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Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Edited by Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri, St. Louis)
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  1. added 2016-05-04
    Bradley Richards (forthcoming). Attention and Seeing Objects: The Identity-Crowding Debate. Philosophical Psychology:1-16.
    Can unattended objects by seen? Ned Block has claimed they can on the basis of “identity-crowding.” This paper summarizes the ensuing debate with particular emphasis on the role of unconscious perception. Although unconscious perception plays an important role, it cannot support conscious object-seeing in identity-crowding. Nevertheless, unconscious perception assists in making successful judgments about unseen objects. Further, compelling conceptual evidence against seeing unattended objects places the burden of proof on Block. I argue that countability is necessary for seeing objects and (...)
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  2. added 2016-05-04
    Ayoob Shahmoradi (forthcoming). Why Do We Need Perceptual Content? Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
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  3. added 2016-05-03
    Michelle Montague (2016). Cognitive Phenomenology and Conscious Thought. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):167-181.
    How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as (...)
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  4. added 2016-05-02
    Joel Krueger (forthcoming). Intentionality. In G. Stanghellini, M. Broome, A. Fernandez, P. Fusar Poli, Raballo A. & R. Rosfort (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford University Press
  5. added 2016-05-02
    Beate Krickel (forthcoming). A Regularist Approach to Mechanistic Type-Level Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Most defenders of the new mechanistic approach accept ontic constraints for successful scientific explanation (Illari 2013; Craver 2014). The minimal claim is that scientific explanations have objective truthmakers, namely mechanisms that exist in the physical world independently of any observer and that cause or constitute the phenomena-to- be-explained. How can this idea be applied to type-level explanations? Many authors at least implicitly assume that in order for mechanisms to be the truthmakers of type-level explanation they need to be regular (Andersen (...)
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  6. added 2016-05-02
    Anja Berninger (forthcoming). Temporal Experience, Emotions and Decision Making in Psychopathy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
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  7. added 2016-05-02
    Subhasis Chattopadhyay (2016). Mindful Therapy: A Guide for Therapists and Helping Professionals. [REVIEW] Prabuddha Bharata or Awakened India 121 (5):480-82.
    This is a study in Buddhist psychoanalysis, especially the care of the care-giver.
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  8. added 2016-04-29
    Joe Dewhurst (forthcoming). Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  9. added 2016-04-28
    Filip Radovic (forthcoming). The Sense of Death and Non-Existence in Nihilistic Delusions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
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  10. added 2016-04-28
    James Elliott (forthcoming). Images. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  11. added 2016-04-28
    Richard Heersmink (forthcoming). Distributed Selves: Personal Identity and Extended Memory Systems. Synthese:1-17.
    This paper explores the implications of extended and distributed cognition theory for our notions of personal identity. On an extended and distributed approach to cognition, external information is under certain conditions constitutive of memory. On a narrative approach to personal identity, autobiographical memory is constitutive of our diachronic self. In this paper, I bring these two approaches together and argue that external information can be constitutive of one’s autobiographical memory and thus also of one’s (...)
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  12. added 2016-04-28
    Marie Guillot (forthcoming). I Me Mine: On a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...)
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  13. added 2016-04-27
    Machiel Keestra, How Do Narratives and Brains Mutually Influence Each Other? Taking Both the ‘Neuroscientific Turn’ and the ‘Narrative Turn’ in Explaining Bio-Political Orders.
    Introduction: the neuroscientific turn in political science The observation that brains and political orders are interdependent is almost trivial. Obviously, political orders require brain processes in order to emerge and to remain in place, as these processes enable action and cognition. Conversely, every since Aristotle coined man as “by nature a political animal” (Aristotle, Pol.: 1252a 3; cf. Eth. Nic.: 1097b 11), this also suggests that the political engagements of this animal has likely consequences for its natural development, including the (...)
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  14. added 2016-04-27
    Machiel Keestra (2015). Understanding Human Action. Integrating Meanings, Mechanisms, Causes, and Contexts. In V. Bazhanov & R. W. Scholz (eds.), Transdisciplinarity in philosophy and science: approaches, problems, prospects. Russian Academy of Science 201-235.
