Children are the real victims of world hunger: at least 70% of the malnourished people of the world are children. By best estimates forty thousand children a day die of starvation (FAO 1989: 5). Children do not have the ability to forage for themselves, and their nutritional needs are exceptionally high. Hence, they are unable to survive for long on their own, especially in lean times. Moreover, they are especially susceptible to diseases and conditions which are the staple of undernourished (...) people: simple infections and simple diarrhea (UNICEF 1993: 22). Unless others provide adequate food, water, and care, children will suffer and die (WHO 1974: 677, 679). This fact must frame any moral discussions of the problem. And so it does — at least pre-philosophically. When most of us first see pictures of seriously undernourished children, we want to help them, we have a sense of responsibility to them, we feel sympathy toward them (Hume 1978: 368-71). Even those who think we needn't or shouldn't help the starving take this initial response seriously: they go to great pains to show that this sympathetic response should be constrained. They typically claim that assisting the hungry will demand too much of us, or that assistance would be useless and probably detrimental. The efforts of objectors to undermine this natural sympathetic reaction would be pointless unless they saw its psychological force. We want to explain and bolster this sympathetic reaction — this conviction that those of us in a position to help are responsible to the.. (shrink)

Scientists are divided on the status of hypothesis H that low doses of ionizing radiation (under 20 rads) cause hormetic (or non-harmful) effects. Military and industrial scientist s tend to accept H, while medical and environmental scientists tend to reject it. Proponents of the strong programme claim this debate shows that uncertain science can be clari ed only by greater attention to the social values in uencing it. While they are in part correct, this paper argues that methodological analyses (not (...) merely attention to social values) also can help clarify uncertain science. The paper analyzes ve measurement uncertainties , as well as seven methodological value judgments, relevant to H. Using criteria of internal and external consistency, as well as predictive power, it argues that metascience also helps resolve this debate. And if so, then value-laden, policy-relevan t science may need, not only more attention to social values in order to resolve and to clarify disputes, but also more conceptual and methodological analyses of science. (This paper suggests what such methodological analyses might be like and uses the case of low-dose risks from radiation to illustrate its points, while a companion paper (“Chemical Hormesis, Conceptual Clari cation, and the Warrant for Policy-Driven Science”) in this same issue of POS suggests what such conceptual analyses might be like and uses the case of low-dose risks from chemicals to illustrate its points.) If this paper’s thesis holds in the very politicize d “hard case” of radiation hormesis, then it suggests that the metascientist s may be right about what is also often necessary to clarify scienti c disputes. (shrink)

This paper analyzes one dimension of the frequently alleged contradiction between treating medicine as a business and as a profession, namely the incompatibility between viewing the physician patient relationship in economic and moral terms. The paper explores the utilitarian foundations of economics and the deontological foundations of professional medical ethics as one source for the business/medicine conflict that influences beliefs about the proper understanding of the therapeutic relationship. It, then, focuses on the contrast and distinction between medicine as business and (...) profession by critically analyzing the classic economic view of the moral status of medicine articulated by Kenneth Arrow. The paper concludes with a discussion of some advantages associated with regarding medicine as a business. (shrink)

Recent philosophical attention to the language of disease has focused primarily on the question of its value-neutrality or non-neutrality. Proponents of the value-neutrality thesis symbolically combine political and other criticisms of medicine in an attack on what they see as value-infected uses of disease language. The present essay argues against two theses associated with this view: a methodological thesis which tends to divorce the analysis of disease language from the context of the practice of medicine and a substantive thesis which (...) holds that disease language is evaluatively neutral. In particular, the essay critically focuses on the value neutral position adopted by Christopher Boorse, which he terms a functional theory of disease. The argument concerns whether or not one can have value neutral description of disease states or whether disease language essentially involves values. (shrink)

