This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
280 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 280
  1. Drew Abney, Rick Dale, Jeff Yoshimi, Chris Kello, Kristian Tylén & Riccardo Fusaroli (2014). Joint Perceptual Decision-Making: A Case Study in Explanatory Pluralism. Frontiers in Psychology 5:330.
    Traditionally different approaches to the study of cognition have been viewed as competing explanatory frameworks. An alternative view, explanatory pluralism, regards different approaches to the study of cognition as complementary ways of studying the same phenomenon, at specific temporal and spatial scales, using appropriate methodological tools. Explanatory pluralism has been often described abstractly, but has rarely been applied to concrete cases. We present a case study of explanatory pluralism. We discuss three separate ways of studying the same phenomenon: a perceptual (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jack A. Adams, Philip H. Marshall & Norman W. Bray (1971). Closed-Loop Theory and Long-Term Retention. Journal of Experimental Psychology 90 (2):242-250.
  3. Marcus P. Adams (2011). Modularity, Theory of Mind, and Autism Spectrum Disorder. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):763-773.
    The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism spectrum disorder has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. In a series of papers, Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone argue that positing a ToM module does not best explain the deficits exhibited by individuals with autism (Gerrans 2002; Stone & Gerrans 2006a, 2006b; Gerrans & Stone 2008). In this paper, I first criticize Gerrans and Stone’s (2008) account. Second, I discuss various studies of individuals (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Kenneth Aizawa (2002). Cognitive Architecture. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Kenneth Aizawa (1993). Cognitive Science. In Reflections on Philosophy. New York: St Martin's Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Kenneth Aizawa (1993). Reflections on Philosophy. New York: St Martin's Press.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Holly Andersen (forthcoming). Mental Causation. In N. Levy J. Clausen (ed.), Springer Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer.
    The problem of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind concerns the possibility of holding two different views that are in apparent tension. The first is physicalism, the view that there is nothing more to the world than the physical. The second is that the mental has genuine causal efficacy in a way that does not reduce to pure physical particle-bumping. This article provides a historical background to this question, with focus on Davidson’s anomalous monism and Kim’s causal exclusion problem. (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. James A. Anderson (2003). Arithmetic on a Parallel Computer: Perception Versus Logic. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 4 (2):169-188.
    This article discusses the properties of a controllable, flexible, hybrid parallel computing architecture that potentially merges pattern recognition and arithmetic. Humans perform integer arithmetic in a fundamentally different way than logic-based computers. Even though the human approach to arithmetic is both slow and inaccurate it can have substantial advantages when useful approximations ( intuition ) are more valuable than high precision. Such a computational strategy may be particularly useful when computers based on nanocomponents become feasible because it offers a way (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Michael L. Anderson (2006). Cognitive Science and Epistemic Openness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (2):125-154.
    b>. Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating for particular purposes and according to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. John S. Antrobus (1993). Commentary on Horne. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (1):83-85.
  11. John Antrobus, Toshiaki Kondo, Ruth Reinsel & George Fein (1995). Dreaming in the Late Morning: Summation of REM and Diurnal Cortical Activation. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (3):275-299.
  12. Eric Arnau, Saray Ayala & Thomas Sturm (2014). Cognitive Externalism Meets Bounded Rationality. Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):50-64.
    When proponents of cognitive externalism (CE) turn to empirical studies in cognitive science to put the framework to use and to assess its explanatory success, they typically refer to perception, memory, or motor coordination. In contrast, not much has been said about reasoning. One promising avenue to explore in this respect is the theory of bounded rationality (BR). To clarify the relationship between CE and BR, we criticize Andy Clark's understanding of BR, as well as his claim that BR does (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Eric Arnau & Andreu Ballús (2013). Innovative Scaffolding: Understanding Innovation as the Disclosure of Hidden Affordances. Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación 7:1-11.
    Much attention has been drawn to the cognitive basis of innovation. While interesting in many ways, this poses the threat of falling back to traditional internalist assumptions with regard to cognition. We oppose the ensuing contrast between internal cognitive processing and external public practices and technologies that such internal cognitive systems might produce and utilize. We argue that innovation is best understood from the gibsonian notion of affordance, and that many innovative practices emerge from the external scaffolding of cognitive processes. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Harald Atmanspacher (2003). Editorial. Mind and Matter 1 (1):3-7.
