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Philosophy of Action

Edited by Constantine Sandis (University of Hertfordshire)
Assistant editor: István Zárdai (University of Pécs, Oxford Brookes University, University of Hertfordshire)
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  1. added 2016-07-23
    Rituparna Ray Chaudhuri, Https://Archive.Org/Details/AspirationAndRealityOneOfMyFavouritePoems.
    To read Literature by Generation today in majority, is not to pass on the subject only, rather more than this know what 'you' are learning..
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  2. added 2016-07-20
    Chrisoula Andreou & Sergio Tenenbaum (eds.) (2016). Belief, Action and Rationality Over Time. Routledge.
    Action theorists and formal epistemologists often pursue parallel inquiries regarding rationality, with the former focused on practical rationality, and the latter focused on theoretical rationality. In both fields, there is currently a strong interest in exploring rationality in relation to time. This exploration raises questions about the rationality of certain patterns over time. For example, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of intention; similarly, it raises questions about the rational permissibility of certain patterns of belief. While (...)
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  3. added 2016-07-20
    Jens Gillessen (2015). Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long-term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The article challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action – (...)
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  4. added 2016-07-19
    Dominique Pestre (2016). Knowledge and Rational Action: The Economization of Environment, and After. In Susan Neiman, Peter Galison & Wendy Doniger (eds.), What Reason Promises: Essays on Reason, Nature and History. De Gruyter 93-99.
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  5. added 2016-07-19
    Jussi Suikkanen (2016). Review of Errol Lord and Barry Maguire's (Eds.) Weighing Reasons. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2016 (7).
    This is a short review of a collection of articles entitled Weighing Reasons edited by Errol Lord and Barry Maguire.
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  6. added 2016-07-19
    Neil Sinclair, On the Connection Between Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Acting for Those Reasons.
    According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to Φ then it must be possible that A should Φ for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-called ‘internalist’ theories of reasons. In this paper I rebut an apparent counterexamples to Williams’ claim: Schroeder’s example of Nate. I argue that this (...)
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  7. added 2016-07-19
    Derek Clayton Baker, Akrasia and the Problem of the Unity of Reason.
    Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.
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  8. added 2016-07-19
    Jens Gillessen (2015). Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long-term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The article challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action – (...)
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  9. added 2016-07-19
    Hameed Chughtai & Michael David Myers, The Entwinement Logic of Practices: Insights From an Ethnography of Young IT Professionals.
    This paper seeks to place the phenomenon of technology within the context of everyday practices using the logic of practical rationality. We draw some insights from our ethnography of young professionals and shed light on their everyday technological practices by invoking the concept of entwinement from hermeneutic phenomenology. Our findings reveal that the new generation users are becoming intimately entwined with information technologies in their everyday practices. Our study contributes toward the ongoing debate concerning the theorizing of technology and its (...)
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  10. added 2016-07-19
    Philip Pettit (2006). Preference, Deliberation and Satisfaction. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:131-154.
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  11. added 2016-07-19
    David Copp (1995). Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (sup1):187-219.
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  12. added 2016-07-19
    David Pole (1968). VII—On Practical Reason and Benevolence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68 (1):129-144.
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  13. added 2016-07-19
    W. D. Falk (1948). VIII.—“Ought” and Motivation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 48 (1):111-138.
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  14. added 2016-07-18
    Matteo Bianchin (forthcoming). Intentions and Intentionality. Philosophy and Public Issues – Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche.
    Michael Thompson recently advanced a “naïve action theory” as an alternative to the “sophisticated” accounts of action displayed by ordinary folk psychology. In what follows I defend the plausibility of intentional psychology and folk psychological explanations. I do this in two ways. First I question that naïve explanations are more naïve than the ones provided by folk psychology and suggest that the latter are phenomenologically prior to the former. Second, I focus on the role of intentionality in deliberation and action (...)
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  15. added 2016-07-18
    Kirk Ludwig (2016). Corporate Speech in Citizens United Vs. Federal Election Commission. SpazioFilosofico 16:47-79.
    In its January 20th, 2010 decision in Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission, the United States Supreme Court ruled that certain restrictions on independent expenditures by corporations for political advocacy violate the First Amendment of the Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Justice Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority, (...)
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  16. added 2016-07-17
    Dietrich von Engelhardt & Alfred Gierer (eds.) (2000). Georg Ernst Stahl (1659-1734) in wissenschaftshistorischer Sicht. Acta Historica Leopoldina 30.
