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Philosophy of Language

Edited by Berit Brogaard (University of Missouri, St. Louis)
Assistant editor: Jiangtian Li (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2016-12-07
    Jessica Pepp (forthcoming). Assertion, Lying, and Falsely Implicating. In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook ofAssertion. OUP
    There is an intuitive and seemingly significant difference between lying and falsely implicating. This difference has received scrutiny both historically and recently, mostly in the context of the following two questions. First, how should lying be defined so as to distinguish it from falsely implicating? Second, is the difference between lying and falsely implicating really significant, and if so, how and why is it significant? Answers to the first question typically invoke assertion, claiming (roughly) that to lie is to assert (...)
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  2. added 2016-12-07
    Brandt H. van der Gaast, A Defense of Russellian Descriptivism.
    In this dissertation, I defend a Russellian form of descriptivism. The main supporting argument invokes a relation between meaning and thought. I argue that the meanings of sentences are the thoughts people use them to express. This is part of a Gricean outlook on meaning according to which psychological intentionality is prior to, and determinative of, linguistic intentionality. The right approach to thought, I argue in Chapter 1, is a type of functionalism on which thoughts have narrow contents. On this (...)
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  3. added 2016-12-04
    Alessia Marabini & Luca Moretti, Boghossian's Template and Transmission Failure.
    Within his overarching program aiming to defend an epistemic conception of analyticity, Boghossian (1996 and 1997) has offered a clear-cut explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical truths and logical rules through implicit definition. The explanation is based on a special template or general form of argument. Ebert (2005) has argued that an enhanced version of this template is flawed because a segment of it is unable to transmit warrant from its premises to the conclusion. This (...)
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  4. added 2016-12-04
    Barry Schein (forthcoming). Noughty Bits: The Subatomic Scope of Negation. Linguistics and Philosophy:1-82.
    Since Fodor 1970, negation has worn a Homogeneity Condition to the effect that homogeneous predicates, ) denote homogeneously—all or nothing —to characterize the meaning of – when uttered out-of-the blue, in contrast to –:The mirrors are smooth. The mirrors are not smooth. The mirrors circle the telescope’s reflector. The mirrors do not circle the telescope’s reflector. It has been a problem for philosophical logic and for the semantics of natural language that – appear to defy the Principle of Excluded Middle (...)
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  5. added 2016-12-02
    Jared Warren (2016). Internal and External Questions Revisited. Journal of Philosophy 113 (4):177-209.
    Rudolf Carnap famously distinguished between the external meanings that existence questions have when asked by philosophers and the internal meanings they have when asked by non-philosophers. Carnap’s overall position involved various controversial commitments, but relatively uncontroversial interpretative principles also lead to a Carnap-style distinction between internal and external questions. In section 1 of this paper I offer arguments for such a distinction in several particular cases; in section 2 I defend my arguments from numerous objections and motivate them by using (...)
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  6. added 2016-12-01
    Andrei Moldovan (2016). Presumptions in Communication. Studia Humana 5 (3):104-117.
    In the first part of this paper I consider the Gricean account of communication, as structured by the Cooperative Principle and the four maxims. Several authors, including Jean Goodwin [10], Fred Kauffeld [17], Michael Gilbert [7], Ernie Lepore and Mathew Stone [22], among others, argue that the Gricean view of communication fails in as much as it pretends to offer an account of all such human interactions. As Goodwin and Kauffeld suggest, a more promising starting point is to consider the (...)
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  7. added 2016-12-01
    Andrei Moldovan (2016). Quantifier Domain Restriction, Hidden Variables and Variadic Functions. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 3 (23):384-404.
    In this paper I discuss two objections raised against von Fintel’s (1994) and Stanley and Szabó’s (2000a) hidden variable approach to quantifier domain restriction (QDR). One of them concerns utterances of sentences involving quantifiers for which no contextual domain restriction is needed, and the other concerns multiple quantified contexts. I look at various ways in which the approaches could be amended to avoid these problems, and I argue that they fail. I conclude that we need a more flexible account of (...)
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  8. added 2016-12-01
    Andrei Moldovan (2016). An Assessment of the Argument From Convention. Discusiones Filosóficas 17 (28):15 - 34.