    Mind and Matter is conceived as an interdisciplinary journal, aimed at an educated readership interested in all aspects of mind-matter research from the perspectives of the sciences and humanities. It is devoted to the publication of empirical, theoretical, and conceptual research and the discussion of its results. The main subject areas of the journal are -- neuroscience, cognitive science, behavioral science -- physical approaches, mathematical modeling, data analysis -- philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, applied metaphysics --cultural and social studies, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Saray Ayala (2010). Superfunctionalizing the Mind. [REVIEW] Teorema (1).
  16. Bernard J. Baars (2006). Conscious Cognition and Blackboard Architectures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (1):70-71.
    van der Velde & de Kamps make a case for neural blackboard architectures to address four questions raised by human language. Unfortunately, they neglect a sizable literature relating blackboard architectures to other fundamental cognitive questions, specifically consciousness and voluntary control. Called “global workspace theory,” this literature integrates a large body of brain and behavioral evidence to come to converging conclusions.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Bernard J. Baars & Katharine McGovern (1993). Does Philosophy Help or Hinder Scientific Work on Consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 2 (1):18-27.
  18. Theodore Bach (2012). Analogical Cognition: Applications in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind and Language. Philosophy Compass 7 (5):348-360.
    Analogical cognition refers to the ability to detect, process, and learn from relational similarities. The study of analogical and similarity cognition is widely considered one of the ‘success stories’ of cognitive science, exhibiting convergence across many disciplines on foundational questions. Given the centrality of analogy to mind and knowledge, it would benefit philosophers investigating topics in epistemology and the philosophies of mind and language to become familiar with empirical models of analogical cognition. The goal of this essay is to describe (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Justin L. Barrett & Ian M. Church (2013). Should CSR Give Atheists Epistemic Assurance? On Beer-Goggles, BFFs, and Skepticism Regarding Religious Beliefs. The Monist 96 (3):311-324.
    Recent work in cognitive science of religion (CSR) is beginning to converge on a very interesting thesis—that, given the ordinary features of human minds operating in typical human environments, we are naturally disposed to believe in the existence of gods, among other religious ideas (e.g., seeAtran [2002], Barrett [2004; 2012], Bering [2011], Boyer [2001], Guthrie [1993], McCauley [2011], Pyysiäinen [2004; 2009]). In this paper, we explore whether such a discovery ultimately helps or hurts the atheist position—whether, for example, it lends (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Hilary Barth, Kristen La Mont, Jennifer Lipton, Stanislas Dehaene, Nancy Kanwisher & Elizabeth Spelke (2006). Non-Symbolic Arithmetic in Adults and Young Children. Cognition 98 (3):199-222.
  21. Vadim Batitsky (1998). A Formal Rebuttal of the Central Argument for Functionalism. Erkenntnis 49 (2):201-20.
    The central argument for functionalism is the so-called argument from multiple realizations. According to this argument, because a functionally characterized system admits a potential infinity of structurally diverse physical realizations, the functional organization of such systems cannot be captured in a law-like manner at the level of physical description (and, thus, must be treated as a principally autonomous domain of inquiry). I offer a rebuttal of this argument based on formal modeling of its premises in the framework of automata theory. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. George Bealer (1987). The Boundary Between Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Journal of Philosophy 84 (10):553-55.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Anthony F. Beavers (2012). Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Science of the Mind. Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):625-628.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Anthony F. Beavers (2009). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):533-537.
    The Phenomenological Mind, by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, is part of a recent initiative to show that phenomenology, classically conceived as the tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and not as mere introspection, contributes something important to cognitive science. (For other examples, see “References” below.) Phenomenology, of course, has been a part of cognitive science for a long time. It implicitly informs the works of Andy Clark (e.g. 1997) and John Haugeland (e.g. 1998), and Hubert Dreyfus explicitly uses it (e.g. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. William Bechtel (2010). How Can Philosophy Be a True Cognitive Science Discipline? Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):357-366.