    Humans are capable of understanding an incredible variety of actions performed by other humans. Even though these range from primary biological actions, like eating and fleeing, to acts in parliament or in poetry, humans generally can make sense of each other’s actions. Action understanding is the cognitive ability to make sense of another person’s action by integrating perceptual information about the behavior with knowledge about the immediate and sociocultural contexts of the action, understanding of relevant meanings and one’s own experience. (...)
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  15. added 2016-04-26
    Alessio Plebe & Vivian De La Cruz (2016). Neurosemantics Neural Processes and the Construction of Language Meaning. Springer.
    This book examines the concept of “ Neurosemantics”, a term currently used in two different senses: the informational meaning of the physical processes in the neural circuits, and semantics in its classical sense, as the meaning of language, explained in terms of neural processes. The book explores this second sense of neurosemantics, yet in doing so, it addresses much of the first meaning as well. Divided into two parts, the book starts with a description and analysis of the mathematics of (...)
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  16. added 2016-04-26
    H. Von Foerster & G. W. Zopf Jr, (eds.) (1962). Principles of Self-Organization: Transactions of the University of Illinois Symposium. Pergamon.
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  17. added 2016-04-25
    David Miguel Gray (2014). Failing to Self-Ascribe Thought and Motion: Towards a Three-Factor Account of Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research 152 (1):28-32.
    There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split (...)
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  18. added 2016-04-24
    David Simpson & David Beckett (eds.) (2016). Expertise, Pedagogy and Practice. Routledge.
  19. added 2016-04-23
    James R. Beebe & David Sackris (forthcoming). Moral Objectivism Across the Lifespan. Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    We report the results of two studies that examine folk metaethical judgments about the objectivity of morality. We found that participants attributed almost as much objectivity to ethical statements as they did to statements of physical fact and significantly more objectivity to ethical statements than to statements about preferences or tastes. In both studies, younger participants attributed less objectivity to ethical statements than older participants. Females were observed to attribute slightly less objectivity to ethical statements than males, and we found (...)
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  20. added 2016-04-22
    Neil Levy (forthcoming). The Sweetness of Surrender: Glucose Enhances Self-Control by Signaling Environmental Richness. Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    According to the ego-depletion account of loss of self-control, self-control is, or depends on, a depletable resource. Advocates of this account have argued that what is depleted is actually glucose. However, there is experimental evidence that indicates that glucose replenishment is not necessary for regaining self-control, as well as theoretical reasons for thinking that it is not depleted by exercises of self-control. I suggest that glucose restores self-control not because it is a resource on which it relies, but because it (...)
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  21. added 2016-04-22
    Ryan Smith (forthcoming). The Relationship Between Consciousness, Understanding, and Rationality. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    The purpose of the present article is to explore the relationship between consciousness and understanding. To do so, I first briefly review recent work on the nature of both understanding and consciousness within philosophy and psychology. Building off of this work, I then defend the thesis that if one is conscious of a given content then one also understands that content. I argue that this conclusion can be drawn from the fact that understanding is associated with rational intention formation and (...)
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  22. added 2016-04-22
    James Elliott (2016). Images. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  23. added 2016-04-21
    Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Pain and Incorrigibility. In J. Corns (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge
    This chapter (from Routledge's forthcoming handbook on the philosophy of pain) considers the question of whether people are always correct when they judge themselves to be in pain, or not in pain. While I don't show sympathy for traditional routes to the conclusion that people are "incorrigible" in their pain judgments, I explore--and perhaps even advocate--a different route to such incorrigibility. On this low road to incorrigibility, a sensory state's being judged unpleasant is what makes it a pain (or not).
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  24. added 2016-04-21
    Araceli Ramirez-Cardenas, Maria Moskaleva & Andreas Nieder (2016). Neuronal Representation of Numerosity Zero in the Primate Parieto-Frontal Number Network. Current Biology 26.
    Neurons in the primate parieto-frontal network represent the number of visual items in a collection, but it is unknown whether this system encodes empty sets as conveying null quantity. We recorded from the ventral intraparietal area (VIP) and the prefrontal cortex (PFC) of monkeys performing a matching task including empty sets and countable numerosities as stimuli. VIP neurons encoded empty sets predominantly as a distinct category from numerosities. In contrast, PFC neurons represented empty sets more similarly to numerosity one than (...)
