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  1. Adrian Alsmith (2014). Eric Schwitzgebel: Perplexities of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):497-501.
    A glance at the contents of this book might be enough to persuade that it is absolutely required reading for anyone interested in the study of consciousness. The discussion is replete with insight into a number of neglected topics: colour in dream experience (chapter 1), echolocation in auditory experience (chapter 4) and closed-eye visualisations (chapter 8). More familiar themes such as the spatial qualities presented in visual experience (chapter 2), visual imagery (chapter 3), the introspectionist movement (chapter 5), conscious attention (...)
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  2. Marcus Anthony (2008). The Case for Integrated Intelligence. World Futures 64 (4):233 – 253.
    In this article I develop a case for a theory of intelligence incorporating transpersonal dimensions, namely integrated intelligence. Some recent expanded theories of intelligence move into concepts like creativity, wisdom, and emotional intelligence. Yet they remain embedded within mainstream intelligence theory and its reductionist and materialist presuppositions. Although various theorists in consciousness theory have developed transpersonal models that are beginning to be discussed in some mainstream circles, mainstream intelligence theory is yet to address the broader implications of this. Recent changes (...)
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  3. Michael V. Antony (2006). Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.
    An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct (at least in respect of its sharpness), then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false.
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  4. István Aranyosi (2012). Should We Fear Quantum Torment? Ratio 25 (3):249-259.
    The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely (...)
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  5. Robert L. Arrington (1999). Machines, Consciousness, and Thought. Idealistic Studies 29 (3):231-243.
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  6. Bernard J. Baars (2006). Conscious Cognition and Blackboard Architectures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (1):70-71.
    van der Velde & de Kamps make a case for neural blackboard architectures to address four questions raised by human language. Unfortunately, they neglect a sizable literature relating blackboard architectures to other fundamental cognitive questions, specifically consciousness and voluntary control. Called “global workspace theory,” this literature integrates a large body of brain and behavioral evidence to come to converging conclusions.
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  7. T. Bakhman (2007). Experimental Phenomena of Consciousness: A Brief Dictionary. Oxford University Press.
    Experimental Phenomena of Consciousness is the definitive collection of consciousness phenomena in which awareness emerges as an experimental variable. With its comprehensive yet succinct entries, arranged alphabetically, this dictionary will be a valuable reference tool for libraries and researchers at all levels in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy, who are investigating consciousness, cognition, perception, and attention. It will also be an important addition to the reading lists of courses on consciousness and cognition. Most entries include illustrations and a list of references (...)
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  8. Tim Bayne, Agency as a Marker of Consciousness.
    One of the central problems in the study of consciousness concerns the ascription of consciousness. We want to know whether certain kinds of creatures—such as non-human animals, artificially created organisms, and even members of our own species who have suffered severe brain-damage—are conscious, and we want to know what kinds of conscious states these creatures might be in if indeed they are conscious. The identification of accurate markers of consciousness is essential if the science of consciousness is to have any (...)
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  9. Tim Bayne, Consciousness.
    After being sorely neglected for some time, consciousness is well and truly back on the philosophical and scientific agenda. This entry provides a whistle-stop tour of some recent debates surrounding consciousness, with a particular focus on issues relevant to the scientific study of consciousness. The first half of this entry (the first to fourth sections) focuses on clarifying the explanandum of a science of consciousness and identifying constraints on an adequate account of consciousness; the second half of this entry (the (...)
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  10. Anthony F. Beavers (2009). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):533-537.
    The Phenomenological Mind, by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, is part of a recent initiative to show that phenomenology, classically conceived as the tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and not as mere introspection, contributes something important to cognitive science. (For other examples, see “References” below.) Phenomenology, of course, has been a part of cognitive science for a long time. It implicitly informs the works of Andy Clark (e.g. 1997) and John Haugeland (e.g. 1998), and Hubert Dreyfus explicitly uses it (e.g. (...)
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  11. Ned Block (1999). Ridiculing Social Constructivism About Phenomenal Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):199-201.
    Money is a cultural construction, leukemia is not. In which category does phenomenal consciousness fit? The issue is clarified by a distinction between what cultural phenomena causally influence and what culture constitutes. Culture affects phenomenal consciousness but it is ridiculous to suppose that culture constitutes it, even in part.
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  12. Ned Block (1996). How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness. In João Branquinho (ed.), [Book Chapter] (Unpublished). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1.
