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Philosophy of Consciousness

Edited by David Chalmers (Australian National University, New York University)
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  1. Robert P. Abelson (1983). Commentary Points. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (4):591.
  2. Robert P. Abelson (1980). Searle's Argument is Just a Set of Chinese Symbols. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):424.
  3. William L. Abler (1978). Asymmetry and Evolution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):277.
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  4. Mark Addis (2013). Response to Collins. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (2):427-429.
  5. Dell’Anna Alessandro & Paternoster Alfredo (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness and the Sensorimotor Approach. A Critical Account. Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):435.
    The paper discusses some recent suggestions offered by the so-called sensorimotor (or enactivist) theorists as to the problem of the explanatory gap, that is, the alleged impossibility of accounting for phenomenal consciousness in any scientific theory. We argue in the paper that, although some enactivist theorists’ suggestions appear fresh and eye-opening, the claim that the explanatory gap is (dis)solved is much overstated.
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  6. Colin Allen (2005). Evolving Phenomenal Consciousness. Anthropology and Philosophy 6 (1/2).
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  7. Colin Allen (2001). [Book Chapter] (in Press).
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  8. J. Allsop (2000). Where There's No Will, There's One Way. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (6):69-69.
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  9. Pereira A. Almada Lf (2013). What Affective Neuroscience Means for Science of Consciousness. Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):253.
    The field of affective neuroscience has emerged from the efforts of Jaak Panksepp in the 1990s and reinforced by the work of, among others, Joseph LeDoux in the 2000s. It is based on the ideas that affective processes are supported by brain structures that appeared earlier in the phylogenetic scale (as the periaqueductal gray area), they run in parallel with cognitive processes, and can influence behaviour independently of cognitive judgements. This kind of approach contrasts with the hegemonic concept of conscious (...)
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  10. M. Almotahari (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain * by Dimitris Platchias. Analysis 73 (1):196-198.
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  11. Torin Alter, Deviant Phenomenal Knowledge.
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  12. Torin Alter (2008). Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The case for qualia. Mit Press. 247.
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  13. Torin Alter (2008). Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. Mit Press. 247.
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  14. Torin Alter (2005). Review of P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa & D. Stoljar , There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. [REVIEW] Psyche 11.
    The titular ‘Mary’ refers to Jackson’s famous protagonist. Her story takes place in the future, when all physical facts have been discovered. This includes “everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles” . Mary learns all this by watching lectures on a monochromatic television monitor. But she spends her life in a black-and-white room and has no color experiences. Then she (...)
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  15. Torin Andrew Alter (2009). A Dialogue on Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    In recent years, the problem of consciousness has developed into one of the most important and hotly contested areas in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers regard consciousness as an entirely physical phenomenon, yet it seems to elude scientific explanation. On the other hand, viewing consciousness as a nonphysical phenomenon brings up even larger issues. If consciousness is not physical, how can it be explained? Concise, up-to-date, and engaging, A Dialogue on Consciousness explores these issues in depth. It features two (...)
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  16. M. Cristina Amoretti (2007). D. Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination. The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. Epistemologia 30 (2):373-374.
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  17. Richard L. Amoroso (2012). Part III: The Consciousness of Dualism-Interactionism, Economics and Mind. In Ingrid Fredriksson (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness: Essays on Physics, Death and the Mind. Mcfarland & Co.. 147.
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  18. Jensine Andresen & R. K. C. Foreman (2000). Methodological Pluralism in the Study of Religion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (11-12):11-12.
    How the Study of Consciousness and Mapping Spiritual Experiences Can Reshape Religious Methodology This special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies throws down a methodological challenge to the field of Religious Studies. Over the last half century, the academic study of religion has developed a variety of angles and approaches: structuralist, Eliadian, Marxist, feminist, and so on. Recently, approaches popular in many institutions and departments have centred on linguistic and cultural analysis, notably the postmodern and deconstructivist approaches championed by (...)
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  19. Michael V. Antony (2008). Are Our Concepts Conscious State and Conscious Creature Vague? Erkenntnis 68 (2):239 - 263.
    are sharp rather than vague, that they can have no borderline cases. On the other hand, many who take conscious states to be identical to, or realized by, complex physical states are committed to the vagueness of those concepts. In the paper I argue that conscious state and conscious creature are sharp by presenting four necessary conditions for conceiving borderline cases in general, and showing that some of those conditions cannot be met with conscious state. I conclude that conscious state (...)
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  20. Adam Arico (2010). Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):371-393.
    Traditionally, the philosophical study of Folk Psychology has focused on how ordinary people (i.e., those without formal training in academic fields like Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, etc.) go about attributing mental states. Those working in this tradition have tended to focus primarily on intentional states, like beliefs and desires . Recently, though a body of work has emerged in the growing field of Experimental Philosophy that focuses on folk attributions of mental states that are not paradigmatically considered intentional. (...)
