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  1. Jami L. Anderson (1999). Annulment Retributivism: A Hegelian Theory of Punishment. Cambridge University Press 5 (4):363-388.
    Despite the bad press that retributivism often receives, the basic assumptions on which this theory of punishment rests are generally regarded as being attractive and compelling. First of these is the assumption that persons are morally responsible agents and that social practices, such as criminal punishment, must acknowledge that fact. Additionally, retributivism is committed to the claim that punishment must be proportionate to the crime, and not determined by such utilitarian concerns as the welfare of society, or the hope of (...)
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  2. Rani Lill Anjum & Stephen Mumford, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility - On Causation and Responsibility in Spider-Man, and Possibly Moore. Critical Essays on Causation and Responsibility.
    Omissions are sometimes linked to responsibility. A harm can counterfactually depend on an omission to prevent it. If someone had the ability to prevent a harm but didn’t, this could suffice to ground their responsibility for the harm. We present an argument for this based on the WGPCGR-thesis: With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility. -/- We argue, with reference to Moore’s account in Causation and Responsibility (Moore 2009), that moral and legal responsibility is based on the power we have as (...)
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  3. Simon Beck (2008). Intuitionism, Constructive Interpretation, and Cricket. Philosophical Papers 37 (2):319-331.
    This paper is a re-reading of Colin Radford's paper 'The Umpire's Dilemma', published in Analysis in 1985. It argues that Radford's dilemma has been unjustly ignored and has interesting (and problematic) implications for both intuitionism and Ronald Dworkin's constructive interpretationist jurisprudence.
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  4. Christopher Bennett, Edgar Maraguat, J. M. Pérez Bermejo, Antony Duff, J. L. Martí, Sergi Rosell & Constantine Sandis (2012). Symposium. The Apology Ritual. Teorema 31 (2).
    Symposium on Christopher Bennet's The Apology Ritual. A Philosophical Theory of Punishment [Cambridge University Press, 2008].
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  5. David Brax & Christian Munthe (2013). The Philosophy of Hate Crime Anthology. University of Gothenburg.
    Introductory anthology to the philosophy of hate crime, written in the EU project "When Law and Hate Collide".
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  6. David Brax & Christian Munthe (2013). Part I: Introduction to the Philosophy of Hate Crime. In The Philosophy of Hate Crime Anthology. University of Gothenburg.
  7. Thom Brooks (2003). Does Philosophy Deserve a Place at the Supreme Court? Rutgers Law Record 27 (1):1-17.
    This Comment demonstrates that policy judgements are not masked by philosophical references, nor do philosophers play any crucial role in contentious judicial decisions. Neomi Rao’s study is flawed for many reasons: incomplete content analysis, poor assessment of data, and an inadequate definition of philosophy. She should be criticised for hypocritically praising Court philosopher references in some instances and not others, especially with regard to the Court’s early development. This Comment searched unsuccessfully for an instance where philosophers were cited just once (...)
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  8. Daniel I. A. Cohen (1994). The Hate That Dare Not Speak its Name: Pornography Qua Semi-Political Speech. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 13 (2):195 - 239.
    In this essay we shall examine the contemporary jurisprudential thinking and legal precedents surrounding the issue of the sanctionability of pornography. We shall catalogue them by their logical presumptions, such as whether they view pornography as speech or act, whether they view pornography as obscenity, political hate-speech or anomalous other, whether they would scrutinize legislation governing pornography by a balancing of the harm of repression against the harm of permission, and who exactly they view as the victims.We shall take a (...)
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  9. Simon Critchley & William Schroeder (1996). A Companion to Continental Philosophy. In Dennis M. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell Publishers.
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  10. Steven M. Duncan (2013). It's Murder!(?). Seattle Critical Review (3):8-12.
    Although this piece was inspired by the kinds of legal puzzles discussed by Hart and Honore in Causation in the Law, the puzzle cases presented here are intended to test the readers intuitions about what constitutes murder. Play along!
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  11. William A. Edmundson (2014). Why Legal Theory is Political Philosophy. Legal Theory 19 (4):1-16.
    The concept of law is not a theorist's invention but one that people use every day. Thus one measure of the adequacy of a theory of law is its degree of fidelity to the concept as it is understood by those who use it. That means as far as possible. There are important truisms about the law that have an evaluative cast. The theorist has either to say what would make those evaluative truisms true or to defend her choice to (...)
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  12. Paul Franco & Leslie Marsh (eds.) (2012). A Companion to Michael Oakeshott. Penn State.
    Michael Oakeshott has long been recognized as one of the most important political philosophers of the twentieth century, but until now no single volume has been able to examine all the facets of his wide-ranging philosophy with sufficient depth, expertise, and authority. The essays collected here cover all aspects of Oakeshott’s thought, from his theory of knowledge and philosophies of history, religion, art, and education to his reflections on morality, politics, and law. The volume provides an authoritative and synoptic guide (...)
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  13. Dean Goorden (2012). Dworkin and Phenomenology of the “Pre-Legal”? Ratio Juris 25 (3):393-408.