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  25. added 2016-04-21
    Mazviita Chirimuuta (2015). Ecumenicism, Comparability, and Color, Or: How to Have Your Cake and Eat It, Too. Minds and Machines 25 (2):149-175.
    Data about perceptual variation motivate the ecumenicist view that distinct color representations are mutually compatible. On the other hand, data about agreement and disagreement motivate making distinct color representations mutually incompatible. Prima facie, these desiderata appear to conflict. I’ll lay out and assess two strategies for managing the conflict—color relationalism, and the self-locating property theory of color—with the aim of deciding how best to have your cake and eat it, too.
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  26. added 2016-04-21
    Mazviita Chirimuuta (2015). The Self-Locating Property Theory of Color. Minds and Machines 25 (2):133-147.
    The paper reviews the empirical evidence for highly significant variation across perceivers in hue perception and argues that color physicalism cannot accommodate this variability. Two views that can accommodate the individual differences in hue perception are considered: the self-locating property theory, according to which colors are self-locating properties, and color relationalism, according to which colors are relations to perceivers and viewing conditions. It is subsequently argued that on a plausible rendition of the two views, the self-locating theory (...)
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  27. added 2016-04-21
    Mazviita Chirimuuta (2015). Colour Layering and Colour Relationalism. Minds and Machines 25 (2):177-191.
    Colour Relationalism asserts that colours are non-intrinsic or inherently relational properties of objects, properties that depend not only on a target object but in addition on some relation that object bears to other objects. The most powerful argument for Relationalism infers the inherently relational character of colour from cases in which one’s experience of a colour contextually depends on one’s experience of other colours. Experienced colour layering—say looking at grass through a tinted window and experiencing opaque green through transparent grey—demands (...)
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  28. added 2016-04-21
    Mazviita Chirimuuta (2015). Colour Physicalism, Naïve Realism, and the Argument From Structure. Minds and Machines 25 (2):193-212.
    Colours appear to instantiate a number of structural properties: for instance, they stand in distinctive relations of similarity and difference, and admit of a fundamental distinction into unique and binary. Accounting for these structural properties is often taken to present a serious problem for physicalist theories of colour. This paper argues that a prominent attempt by Byrne and Hilbert to account for the structural properties of the colours, consistent with the claim that colours are types of surface spectral reflectance, is (...)
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  29. added 2016-04-21
    Irene Berra (2014). An Evolutionary Ockham's Razor to Reciprocity. Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 5:01258.
    Reciprocal altruism implies delayed payoffs by definition. It might therefore seem logical to assume that limited memory, calculation, and planning capacities have constrained the evolution of reciprocity in non-human animals. Here I will argue that this is not the case. First, I will show that the emotional track of past interactions is enough to motivate and maintain reciprocity over longer timespans. Second, I will propose a developmental pathway of this system of emotional bookkeeping. In particular, the neuropeptide modulation underlying mother-infant (...)
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  30. added 2016-04-20
    Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Brittany Nelson (forthcoming). Experimental Philosophy Needs to Matter: Reply to Andow and Cova. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  31. added 2016-04-20
    Will Davies (forthcoming). Externalist Psychiatry. Analysis.
    Psychiatry widely assumes an internalist biomedical model of mental illness. I argue that many of psychiatry’s diagnostic categories involve an implicit commitment to constitutive externalism about mental illness. Some of these categories are socially externalist in nature.
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  32. added 2016-04-20
    Silvia Felletti & Fabio Paglieri (forthcoming). The Illusionist and the Folk: On the Role of Conscious Planning in Intentionality Judgments. Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    Illusionism is a prominent hypothesis about action control, according to which acts that we consider voluntary are nevertheless caused by unconscious brain events, and thus our subjective experience of consciously willing them is ultimately illusory. Illusionism can be understood as either an ontological thesis or a phenomenological claim, but both versions are vulnerable to a line of attack based on the role of long-term planning in action control. According to this objection, the evidence upon which illusionism rests is confined to (...)
