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  1. A. V. Afonso (ed.) (2006). Consciousness, Society, and Values. Indian Institute of Advanced Study.
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  2. Ian W. Alexander (1985). French Literature and the Philosophy of Consciousness: Phenomenological Essays. St. Martin's Press.
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  3. Stephen Asma, Jaak Panksepp, Rami Gabriel & Glennon Curran (2012). Philosophical Implications of Affective Neuroscience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4):6-48.
    These papers are based on a Symposium at the COGSCI Conference in 2010. 1. Naturalizing the Mammalian Mind (Jaak Panksepp) 2. Modularity in Cognitive Psychology and Affective Neuroscience (Rami Gabriel) 3. Affective Neuroscience and the Philosophy of Self (Stephen Asma and Tom Greif) 4. Affective Neuroscience and Law (Glennon Curran and Rami Gabriel).
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  4. Kati Balog (2009). Phenomenal Concepts. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...)
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  5. Gary Bartlett (2014). Internalism and the Snapshot Conception of Phenomenal Experience: A Reply to Fisher. Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):652-664.
    Justin Fisher (2007) has presented a novel argument designed to prove that all forms of mental internalism are false. I aim to show that the argument fails with regard to internalism about phenomenal experiences. The argument tacitly assumes a certain view about the ontology of phenomenal experience, which (inspired by Alva Noe) I call the “snapshot conception of phenomenal experience.” After clarifying what the snapshot conception involves, I present Fisher with a dilemma. If he rejects the snapshot conception, then his (...)
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  6. Gary Bartlett (2014). On Phenomenal Character and Petri Dishes. Journal of Philosophical Research 39:67-74.
    Michael Tye (2007) argues that phenomenal character cannot be an intrinsic microphysical property of experiences (or be necessitated by intrinsic microphysical properties) because this would entail that experience could occur in a chunk of tissue in a Petri dish. Laudably, Tye attempts to defend the latter claim rather than resting content with the counter-intuitiveness of the associated image. However, I show that his defense is problematic in several ways, and ultimately that it still amounts to no more than an appeal (...)
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  7. Joe Becker (2008). Conceptualizing Mind and Consciousness: Using Constructivist Ideas to Transcend the Physical Bind. Human Development 51 (3):165-189.
    Philosophers and scientists seeking to conceptualize consciousness, and subjective experience in particular, have focused on sensation and perception, and have emphasized binding – how a percept holds together. Building on a constructivist approach to conception centered on separistic-holistic complexes incorporating multiple levels of abstraction, the present approach reconceptualizes binding and opens a new path to theorizing the emergence of consciousness. It is proposed that all subjective experience involves multiple levels of abstraction, a central feature of conception. This modifies the prevalent (...)
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  8. Joe Becker (2004). Reconsidering the Role of Overcoming Perturbations in Cognitive Development: Constructivism and Consicousness. Human Development 47 (2):77-93.
    Constructivist theory must choose between the hypothesis that felt perturbation drives cognitive development (the priority of felt perturbation) and the hypothesis that the particular process that eventually produces new cognitive structures first produces felt perturbation (the continuity of process). There is ambivalence in Piagetian theory regarding this choice. The prevalent account of constructivist theory adopts the priority of felt perturbation. However, on occasion Piaget has explicitly rejected it, simultaneously endorsing the continuity of process. First, I explicate and support this latter (...)
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  9. Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science. Philosophical Topics 44 (2).
    Pictures are 2D surfaces designed to elicit 3D-scene-representing experiences from their viewers. In this essay, I argue that philosophers have tended to underestimate the relevance of research in vision science to understanding the nature of pictorial experience or ‘seeing-in’, to use Richard Wollheim’s familiar expression. Both the deeply entrenched methodology of virtual psychophysics as well as empirical studies of pictorial space perception provide compelling support for the view that seeing-in and seeing face-to-face are experiences of the same psychological, explanatory kind. (...)
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  10. Susan Brower-Toland (2012). Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (17):1-29.
    My aim in this paper is to advance our understanding of medieval approaches to consciousness by focusing on a particular but, as it seems to me, representative medieval debate. The debate in question is between William Ockham and Walter Chatton over the existence of what these two thinkers refer to as “reflexive intellective intuitive cognition”. Although framed in the technical terminology of late-medieval cognitive psychology, the basic question at issue between them is this: Does the mind (or “intellect”) cognize its (...)
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  11. Robert G. Burton (2005). A Multilevel, Interdisciplinary Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):531-543.
