of intentions in practical reasoning and action to better understand the agency exercised by the promisee. The proposal also accounts for rational constraints on acceptance, and the so-called directedness of promissory (...)
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  30. added 2016-11-03
    Benjamin Kozuch (ed.) (forthcoming). Consciousness and Mental Causation: Contemporary Empirical Cases for Epiphenomenalism, in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  31. added 2016-11-03
    David Horst (2012). Absichtliches Handeln. Mentis.
  32. added 2016-11-02
    E. J. Coffman (2016). Incompatibilist Commitment and Moral Self‐Knowledge: The Epistemology of Libertarianism. Philosophical Issues 26 (1):78-98.
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  33. added 2016-10-31
    Margot Wilson (2016). A Study of Ignorance: Suffering and Freedom in Early Buddhist Teachings and Parallels in Modern Neuroscience. Dissertation, University of Glasgow
    What might early Buddhist teachings offer neuroscience and how might neuroscience inform contemporary Buddhism? Both early Buddhist teachings and cognitive neuroscience suggest that the conditioning of our cognitive apparatus and brain plays a role in agency that may be either efficacious or non-efficacious. Both consider internal time to play a central role in the efficacy of agency. Buddhism offers an approach that promises to increase the efficacy of agency. This approach is found in five early Buddhist teachings that are re-interpreted (...)
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  34. added 2016-10-30
    Aleksandr Mishura (forthcoming). Crossing the Line: New Intuitions Behind Frankfurt-Type Cases. Axiomathes:1-10.
    Frankfurt-type cases with covered manipulation received a great attention in the debates about freedom of will and moral responsibility. They pretend to give the refutation of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities and to show that we can intuitively blame or praise an agent who was not able to do otherwise. In this paper, I will try to make explicit some basic intuitions underlying the agent’s responsibility in Frankfurt-type cases, which were surprisingly ignored in the contemporary debates. The key intuition is (...)
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  35. added 2016-10-28
    Jens Gillessen (forthcoming). Flat Intentions – Crazy Dispositions? Philosophical Explorations:1-16.
    Future-directed intentions, it is widely held, involve behavioral dispositions. But of what kind? Suppose you now intend to Φ at future time t. Are you thereby now disposed to Φ at t no matter what? If so, your intention disposes you to Φ even if around t you will come to believe that Φ-ing would be crazy. And would not that be a crazy intention to have? – Like considerations have led Luca Ferrero and others to believe that only intentions (...)
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  36. added 2016-10-28
    David Horst (2016). Enkratic Agency. European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2).
    An enkratic agent is someone who intends to do A because she believes she should do A. Being enkratic is usually understood as something rationality requires of you. However, we must distinguish between different conceptions of enkratic rationality. According to a fairly common view, enkratic rationality is solely a normative requirement on agency: it tells us how agents should think and act. However, I shall argue that this normativist conception of enkratic rationality faces serious difficulties: it makes it a mystery (...)
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  37. added 2016-10-25
    Facundo M. Alonso (forthcoming). Intending, Settling, and Relying. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Volume 4. Oxford University Press
    Philosophers of action of different persuasions have suggested that there is a tight connection between the phenomenon of intending and the phenomena of “being settled on” and of “settling” a course of action. For many, this connection supports an important constraint on intention: one may only intend what one takes one’s so intending as settling. Traditionally, this has been understood as a doxastic constraint on intention: what one takes one’s intention as settling is what one believes one’s so intending as (...)
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  38. added 2016-10-24
    Julian Fink (forthcoming). The Property of Rationality: A Guide to What Rationality Requires? Philosophical Studies.
    Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’ – at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by (...)
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  39. added 2016-10-24
    Kirk Ludwig (2018). An Introduction to Collective Intentionality: In Action, Thought, and Society. Routledge.
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  40. added 2016-10-24
    Radek Trnka & Radmila Lorencova (2016). Quantum Anthropology: Man, Cultures, and Groups in a Quantum Perspective. Charles University Karolinum Press.
    This philosophical anthropology tries to explore the basic categories of man’s being in the worlds using a special quantum meta-ontology that is introduced in the book. Quantum understanding of space and time, consciousness, or empirical/nonempirical reality elicits new questions relating to philosophical concerns such as subjectivity, free will, mind, perception, experience, dialectic, or agency. The authors have developed an inspiring theoretical framework transcending the boundaries of particular disciplines, e.g. quantum philosophy, metaphysics of consciousness, philosophy of mind, phenomenology of space and (...)
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  41. added 2016-10-21
    Michael Starks, Review of Religion Explained The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought by Pascal Boyer (2002).