    This paper focuses on what is known in the literature on the semantics and pragmatics of definite descriptions as “the argument from convention”. This argument purports to show that referential uses of definite descriptions are a semantic phenomenon. A key premise of the argument is that none of the pragmatic alternatives (any one of a variety of Gricean accounts of referential uses) is successful. I argue that no good reason is offered to support this claim. I conclude that the argument (...)
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  9. added 2016-11-30
    Salvatore Florio & Graham Leach-Krouse (forthcoming). What Russell Should Have Said to Burali-Forti. Review of Symbolic Logic.
    The paradox that appears under Burali-Forti’s name in many textbooks of set theory is a clever piece of reasoning leading to an unproblematic theorem. The theorem asserts that the ordinals do not form a set. For such a set would be—absurdly—an ordinal greater than any ordinal in the set of all ordinals. In this article, we argue that the paradox of Burali-Forti is first and foremost a problem about concept formation by abstraction, not about sets. We contend, furthermore, that some (...)
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  10. added 2016-11-29
    Adam Bear & Joshua Knobe (forthcoming). Normality: Part Descriptive, Part Prescriptive. Cognition.
    People’s beliefs about normality play an important role in many aspects of cognition and life (e.g., causal cognition, linguistic semantics, cooperative behavior). But how do people determine what sorts of things are normal in the first place? Past research has studied both people’s representations of statistical norms (e.g., the average) and their representations of prescriptive norms (e.g., the ideal). Four studies suggest that people’s notion of normality incorporates both of these types of norms. In particular, people’s representations of what is (...)
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  11. added 2016-11-29
    Susanne Bobzien (2016). Reply to Rosanna Keefe’s ‘Modelling Higher-Order Vagueness: Columns, Borderlines and Boundaries’.
    This paper is an expanded written version of my reply to Rosanna Keefe’s paper ‘Modelling higher-order vagueness: columns, borderlines and boundaries’ (Keefe 2015), which in turn is a reply to my paper ‘Columnar higher-order vagueness, or Vagueness is higher-order vagueness’ (Bobzien 2015). Both papers were presented at the Joint Session of the the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association in July, 2015. At the Joint Session meeting, there was insufficient time to present all of my points in response to Keefe’s (...)
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  12. added 2016-11-28
    James R. Beebe (2016). Individual and Cross-Cultural Differences in Semantic Intuitions: New Experimental Findings. Journal of Cognition and Culture 16:322-357.
    In 2004 Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich published what has become one of the most widely discussed papers in experimental philosophy, in which they reported that East Asian and Western participants had different intuitions about the semantic reference of proper names. A flurry of criticisms of their work has emerged, and although various replications have been performed, many critics remain unconvinced. We review the current debate over Machery et al.’s (2004) results and take note of which (...)
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  13. added 2016-11-26
    John Maier (forthcoming). Modal Predicates. Linguistics and Philosophy:1-15.
    I propose a semantics for a class of English predicates characteristically associated with possibility. The central idea is that such predicates are typically associated with an ordering source, and that differences among them are due to differences in their ordering sources. The ‘dispositional predicates’ that have been central to philosophical discussions are shown to be derivable as a special case from this more general class.
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  14. added 2016-11-25
    Mihaela Popa-Wyatt (forthcoming). Go Figure: Understanding Figurative Talk. Philosophical Studies.
    We think and speak in figures. This is key to our creativity. We re-imagine one thing as another, pretend ourself to be another, do one thing in order to achieve another, or say one thing to mean another. This comes easily because of our abilities both to work out meaning in context and re-purpose words. Figures of speech are tools for this re-purposing. Whether we use metaphor, simile, irony, hyperbole, and litotes individually, or as compound figures, the uses are all (...)
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  15. added 2016-11-23
    Tomoe Arii, Kristen Syrett & Takuya Goro (forthcoming). Investigating the Form-Meaning Mapping in the Acquisition of English and Japanese Measure Phrase Comparatives. Natural Language Semantics:1-38.