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  12. Alex Byrne, David Hilbert & Susanna Siegel (2007). Do We See More Than We Can Access? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (5-6):501-502.
    Short commentary on a paper by Ned Block.
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  13. Peter Carruthers (2001). Who is Blind to Blindsight? Psyche 7 (4).
    This paper uses the explanation of blindsight generated by a two-systems theory of vision in order to set Siewert a dilemma. Either his blindsight examples are modelled on actual blindsight, in which case certain reductive theories of phenomenal consciousness will have no difficulty in accommodating them. Or they are intended to be purely imaginary, in which case they will have no force against a reductive naturalist.
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  14. Gregg Caruso (2015). If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, Then People Are Less Responsible Than We Think. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):49-60.
  15. Gregg Caruso (2015). Précis of Neil Levy’s Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):7-15.
  16. Gregg Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. In this book I examine both the traditional philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will, as well as recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to consciousness (...)
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  17. Michael Cerullo (2011). Integrated Information Theory A Promising but Ultimately Incomplete Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):11-12.
    Tononi has proposed a fundamental theory of consciousness he terms Integrated Information Theory (IIT). IIT purports to explain the quantity of conscious experience by linking it with integrated information: information shared by the system as a whole and quantified by adopting a modified version of Shannon's definition of information. Since the fundamental aspect of IIT is information the theory allows for the multiple realizability of consciousness. While there are several concepts within IIT that need further theoretical development, the main failings (...)
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  18. David J. Chalmers, On ``Consciousness and the Philosophers''.
    John Searle's review of my book The Conscious Mind appeared in the March 6, 1997 edition of the New York Review of Books. I replied in a letter printed in their May 15, 1997 edition, and Searle's response appeared simultaneously. I set up this web page so that interested people can see my reply to Searle in turn, and to give access to other relevant materials.
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  19. David J. Chalmers (1997). Reply to Mulhauser's Review of The Conscious Mind. Psyche.
    First, I should clarify the notion of "taking consciousness seriously", which serves as a premise in my work. Mulhauser characterizes this as the assumption that no cognitive theory of consciousness will suffice. The latter assumption would indeed beg some crucial questions, but it is not the assumption that I make. I make an assumption about the problem of consciousness, not about any solution. To quote (p. xii): Throughout the book, I have assumed that consciousness exists, and that to redefine the (...)
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  20. David J. Chalmers (1997). Response to Searle. New York Review of Books 44 (8).
    In my book _The Conscious Mind_ , I deny a number of claims that John Searle finds "obvious", and I make some claims that he finds "absurd". But if the mind/body problem has taught us anything, it is that nothing about consciousness is obvious, and that one person's obvious truth is another person's absurdity. So instead of throwing around this sort of language, it is best to examine the claims themselves and the arguments that I give for them, to see (...)
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  21. Marc Champagne (2009). Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission Instead of Reification. Dialogue 48 (1):145-183.
    ABSTRACT: This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the “explanatory gap” that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel’s revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block’s controversial claim that we should countenance a “phenomenal-consciousness” which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy (...)
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  22. Tony Cheng (2014). Phenomenal Specificity. Dissertation, University College London
    The essay is a study of phenomenal specificity. By ‘phenomenal’ here we mean conscious awareness, which needs to be cashed out in detail throughout the study. Intuitively, one dimension of phenomenology is along with specificity. For example it seems appropriate to say that one’s conscious awareness in the middle of the visual field is in some sense more specific than the awareness in the periphery under normal circumstances. However, it is difficult to characterise the nature of phenomenal specificity in an (...)
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  23. Tony Cheng (2012). Consciousness and the Flow of Attention. Dissertation, City University of New York, Graduate Center
    Visual phenomenology is highly illusive. One attempt to operationalize or to measure it is to use ‘cognitive accessibility’ to track its degrees. However, if Ned Block is right about the overflow phenomenon, then this way of operationalizing visual phenomenology is bound to fail. This thesis does not directly challenge Block’s view; rather it motivates a notion of cognitive accessibility different from Block’s one, and argues that given this notion, degrees of visual phenomenology can be tracked by degrees of cognitive accessibility. (...)
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  24. Tony Cheng (2011). Review of The Character of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Metapsychology 15 (6).
    Recently philosopher David Chalmers published his second book. As the first one, the main theme is consciousness. This collection of papers is divided into six parts by the author. They are the problems, the science, the metaphysics, the concepts, the contents, and the unity of consciousness. They cover most aspects of consciousness discussed in philosophy of mind. Part II (the science) and part IV (concepts) can be seen as the epistemology of consciousness; part V (the contents) and part VI (the (...)