    Although philosophy has been only a minor contributor to cognitive science to date, this paper describes two projects in naturalistic philosophy of mind and one in naturalistic philosophy of science that have been pursued during the past 30 years and that can make theoretical and methodological contributions to cognitive science. First, stances on the mind–body problem (identity theory, functionalism, and heuristic identity theory) are relevant to cognitive science as it negotiates its relation to neuroscience and cognitive neuroscience. Second, analyses of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. William Bechtel (2009). Constructing a Philosophy of Science of Cognitive Science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):548-569.
    Philosophy of science is positioned to make distinctive contributions to cognitive science by providing perspective on its conceptual foundations and by advancing normative recommendations. The philosophy of science I embrace is naturalistic in that it is grounded in the study of actual science. Focusing on explanation, I describe the recent development of a mechanistic philosophy of science from which I draw three normative consequences for cognitive science. First, insofar as cognitive mechanisms are information-processing mechanisms, cognitive science needs an account of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. William P. Bechtel, Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on the Sciences of Cognition and the Brain.
    1. The Naturalistic Turn in Philosophy of Science 2. The Framework of Mechanistic Explanation: Parts, Operations, and Organization 3. Representing and Reasoning About Mechanisms 4. Mental Mechanisms: Mechanisms that Process Information 5. Discovering Mental Mechanisms 6 . Summary.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. William Bechtel, Marlene Behrmann, Nick Chater, Robert J. Glushko, Robert L. Goldstone & Paul Smolensky (2010). The Rumelhart Prize at 10. Cognitive Science 34 (5):713-715.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Jacob Beck, Can Bootstrapping Explain Concept Learning?
    Susan Carey’s account of bootstrapping aims to explain how important new concepts are learned. After arguing that Carey’s own formulations of bootstrapping fail in this aim, I critically evaluate three reformulations of bootstrapping that may have a better chance at success.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Joe Becker (2004). Reconsidering the Role of Overcoming Perturbations in Cognitive Development: Constructivism and Consicousness. Human Development 47 (2):77-93.
    Constructivist theory must choose between the hypothesis that felt perturbation drives cognitive development (the priority of felt perturbation) and the hypothesis that the particular process that eventually produces new cognitive structures first produces felt perturbation (the continuity of process). There is ambivalence in Piagetian theory regarding this choice. The prevalent account of constructivist theory adopts the priority of felt perturbation. However, on occasion Piaget has explicitly rejected it, simultaneously endorsing the continuity of process. First, I explicate and support this latter (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Joseph Becker (1993). The Essential Nature of the Method of the Natural Sciences: Response to A. T. Nuyen's "Truth, Method, and Objectivity: Husserl and Gadamer on Scientific Method&Quot;. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23 (1):73-76.
  32. Vincent Bergeron (forthcoming). Functional Independence and Cognitive Architecture. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    In cognitive science, the concept of dissociation has been central to the functional individuation and decomposition of cognitive systems. Setting aside debates about the legitimacy of inferring the existence of dissociable systems from behavioral dissociation data, the main idea behind the dissociation approach is that two cognitive systems are dissociable, and therefore viewed as distinct, if each can be damaged, or impaired, without affecting the other system’s functions. In this paper, I propose a notion of functional independence that does not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Derek Bickerton (1997). Constructivism, Nativism, and Explanatory Adequacy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):557-558.
    Constructivism is the most recent in a long line of failed attempts to discredit nativism. It seeks support from true (but irrelevant) facts, wastes its energy on straw men, and jumps logical gaps; but its greatest weakness lies in its failure to match nativism's explanation of a wide range of disparate phenomena, particularly in language acquisition.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Mark H. Bickhard, The Biological Foundations of Cognitive Science.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. John Bickle (2001). Book Symposium on John Horgan's the Undiscovered Mind: How the Human Brain Denies Replication, Medication and Explanation. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 2 (2):213-213.
  36. John Bickle (2000). Editor's Note. Brain and Mind 1 (1):305-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. John Bickle, Gillian Einstein & Valerie Hardcastle (2000). Editors' Introduction. Brain and Mind 1 (1):1-6.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Paul Bloom, Homer's Soul.