    We present a set of experiments investigating how English- and Japanese-speaking children interpret Measure Phrase comparatives. We show that despite overt cues to the comparative interpretation, children representing both languages diverge from their adult counterparts in that they access a non-adult-like ‘absolute measurement’ interpretation. We propose to account for their response pattern by appealing to proposals by Svenonius and Kennedy and Sawada and Grano that Meas in the head of the DegP, which houses the differential, selects for an absolute minimal (...)
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  16. added 2016-11-23
    Rasmussen Mattias Skipper (2016). Counterpossibles and the Nature of Impossible Worlds. SATS 17 (2):145-158.
    One well-known objection to the traditional Lewis-Stalnaker semantics of counterfactuals is that it delivers counterintuitive semantic verdicts for many counterpossibles (counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents). To remedy this problem, several authors have proposed extending the set of possible worlds by impossible worlds at which necessary falsehoods may be true. Linguistic ersatz theorists often construe impossible worlds as maximal, inconsistent sets of sentences in some sufficiently expressive language. However, in a recent paper, Bjerring (2014) argues that the “extended” Lewis-Stalnaker semantics delivers (...)
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  17. added 2016-11-22
    Cheng-Chih Tsai (forthcoming). The Prisoner’s Dilemma: From a Logical Point of View. Axiomathes:1-20.
    It is generally believed that, for a one-off Prisoner’s Dilemma game, it is logical to defect. However, both players cooperating is apparently a better choice than both defecting, hence the dilemma. In this paper, by resorting to Ramsey’s Test, Kripke’s possible world semantics, and Stalnaker/Lewis-style account of conditionals, I show that the first horn of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is an unsound argument. It originates from failing to differentiate between a possible world and a possible set of possible worlds and failing (...)
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  18. added 2016-11-22
    Steven James Bartlett (1980). Self-Reference, Phenomenology, and Philosophy of Science. Methodology and Science: Interdisciplinary Journal for the Empirical Study of the Foundations of Science and Their Methodology 13 (3):143-167.
    The paper begins by acknowledging that weakened systematic precision in phenomenology has made its application in philosophy of science obscure and ineffective. The defining aspirations of early transcendental phenomenology are, however, believed to be important ones. A path is therefore explored that attempts to show how certain recent developments in the logic of self-reference fulfill in a clear and more rigorous fashion in the context of philosophy of science certain of the early hopes of phenomenologists. The resulting dual approach is (...)
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  19. added 2016-11-21
    Axel Mueller (2014). Löst Brandoms Inferentialismus bedeutungsholistische Kommunikationsprobleme? Zeitschrift Für Semiotik 34 (3-4):141-185.
    This article analyzes whether Brandom’s ISA (inferential-substitutional-anaphoric) semantics as presented in Making It Explicit (MIE) and Articulating Reasons (AR) can cope with problems resulting from inferentialism’s near-implied meaning holism. Inferentialism and meaning holism entail a radically perspectival conception of content as significance for an individual speaker. Since thereby its basis is fixed as idiolects, holistic inferentialism engenders a communication-problem. Brandom considers the systematic difference in information among individuals as the „point“ of communication and thus doesn’t want to diminish these effects (...)
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  20. added 2016-11-19
    Juhani Yli-Vakkuri, John Hawthorne & Peter Fritz, Operator Arguments Revisited.
    Certain passages in Kaplan’s ‘Demonstratives’ are often read as constituting an argument for the conclusion that the presence of a non-vacuous sentential operator associated with a certain parameter of sentential truth in a language requires the assertoric contents-cum-compositional semantic values of sentences in that language to vary in truth value with that parameter. Thus, for example, the non-vacuity of a temporal sentential operator ‘always’ would require some of its operands to have assertoric contents that have different truth values at different (...)
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  21. added 2016-11-19
    Andrew Peet (forthcoming). Etiology, Understanding, and Testimonial Belief. Synthese:1-21.
    The etiology of a perceptual belief can seemingly affect its epistemic status. There are cases in which perceptual beliefs seem to be unjustified because the perceptual experiences on which they are based are caused, in part, by wishful thinking, or irrational prior beliefs. It has been argued that this is problematic for many internalist views in the epistemology of perception, especially those which postulate immediate perceptual justification. Such views are unable to account for the impact of an experience’s etiology on (...)
