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  1. Jami L. Anderson (1999). Annulment Retributivism: A Hegelian Theory of Punishment. Cambridge University Press 5 (4):363-388.
    Despite the bad press that retributivism often receives, the basic assumptions on which this theory of punishment rests are generally regarded as being attractive and compelling. First of these is the assumption that persons are morally responsible agents and that social practices, such as criminal punishment, must acknowledge that fact. Additionally, retributivism is committed to the claim that punishment must be proportionate to the crime, and not determined by such utilitarian concerns as the welfare of society, or the hope of (...)
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  2. Michael Blake (2012). International Law and Global Justice. In Marmor Andrei (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law. Routledge.
  3. Thom Brooks (2003). Does Philosophy Deserve a Place at the Supreme Court? Rutgers Law Record 27 (1):1-17.
    This Comment demonstrates that policy judgements are not masked by philosophical references, nor do philosophers play any crucial role in contentious judicial decisions. Neomi Rao’s study is flawed for many reasons: incomplete content analysis, poor assessment of data, and an inadequate definition of philosophy. She should be criticised for hypocritically praising Court philosopher references in some instances and not others, especially with regard to the Court’s early development. This Comment searched unsuccessfully for an instance where philosophers were cited just once (...)
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  4. William A. Edmundson (2014). Why Legal Theory is Political Philosophy. Legal Theory 19 (4):1-16.
    The concept of law is not a theorist's invention but one that people use every day. Thus one measure of the adequacy of a theory of law is its degree of fidelity to the concept as it is understood by those who use it. That means as far as possible. There are important truisms about the law that have an evaluative cast. The theorist has either to say what would make those evaluative truisms true or to defend her choice to (...)
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  5. Adam Omar Hosein (2014). Doing, Allowing, and the State. Law and Philosophy 33 (2):235-264.
    The doing/allowing distinction plays an important role in our thinking about a number of legal issues, such as the need for criminal process protections, prohibitions on torture, the permissibility of the death penalty and so on. These are areas where, at least initially, there seem to be distinctions between harms that the state inflicts and harms that it merely allows. In this paper I will argue for the importance of the doing/allowing distinction as applied to state action. Sunstein, Holmes, Vermeule (...)
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  6. Marcin Matczak (2007). Semantyka Kripkego-Putnama a język prawny. Studia Semiotyczne 26:307-329.
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  7. Mary Kate McGowan (2012). On 'Whites Only' Signs and Racist Hate Speech: Verbal Acts of Racial Discrimination. In Mary Kate McGowan Ishani Maitra (ed.), Speech and harm: Controversies over Free Speech. Oxford University Press.
  8. Massimo Renzo (2011). State Legitimacy and Self-Defence. Law and Philosophy 30 (5):575-601.
  9. Massimo Renzo (2008). Duties of Samaritanism and Political Obligation. Legal Theory 14 (3):193–217.
    In this article I criticize a theory of political obligation recently put forward by Christopher Wellman. Wellman's “samaritan theory” grounds both state legitimacy and political obligation in a natural duty to help people in need when this can be done at no unreasonable cost. I argue that this view is not able to account for some important features of the relation between state and citizens that Wellman himself seems to value. My conclusion is that the samaritan theory can only be (...)
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  10. Re'em Segev (2013). Making Sense of Discrimination. Ratio Juris (1):47-78.
    Discrimination is a central moral and legal concept. However, it is also a contested one. Particularly, accounts of the wrongness of discrimination often rely on controversial and particular assumptions. In this paper, I argue that a theory of discrimination that relies on premises that are general (rather than unique to the concept of discrimination) and widely accepted provides a plausible (exhaustive) account of the concept of wrongful discrimination. According to the combined theory, wrongful discrimination consists of allocating a benefit that (...)
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  11. Re'em Segev (2012). Justification Under Uncertainty. Law and Philosophy 31 (5):523-563.
    There is a controversy as to the moral status of an action in the face of uncertainty concerning a non-moral fact that is morally significant (according to an applicable moral standard): According to the objective conception, the right action is determined in light of the truth, namely the actual state of affairs (regarding the pertinent fact), whereas according to the subjective conception, the right action depends on the epistemic state of the agent, namely her (justified) belief (concerning the pertinent fact). (...)
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  12. Re'em Segev (2011). Governmental Power: Quality or Identity? Comment on Alon Harel's Argument Against Outsourcing Violence. Law and Ethics of Human Rights 5 (2):416-423.
    What is the appropriate division of power between public officials and private individuals? The straightforward answer to this question, it seems, is that an official should have a power if she employs it (morally) better compared to a private individual. However, Alon Harel argues that this answer is misguided, or at least partially, since there are some decisions—mainly concerning the employment of violence—that should be made and implemented only by public officials regardless of the (relative) moral quality of the decision (...)
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  13. Re'em Segev (2010). Is the Criminal Law (So) Special? Comments on Douglas Husak’s Theory of Criminalization. Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 1 (1):3-20.