This article isolates ten prepositions, which constitute the undercurrent paradigm of contemporary discourse of health disease and medicine. Discussion of the interrelationship between those prepositions leads to a systematic refutation of this paradigm. An alternative set is being forwarded. The key notions of the existing paradigm are that health is the natural condition of humankind and that disease is a deviance from that nature. Natural things are harmonious and healthy while human made artifacts are coercive interference with natural balance. It (...) is suggested that the current paradigm is influenced by the world of finances and by instrumental reason. The alternative model suggests that human nature cannot be delineated. Humans fashion their own selves and nature by artificial means, medicine among them. The article discusses the implications of the paradigm adapted in various scholarly and popular debates such as the use of sex hormones for contraception, the care of the elderly, holistic medicine and distributive justice in health care. Medicine is not an isolated or a privileged realm. There is no unique entitlement to health care. It is always part of a broader agenda of social values and institutions. A open view of human societies, values and practices as they are situated within concrete material conditions is the platform required for an integrative and creative discourse of health care. (shrink)

Living things are often plastic during their early development and are moulded by the environment. Many human fetuses have to adapt to a limited supply of nutrients, and in doing so they permanently change their physiology and metabolism. These programmed changes may be the origins of a number of diseases in later life, including coronary heart disease, stroke, diabetes and hypertension.

Ivan Illich, philosopher, historian, priest and social commentator died in Bremen, Germany on December 2, 2002. Illich was noted for his critique of the Church, education and medicine but his concepts dealt with more fundamental issues. This article reveals aspects of Illich, the man, and explores his ideas as they apply to the meaning of medicine and, in particular, the role of health care in contemporary society.

Despite its virtues, lay decision-making in medicine shares with professional decision-making a disturbing common feature, reflected both in formal policies prohibiting high-risk research and in informal policies favoring treatment decisions made when a crisis or change of status occurs, often late in a downhill course. By discouraging patient decision-making but requiring dedication to the patient's interests by those who make decisions on the patient's behalf, such practices tend to preclude altruistic choice on the part of the patient. This eclipse is (...) to be regretted not just because widescale altruism has the capacity to provide important social goods and correct injustices in distribution, but for intrinsic reasons as well. It is argued that preserving the possibility of altruism obliges patients – and future patients – to make decisions about dying and other medical matters in advance, thus avoiding that displacement of decision-making onto lay and professional second parties which results in altruism's eclipse. Keywords: altruism, medical decision-making, patient's interest, self-interest, autonomy, death and dying decisions, refusal of treatment, prolongation of life, allowing to die, high-risk research CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

For the philosophy of medicine, there are two things of interest about the stoic account of moral norms, quite apart from whether the rest of stoic ethical theory is compelling. One is the stoic version of naturalism: its account of practical reasoning, its solution to the is/ought problem, and its contention that norms for creating, sustaining, or restoring human health are tantamount to moral norms. The other is the stoic account of human agency: its description of the intimate connections between (...) human health, rational agency, and moral norms. There is practical guidance to be gained from exploring those connections, whether or not one is ready to follow stoic moral theory all the way to its austere end. (shrink)

The field of spirituality and medicine has seen explosive growth in recent years, due in part to significant private support for the development of curricula in more than half of all U.S. medical schools, and for related residency training programs and research centers. While there is no single definition of "spirituality" in use across these initiatives, this article examines the definitions and learning objectives relevant to spirituality that are addressed in a 1999 report of the Medical School (...) Objectives Project (MSOP), with special attention to their ethical implications. It concludes with several "diagnostic" case studies of religious consciousness from the medical literature and in literary texts, again with attention to ethical concerns. (shrink)

Genomics has brought biology, medicine, agriculture, psychology, anthropology, and even philosophy to a new threshold. In this new context, the question about "what is human in humans" may end up being answered by geneticists, specialists of technoscience, and owners of biotech companies. The author defends, in this article, the idea that humanity is at risk in our age of genetic engineering, biotechnologies, and market-geared genetic research; he also argues that the values at the very core of our postgenomic era bring (...) to its peak the science-based ideology that has developed since the time of Galileo, Newton, Descartes, and Harvey; finally, it shows that the bioindustry has invented a new genomythology that goes against the scientific evidence produced by the research in human sciences in which life is interpreted as a language. (shrink)