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  22. added 2016-11-19
    Tim Hunter, Jeffrey Lidz, Darko Odic & Alexis Wellwood (forthcoming). On How Verification Tasks Are Related to Verification Procedures: A Reply to Kotek Et Al. Natural Language Semantics:1-17.
    Kotek et al. argue on the basis of novel experimental evidence that sentences like ‘Most of the dots are blue’ are ambiguous, i.e. have two distinct truth conditions. Kotek et al. furthermore suggest that when their results are taken together with those of earlier work by Lidz et al., the overall picture that emerges casts doubt on the conclusions that Lidz et al. drew from their earlier results. We disagree with this characterization of the relationship between the two studies. Our (...)
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  23. added 2016-11-19
    Andrew Peet (forthcoming). Etiology, Understanding, and Testimonial Belief. Synthese:1-21.
    The etiology of a perceptual belief can seemingly affect its epistemic status. There are cases in which perceptual beliefs seem to be unjustified because the perceptual experiences on which they are based are caused, in part, by wishful thinking, or irrational prior beliefs. It has been argued that this is problematic for many internalist views in the epistemology of perception, especially those which postulate immediate perceptual justification. Such views are unable to account for the impact of an experience’s etiology on (...)
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  24. added 2016-11-17
    Eran Asoulin (2016). Language as an Instrument of Thought. Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics 1 (1):1-23.
    I show that there are good arguments and evidence to boot that support the language as an instrument of thought hypothesis. The underlying mechanisms of language, comprising of expressions structured hierarchically and recursively, provide a perspective (in the form of a conceptual structure) on the world, for it is only via language that certain perspectives are avail- able to us and to our thought processes. These mechanisms provide us with a uniquely human way of thinking and talking about the world (...)
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  25. added 2016-11-15
    Nat Hansen & Emmanuel Chemla (forthcoming). Color Adjectives, Standards, and Thresholds: An Experimental Investigation. Linguistics and Philosophy.
    Are color adjectives ("red", "green", etc.) relative adjectives or absolute adjectives? Existing theories of the meaning of color adjectives attempt to answer that question using informal ("armchair") judgments. The informal judgments of theorists conflict: it has been proposed that color adjectives are absolute with standards anchored at the minimum degree on the scale, that they are absolute but have near-midpoint standards, and that they are relative. In this paper we report two experiments, one based on entailment patterns and one based (...)
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  26. added 2016-11-15
    Mark Jago (forthcoming). Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions. Argumenta.
    Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness.
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  27. added 2016-11-13
    Geert Keil, Lara Keuck & Rico Hauswald (eds.) (2016). Vagueness in Psychiatry. Oxford University Press Uk.
    In psychiatry there is no sharp boundary between the normal and the pathological. Although clear cases abound, it is often indeterminate whether a particular condition does or does not qualify as a mental disorder. For example, definitions of ‘subthreshold disorders’ and of the ‘prodromal stages’ of diseases are notoriously contentious. -/- Philosophers and linguists call concepts that lack sharp boundaries, and thus admit of borderline cases, ‘vague’. Although blurred boundaries between the normal and the pathological are a recurrent theme in (...)
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  28. added 2016-11-13
    Christian Helmut Wenzel (2004). Where After All Are the Meanings? A Defense of Internalism. Searle Versus Putnam. Experience and Analysis. Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium 12:408-409.
    There has been recent dispute between Putnam and Searle over whether meanings are “in the head”. Putnam makes use of Twin-Earth thought experiments to show that our mental states alone cannot determine what we refer to (and thus “mean”) and that we rely also on external factors, which are not “in the head”. This suggests to me that we in some way mean more than we actually know. Searle on the other hand makes use of what he calls “Intentional contents”, (...)
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  29. added 2016-11-12
    John Hawthorne (2016). Some Remarks on Imagination and Convention. Mind and Language 31 (5):625-634.
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  30. added 2016-11-10
    Michael J. Shaffer (forthcoming). Might/Would Duality and the Probabilities of Counterfactuals. Logique and Analyse.
    In this paper it is shown that Lewis' MWD (might/would duality) and imaging principles lead to wildly implausible probability assignments for would counterfactuals.
