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  1. Adrian Alsmith (2014). Eric Schwitzgebel: Perplexities of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):497-501.
    A glance at the contents of this book might be enough to persuade that it is absolutely required reading for anyone interested in the study of consciousness. The discussion is replete with insight into a number of neglected topics: colour in dream experience (chapter 1), echolocation in auditory experience (chapter 4) and closed-eye visualisations (chapter 8). More familiar themes such as the spatial qualities presented in visual experience (chapter 2), visual imagery (chapter 3), the introspectionist movement (chapter 5), conscious attention (...)
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  2. Marcus Anthony (2008). The Case for Integrated Intelligence. World Futures 64 (4):233 – 253.
    In this article I develop a case for a theory of intelligence incorporating transpersonal dimensions, namely integrated intelligence. Some recent expanded theories of intelligence move into concepts like creativity, wisdom, and emotional intelligence. Yet they remain embedded within mainstream intelligence theory and its reductionist and materialist presuppositions. Although various theorists in consciousness theory have developed transpersonal models that are beginning to be discussed in some mainstream circles, mainstream intelligence theory is yet to address the broader implications of this. Recent changes (...)
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  3. Michael V. Antony (2006). Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.
    An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct , then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false.
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  4. István Aranyosi (2012). Should We Fear Quantum Torment? Ratio 25 (3):249-259.
    The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely (...)
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  5. William Arkle (1974). A Geography of Consciousness. London,Spearman.
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  6. Robert L. Arrington (1999). Machines, Consciousness, and Thought. Idealistic Studies 29 (3):231-243.
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  7. Bernard J. Baars (2006). Conscious Cognition and Blackboard Architectures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (1):70-71.
    van der Velde & de Kamps make a case for neural blackboard architectures to address four questions raised by human language. Unfortunately, they neglect a sizable literature relating blackboard architectures to other fundamental cognitive questions, specifically consciousness and voluntary control. Called “global workspace theory,” this literature integrates a large body of brain and behavioral evidence to come to converging conclusions.
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  8. Norman Bacrac (2004). Consciousness. Philosophy Now 48:44-44.
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  9. T. Bakhman (2007). Experimental Phenomena of Consciousness: A Brief Dictionary. Oxford University Press.
    Experimental Phenomena of Consciousness is the definitive collection of consciousness phenomena in which awareness emerges as an experimental variable. With its comprehensive yet succinct entries, arranged alphabetically, this dictionary will be a valuable reference tool for libraries and researchers at all levels in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy, who are investigating consciousness, cognition, perception, and attention. It will also be an important addition to the reading lists of courses on consciousness and cognition. Most entries include illustrations and a list of references (...)
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  10. William Banks (ed.) (2009). The Elsevier Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.
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  11. Tim Bayne, Agency as a Marker of Consciousness.
    One of the central problems in the study of consciousness concerns the ascription of consciousness. We want to know whether certain kinds of creatures—such as non-human animals, artificially created organisms, and even members of our own species who have suffered severe brain-damage—are conscious, and we want to know what kinds of conscious states these creatures might be in if indeed they are conscious. The identification of accurate markers of consciousness is essential if the science of consciousness is to have any (...)
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  12. Tim Bayne, Consciousness.
    After being sorely neglected for some time, consciousness is well and truly back on the philosophical and scientific agenda. This entry provides a whistle-stop tour of some recent debates surrounding consciousness, with a particular focus on issues relevant to the scientific study of consciousness. The first half of this entry (the first to fourth sections) focuses on clarifying the explanandum of a science of consciousness and identifying constraints on an adequate account of consciousness; the second half of this entry (the (...)
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  13. Timothy Bayne (2000). Charles Siewert, The Significance of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 20:217-221.
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  14. Anthony F. Beavers (2009). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):533-537.
    The Phenomenological Mind, by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, is part of a recent initiative to show that phenomenology, classically conceived as the tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and not as mere introspection, contributes something important to cognitive science. (For other examples, see “References” below.) Phenomenology, of course, has been a part of cognitive science for a long time. It implicitly informs the works of Andy Clark (e.g. 1997) and John Haugeland (e.g. 1998), and Hubert Dreyfus explicitly uses it (e.g. (...)
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  15. Ned Block (1999). Ridiculing Social Constructivism About Phenomenal Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):199-201.
    Money is a cultural construction, leukemia is not. In which category does phenomenal consciousness fit? The issue is clarified by a distinction between what cultural phenomena causally influence and what culture constitutes. Culture affects phenomenal consciousness but it is ridiculous to suppose that culture constitutes it, even in part.
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  16. Ned Block (1996). How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In João Branquinho (ed.), [Book Chapter] (Unpublished). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1.
    There are two concepts of consciousness that are easy to confuse with one another, access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. However, just as the concepts of water and H2O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle’s reasoning about the function of consciousness goes (...)
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  17. Tyler Burge (2007). Psychology Supports Independence of Phenomenal Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):500-501.
    Inference-to-best-explanation from psychological evidence supports the view that phenomenal consciousness in perceptual exposures occurs before limited aspects of that consciousness are retained in working memory. Independently of specific neurological theory, psychological considerations indicate that machinery producing phenomenal consciousness is independent of machinery producing working memory, hence independent of access to higher cognitive capacities.