E. Haavi Morreim's book, Holding Health Care Accountable , insightfully describes several features of the current crisis in malpractice in relation to the health care marketplace. In this essay, I delineate the key and eminently practical guide for reform that she lays out. I argue that her insights bring us to more fundamental aspects than immanent medical economy and accountability - aspects that are ignored at present. I describe the features of immanent economy and how they tend to cover over (...) epistemological and existential finitude in medicine, show how economy can in fact create new medical knowledge, and show that necessary error is a real feature of day-to-day medical practice. The current system, even with Morreim's reforms, remains at the level of immanent economy, but with modifications may point to the features of medicine that transcend medical knowledge and economy. The gifts of medicine cannot be reduced to the immanent medical economy, and any attempt to do so results in crisis. A health care that points to finitude and fallibility is one that points to the mystery of human existence and mortality. Any health care financing system that helps to delineate finitude - both epistemological and existential - is one that will give patients a new lease on living and dying. (shrink)

A perspective is developed for approaching affliction as a social fact. Disability and disease are considered as two ways in which we suffer a disjunction which arises from the need to take initiative with respect to the inexorable, whether that means the mark of disability or the unconquerability of disease.The story of affliction always raises and masks in certain respects the problem of suffering as the collective representation of our experience of subjectivity where that experience passes through the separateness of (...) being marked to the singularity of being without hope. (shrink)

The convergence of biomedical sciences with nanotechnology as well as ICT has created a new wave of biomedical technologies, resulting in visions of a ‘molecular medicine’. Since novel technologies tend to shift concepts of disease and health, this paper investigates how the emerging field of molecular medicine may shift the meaning of ‘disease’ as well as the boundary between health and disease. It gives a brief overview of the development towards and the often very speculative visions of molecular medicine. Subsequently (...) three views of disease often used in the philosophy of medicine are briefly discussed: the ontological or neo-ontological, the physiological and the normative/holistic concepts of disease. Against this background two tendencies in the field of molecular medicine are highlighted: (1) the use of a cascade model of disease and (2) the notion of disease as a deviation from an individual pattern of functioning. It becomes clear that molecular medicine pulls conceptualizations of disease and health in several, partly opposed directions. However, the resulting tensions may also offer opportunities to steer the future of medicine in more desirable directions. (shrink)

Generally, rational decision-making is conceived as arriving at a decision by a correct application of the rules of logic and statistics. If not, the conclusions are called biased. After an impressive series of experiments and tests carried out in the last few decades, the view arose that rationality is tough for all, skilled field experts not excluded. A new type of planner's counsellor is called for: the normative statistician, the expert in reasoning with uncertainty par excellence. To unravel this view, (...) the paper explores a specific practice of clinical decision-making, namely Evidence-Based Medicine. This practice is chosen, because it is very explicit about how to rationalize practice. The paper shows that whether a decision-making process is rational cannot be assessed without taking into account the environment in which the decisions have to be taken. To be more specific, the decision to call for new evidence should be rational too. This decision and the way in which this evidence is obtained are crucial to validate the base rates. Rationality should be model-based, which means that not only the isolated decision-making process should take a Bayesian updating process as its norm, but should also model the acquisition of evidence (priors and tests results) as a rational process. (shrink)

This essay argues that making a diagnosis in medicine is essentially a hermeneutic enterprise, one in which interpretation skills play a major part in understanding a disease. The clinical encounter is an event comprised of two voices; one is the voice of science which is grounded in empiricism, the other is that of human experience, which is grounded in story-telling and the interpretation of those stories.Using two voices, one from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-III-Revised, which describes alcohol (...) abuse and alcohol dependence, and the other, that of Claire, a character in Edward Albee's play, A Delicate Balance, who is conversing with her brother-in-law, Tobias, I apply principles from Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics to the clinical diagnostic process. The essay will demonstrate that we overlook an enormous amount of information about alcoholism by an overreliance on objective data and that our hope for understanding alcoholics is in listening to their voices, and sharing the interpretation of their experiences with them. (shrink)