    There are two concepts of consciousness that are easy to confuse with one another, access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. However, just as the concepts of water and H2O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle’s reasoning about the function of consciousness goes (...)
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  13. Havi Hannah Carel (2013). Illness, Phenomenology, and Philosophical Method. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (4):345-357.
    In this article, I propose that illness is philosophically revealing and can be used to explore human experience. I suggest that illness is a limit case of embodied experience. By pushing embodied experience to its limit, illness sheds light on normal experience, revealing its ordinary and thus overlooked structure. Illness produces a distancing effect, which allows us to observe normal human behavior and cognition via their pathological counterpart. I suggest that these characteristics warrant illness a philosophical role that has not (...)
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  14. Richard A. Carlson (2002). Mentalism, Information, and Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):333-333.
    The target article addresses important empirical issues, but adopts a nonanalytic stance toward consciousness and presents the mentalistic view as a very radical position that rules out informational description of anything other than conscious mental states. A better mentalistic strategy is to show how the structure of some informational states is both constitutive of consciousness and necessary for psychological functions.
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  15. Gregg Caruso (2008). Consciousness and Free Will: A Critique of the Argument From Introspection. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.
    One of the main libertarian arguments in support of free will is the argument from introspection. This argument places a great deal of faith in our conscious feeling of freedom and our introspective abilities. People often infer their own freedom from their introspective phenomenology of freedom. It is here argued that from the fact that I feel myself free, it does not necessarily follow that I am free. I maintain that it is our mistaken belief in the transparency and infallibility (...)
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  16. Cristiano Castelfranchi (2014). Minds as Social Institutions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):121-143.
    I will first discuss how social interactions organize, coordinate, and specialize as “artifacts,” tools; how these tools are not only for coordination but for achieving something, for some outcome (goal/function), for a collective work. In particular, I will argue that these artifacts specify (predict and prescribe) the mental contents of the participants, both in terms of beliefs and acceptances and in terms of motives and plans. We have to revise the behavioristic view of “scripts” and “roles”; when we play a (...)
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  17. Monima Chadha (forthcoming). Meditation and Unity of Consciousness: A Perspective From Buddhist Epistemology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    The paper argues that empirical work on Buddhist meditation has an impact on Buddhist epistemology, in particular their account of unity of consciousness. I explain the Buddhist account of unity of consciousness and show how it relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of unity of consciousness. The contemporary accounts of unity of consciousness are closely integrated with the discussion of neural correlates of consciousness. The conclusion of the paper suggests a new direction in the search for neural correlates of state consciousness (...)
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  18. Axel Cleeremans, A Short Review of 'Consciousness in Action'.
    Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in which (...)
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  19. Matthijs Cornelissen (ed.) (2001). Consciousness and its Transformation: Papers Presented at the Second International Conference on Integral Psychology. Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education.
  20. Erica Cosentino & Francesco Ferretti (2014). Communication as Navigation: A New Role for Consciousness in Language. Topoi 33 (1):263-274.
    Classical cognitive science has been characterized by an association with the computational theory of mind. Although this association has produced highly significant results, it has also limited the scope of scientific psychology. In this paper, we analyse the limits of the specific kind of computational model represented by the Chomskian-Fodorian tradition in the study of mind and language. In our opinion, the adhesion to the principle of formality imposed by this specific computational model has motivated the exclusion of consciousness in (...)
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  21. Ralph D. Ellis (1999). Why Isn't Consciousness Empirically Observable? Emotion, Self-Organization, and Nonreductive Physicalism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):391-402.
  22. B. T. Evans (1995). Implicit Learning, Consciousness, and the Psychology of Thinking. Thinking and Reasoning 1 (1):105 – 118.
  23. Robert Gordon, Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science.
    This paper supports the basic integrity of the folk psychological conception of consciousness and its importance in cognitive theorizing. Section 1 critically examines some proposed definitions of consciousness, and argues that the folk- psychological notion of phenomenal consciousness is not captured by various functional-relational definitions. Section 2 rebuts the arguments of several writers who challenge the very existence of phenomenal consciousness, or the coherence or tenability of the folk-psychological notion of awareness. Section 3 defends a significant role for phenomenal consciousness (...)
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  24. George Graham (2000). Ullin Thomas Place: 24 October 1924–2 January 2000. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1 (2):181-182.