    This is Re'em Segev's contribution to the symposium on Douglas Husak's book "Overcriminalization.".
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  14. Re'em Segev (2009). Sub-Optimal Justification and Justificatory Defenses. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):57-76.
    Justificatory defenses apply to actions that are generally wrong and illegal—mainly since they harm people—when they are (exceptionally) justified—usually since they prevent (more serious) harm to others. A strict conception of justification limits justificatory defenses to actions that reflect all pertinent principles in the optimal manner. A more relaxed conception of justification applies (also) to actions that do not reflect all pertinent principles optimally due to (unjustified) mistake but are not too far from this optimum. In the paper, I consider (...)
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  15. Re'em Segev (2009). Balancing, Judicial Review and Disobedience: Comments on Richard Posner’s Analysis of Anti-Terror Measures (Not a Suicide Pact). Israel Law Review 43 (2):234-247.
    The general assumption that underlines Richard Posner’s argument in his book Not a Suicide Pact is that decisions concerning rights and security in the context of modern terrorism should be made by balancing competing interests. This assumption is obviously correct if one refers to the most rudimentary sense of balancing, namely, the idea that normative decisions should be made in light of the importance of the relevant values and considerations. However, Posner advocates a more specific conception of balancing, both substantively (...)
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  16. Re'em Segev (2008). The Distributive Justice Theory of Self-Defense: A Response to Whitley Kaufman. Ethics and International Affairs 22 (1).
    In several papers, I have argued for a theory of distributive justice and considered its implications. This theory includes a principle of responsibility that was endorsed by others within an account of defensive force (self-defense and defense of others). Whitley Kaufman criticizes this account which he refers to as the "distributive justice theory of self-defense" (DJ theory). In this paper, I respond to this criticism. I argue that Kaufman presents the theory inaccurately, that his standard of evaluation of the theory (...)
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  17. Re'em Segev (2008). Weighing Values and Balancing Interests. Israel Democracy Institute.
    One of the central normative questions regards a decision between conflicting moral values. A decision of this nature is often required in disciplines such as philosophy, economics and law. According to common terminology, a decision between conflicting values reflects a balance of values, considerations or interests. Several types of questions arise in this context. One category includes substantive questions: which values exist, which considerations should be derived from these values, what is the degree of importance of these considerations, and which (...)
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  18. Re'em Segev (2008). Freedom of Expression: Justifications & Restrictions. Israel Democracy Institute.
    "Freedom of expression" is a complex notion that reflects various considerations and raises many questions related to their content and interaction. This paper is an abstract of a book that considers general aspects regarding the justification and the limits of freedom of expression and analyzes exiting law in light of this normative discussion. Particularly, it considers the way to determine the proper scope of freedom of expression; first-order and second-order considerations in favor and against freedom of expression, both in general (...)
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  19. Re'em Segev (2001). Freedom of Expression Against Governmental Authorities. Israel Democracy Institute.
    The subject of this study is the justification for limiting negative expression directed at the government: its institutions and public officials, in order to preserve public faith in government. This paper is an abstract of a book that considers this question. The conclusion is that since the value of speech concerned with the performance of government is very high and the interest in protecting the status of government is limited and typically not substantial, there is generally no justification for legal (...)
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  20. Katrina L. Sifferd (2013). Translating Scientific Evidence Into the Language of the ‘Folk’: Executive Function as Capacity-Responsibility. In Nicole A. Vincent (ed.), Legal Responsibility and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    There are legitimate worries about gaps between scientific evidence of brain states and function (for example, as evidenced by fMRI data) and legal criteria for determining criminal culpability. In this paper I argue that behavioral evidence of capacity, motive and intent appears easier for judges and juries to use for purposes of determining criminal liability because such evidence triggers the application of commonsense psychological (CSP) concepts that guide and structure criminal responsibility. In contrast, scientific evidence of neurological processes and function (...)
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  21. Lawrence B. Solum (1992). Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences. North Carolina Law Review 70:1231.
    Could an artificial intelligence become a legal person? As of today, this question is only theoretical. No existing computer program currently possesses the sort of capacities that would justify serious judicial inquiry into the question of legal personhood. The question is nonetheless of some interest. Cognitive science begins with the assumption that the nature of human intelligence is computational, and therefore, that the human mind can, in principle, be modelled as a program that runs on a computer. Artificial intelligence (AI) (...)
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  22. Irving Thalberg (1971). Hart on Strict Liability and Excusing Conditions. Ethics 81 (2):150-160.
  23. Bas van der Vossen (2011). Assessing Law's Claim to Authority. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (3):481-501.
    The idea that law claims authority (LCA) has recently been forcefully criticized by a number of authors. These authors present a new and intriguing objection, arguing that law cannot be said to claim authority if such a claim is not justified. That is, these authors argue that the view that law does not have authority viciously conflicts with the view that law claims authority. I will call this the normative critique of LCA. In this article, I assess the normative critique (...)
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