In this article I seek to say what it is for something to count as a neglected disease. I argue that neglect should be defined in terms of efforts at prevention, mitigation and cure, and not solely in terms of research dollars per disability-adjusted life-year. I further argue that the trend towards multifactorialism and risk factor thinking in modern epidemiology has lent credibility to the erroneous view that the primary problem with neglected diseases is a lack of research. A more (...) restrictive contrastive model of disease is endorsed as better suited to the definition of neglected disease. (shrink)

A less analytic and more wholistic approach to philosophy, described as best overall fit or seeing how things all hang together, is defended in recent works by John Rawls and Richard Rorty and can usefully be applied to problems in philosophy of medicine. Looking at sickness and its impact upon the person as a central problem for philosophy of medicine, this approach discourages a search for necessary and sufficient conditions for being sick, and instead encourages a listing of true and (...) interesting observations about sickness which reflect the convergence of a number of different viewpoints. Among the relevant viewpoints are other humanities disciplines besides philosophy and the social sciences. Literature, in particular, provides insights into the meaning and the uniqueness of episodes of sickness in a way that philosophers may otherwise fail to grasp. (shrink)

The question of the philosophical basis of medical science and medical practice is considered under three closely related themes: (i) the doctor-patient relationship, (ii) the structure of the medical-ethical discourse, and (iii) the problem of philosophical founding in relation to medical conduct. The doctor-patient relationship is regarded as a transformational relation. Acceptance of the illness of the patient, the construction of a complaint as a necessary condition — and not a description of an existing reality — as well as the (...) establishment of a common interest are determinants of that relation. They are related to the dominant form of science and thought in medicine, namely application. This is typical for the Standard Medical-Ethical Discussion (SMED), its scope and its rationality. The third issue leads to the thesis that this particular rationality is not a sufficient ground for considering the medical discourse to be founded in philosophy. (shrink)

This essay examines several recent philosophical attempts to define ‘disease’. Two prominent ones are considered in detail, an objective approach by Christopher Boorse and a normative approach by Caroline Whitbeck. Both are found to be inadequate for a variety of reasons, though Whitbeck's is superior because of her careful preliminary distinctions and because of its normative approach which is more nearly in accord with medical and lay usage. The paper concludes with a discussion of the nature of such efforts at (...) definition and suggests that their limitations are due both to the nature of our language and concepts in general, and to the nature of medicine in particular. It is the practical and changing character of medicine and its language that frustrates the efforts of philosophers to formulate such definitions. Keywords: disease, definition CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The ethical implications of the growth of for-profit health care institutions are complex. Two major moral criticisms of for-profit medicine are analyzed. The first claim is that for-profit health care institutions fail to fulfill their obligations to do their fair share in providing health care to the poor and so exacerbate the problem of access to health care. The second claim is that profit seeking in medicine will damage the physician-patient relationship, creating conflicts of interest that will diminish the quality (...) of care and erode patients' trust in their physicians and the public's trust in the medical profession. The authors conclude that while the continued expansion of for-profit health care may exacerbate in some respects problems of access, trust and conflicts of interest, it is a mistake to consider these problems as unique to for-profit health care; they are problems for not for-profit health care as well. Though these issues justify continuing moral concern, they do not at this time provide decisive grounds for substantially curbing or eliminating for-profit enterprise in health care. Keywords: for-profit medicine, competetion, access to health care, justice, patient-physician relationship CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The concept of predisposition in medicine is ancient, and the term diathesis was used to express it since the days of Hippocrates and, especially, of Galen.The concept of diathesis was enormously popular throughout the nineteenth century, despite the vagueness of its actual meaning. It was clarified only in the early years of the twentieth century (1902), when it was however losing its clinical relevance, by a replacement of the concept ofchemical individuality by A.E. Garrod, followed thirty years later by the (...) concept ofinborn factors in disease (1931). (shrink)