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  21. D. Armstrong (1995). Qualia Ain't in the Head Review of Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind by Michael Tye. [REVIEW] Psyche 2.
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  22. D. M. Armstrong (1988). The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder: Westview, 1999); U. Place,'Thirty Years On: Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process?'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (2).
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  23. R. Arp (2007). Awareness and Consciousness: Switched-on Rheostats. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14:101-106.
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  24. Marcus Arvan (2013). A New Theory of Free Will. Philosophical Forum 44 (1):1-48.
    This paper shows that several live philosophical and scientific hypotheses – including the holographic principle and multiverse theory in quantum physics, and eternalism and mind-body dualism in philosophy – jointly imply an audacious new theory of free will. This new theory, "Libertarian Compatibilism", holds that the physical world is an eternally existing array of two-dimensional information – a vast number of possible pasts, presents, and futures – and the mind a nonphysical entity or set of properties that "read" that physical (...)
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  25. Sunny Auyang, Who Am I? What is It? The Subject-Object Relation.
    Mind is not some mysterious mind stuff; no such stuff exists and the universe comprises only physical matter. It is an emergent property of certain complex material entities, not brains alone but whole human beings living and coping in the physical and social world. This thesis involves three ideas: materialism, emergent properties, and intentionality. The first two belong to the mind-body problem and the status of mental properties in the material universe. The third refers to the mind-world relation, the symbiotic (...)
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  26. Bernard J. Baars (2013). A Scientific Approach to Silent Consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology 4.
    A scientific approach to silent consciousness.
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  27. T. Bachmann (2011). How to Begin to Overcome the Ambiguity Present in Differentiation Between Contents and Levels of Consciousness? Frontiers in Psychology 3:82-82.
    How to Begin to Overcome the Ambiguity Present in Differentiation between Contents and Levels of Consciousness?
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  28. Talis Bachmann (2011). Attention as a Process of Selection, Perception as a Process of Representation, and Phenomenal Experience as the Resulting Process of Perception Being Modulated by a Dedicated Consciousness Mechanism. Frontiers in Psychology 2.
    Equivalence of attention and consciousness is disputed and necessity of attentional effects for conscious experience has become questioned. However, the conceptual landscape and interpretations of empirical evidence as related to this issue have remained controversial. Here I present some conceptual distinctions and research strategies potentially useful for moving forward. Specifically, we should differentiate between processes and the results of the processes, move the emphasis from studying the effects of attention on the modality-specific and feature-specific perception to studying attentional effects on (...)
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  29. Thomas P. Bailey (1908). Organic Sensation and Organismic Feeling. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (15):406-412.
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  30. Lynne Rudder Baker, Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions.
    After an undergraduate degree with a major in mathematics, I turned to philosophy—in part because philosophy had all the interest of math (and logic) plus an indefinitely wide range of subject matter. I began philosophy at an intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of science. My dissertation, Ontological and Linguistic Aspects of Temporal Becoming, was on the philosophy of time. A convinced physicalist, I defended the idea that past, present and future (the A-series) are merely “mind-dependent.” I spent a year as (...)
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  31. Lynne Rudder Baker, With Science in Mind.
    In his Confessions, Augustine lamented, “What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one who asks, I know not.” In this respect, consciousness is like time. If no one asks me what consciousness is, I know. To pay attention to something is to become conscious of it. Indeed, everything with which I can be familiar ­­ from the sound of your footsteps to my own daydreams ­­ can be an object (...)
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  32. Lynne Rudder Baker (1992). Consciousness Explained. Review of Metaphysics 46 (2):398-399.
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  33. Oded Balaban (1990). Subject and Consciousness: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Self-Consciousness. Rowman & Littlefield.
    Title on spine: Subject & consciousness.
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  34. R. Balasubramanian (2011). Consciousness, Cognition and the Cognitive Apparatus in the Vedānta Tradition. Mens Sana Monographs 9 (1):54.
    A human being is a complex entity consisting of the Self (also known as Consciousness), mind, senses and the body. The Vedānta tradition holds that the mind, the senses and the body are essentially different from the Self or Consciousness. It is through consciousness that we are able to know the things of the world, making use of the medium of the mind and the senses. Furthermore, the mind, though material, is able to reveal things, borrowing the light from consciousness. (...)
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  35. Derek Ball (2014). Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, by Derk Pereboom. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):118-129.
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  36. G. Barnard (2014). Exploring the Unseen Worlds of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (3-4):40-59.
    For the past two decades, my research has primarily focused on two interrelated questions: 1)What do the data from mysticism and non-ordinary states of consciousness imply about the nature of consciousness understood broadly? 2) In what ways does a careful examination of the nature of consciousness illuminate the processes that undergird mysticism and non-ordinary states of consciousness? In my attempts to offer coherent, cogent, and compelling answers to these questions, I have been helped, immeasurably, by the work of William James (...)
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  37. John Barnden (2014). Running Into Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (5-6):33-56.