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  33. added 2016-04-18
    Uwe Peters (2016). Human Thinking, Shared Intentionality, and Egocentric Biases. Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):299-312.
    The paper briefly summarises and critiques Tomasello’s A Natural History of Human Thinking. After offering an overview of the book, the paper focusses on one particular part of Tomasello’s proposal on the evolution of uniquely human thinking and raises two points of criticism against it. One of them concerns his notion of thinking. The other pertains to empirical findings on egocentric biases in communication.
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  34. added 2016-04-17
    Victoria Y. Allison-Bolger (2016). Locating Thought Insertion on the Map of Ordinary Thinking. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (3):235-238.
    In her account of thought insertion, Pedrini follows the prevailing view that it is an error about ‘who is thinking a thought.’ This view is based on a particular characterization of thinking as analogous to physical actions, where an object can be made, possessed, moved about, and put in and out of containers. This picture is well-suited for explaining thought insertion where the speaker talks of having the thoughts of others put into his mind. The question, ‘Who is (...)
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  35. added 2016-04-17
    Matthew Parrott (2016). Explaining Inserted Thoughts. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (3):239-242.
    It seems to be impossible for a person to have introspective access to thoughts that are not her own. Yet, although first-personal conscious awareness of a particular thought is normally sufficient for being its owner, some schizophrenic subjects report being conscious of thoughts that are not theirs. This suggests that, contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, thought ownership is not a necessary condition for consciously experiencing a thought. Because what schizophrenics report is thus rather difficult to reconcile with standard philosophical conceptions of (...)
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  36. added 2016-04-17
    Patrizia Pedrini (2016). On the Pre-Reflective Perplexity of a Schizophrenic Thinker. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (3):243-245.
    I thank Dr. Matthew Parrott and Dr. V.Y. Allison-Bolger very much for their valuable comments on my paper. They have given me the chance to reflect further on the account of thought insertion I propose, and I respond to them with enthusiasm. I also thank the Editor of this journal for arranging this discussion and for giving me the opportunity to reply. Both Dr. Parrott and Dr. Allison-Bolger are concerned about whether my account is fundamentally tenable. They suggest that I (...)
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  37. added 2016-04-17
    Wayne Christensen, Kath Bicknell, Doris McIlwain & John Sutton (2015). The Sense of Agency and its Role in Strategic Control for Expert Mountain Bikers. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2 (3):340-353.
    Much work on the sense of agency has focused either on abnormal cases, such as delusions of control, or on simple action tasks in the laboratory. Few studies address the nature of the sense of agency in complex natural settings, or the effect of skill on the sense of agency. Working from 2 case studies of mountain bike riding, we argue that the sense of agency in high-skill individuals incorporates awareness of multiple causal influences on action outcomes. This allows fine-grained (...)
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  38. added 2016-04-17
    Doris J. F. McIllwain & John Sutton (2015). Methods for Measuring Breadth and Depth of Knowledge. In Damion Farrow & Joe Baker (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Sport Expertise.
    In elite sport, the advantages demonstrated by expert performers over novices are sometimes due in part to their superior physical fitness or to their greater technical precision in executing specialist motor skills. However at the very highest levels, all competitors typically share extraordinary physical capacities and have supremely well-honed techniques. Among the extra factors which can differentiate between the best performers, psychological skills are paramount. These range from the capacities to cope under pressure and to bounce back from setbacks, to (...)
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  39. added 2016-04-16
    Feraz Azhar (forthcoming). Polytopes as Vehicles of Informational Content in Feedforward Neural Networks. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    Localizing content in neural networks provides a bridge to understanding the way in which the brain stores and processes information. In this paper, I propose the existence of polytopes in the state space of the hidden layer of feedforward neural networks as vehicles of content. I analyze these geometrical structures from an information-theoretic point of view, invoking mutual information to help define the content stored within them. I establish how this proposal addresses the problem of misclassification and provide a novel (...)
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  40. added 2016-04-16
    Maarten Boudry & Jerry Coyne (forthcoming). Fakers, Fanatics, and False Dilemmas: Reply to Van Leeuwen. Philosophical Psychology:1-6.