The often-emphasized tension between the singularity of the patient and technical–scientific reproducibility in medicine cannot be resolved without a discussion of the epistemological and methodological status of the human sciences. On the one hand, the rules concerning human action are analogous to the scientific laws of nature. They are de facto sufficiently stable to allow predictions and explanations similar to those of experimental sciences. From this point of view, it is only a trivial truth, but still a methodological irrelevancy, that (...) the patient and the doctor–patient relationship represent an ontologically irreproducible reality. On the other hand, however, one can never exclude that one can fail in the application of "laws" of the human sciences to the individual patient, for such laws are by no means wholly separated from a patient's personal-hermeneutic mediation, and can at any time be revoked by becoming aware of them. This requires a synergistic collaboration of clinical and statistical methods, and shows a methodologically relevant sense in which one cannot disregard the singularity of the patient. The reason for the crucial role of the patient's singularity in medicine is every individual patient's capacity to revoke, in principle, routines and quasi-automatisms, even though the personal mediation by the patient's consciousness de facto changes them in such a small degree that predictions and explanations modeled in experimental science remain possible. (shrink)

All the powerful influences exertedby the subjective-interpersonal dimension onthe organic or technical-functional dimensionof sickness and health do not make anintersubjective test concerning medicaltherapeutic results impossible. Theseinfluences are not arbitrary; on the contrary,they obey laws that are de facto sufficientlystable to allow predictions and explanationssimilar to those of experimental sciences.While, in this respect, the rules concerninghuman action are analogous to the scientificlaws of nature, they can at any time be revokedby becoming aware of them. Law-like andreproducible regularities in the sciences ofman (...) are by no means separated from a patient'spersonal-hermeneutic mediation. This makes itpossible for human beings to modify, improve orsometimes even entirely (or better almostentirely) suspend these psychological,sociological, ethnological, medical,regularities. For this reason the sciences ofman including medicine are under the obligationof constantly inspecting the continuingvalidity of the rules on which theirpredictions and explanations are based, namelyby indirect, statistical methods. Thisrequires a synergistic collaboration ofextra-clinical and clinical tests through whichmedicine can obtain a good level ofintersubjective testability. (shrink)

One of the most important developments in international medicine over the past two decades has been a turn to the market as a way of coping with rising costs and responding to calls for more freedom from government control. A full moral evaluation of the relationship of medicine and the market requires asking a wide range of questions bearing on the meaning and impact of market strategies on the economics of health care and on the clinical and public health outcomes (...) of those strategies. A number of the leading questions are presented and some provisional answers offered. (shrink)

The contributions that the philosophy of medicine can make to both the philosophy of science and the practice of science have been obscured in recent years by an overemphasis on personalities rather than critical themes. Two themes have dominated general discussion within contemporary philosophy of science: methodological essentialism and dynamic gradualism. These themes are defined and considered in light of Kenneth Schaffner's argument that theories in biomedicine have a structure and logic unlike that found in theories of the natural sciences. (...) Schaffner's arguments are suggestive but not definitive as a refutation of methodological essentialism. I argue that a primary reason for differences in the logic and structure of theories in biomedicine is not, as some philosophers have suggested, a product of ontological differences, but rather a product of the practical and pragmatic concerns of scientific theorizing in many areas of science, such as medicine. Keywords: philosophy of medicine, philosophy of science, logic of medicine, medical theory, methodological essentialism, dynamic gradualism CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Health, Disease, and Illness brings together a sterling list of classic and contemporary thinkers to examine the history, state, and future of ever-changing "concepts" in medicine.