    Georg Ernst Stahl (1659-1734) was a German physician and chemist. The book (in German) documents a symposium of the Academy Leopoldina on his works and thoughts that contributed to the Enlightenment. Der weite Horizont seines Denkens und seiner Arbeiten umfasst die Phlogiston-Theorie der Verbrennung, die später mit der Entdeckung des Sauerstoffs widerlegt wurde, aber dennoch wichtige Erkenntnisse zur Reversibilität von Reaktionen und zur unsichtbaren Persistenz der beteiligten chemischen Komponenten beitrug. Seine Gedanken zur Rolle der „Anima“, die heute überholt erscheinen, führten (...)
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  17. added 2016-07-15
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  18. added 2016-07-15
    Jens Gillessen (2015). Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long-term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The article challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action – (...)
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  19. added 2016-07-15
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  20. added 2016-07-15
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  21. added 2016-07-15
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  22. added 2016-07-15
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  23. added 2016-07-15
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  24. added 2016-07-15
    김남준 (2012). A Debate on Moral Motivation in the Contemporary Ethics and Moral Subject Education. Journal of Ethics 1 (86):55-89.
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  25. added 2016-07-15
    Peter Schotch (2009). 9. Forcing and Practical Inference. In Raymond Jennings, Bryson Brown & Peter Schotch (eds.), On Preserving: Essays on Preservationism and Paraconsistent Logic. University of Toronto Press 161-174.
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  26. added 2016-07-15
    Joseph Raz (1999). Practical Reason and Norms. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Practical Reason and Norms focuses on three problems: In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? All three questions are answered by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity. Rules are a structure of reasons to perform the required act (...)
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  27. added 2016-07-15
    David Wiggins (1979). XV—Weakness of Will Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (1):251-278.
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  28. added 2016-07-15
    David Wiggins (1976). II—Deliberation and Practical Reason. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1):29-52.
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  29. added 2016-07-14
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). Existentialism. Amazon Digital Services LLC.
    Do we choose our values or do our values choose us?
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  30. added 2016-07-13
    Kelly McCormick (forthcoming). Why We Should Be Discretionists About Free Will. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    One of the projects Shaun Nichols takes up in Bound is to provide a folk psychological diagnosis of the problem of free will. As part of this diagnosis, Nichols suggests that the dispute between eliminativists and preservationists depends to some extent on assumptions about the way ‘free will’ refers. In light of this, he argues that we might have good reason to accept a discretionary view of free will. Here, I will focus on teasing out some of the more fine-grained (...)
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  31. added 2016-07-13
    Shaun Nichols (forthcoming). Replies to Kane, McCormick, and Vargas. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    This is a reply to discussions by Robert Kane, Kelly McCormick, and Manuel Vargas of Shaun Nichols, Bound: Essays on Free Will and Responsibility.
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  32. added 2016-07-13
    Myrto Mylopoulos & Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). Agentive Phenomenology. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press
    In this chapter we reflect on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology – that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. Our discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 80s (section 1). As we will see, much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and philosophy draws motivation from this work, and the questions it raises. After discussing empirical (...)
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  33. added 2016-07-13
    Justin A. Capes & Philip Swenson (forthcoming). Frankfurt Cases: The Fine-Grained Response Revisited. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    Frankfurt cases are supposed to provide us with counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities. Among the most well known responses to these cases is what John Fischer has dubbed the flicker of freedom strategy. Here we revisit a version of this strategy, which we refer to as the fine-grained response. Although a number of philosophers, including some who are otherwise unsympathetic to Frankfurt’s argument, have dismissed the fine grained response, we believe there is a good deal to be said (...)
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  34. added 2016-07-12
    Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). Neuroscientific Threats to Free Will. In Meghan Griffith, Kevin Timpe & Neil Levy (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge
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  35. added 2016-07-12
    Ekaterina Svetlova & Henk van Elst (2015). Decision-Theoretic Approaches to Non-Knowledge in Economics. In Gross Matthias & McGoey Linsy (eds.), Routledge International Handbook of Ignorance Studies. Routledge 349-360.
    The aim of this contribution is to provide an overview of conceptual approaches to incorporating a decision maker’s non-knowledge into economic theory. We will focus here on the particular kind of non-knowledge which we consider to be one of the most important for economic discussions: non-knowledge of possible consequence-relevant uncertain events which a decision maker would have to take into account when selecting between different strategies.
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  36. added 2016-07-11
    Matthew Kopec, Game Theory and the Self-Fulfilling Climate Tragedy.
    Game theorists tend to model climate negotiations as a so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’. This is rather worrisome, since the conditions under which such commons problems have historically been solved are almost entirely absent in the case of international greenhouse gas emissions. In this paper, I will argue that the predictive accuracy of the tragedy model might not stem from the model’s inherent match with reality but rather from the model’s ability to make self-fulfilling predictions. I then sketch some possible (...)