    You can get a quick summary of this book on p 135 or 326. If you are not up to speed on evolutionary psychology you should first read one of the numerous recent texts with this term in the title. One of the best is " The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology " by Buss, but it is big and expensive. Until about 15 years ago, ´explanations´´of behavior have not really been explanations of mental processes at all, but rather vague and (...)
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  42. added 2016-10-21
    Daphne Brandenburg (forthcoming). Implicit Attitudes and the Social Capacity for Free Will. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    In this paper I ask what implicit attitudes tell us about our freedom. I analyze the relation between the literature on implicit attitudes and an important subcategory of theories of free will—self-disclosure accounts. If one is committed to such a theory, I suggest one may have to move to a more social conceptualization of the capacity for freedom. I will work out this argument in five sections. In the first section, I discuss the specific theories of free will that are (...)
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  43. added 2016-10-21
    Jacqueline Broad & Karen Detlefsen (forthcoming). Women and Liberty, 1600-1800: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    This book addresses the theme of liberty as it is found in the writing of women philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or as it is theorized with respect to women and their lives. It covers both theoretical and practical philosophy, with chapters grappling with problems in the metaphysics of free will (both human and God’s), the liberty (or lack thereof) of women in their moral, personal lives as well as their social-political, public lives, and the interactions between the (...)
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  44. added 2016-10-21
    Hugh J. McCann (ed.) (2017). Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology. Oxford University Press Usa.
    The articles in the present collection deal with the religious dimension of the problem of free will. All of the papers also have implications for broader philosophical and theological issues, and will thus be of interest to a wide variety of scholars, both religious and secular. Together they provide a historical and contemporary overview of problems in the theology of freedom, together with recent work by some important philosophers in the field aimed at resolving those problems. The chapters are divided (...)
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  45. added 2016-10-21
    John Thorp (2017). Free Will: A Defence Against Neurophysiological Determinism. Routledge.
    The problem of freedom and determinism is one of the most enduring, and one of the best, problems in philosophy. One of the best because it so tenaciously resists solution while yet always seeming urgent, and one of the most enduring because it has always been able to present itself in different ways to suit the preoccupations of different ages. This book, first published in 1980, sets out to defend free will: it elaborates a sober and systematic case for libertarianism (...)
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  46. added 2016-10-20
    Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way (forthcoming). What is Reasoning? Mind.
    Reasoning is a certain kind of attitude-revision. What kind? The aim of this paper is to introduce and defend a new answer to this question, based on the idea that reasoning is a goodness-fixing kind. Our central claim is that reasoning is a functional kind: it has a constitutive point or aim that fixes the standards for good reasoning. We claim, further, that this aim is to get fitting attitudes. We start by considering recent accounts of reasoning due to Ralph (...)
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  47. added 2016-10-20
    Matthew Mandelkern, Ginger Schultheis & David Boylan (forthcoming). Agentive Modals. Philosophical Review.
    We propose a new analysis of a class of modals which we call agentive modals: ability modals and their duals, compulsion modals. After criticizing existing approaches − the existential quantificational analysis, the universal quantificational analysis, and the conditional analysis − we lay out a new account that builds on both the existential and conditional analyses. On our account, the act conditional analysis of agentive modality, a sentence like ‘John can swim across the river’ says that there is some practically available (...)
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  48. added 2016-10-19
    Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (forthcoming). Hard-Incompatibilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life. In Gregg D. Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press
    As philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism continue to gain traction, we are likely to see a fundamental shift in the way people think about free will and moral responsibility. Such shifts raise important practical and existential concerns: What if we came to disbelieve in free will? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some (...)
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  49. added 2016-10-19
    Adam R. Thompson (forthcoming). Blame and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Philosophia.
    A classic, though basically neglected question about motivation arises when we attempt to account for blame’s nature—namely, does the recognition central to blame need help from an independent desire in order to motivate the blame-characteristic dispositions that arise in the blamer? Those who have attended to the question think the answer is yes. Hence, they adopt what I call a Humean Construal of blame on which blame is (a) a judgment that an individual S is blameworthy and (b) an independent (...)
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  50. added 2016-10-15
    Earl Conee (2016). A Mysterious Case of Missing Value. Philosophic Exchange 45 (1):1-22.
    Sometimes there are conflicts about what we ought to do according to differing evaluative dimensions, like morality and self-interest. After sketching an interpretation of "ought" claims of all sorts, it is argued that there is no overriding evaluation that authoritatively resolves the conflicts. It is further argued that this is not altogether disappointing.
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