This article provides an introduction to the articles in this theme issue. This collection examines epistemological, ontological, moral and political questions in medicine in light of the philosophical ideas of Charles Taylor. A synthesis of Taylor's relevant work is presented. Taylor has argued for a conception of the human sciences that regards human life as meaningful–deriving meaning from surrounding horizons of significance. An overview of the interdisciplinary articles in this issue is presented. This collection advances our thinking in the philosophy (...) of medicine as well as the philosophy of Charles Taylor. (shrink)

Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are widely taken as the gold standard for establishing causal conclusions. Ideally conducted they ensure that the treatment ‘causes’ the outcome—in the experiment. But where else? This is the venerable question of external validity. I point out that the question comes in two importantly different forms: Is the specific causal conclusion warranted by the experiment true in a target situation? What will be the result of implementing the treatment there? This paper explains how the probabilistic theory (...) of causality implies that RCTs can establish causal conclusions and thereby provides an account of what exactly that causal conclusion is. Clarifying the exact form of the conclusion shows just what is necessary for it to hold in a new setting and also how much more is needed to see what the actual outcome would be there were the treatment implemented. (shrink)

What kinds of evidence reliably support predictions of effectiveness for health and social care interventions? There is increasing reliance, not only for health care policy and practice but also for more general social and economic policy deliberation, on evidence that comes from studies whose basic logic is that of JS Mill's method of difference. These include randomized controlled trials, case–control studies, cohort studies, and some uses of causal Bayes nets and counterfactual-licensing models like ones commonly developed in econometrics. The topic (...) of this paper is the 'external validity' of causal conclusions from these kinds of studies. We shall argue two claims. Claim, negative: external validity is the wrong idea; claim, positive: 'capacities' are almost always the right idea, if there is a right idea to be had. If we are right about these claims, it makes big problems for policy decisions. Many advice guides for grading policy predictions give top grades to a proposed policy if it has two good Mill's-method-of difference studies that support it. But if capacities are to serve as the conduit for support from a method-of-difference study to an effectiveness prediction, much more evidence, and much different in kind, is required. We will illustrate the complexities involved with the case of multisystemic therapy, an internationally adopted intervention to try to diminish antisocial behaviour in young people. (shrink)

This paper begins by examining the claim that the practice of medicine is essentially a moral endeavor. According to this view, all clinical practice has moral content, and each clinical situation has a moral dimension. I suggest that in order to recognize this moral dimension, clinicians must engage in an interpretive process, and that they must be able to interpret clinical data in ethical terms. However, clinicians often lack the ‘moral perception’ required to appreciate this moral dimension. I will argue (...) that physicians lack moral perception when the clinical data they are given do not offer sufficient opportunity for interpretation. This paper draws on the work of Merleau-Ponty to suggest that this loss of interpretation is, paradoxically, the result of the way that patients experience illness. This thesis may be productive, first, because it suggests opportunities to explore the process of moral perception. This thesis also suggests ways for ethicists and educators to enhance clinicians' perception of the ethical dimensions of clinical practice. Finally, the concept of moral perception, when grounded in the patient's experience of illness, creates a fruitful area of inquiry that warrants inclusion in what may someday be the philosophy of medicine's canon. (shrink)

Coma, vegetative state, lock-in syndrome and akinetic mutism are defined. Vegetative state is a state with no evidence of awareness of self or environment and showing cycles of sleep and wakefulness. PVS is an operational definition including time as a variable. PVS is a vegetative state that has endured or continued for at least one month. PVS can be diagnosed with a reasonable amount of medical certainty; however, the diagnosis of PVS must be kept separate from the outcome. The patient (...) outcome can be predicted based on etiology and age. Using outcome probabilities and etiology as criteria, patients can be subdivided in 5 groups and reasonable management guidelines can be suggested. Three levels of care can be provided to PVS patients: high technology, supportive and compassionate care. Pragmatic options for the various subgroups of patients are suggested. Management decisions will remain difficult for both the family and the health-care team. The role of the physician in these difficult cases is to share the decision-making with the family. (shrink)