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  18. Trigant Burrow (1929). The Social Basis of Consciousness: A Study in Organic Psychology, Based Upon a Synthetic and Societal Concept of the Neuroses. Philosophical Review 38 (1):94-98.
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  19. Havi Hannah Carel (2013). Illness, Phenomenology, and Philosophical Method. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (4):345-357.
    In this article, I propose that illness is philosophically revealing and can be used to explore human experience. I suggest that illness is a limit case of embodied experience. By pushing embodied experience to its limit, illness sheds light on normal experience, revealing its ordinary and thus overlooked structure. Illness produces a distancing effect, which allows us to observe normal human behavior and cognition via their pathological counterpart. I suggest that these characteristics warrant illness a philosophical role that has not (...)
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  20. Alan Carling (2000). Boehms Golden Age: Equality and Consciousness in Early Human Society. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
    Boehm's interesting hypothesis concerning the origins of human morality within egalitarian hunter-gatherer society relies on a one-sided view of the genetic inheritance of proto-humans, and on an over-optimistic view of the egalitarian effects of evolving human consciousness. The four papers as a whole would benefit from a richer conception of evolved human nature, involving the interaction of normative, affective, and rational elements.
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  21. Richard A. Carlson (2002). Mentalism, Information, and Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):333-333.
    The target article addresses important empirical issues, but adopts a nonanalytic stance toward consciousness and presents the mentalistic view as a very radical position that rules out informational description of anything other than conscious mental states. A better mentalistic strategy is to show how the structure of some informational states is both constitutive of consciousness and necessary for psychological functions.
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  22. Gregg Caruso (2008). Consciousness and Free Will: A Critique of the Argument From Introspection. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.
    One of the main libertarian arguments in support of free will is the argument from introspection. This argument places a great deal of faith in our conscious feeling of freedom and our introspective abilities. People often infer their own freedom from their introspective phenomenology of freedom. It is here argued that from the fact that I feel myself free, it does not necessarily follow that I am free. I maintain that it is our mistaken belief in the transparency and infallibility (...)
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  23. Cristiano Castelfranchi (2014). Minds as Social Institutions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):121-143.
    I will first discuss how social interactions organize, coordinate, and specialize as “artifacts,” tools; how these tools are not only for coordination but for achieving something, for some outcome (goal/function), for a collective work. In particular, I will argue that these artifacts specify (predict and prescribe) the mental contents of the participants, both in terms of beliefs and acceptances and in terms of motives and plans. We have to revise the behavioristic view of “scripts” and “roles”; when we play a (...)
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  24. Monima Chadha (2015). Meditation and Unity of Consciousness: A Perspective From Buddhist Epistemology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):111-127.
    The paper argues that empirical work on Buddhist meditation has an impact on Buddhist epistemology, in particular their account of unity of consciousness. I explain the Buddhist account of unity of consciousness and show how it relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of unity of consciousness. The contemporary accounts of unity of consciousness are closely integrated with the discussion of neural correlates of consciousness. The conclusion of the paper suggests a new direction in the search for neural correlates of state consciousness (...)
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  25. Axel Cleeremans, A Short Review of 'Consciousness in Action'.
    Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in which (...)
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  26. Matthijs Cornelissen (ed.) (2001). Consciousness and its Transformation: Papers Presented at the Second International Conference on Integral Psychology. Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education.
  27. Erica Cosentino & Francesco Ferretti (2014). Communication as Navigation: A New Role for Consciousness in Language. Topoi 33 (1):263-274.
    Classical cognitive science has been characterized by an association with the computational theory of mind. Although this association has produced highly significant results, it has also limited the scope of scientific psychology. In this paper, we analyse the limits of the specific kind of computational model represented by the Chomskian-Fodorian tradition in the study of mind and language. In our opinion, the adhesion to the principle of formality imposed by this specific computational model has motivated the exclusion of consciousness in (...)
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  28. G. Watts Cunningham (1911). Self-Consciousness and Consciousness of Self. Mind 20 (80):530-537.
  29. J. E. Tomberg Desmedt (1995). Consciousness. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, Supplement 44:227-34.
  30. Ralph D. Ellis (1999). Why Isn't Consciousness Empirically Observable? Emotion, Self-Organization, and Nonreductive Physicalism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):391-402.
    Most versions of the knowledge argument say that, since scientists observing my brain wouldn't know what my consciousness "is like," consciousness isn't describable as a physical process. Although this argument unwarrantedly equates the physical with the empirically observable, we can conclude, not that consciousness is nonphysical but that consciousness isn't identical with anything empirically observable. But what kind of mind&endash;body relation would render possible this empirical inaccessibility of consciousness? Even if multiple realizability may allow a distinction between consciousness and its (...)
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  31. Frederick Karl Errington (1984). Manners and Meaning in West Sumatra the Social Context of Consciousness. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  32. B. T. Evans (1995). Implicit Learning, Consciousness, and the Psychology of Thinking. Thinking and Reasoning 1 (1):105 – 118.