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  25. Lorna Green (ed.) (2005). The Reign of the Holy Spirit, Christ-Self: I Am. iUniverse.
    The truth of human indentity in the consciousness universe.
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  26. Anthony Jack (2001). Paradigm Lost: Review of Lawrence Weiskrantz, Consciousness Lost and Found. [REVIEW] Mind and Language 16 (1):101-107.
  27. Luis Jiménez (2002). Surfing on Consciousness, or, a Deliberately Shallow Outline of Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):342-342.
    By assuming that conscious states are the only constructs entitled to bear a cognitive status, while denying this status both to the learning processes and to their nonconscious outcomes, the SOC view leaves consciousness alone as the single tool to explain itself. This does not endow consciousness with any self-organizing properties, but rather, draws a deliberately shallow outline of cognition.
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  28. Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.) (2002). Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Consciousness is perhaps the most puzzling problem we humans face in trying to understand ourselves. It has been the subject of intense study for several decades, but, despite substantial progress, the most difficult problems have still not reached any generally agreed solution. Future research can start with this book. Eighteen original, specially written essays offer new angles on the subject. The contributors, who include many of the leading figures in philosophy of mind, discuss such central topics as intentionality, phenomenal content, (...)
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  29. David Kirsh (2009). Knowledge, Explicit Vs Implicit. Oxford Companion to Consciousness:397-402.
    In the scientific study of mind a distinction is drawn between explicit knowledge— knowledge that can be elicited from a subject by suitable inquiry or prompting, can be brought to consciousness, and externally expressed in words—and implicit knowledge—knowledge that cannot be elicited, cannot be made directly conscious, and can- not be articulated. Michael Polanyi (1967) argued that we usually ‘know more than we can say’. The part we can articulate is explicitly known; the part we cannot is implicit.
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  30. Samuel H. LiPuma & Joseph P. DeMarco (2013). Reviving Brain Death: A Functionalist View. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (3):383-392.
    Recently both whole brain death (WBD) and higher brain death (HBD) have come under attack. These attacks, we argue, are successful, leaving supporters of both views without a firm foundation. This state of affairs has been described as “the death of brain death.” Returning to a cardiopulmonary definition presents problems we also find unacceptable. Instead, we attempt to revive brain death by offering a novel and more coherent standard of death based on the permanent cessation of mental processing. This approach (...)
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  31. Neil C. Manson (2011). Why “Consciousness” Means What It Does. Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):98-117.
    Abstract: “Consciousness” seems to be a polysemic, ambiguous, term. Because of this, theorists have sought to distinguish the different kinds of phenomena that “consciousness” denotes, leading to a proliferation of terms for different kinds of consciousness. However, some philosophers—univocalists about consciousness—argue that “consciousness” is not polysemic or ambiguous. By drawing upon the history of philosophy and psychology, and some resources from semantic theory, univocalism about consciousness is shown to be implausible. This finding is important, for if we accept the univocalist (...)
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  32. Colin Martindale (1981). Cognition and Consciousness. Dorsey Press.
  33. Steven Nadler (2008). Spinoza and Consciousness. Mind 117 (467):575-601.
    Most discussions of Spinoza and consciousness—and there are not many— conclude either that he does not have an account of consciousness, or that he does have one but that it is at best confused, at worst hopeless. I argue, in fact, that people have been looking in the wrong place for Spinoza's account of consciousness, namely, at his doctrine of "ideas of ideas". Indeed, Spinoza offers the possibility of a fairly sophisticated, naturalistic account of consciousness, one that grounds it in (...)
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  34. Erich Neumann (1954/1970). The Origins and History of Consciousness. [Princeton, N.J.]Princeton University Press.
    The first of Erich Neumann's works to be translated into English, this eloquent book draws on a full range of world mythology to show that individual consciousness undergoes the same archetypal stages of development as has human consciousness as a whole. Neumann, one of Jung's most creative students and a renowned practitioner of analytical psychology in his own right, shows how the stages begin and end with the symbol of the Uroboros, or tail-eating serpent. The intermediate stages are projected in (...)
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  35. Jesse Prinz (2011). The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology. In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. OUP. 174--196.
  36. John Protevi (2009). Philosophies of Consciousness and the Body. In John Mullarkey & Beth Lord (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Continental Philosophy. Continuum. 69.