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  31. added 2016-11-10
    Tony Cheng (2016). The Situational Structure of Primate Beliefs. Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 6 (1).
    This paper develops the situational model of primate beliefs from the Prior-Lurz line of thought. There is a strong skepticism concerning primate beliefs in the analytic tradition which holds that beliefs have to be propositional and non-human animals do not have them (e.g., Davidson 1975, 1982). The response offered in this paper is twofold. First, two arguments against the propositional model as applied to other animals are put forward: an a priori argument from referential opacity and an empirical argument from (...)
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  32. added 2016-11-08
    Daniel Fogal & Kurt Sylvan (forthcoming). Contextualism About Epistemic Reasons. In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge
  33. added 2016-11-07
    Jani Hakkarainen, Johdatus filosofiaan.
    Mitä on filosofia? Johdatus filosofiaan -kurssin luentokalvot syksyltä 2016 (Tampereen yliopisto).
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  34. added 2016-11-07
    James Edwin Mahon (2016). Review of Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2016.
    In this review I examine Cuneo's comparison of the non-normative, perlocutionary-intention theory of speech acts (Grice) with the normative theory of speech acts (Searle and Alston) and the moral theory of speech acts (Wolterstorff, Cuneo) in his transcendental argument for moral realism (since moral facts are among the necessary conditions for the possibility of speech acts, and since there are speech acts (asserting, promising, asking questions, issuing commands, etc.), it follows that moral facts exist). I argue that Cuneo does not (...)
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  35. added 2016-11-06
    Ivano Ciardelli, Linmin Zhang & Lucas Champollion, Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals: A study of truth conditionality and minimal change.
    Based on a crowdsourced truth-value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: truth-conditionally (...)
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  36. added 2016-11-05
    Herman Cappelen (forthcoming). Why Philosophers Shouldn't Do Semantics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
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  37. added 2016-11-05
    William B. Starr (2016). Dynamic Expressivism About Deontic Modality. In Nate Charlow Matthew Chrisman (ed.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press 355-394.
  38. added 2016-11-04
    William B. Starr (2016). Expressing Permission. Semantics and Linguistic Theory 26:325-349.
    This paper proposes a semantics for free choice permission that explains both the non-classical behavior of modals and disjunction in sentences used to grant permission, and their classical behavior under negation. It also explains why permissions can expire when new information comes in and why free choice arises even when modals scope under disjunction. On the proposed approach, deontic modals update preference orderings, and connectives operate on these updates rather than propositions. The success of this approach stems from its capacity (...)
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  39. added 2016-11-03
    Jon Scott Stevens (2016). Focus Games. Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (5):395-441.
    This paper provides a game-theoretic analysis of contrastive focus, extending insights from recent work on the role of noisy communication in prosodic accent placement to account for focus within sentences, sub-sentential phrases and words. The shared insight behind these models is that languages with prosodic focus marking assign prosodic prominence only within elements which constitute material critical for successful interpretation. We first take care to distinguish the information-structural notion of focus from an ontologically distinct notion of givenness marking, and then (...)
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  40. added 2016-11-03
    Mark Jago & Harold Noonan (2016). Modal Realism, Still At Your Convenience. Analysis.
    Divers (2014) presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis.
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  41. added 2016-11-02
    Antonella Tramacere & Richard Moore (forthcoming). Reconsidering the Role of Manual Imitation in Language Evolution. Topoi:1-10.
    In this paper, we distinguish between a number of different phenomena that have been called imitation, and identify one form – a high fidelity mechanism for social learning – considered to be crucial for the development of language. Subsequently, we consider a common claim in the language evolution literature, which is that prior to the emergence of vocal language our ancestors communicated using a sophisticated gestural protolanguage (the ‘gesture-first view’), the learning of some parts of which required manual imitation. Drawing (...)
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  42. added 2016-11-01
    Nate Charlow (forthcoming). Clause-Type, Force, and Normative Judgment in the Semantics of Imperatives. In Daniel Fogal Daniel Harris & Matt Moss (eds.), New Work on Speech Acts. Oxford University Press
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  43. added 2016-10-31
    Francois-Igor Pris (2016). The Problems of Epistemology in the Wittgensteinian Context ISBN: 978-3-659-97848-7. Lap Lambert.