  33. Warner Fite (1917). Consciousness--Where is It? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (11):281-288.
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  34. J. A. M. Fredericks (1969). Consciousness. In P. Vinken & G. Bruyn (eds.), Handbook of Clinical Neurology. North Holland.
  35. Robert Gordon, Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science.
    This paper supports the basic integrity of the folk psychological conception of consciousness and its importance in cognitive theorizing. Section 1 critically examines some proposed definitions of consciousness, and argues that the folk- psychological notion of phenomenal consciousness is not captured by various functional-relational definitions. Section 2 rebuts the arguments of several writers who challenge the very existence of phenomenal consciousness, or the coherence or tenability of the folk-psychological notion of awareness. Section 3 defends a significant role for phenomenal consciousness (...)
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  36. George Graham (2000). Ullin Thomas Place: 24 October 1924–2 January 2000. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1 (2):181-182.
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  37. Lorna Green (ed.) (2005). The Reign of the Holy Spirit, Christ-Self: I Am. iUniverse.
    The truth of human indentity in the consciousness universe.
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  38. Richard L. Gregory (1980). Regarding Consciousness. In Brian Josephson & Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (eds.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Pergamon Press.
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  39. Valerie Hardcastle (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. [REVIEW] Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (4):391-398.
    David Chalmers’ book The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory is well-written, though a bit repetitious. He follows the current major arguments for why materialist theories of consciousness can’t work and then advances his own dualistic theory of consciousness based on Shannon information partitions. There is much — probably too much — territory covered in this book, and in this review I hope to present a fair summary of what Chalmers believes and to offer some reasons why his (...)
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  40. William Henry Scott (1918). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 27 (1):1-20.
  41. Jay G. Hull, Laurie B. Slone, Karen B. Meteyer & Amanda R. Matthews (2002). The Nonconsciousness of Self-Consciousness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (2):406-424.
  42. Anthony Jack (2001). Paradigm Lost: Review of Lawrence Weiskrantz, Consciousness Lost and Found. [REVIEW] Mind and Language 16 (1):101-107.
  43. Hilla Jacobson-Horovitz (2003). What Matters in Phenomenal Consciousness: A Conative-Evaluative Account. Dissertation, Harvard University
    Current theories of phenomenal consciousness---theories, that is, of the felt or qualitative aspect of mental states---are often accused of leaving out the essential features of this phenomenon. Moreover, the opponents of these theories typically hold that their failure is not accidental. They argue either that the problem of phenomenal consciousness is unsolvable, or that we still lack even the conceptual resources needed for its solution. My dissertation challenges both the adequacy of current theories and the skeptical stance of their rivals. (...)
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  44. William James (1890). The Consciousness of Self. In The Principles of Psychology. Harvard University Press.
  45. Luis Jiménez (2002). Surfing on Consciousness, or, a Deliberately Shallow Outline of Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):342-342.
    By assuming that conscious states are the only constructs entitled to bear a cognitive status, while denying this status both to the learning processes and to their nonconscious outcomes, the SOC view leaves consciousness alone as the single tool to explain itself. This does not endow consciousness with any self-organizing properties, but rather, draws a deliberately shallow outline of cognition.
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  46. Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.) (2002). Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Consciousness is perhaps the most puzzling problem we humans face in trying to understand ourselves. It has been the subject of intense study for several decades, but, despite substantial progress, the most difficult problems have still not reached any generally agreed solution. Future research can start with this book. Eighteen original, specially written essays offer new angles on the subject. The contributors, who include many of the leading figures in philosophy of mind, discuss such central topics as intentionality, phenomenal content, (...)
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  47. David Kirsh (2009). Knowledge, Explicit Vs Implicit. Oxford Companion to Consciousness:397-402.
    In the scientific study of mind a distinction is drawn between explicit knowledge— knowledge that can be elicited from a subject by suitable inquiry or prompting, can be brought to consciousness, and externally expressed in words—and implicit knowledge—knowledge that cannot be elicited, cannot be made directly conscious, and can- not be articulated. Michael Polanyi (1967) argued that we usually ‘know more than we can say’. The part we can articulate is explicitly known; the part we cannot is implicit.
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  48. Ken Knisely, Peter Caws & Floyd Tesmer (2001). Consciousness: Dvd. Milk Bottle Productions.
    So who is that behind the face in the mirror? Better yet, what is that? What is the uncanny sense that one is an experiencing agent, a reflecting self? Can we explain consciousness? With Jay Lambert, Peter Caws, and Floyd Tesmer.
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  49. Uriah Kriegel (2004). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
    In recent philosophy of mind, it is often assumed that consciousness and self-consciousness are two separate phenomena. In this paper, I argue that this is not quite right. The argument proceeds in two phases. First, I draw a distinction between (i) being self-conscious of a thought that p and (ii) self-consciously thinking that p. I call the former transitive self-consciousness and the latter intransitive self-consciousness. I then argue that consciousness does depend on intransitive self-consciousness, and that the common reasons for (...)
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  50. Joel Krueger (2007). Consciousness. In John Lachs & Robert Talisse (eds.), Encyclopedia of American Philosophy. Routledge.
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