  37. David Rosenthal (2012). Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function. Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.
    Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological (...)
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  38. Ed Subitzky (2008). The Experiment: A Writer's Contribution to the Consciousness Debate. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):83-85.
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  39. Zoltan Torey (1999/2009). The Crucible of Consciousness: An Integrated Theory of Mind and Brain. Mit Press.
    An interdisciplinary examination of the evolutionary breakthroughs that rendered the brain accessible to itself.
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  40. Lisa Warenski (forthcoming). The Mystery of the Mirror. In Jason Holt (ed.), The Philosophy of Leonard Cohen. Open Court.
    Leonard Cohen’s celebrated song “Suzanne” exhibits a certain conception of self-awareness and intersubjectivity that is embraced by phenomenologists and some psychologists. A key element of this conception is that we have pre-reflective self-awareness, including and especially bodily self-awareness. We are tacitly and pre-reflectively aware of ourselves in experience. A second, related element concerns reflective functioning. Reflective functioning is the ability to appreciate oneself and others as being “minded,” that is to say, as having beliefs, desires, and emotions with intentional content. (...)
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  41. Rex Welshon (2013). Searching for the Neural Realizers of Ownership Unity. Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):839 - 862.
    An argument is developed for the conclusion that certain neurological conditions and disorders are directly relevant for understanding the self?'s embodiment and the ownership of conscious experience enjoyed by such an embodied self. Since these neurological conditions and disorders provide evidence that there can be shifts of, and compromises to, ownership, they help identify neural substrates and realizers of such ownership. However, even if recent neuroimaging and neuropsychological nominees for neural substrates of ownership unity are core realizers of ownership, they (...)
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Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works
  1. Mahesh Ananth (2010). The Scientific Study of Consciousness: Searle’s Radical Request. Psyche 16 (2):59-89.
    John Searle offers what he thinks to be a reasonable scientific approach to the understanding of consciousness. I argue that Searle is demanding nothing less than a Kuhnian-type revolution with respect to how scientists should study consciousness given his rejection of the subject-object distinction and affirmation of mental causation. As part of my analysis, I reveal that Searle embraces a version of emergentism that is in tension, not only with his own account, but also with some of the theoretical tenets (...)
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  2. David M. Armstrong & Norman Malcolm (1984). Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind. Blackwell.
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  3. Stephen Asma, Jaak Panksepp, Rami Gabriel & Glennon Curran (2012). Philosophical Implications of Affective Neuroscience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4):6-48.
    These papers are based on a Symposium at the COGSCI Conference in 2010. 1. Naturalizing the Mammalian Mind (Jaak Panksepp) 2. Modularity in Cognitive Psychology and Affective Neuroscience (Rami Gabriel) 3. Affective Neuroscience and the Philosophy of Self (Stephen Asma and Tom Greif) 4. Affective Neuroscience and Law (Glennon Curran and Rami Gabriel).
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  4. Hiranmoy Banerjee (2003). Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
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  5. S. S. Barlingay (1976). Awareness. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 4 (October):83-96.
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  6. Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Wilken (eds.) (2009). The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Five years in the making and including over 250 concise entries written by leaders in the field, the volume covers both fundamental knowledge as well as more ...
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  7. Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume. Oxford University Press.
    The first of a planned two-volume collection of Ned Block's writings on philosophy of mind; this volume treats consciousness, functionalism, and representation ...
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  8. Ned Block (2004). Consciousness. In R. L. Gregory (ed.), R. Gregory (ed.) Oxford Companion to the Mind, second edition 2004. Oxford University Press.
    There are two broad classes of empirical theories of consciousness, which I will call the biological and the functional. The biological approach is based on empirical correlations between experience and the brain. For example, there is a great deal of evidence that the neural correlate of visual experience is activity in a set of occipetotemporal pathways, with special emphasis on the infero-temporal cortex. The functionalist approach is a successor of behaviorism, the view that mentality can be seen as tendencies to (...)
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  9. Ned Block (2003). Philosophical Issues About Consciousness. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
    There are a number of different matters that come under the heading of ‘consciousness’. One of them is phenomenality, the feeling of say a sensation of red or a pain, that is what it is like to have such a sensation or other experience. Another is reflection on phenomenality. Imagine two infants, both of which have pain, but only one of which has a thought about that pain. Both would have phenomenal states, but only the latter would have a state (...)
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