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  25. Andy Clark (2000). Phenomenal Immediacy and the Doors of Sensation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):21-24.
    [opening paragraph]: Nicholas Humphrey offers a refreshingly progressive recipe for laying wide the doors of sensation: for understanding the peculiar features of qualitative or sensational experience in terms of the physical or functional facts about brains, bodies and environments. The key move in the treatment is the promotion of a kind of co- ordinated, double-sided tweaking: a careful restatement, with some amendments, of each side of the elusive identity statement ‘sensational property x = brain state y'. Only after such restatements (...)
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  26. Arthur B. Cody (1994). Hannay's Consciousness. Inquiry 37 (1):117-132.
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  27. E. T. Cokely & A. Feltz (2010). Adaptive Diversity and Misbelieve. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32:516.
    Although it makes some progress, McKay & Dennett’s (M&D’s) proposal is limited because (1) the argument for adaptive misbelief is not new, (2) arguments overextend the evidence provided, and (3) the alleged sufficient conditions are not as prohibitive as suggested. We offer alternative perspectives and evidence, including individual differences research, indicating that adaptive misbeliefs are likely much more widespread than implied.
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  28. Ed D'Angelo (2012). Anarchism and the Beats. In Sharin Elkholy (ed.), The Philosophy of the Beats. The University Press of Kentucky 227-242.
    The paper charts both the interpersonal connections between historical anarchist figures and the beat poets as well as the philosophical similarities between them. Almost all the beat poets were anarchists, though their politics was secondary to their attempts to transform consciousness. Among the anarchists, the romantic socialist Gustav Landauer, who was especially popular in post-war American anarchist circles, came closest to the political perspective of the beat poets. Like the beats, Landauer was a poet, a pacifist, an anarchist, a communitarian, (...)
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  29. Daniel C. Dennett (2005). Two Steps Closer on Consciousness. In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge University Press
    For a solid quarter century Paul Churchland and I have been wheeling around in the space of work on consciousness, and though from up close it may appear that we =ve been rather vehemently opposed to each other =s position, from the bird =s eye view, we are moving in a rather tight spiral within the universe of contested views, both staunch materialists, interested in the same phenomena and the same empirical theories of those phenomena, but differing only over where (...)
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  30. John M. DePoe (2013). RoboMary, Blue Banana Tricks, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness: A Critique of Daniel Dennett's Apology for Physicalism. Philosophia Christi 15 (1):119-132.
    Daniel Dennett has argued that consciousness can be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of physical entities and processes. In some of his most recent publications, he has made this case by casting doubts on purely conceptual thought experiments and proposing his own thought experiments to "pump" the intuition that consciousness can be physical. In this paper, I will summarize Dennett's recent defenses of physicalism, followed by a careful critique of his position. The critique presses two flaws in Dennett's defense (...)
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  31. Willem deVries (2011). Sellars Vs. McDowell on the Structure of Sensory Consciousness. Diametros 27 (27):47-63.
    I argue that John McDowell’s attempt to refute Wilfrid Sellars’s two-component analysis of perceptual experience and substitute for it a conception according to which perceptual experience is the “conceptual shaping of sensory consciousness” fails. McDowell does not recognize the subtle dialectic in Sellars’s thought between transcendental and empirical considerations in favor of a substantive conception of sense impressions, and McDowell’s own proposal seems to empty the notion of sensory consciousness of any real significance.
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  32. Fred Dretske (2001). First Person Warrant: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 7 (11).
    I agree with Siewert's claims about the special character and importance of phenomenal consciousness and the impossibility of providing a satisfactory functionalist reduction of it. I question, however, his dismissal of a representational theory of conscious experience. I also question his account of how conscious agents are supposed to know, or enjoy first person warrant, for their belief that they are conscious.
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  33. George Dreyfus & Evan Thompson (2007). Philosophical Theories of Consciousness: Asian Perspectives. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge
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  34. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Having It Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not Otherworldly. Philosophia 41 (4):1181-1203.
    I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which supports Chalmers’ objection. On the one (...)
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  35. Richard M. Gale, William James on the Misery and Glory of Consciousness.
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  36. Rocco J. Gennaro (2008). Are There Pure Conscious Events? In Chandana Chakrabarti & Gordon Haist (eds.), Revisiting Mysticism. Cambridge Scholars Press 100--120.