    It is proposed that conscious qualia arise when and only when the 'running' of physical processes takes a special, complex form. Running in general is the unified unfolding of processes through time, and is claimed to be an additional quality of physical processes beyond their state trajectories. The type of running needed for conscious qualia is reflexive in physically affecting and responding to itself. Intuitively, running is essentially the flow of causation, and the self-affecting/responding is a matter of causation bearing (...)
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  38. Cícero Antônio Cavalcante Barroso (2014). The Knowability Principle and the Qualia. Trans/Form/Ação 37 (2):91-109.
    O princípio da cognoscibilidade, formulado sem restrições, diz que todos os enunciados verdadeiros são cognoscíveis. O problema é que, com essa formulação, ele está sujeito a muitas objeções, pelo que é necessário restringir o princípio. Com tais restrições, ele diz apenas que todos os enunciados verdadeiros interessantes em certo sentido são cognoscíveis. Não obstante, este artigo mostra que alguns desses enunciados também são incognoscíveis e, desse modo, evidencia que o princípio da cognoscibilidade, mesmo na sua forma mais restrita, é falso. (...)
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  39. Gary Bartlett (2014). On Phenomenal Character and Petri Dishes. Journal of Philosophical Research 39:67-74.
    In “New Troubles for the Qualia Freak,” Michael Tye argues that phenomenal character cannot be an intrinsic micro­physical property of experiences because this would entail that experience could occur in a chunk of tissue in a Petri dish. Laudably, Tye attempts to defend the latter claim rather than resting content with the counter-intuitiveness of the associated image. However, I show that his defense is problematic in several ways, and ultimately that it still amounts to no more than an appeal to (...)
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  40. Imants Baruss (2008). Characteristics of Consciousness in Collapse-Type Quantum Mind Theories. Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (3):257-267.
    The purpose of this paper is to look at some of the apparent characteristics of consciousness in theories in which consciousness is said to play a role in the collapse of the state vector. In particular, these reflections are based primarily on the work of three theorists: Amit Goswami, Henry Stapp, and Evan Harris Walker. Upon looking at such theories, three characteristics of consciousness become apparent. The first is a volitional aspect of the mind that needs to be distinguished from (...)
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  41. Pierfrancesco Basile (2007). Consciousness and its Place in Nature. Process Studies 36 (1):150-153.
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  42. Antonio M. Battro (1981). D. Bindra, J. A. Anderson, M. A. Bunge y otros: The Brain's Mind. A neuroscience Perspective on the Mind-Body Problem. [REVIEW] Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 7 (2):186.
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  43. Antonio M. Battro (1980). Mario Bunge: The Mind-Body Problem. A Psychobiological Approach. [REVIEW] Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 6 (3):284.
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  44. Brian Beakley (1999). The Conscious Mind. Review of Metaphysics 52 (3):664-666.
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  45. Michael Ben-Chaim (1998). Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem & the Myth of the Framework by Karl Popper. Philosophia 26 (3-4):529-544.
  46. Itzhak Bentov (1977/1988). Stalking the Wild Pendulum: On the Mechanics of Consciousness. Distributed to the Book Trade in the U.S. By Harper and Row.
    In his exciting and original view of the universe, Itzhak Bentov has provided a new perspective on human consciousness and its limitless possibilities. Widely known and loved for his delightful humor and imagination, Bentov explains the familiar world of phenomena with perceptions that are as lucid as they are thrilling. He gives us a provocative picture of ourselves in an expanded, conscious, holistic universe. _.
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  47. George Berger (1982). Mario Bunge, "The Mind-Body Problem, a Psychobiological Approach". [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 17:399.
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  48. Jacob Berger (2013). Perceptual Justification Outside of Consciousness. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer. 137-145.
    In his (2011) paper “There It Is” and his (2014) précis “There It Was,” Benj Hellie develops a sophisticated semantics for perceptual justification according to which perceptions in good cases can be explained by intentional psychology and can justify beliefs, whereas bad cases of perception are defective and so cannot justify beliefs. Importantly, Hellie also affords consciousness a central role in rationality insofar as only those good cases of perception within consciousness can play a justificatory function. In this commentary, I (...)
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  49. Bob Bermond (1997). Consciousness or the Art of Foul Play. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 10 (3):227-247.
    The psychological literature about consciousness has been analyzed. It is argued that: 1) Only the higher symbolic cognitive powers like the ability to keep secrets, knowledge of self or self-consciousness, a long-term view on the future, the ability to determine long-term goals, and to freely plan future behavior, add positive fitness-value to consciousness. Without these higher intellectual abilities consciousness will have only negative fitness value and no positive one. The intellectual powers mentioned may therefore be considered as prerequisites for consciousness. (...)
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  50. José Luis Bermúdez (2004). Vagueness, Phenomenal Concepts and Mind-Brain Identity. Analysis 64 (2):134 - 139.
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