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  37. added 2016-07-11
    Stephen C. Sanders, Applying the Social Contract Theory in Opposing Animal Rights.
  38. added 2016-07-11
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). Hedonism. JOHN-MICHAEL KUCZYNSKI.
    This book concisely explicates and evaluates four doctrines concerning the nature of moral obligation: hedonism (one's sole moral obligation is to enjoy oneself); egoism (one's sole moral obligation is to serve one's own interests); consequentialism (the ends justify the means), and deontology (the ends do not justify the means).
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  39. added 2016-07-11
    Christian Piller (2006). ‘Kinds of Practical Reasons: Attitude-Related Reasons and Exclusionary Reasons’. In J. A. Pinto S. Miguens (ed.), Analyses. 98-105.
    I start by explaining what attitude-related reasons are and why it is plausible to assume that, at least in the domain of practical reason, there are such reasons. Then I turn to Raz’s idea that the practice of practical reasoning commits us to what he calls exclusionary reasons. Being excluded would be a third way, additional to being outweighed and being undermined, in which a reason can be defeated. I try to show that attitude-related reasons can explain the phenomena Raz (...)
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  40. added 2016-07-10
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). Determinism, Indeterminism, and Personal Freedom:. John-Michael Kuczynski.
    In this fictitious dialogue, it is shown that there are three kinds of freedom, each of which, though non-trivially different from the other two, is identical with the subject's being appropriately constitutive of a causally cohesive structure of some kind or other. Analogues of this point are proven to hold not just of personal freedom, but also of personal identity, and not just of personal identity, but also of objectual identity.
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  41. added 2016-07-05
    Richard Heersmink (forthcoming). Distributed Cognition and Distributed Morality: Agency, Artifacts and Systems. Science and Engineering Ethics:1-18.
    There are various philosophical approaches and theories describing the intimate relation people have to artifacts. In this paper, I explore the relation between two such theories, namely distributed cognition and distributed morality theory. I point out a number of similarities and differences in these views regarding the ontological status they attribute to artifacts and the larger systems they are part of. Having evaluated and compared these views, I continue by focussing on the way cognitive artifacts are used in moral practice. (...)
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  42. added 2016-07-05
    Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). Kriegel on the Phenomenology of Action. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia.
    I focus on Uriah Kriegel’s account of conative phenomenology. I agree with Kriegel’s argument that some conative phenomenology is primitive in that some conative phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to another kind of property (e.g., perceptual or cognitive). I disagree, however, with Kriegel’s specific characterization of the properties in question. Kriegel argues that the experience of deciding-and-then-trying is the core of conative phenomenology. I argue, however, that the experiences of trying and acting better occupy this place. Further, I suggest that (...)
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  43. added 2016-07-05
    Lara Buchak (2016). Why High-Risk, Non-Expected-Utility-Maximising Gambles Can Be Rational and Beneficial: The Case of HIV Cure Studies. Journal of Medical Ethics:1-6.
    Some early phase clinical studies of candidate HIV cure and remission interventions appear to have adverse medical risk–benefit ratios for participants. Why, then, do people participate? And is it ethically permissible to allow them to participate? Recent work in decision theory sheds light on both of these questions, by casting doubt on the idea that rational individuals prefer choices that maximise expected utility, and therefore by casting doubt on the idea that researchers have an ethical obligation not to enrol participants (...)
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  44. added 2016-07-05
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  45. added 2016-07-05
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  46. added 2016-07-05
    Andrew McAninch (2015). Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason-giving, or her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view (...)
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  47. added 2016-07-05
    A. H. Maslow (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation. Psychological Review 50 (4):370-396.
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  48. added 2016-07-05
    G. H. Seward (1939). Dialectic in the Psychology of Motivation. Psychological Review 46 (1):46-61.
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  49. added 2016-07-03
    Peter Furlong (2016). Libertarianism, the Rollback Argument, and the Objective Probability of Free Choices. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    It is widely assumed that candidates for free, undetermined choices must have objective probabilities prior to their performance. Indeed although this premise figures prominently in a widely discussed argument against libertarianism, few libertarians have called it into question. In this article, I will investigate whether libertarians ought to reject it. I will conclude that doing so should not be tempting to event-causal libertarians or most agent-causal ones, because the added costs outweigh the benefits.
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  50. added 2016-07-03
    Anton Killin (2015). Book Review of 'Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents: Contributions to Social Ontology'. [REVIEW] Studies in Social and Political Thought 25:265-270.
    Book review of Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents: Contributions to Social Ontology, edited by Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid. Springer, 2013.
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