    There has been much discussion about the nature and even existence of so-called “pure conscious events” (PCEs). PCEs are often described as mental events which are non-conceptual and lacking all experiential content (Forman 1990). For a variety of reasons, a number of authors have questioned both the accuracy of such a characterization and even the very existence of PCEs (Katz 1978, Bagger 1999). In this chapter, I take a somewhat different, but also critical, approach to the nature and possibility of (...)
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  37. Brie Gertler (2001). The Relationship Between Phenomenality and Intentionality: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 7 (17).
    Charles Siewert offers a persuasive argument to show that the presence of certain phenomenal features logically suffices for the presence of certain intentional ones. He claims that this shows that phenomenal features are inherently intentional. I argue that he has not established the latter thesis, even if we grant the logical sufficiency claim. For he has not ruled out a rival alternative interpretation of the relevant data, namely, that intentional features are inherently phenomenal.
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  38. Alfred Gierer, (2016) Meister Eckhart, der "Seelengrund", und das Verständnis von Bewusstsein.
    In diesem Essay geht es um ein religionsfreundliches Selbst- und Weltverständnis, das die Reichweite der menschlichen Vernunft ebenso wie deren intrinsische Grenzen achtet. In dem weiten Feld wählen wir hier Betrachtungen des mittelalterlichen Philosophen und Theologen Meister Eckhart aus, beginnen aber mit einigen Grundthesen zur Beziehung von Wissenschaft, menschlichem Bewusstsein und Religion. Modern science led to a far reaching understanding of the natural order, and yet it does not, in principle, provide a complete explanation of human consciousness; the latter is (...)
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  39. Alfred Gierer, (2015) Scientific Rationality, Human Consciousness, and Pro-Religious Ideas.
    The essay discusses immanent versus transcendent concepts in the context of the art of living, as well as the understanding of human consciousness in the context of religion. Science provides us with a far reaching understanding of natural processes, including biological evolution, but also with deep insights into its own intrinsic limitations. This is consistent with more than one interpretation on the “metatheoretical“, that is on the philosophical and cultural level, including liberal, enlightened forms of religion as well as agnostic (...)
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  40. Alfred Gierer (2009). Science, Religion and Basic Biological Issues That Are Open to Interpretation. English Translation Of: Preprint 388, MPI for History of Science.
    This is an English translation of my essay: Alfred Gierer (2009) Wissenschaft, Religion und die deutungsoffenen Grundfragen der Biologie. Mpi for the History of Science, preprint 388, 1-21, also in philpapers. Range and limits of science are given by the universal validity of physical laws, and by intrinsic limitations, especially in self-referential contexts. In particular, neurobiology should not be expected to provide a full understanding of consciousness and the mind. Science cannot provide, by itself, an unambiguous interpretation of the natural (...)
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  41. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1998). Sensations and Grain Processes. In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins
  42. Steven Gross, Knowledge of Meaning, Conscious and Unconscious. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication.
    This paper motivates two bases for ascribing propositional semantic knowledge (or something knowledgelike): first, because it’s necessary to rationalize linguistic action; and, second, because it’s part of an empirical theory that would explain various aspects of linguistic behavior. The semantic knowledge ascribed on these two bases seems to differ in content, epistemic status, and cognitive role. This raises the question: how are they related, if at all? The bulk of the paper addresses this question. It distinguishes a variety of answers (...)
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  43. Johannes Haag (ed.) (2001). Der Blick nach innen. Wahrnehmung und Introspektion. Mentis.
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  44. John F. Halpin, Hard Problems, Interpretive Concepts, and Humean Laws.
    Conceptual problems for consciousness are analogous to a Humean’s problem with scientific laws. Just as consciousness is often seen to involve further facts beyond the physical, laws would seem to involve reality beyond the Humean’s occurrent facts1. I will attempt to show that a Lewis-style best-system solution to the problem for laws should be applied to the related problem for consciousness. The leading idea of a best-system account is that law and chance claims are true in virtue of their place (...)
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  45. Alastair Hannay (1994). Comments on Honderich, Sprigge, Dreyfus and Rubin, and Elster. Synthese 98 (1):95-112.
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  46. Rom Harré (2012). Social Construction and Consciousness. Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (20):13-36.
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  47. Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki & Pauliina Remes (2007). Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Springer.
  48. David K. Herzberger (1976). Ortega y Gasset and the "Critics of Consciousness". Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 34 (4):455-460.
  49. Susan L. Hurley, The Space of Reasons Vs. The Space of Inference: Reply to Noe.
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  50. Susan L. Hurley, Is There a Substantive Disagreement Here? Reply to Chemero and Cordeiro.
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