    Ronald Dworkin states in his preface to “Law's Empire” (1986) that he is doing a phenomenology of law. In regards to a phenomenology of law, I wish to investigate Dworkin's theory of law, and subsequently, what is left out in order for it to be considered a phenomenological account. In doing so, I will compare Dworkin's phenomenology of law to Schütz's phenomenology of the social world. The comparison between the two will illuminate what I believe is necessary for law, and (...)
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  14. Jonathan Gorman (2003). Rights and Reason. Acumen/McGill-Queen's University Press.
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  15. Guy Haarscher (2005). Some Contemporary Trends in Continental Philosophy of Law. In Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell Pub..
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  16. Jaap C. Hage, Ronald Leenes & Arno R. Lodder (1993). Hard Cases: A Procedural Approach. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (2):113-167.
    Much work on legal knowledge systems treats legal reasoning as arguments that lead from a description of the law and the facts of a case, to the legal conclusion for the case. The reasoning steps of the inference engine parallel the logical steps by means of which the legal conclusion is derived from the factual and legal premises. In short, the relation between the input and the output of a legal inference engine is a logical one. The truth of the (...)
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  17. Ori J. Herstein (2012). Defending the Right To Do Wrong. Law and Philosophy 31 (3):343-365.
    Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition (...)
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  18. Frank Hindriks (2010). Person as Lawyer: How Having a Guilty Mind Explains Attributions of Intentional Agency. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (04):339-340.
    In criminal law, foresight betrays a guilty mind as much as intent does: both reveal that the agent is not properly motivated to avoid an illegal state of affairs. This commonality warrants our judgment that the state is brought about intentionally, even when unintended. In contrast to Knobe, I thus retain the idea that acting intentionally is acting with a certain frame of mind.
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  19. Aleksandar Jokic (2013). Go Local: Morality and International Activism. Ethics and Global Politics 6 (1):1-24.
    A step towards constructing an ethics of international activism is proposed by formulating a series of constraints on what would constitute morally permissible agency in the context that involves delivering services abroad, directly or indirectly. Perhaps surprisingly, in this effort the author makes use of the concept of ‘force multiplier’. This idea and its official applications have explanatory importance in considering the correlation between the post-Cold War phenomenal growth in the number of international non-governmental organizations and the emergence of the (...)
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  20. Julias Kraft (1926). Die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung der phänomenologischen Rechtsphilosophie. Kant-Studien 31 (1-3):286-296.
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  21. Volodymyr Kuznetsov (ed.) (2003). The Philosophy of Law. History and Modernity. Stylos.
    The manual represents the evolution of the concept of law from antiquity to the end of XX century. It also describes some important Anglo-American directions in the philosophy of law, which are important for developments of Ukrainian legal system (legal positivism, naturalism, realism, criticism, feminism, economical theory of law, postmodernism, etc. The main text is supplemented with excerpts from the writings on the philosophy of law, which are little known for Ukrainian readers. The audience of textbook is students, educators, jurists (...)
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  22. Holly Lawford-Smith (2010). Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (by Larry Alexander Et Al.). [REVIEW] Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 35:152-158.
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  23. Patrick Lenta & Simon Beck (2006). A Sporting Dilemma and its Jurisprudence. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 33 (2):125-143.
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  24. Elisabeth A. Lloyd (2001). Science Gone Astray: Evolution and Rape. [REVIEW] Michigan Law Review 99 (6):1536-1559.
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  25. David McCarthy (1996). Liability and Risk. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (3):238-262.
    Standard theories of liability say that X is liable to Y only if Y was harmed, only if X caused Y harm, and (usually) only if X was at fault. This article offers a series of criticisms of each of these claims, and use them to construct an alternative theory of liability in which the nature of X's having imposed a risk of harm on Y is central to the question of when X is liable to Y, and for how (...)
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  26. Michaelis Michael (2006). “How Should We Think of Human Rights?”. The Human Rights Defender 15 (2).
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  27. Daniel Moseley (2009). Review of E. Fuller Torrey, "The Insanity Offense&Quot;. [REVIEW] Metapsychology.
  28. María G. Navarro (2012). Discrecionalidad Administrativa. Eunomía. Revista En Cultura de la Legalidad 3:200-205.
    The administrative discretionary act differs from regulated act because while the latter refers to the simple execution of the law, the former refers to cases where there is some leeway for a further understanding and application of the rule. For example, discretionary is necessary when the law can provide two possible proceedings, none of which is mandatory. It is also necessary when legislation merely indicates its ends, without specifying the means to achieve them. When it is not dissociated from the (...)
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  29. Mason Richey (2008). What Can Philosophers Offer Social Scientists?; or The Frankfurt School and its Relevance to Social Science: From the History of Philosophical Sociology to an Examination of Issues in the Current EU. International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences 3 (6):63-72.
    This paper presents the history of the Frankfurt School’s inclusion of normative concerns in social science research programs during the period 1930-1955. After examining the relevant methodology, I present a model of how such a program could look today. I argue that such an approach is both valuable to contemporary social science programs and overlooked by current philosophers and social scientists.