    What does The Simpsons have to say about this issue? Most likely, absolutely nothing. The Simpsons is a fine television show, but it’s not where to look for innovative ideas in cognitive neuroscience or the philosophy of mind. We think, however, that it can help give us insight into a related, and extremely important, issue. We might learn through this show something about common-sense metaphysics, about how people naturally think about consciousness, the brain and the soul.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Margaret Boden (2008). Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science. OUP Oxford.
    The development of cognitive science is one of the most remarkable and fascinating intellectual achievements of the modern era. The quest to understand the mind is as old as recorded human thought; but the progress of modern science has offered new methods and techniques which have revolutionized this enquiry. Oxford University Press now presents a masterful history of cognitive science, told by one of its most eminent practitioners. -/- Cognitive science is the project of understanding the mind by modelling its (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Margaret A. Boden (2001). The Philosopgt of Cognitive Science. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Philosophy at the New Millennium. Cambridge University Press. 209-226.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Radu Bogdan, History of Cognitive Science.
    In spite of of its name, cognitive science is not yet a fully coherent and integrated science but rather a fairly loose coalition of largely independent disciplines, some descriptive and empirical (cognitive psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, cognitive anthropology), some speculative and foundational (philosophy), others both speculative and applied (artificial intelligence). What brought these disciplines together and still sustains their interdisciplinary cooperation is the dedication to explain, simulate and technically reproduce the workings of the human mind according to a distinct and rather (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. James S. Boster (2012). Cognitive Anthropology Is a Cognitive Science. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (3):372-378.
    Cognitive anthropology contributes to cognitive science as a complement to cognitive psychology. The chief threat to its survival has not been rejection by other cognitive scientists but by other cultural anthropologists. It will remain a part of cognitive science as long as cognitive anthropologists research, teach, and publish.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Gordon H. Bower (1996). Reactivating a Reactivation Theory of Implicit Memory. Consciousness and Cognition 5 (1-2):27-72.
  44. João Branquinho (ed.) (2001). The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Given the controversial nature of most issues in the foundations of cognitive science, it could hardly be expected from a description of the territory that ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Berit Brogaard (2002). Andy Clark,Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, VII + 210 Pp., $18.95 (Paper), ISBN 0-19-513857-. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 12 (1):151-156.
  46. Andrew Brook (2003). Kant and Cognitive Science. Teleskop.
    Some of Kant's ideas about the mind have had a huge influence on cognitive science, in particular his view that sensory input has to be worked up using concepts or concept-like states and his conception of the mind as a system of cognitive functions. We explore these influences in the first part of the paper. Other ideas of Kant's about the mind have not been assimilated into cognitive science, including important ideas about processes of synthesis, mental unity, and consciousness and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Elliot C. Brown & Martin Brüne (2012). Evolution of Social Predictive Brains? Frontiers in Psychology 3 (414).
    A commentary on: -/- Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science, by Clark, A. (in press). Behav. Brain Sci.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Laura S. Brown (1995). Comment. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (1):130-132.
  49. Thomas Busey, Chen Yu, Dean Wyatte & John Vanderkolk (2013). Temporal Sequences Quantify the Contributions of Individual Fixations in Complex Perceptual Matching Tasks. Cognitive Science 37 (4):731-756.
    Perceptual tasks such as object matching, mammogram interpretation, mental rotation, and satellite imagery change detection often require the assignment of correspondences to fuse information across views. We apply techniques developed for machine translation to the gaze data recorded from a complex perceptual matching task modeled after fingerprint examinations. The gaze data provide temporal sequences that the machine translation algorithm uses to estimate the subjects' assumptions of corresponding regions. Our results show that experts and novices have similar surface behavior, such as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. C. C., Mwf 2:30-3:20 Main 323.
    Humans and other animals are capable of thought, emotion, consciousness, and understanding. Galaxies, trees, rocks, and chairs are not. Why is this? Is it merely that we are more complicated, or that we are made out of a different kind of material? Or is it that we are not entirely material at all? That is, what does it mean to say that something has a mind? In this course, we will focus on the mind-body problem, the question of how the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 280