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  41. added 2016-04-16
    James Tartaglia (forthcoming). Response to Darragh Byrne’s “Do Phenomenal Concepts Misrepresent?”. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
    I begin by summarizing my view of the progression that occurred from the 1950s to the 1990s on the topic of physicalism and, in terms of this, present an overview of the reconciliation I was attempting in “Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.” I then address Byrne’s two main arguments. In the case of the first, I show that his argument turns on a third-person conception of appearance which is not the one addressed in the debates in question, and argue that functionalism is (...)
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  42. added 2016-04-16
    Stanley B. Klein (forthcoming). Lost Feeling of Ownership of One’s Mental States: The Importance of Situating Patient R.B.'s Pathology in the Context of Contemporary Theory and Empiricism. Philosophical Psychology:1-4.
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  43. added 2016-04-16
    Maarten Boudry & Jerry Coyne (forthcoming). Disbelief in Belief: On the Cognitive Status of Supernatural Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    Religious people seem to believe things that range from the somewhat peculiar to the utterly bizarre. Or do they? According to a new paper by Neil Van Leeuwen, religious “credence” is nothing like mundane factual belief. It has, he claims, more in common with fictional imaginings. Religious folk do not really “believe”—in the ordinary sense of the word—what they profess to believe. Like fictional imaginings, but unlike factual beliefs, religious credences are activated only within specific settings. We argue that Van (...)
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  44. added 2016-04-16
    Rebecca Roache (forthcoming). Memory and Mineness in Personal Identity. Philosophical Psychology:1-11.
    Stanley Klein and Shaun Nichols describe the case of patient R.B., whose memories lacked the sense of “mineness” usually conveyed by memory. Klein and Nichols take R.B.’s case to show that the sense of mineness is merely a contingent feature of memory, which they see as raising two problems for memory-based accounts of personal identity. First, they see it as potentially undermining the appeal of memory-based accounts. Second, they take it to show that the conception of quasi-memory that underpins many (...)
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  45. added 2016-04-16
    Manolo Martínez (forthcoming). Response to Leahy. Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  46. added 2016-04-14
    Luis M. Augusto (2016). Lost in Dissociation: The Main Paradigms in Unconscious Cognition. Consciousness and Cognition 42:293-310.
    Contemporary studies in unconscious cognition are essentially founded on dissociation, i.e., on how it dissociates with respect to conscious mental processes and representations. This is claimed to be in so many and diverse ways that one is often lost in dissociation. In order to reduce this state of confusion we here carry out two major tasks: based on the central distinction between cognitive processes and representations, we identify and isolate the main dissociation paradigms; we then critically analyze their key (...)
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  47. added 2016-04-14
    Massimiliano Cappuccio (2015). Putting Pressure on Theories of Choking: Towards an Expanded Perspective on Breakdown in Skilled Performance. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):253-293.
    There is a widespread view that well-learned skills are automated, and that attention to the performance of these skills is damaging because it disrupts the automatic processes involved in their execution. This idea serves as the basis for an account of choking in high pressure situations. On this view, choking is the result of self-focused attention induced by anxiety. Recent research in sports psychology has produced a significant body of experimental evidence widely interpreted as supporting this account (...)
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  48. added 2016-04-14
    Massimiliano Cappuccio (2015). Choking and The Yips. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):295-308.
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  49. added 2016-04-14
    Massimiliano Cappuccio (2015). Know-How, Procedural Knowledge, and Choking Under Pressure. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):361-378.
    I examine two explanatory models of choking: the representationalist model and the anti-representationalist model. The representationalist model is based largely on Anderson's ACT model of procedural knowledge and is developed by Masters, Beilock and Carr. The antirepresentationalist model is based on dynamical models of cognition and embodied action and is developed by Dreyfus who employs an antirepresentational view of know-how. I identify the models' similarities and differences. I then suggest that Dreyfus is wrong to believe representational activity requires reflection (...)
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  50. added 2016-04-14
    Massimiliano Cappuccio (2015). Is Monitoring One’s Actions Causally Relevant to Choking Under Pressure? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):379-395.
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