  44. added 2016-10-30
    Melvin A. Davila Martinez, Justificatorily.
    Let 'justificatorily' be the adverbial form of 'justificatory,' the adjective referring to the attribute of a referent encoding the feature 'pertaining to justification,' justification roughly understood as the activity of trying to establish whether or not something is in right standing with respect to some standard of evaluation, right standing constituting the ideal satisfaction by a referent of the criteria of a standard of evaluation that are prerequisite to said referent successfully earning an evaluative predicate(s)--which sometimes are scalar, or graduated--generated (...)
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  45. added 2016-10-29
    Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). Attitude Reports, Cognitive Products, and Attitudinal Objects. A Response to G. Felappi On Product-Based Accounts of Attitudes. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    This note gives a brief presentation of my recently developed attitudinal-objects semantics of attitude reports, in order to show that Felappi's (2014) arguments against it are flawed or fail to apply and to point out that her alternative suggestions have already been discussed and rejected in the work she criticizes.
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  46. added 2016-10-28
    Nils Kürbis (forthcoming). Bilateralist Detours: From Intuitionist to Classical Logic and Back. Logique Et Analyse.
    There is widespread agreement that while on a Dummettian theory of meaning the justified logic is intuitionist, as its constants are governed by harmonious rules of inference, the situation is reversed on Huw Price's bilateralist account, where meanings are specified in terms of primitive speech acts assertion and denial. In bilateral logics, the rules for classical negation are in harmony. However, as it is possible to construct an intuitionist bilateral logic with harmonious rules, there is no formal argument against intuitionism (...)
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  47. added 2016-10-28
    Mihaela Popa-Wyatt (2009). Is Semantics Really Psychologically Real? In J. Larrazabal & L. Zubeldia (eds.), Meaning, Content and Argument. Proceedings of the ILCLI International Workshop on Semantics, Pragmatics, and Rhetoric. University of the Basque Country Press. 497-514.
    The starting point for this paper is a critical discussion of claims of psychological reality articulated within Borg’s (forth.) minimal semantics and Carpintero’s (2007) character*-semantics. It has been proposed, for independent reasons, that their respective accounts can accommodate, or at least avoid the challenge from psychological evidence. I outline their respective motivations, suggesting various shortcomings in their efforts of preserving the virtues of an uncontaminated semantics in the face of psychological objection (I-II), and try to make the case that, at (...)
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  48. added 2016-10-26
    Ivano Ciardelli, Floris Roelofsen & Nadine Theiler (forthcoming). Composing Alternatives. Linguistics and Philosophy:1-36.
    There is a prominent line of work in natural language semantics, rooted in the work of Hamblin, in which the meaning of a sentence is not taken to be a single proposition, but rather a set of propositions—a set of alternatives. This allows for a more fine-grained view on meaning, which has led to improved analyses of a wide range of linguistic phenomena. However, this approach also faces a number of problems. We focus here on two of these, in our (...)
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  49. added 2016-10-26
    Craig Warmke (2016). Modal Semantics Without Worlds. Philosophy Compass 11 (11):702-715.
    Over the last half century, possible worlds have bled into almost every area of philosophy. In the metaphysics of modality, for example, philosophers have used possible worlds almost exclusively to illuminate discourse about metaphysical necessity and possibility. But recently, some have grown dissatisfied with possible worlds. Why are horses necessarily mammals? Because the property of being a horse bears a special relationship to the property of being a mammal, they say. Not because every horse is a mammal in every possible (...)
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  50. added 2016-10-25
    Nat Hansen (2016). Color Comparisons and Interpersonal Variation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    An important challenge to color objectivists, who hold that statements concerning color are made true or false by objective (non-subject-involving) facts, is the argument from interpersonal variation in where normal observers locate the unique hues. Recently, an attractive objectivist response to the argument has been proposed that draws on the semantics of gradable adjectives and which does not require defending the idea that there is a single correct location for each of the unique hues (Gómez-Torrente, 2016). In Hansen (2015), I (...)
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