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  30. David T. Risser (1999). Democratic Process. In Christopher B. Gray (ed.), The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia (vol. 1). Garland Publishing, Inc.:193-195.
    The participation of its citizens in the making of public policy is the defining feature of a democratic regime and represents popular sovereignity in action. There are a number of serious problems which threaten the quality or even the legitimacy of the democratic process. The focus of this entry is on four of the most important problems or flaws in democratic politics, particularly democratic politics in the U.S. These four are (1) political agenda formation, (2) the scope and bias of (...)
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  31. David-Hillel Ruben (1972). Warnock on Rules. Philosophical Quarterly 22 (89):349-354.
    A discussion of Geoffrey Warnock's views on the analysis of rules.
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  32. Stefan Sciaraffa (1999). Critical Legal Studies: A Marxist Rejoinder. Legal Theory 5 (2):201-19.
  33. Ori Simchen (2008). Comment on David Enoch's 'Luck Between Morality, Law, and Justice'. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9 (1):8-11.
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  34. Holly Smith (2011). Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance. Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):115-146.
    Recent writers on negligence and culpable ignorance have argued that there are two kinds of culpable ignorance: tracing cases, in which the agent’s ignorance traces back to some culpable act or omission of hers in the past that led to the current act, which therefore arguably inherits the culpability of that earlier failure; and non-tracing cases, in which there is no such earlier failure, so the agent’s current state of ignorance must be culpable in its own right. An unusual but (...)
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  35. Scott Soames, Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation.
    By “legal interpretation” I mean the legally authoritative resolution of questions about what the content of the law is in its application to particular cases. It is the interpretation of legal texts by legally authoritative actors. One aspect of it is epistemological and one is constitutive. The epistemological task is to ascertain the content of laws resulting from previous actions of other legally authoritative sources. The constitutive task is to render an authoritative judgment that itself plays a role in determining (...)
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  36. Lawrence B. Solum (1992). Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences. North Carolina Law Review 70:1231.
    Could an artificial intelligence become a legal person? As of today, this question is only theoretical. No existing computer program currently possesses the sort of capacities that would justify serious judicial inquiry into the question of legal personhood. The question is nonetheless of some interest. Cognitive science begins with the assumption that the nature of human intelligence is computational, and therefore, that the human mind can, in principle, be modelled as a program that runs on a computer. Artificial intelligence (AI) (...)
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  37. Uwe Steinhoff, Why We Shouldn’T Reject Conflicts: A Critique of Tadros.
    Victor Tadros thinks the idea that in a conflict both sides may permissibly use force should (typically) be rejected. Thus, he thinks that two shipwrecked persons should not fight for the only available flotsam (which can only carry one person) but instead toss a coin, and that a bomber justifiably attacking an ammunitions factory must not be counterattacked by the innocent bystanders he endangers. I shall argue that Tadros’s claim rests on unwarranted assumptions and is also mistaken in the light (...)
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  38. Uwe Steinhoff, Justifying Defense Against Non-Responsible Threats and Justified Aggressors: The Liability Vs. The Rights-Infringement Account.
    Even among those who find lethal defense against non-responsible threats, innocent aggressors, or justified aggressors justified even in one to one cases, there is a debate as to what the best explanation of this permissibility is. The contenders in this debate are the liability account, which holds that the non-responsible or justified human targets of the defensive measures are liable to attack (that is, they do not have a right not to be attacked), and the justified infringement account, which claims (...)
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  39. François Tanguay-Renaud (2012). Individual Emergencies and the Rule of Criminal Law. In François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos (eds.), Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law. Hart Publishing.
  40. Erin C. Tarver (2007). Particulars, Practices, and Pragmatic Feminism: Breaking Rules and Rulings with William James. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 21 (4):pp. 275-290.
  41. Nicole A. Vincent (2009). Neuroimaging and Responsibility Assessments. Neuroethics 4 (1):35-49.
    Could neuroimaging evidence help us to assess the degree of a person’s responsibility for a crime which we know that they committed? This essay defends an affirmative answer to this question. A range of standard objections to this high-tech approach to assessing people’s responsibility is considered and then set aside, but I also bring to light and then reject a novel objection—an objection which is only encountered when functional (rather than structural) neuroimaging is used to assess people’s responsibility.
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  42. Nicole A. Vincent (2007). Responsibility, Compensation and Accident Law Reform. Dissertation, University of Adelaide
    This thesis considers two allegations which conservatives often level at no-fault systems — namely, that responsibility is abnegated under no-fault systems, and that no-fault systems under- and over-compensate. I argue that although each of these allegations can be satisfactorily met – the responsibility allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that to properly take responsibility for our actions we must accept liability for those losses for which we are causally responsible; and the compensation allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that tort (...)
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  43. Roger Wertheimer (1975). Are the Police Necessary? In E. Viano & J. Reiman (eds.), The Police in Society. D.C. Heath.