Beginning with a case vignette, this paper uses a semiotic approach to analyze several different kinds of understanding used in clinical medicine. By outlining semiotic structures, four distinct modes of understanding can be defined: (1) the representational mode, corresponding to scientific medicine; (2) the pragmatic mode, constituting the basic standpoint of medicine; (3) the hermeneutic mode, underlying the empathic, humanistic spirit of medicine; and (4) the ontologic mode, associated with both the ethical and ritual aspects of medicine. Clarifying the relationship (...) between these modes avoids common confusions in clinical situations. Although experienced clinicians intuitively use these different modes, they do not necessarily reflect upon them. They are instead mindful of them, and this unique multi-modal consciousness, I suggest, provides a model for integrating theory and practice. (shrink)

While ethicists have directed much attention to controversial biomedical issues--including euthanasia, abortion, and genetic engineering--they have largely ignored the less obvious, but more pervasive, everyday ethical problems faced by family physicians. Ethical Issues in Family Medicine addresses these problems, offering an ethics that reflects the distinctive features of family practice, and helping family physicians to appreciate the extent to which ethical issues influence their practice.

Drew Leder's Clinical Interpretation: The Hermeneutics of Medicine [1] is an essay which understates its case and thereby opens itself to misinterpretation. This response to Leder argues for a more thorough-going hermeneutic for both medicine and science. At the conceptual as well as the practical level, modern medicine and its scientific foundations are hermeneutic enterprises. The purpose of this essay is to argue that we should not back away from this more radical thesis. Embracing it will result in less alienation (...) of physicians from patients, and of physicians from the tasks of medicine. (shrink)

I will present here a personal point of view on the commitment of mathematicians in medicine. Starting from my personal experience, I will suggest generalisations including favourable signs and caveats to show how mathematicians can be welcome and helpful in medicine, both in a theoretical and in a practical way.

Trust relations in medicine are argued to be a requisite response to the special vulnerability of persons as patients. Even so, the problem of motivating trust remains a vital concern. On this score, it is argued that a strong motivation can be found in recognizing that professional self-interest actually entails cultivation of patient trust as a means to maintain professional self-governance. And while the initial move to restore trust must be provoked from such narrow concerns, the process of sustaining trust (...) will require educational initiatives aimed at restoring attitudes and skills suggestive of Percival's concept of empathic care. By including such initiatives, future waves of medical professionals are apt to sustain trust with deepened commitments to character, care, and trust as constitutive properties of their professional mission. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that because the significance of Western medicine lies in its ability to enhance the health of persons within a society, the practice of medicine is foremost an ethic and only thereafter a science. In support of the priority of an ethical perspective in medical practice, the paper explores the socio-cultural nature of knowledge, upon which science itself is constructed. Next, it draws from Levinas' philosophy, which illumines the problem of ontological and epistemological priority. Specifically, (...) it examines Levinas' rendering of the human face and of language, as they found the case for the priority of justice, or ethics. Finally, the paper offers the practice of narrative discourse as one solution that elevates the status of ethics within the institution of medicine and that has the potential to counteract the tendency in medical practice to employ a universalizing methodology based in science's power to control the human Other. (shrink)

This paper argues that modern society does not meet the problems posed by the experience of disease in a satisfactory way. It attempts to show this by examining the distinction between disease and plague. Disease is formulated as necesssarily involving the self in unforeseeable ways with what is other to itself: the challenge of disease is treated as the challenge of this involvement. On the other hand, plague as an abstract threat is that towards which the collective shows principled indifference. (...) The strength and the limits of this indifference are explored. Subsequent upon this, the paper examines the consequences of the loss of the distinction between disease and plague, particularly with respect to the implications of that loss for the treatment, management, and control of disease in modern society. (shrink)

Several recent publications have suggested that hermeneutics, the method of literary criticism, might prove to be useful in medicine. In this essay I consider this thesis with particular attention to the claim that medicine is hermeneutics all the way down. After examining an anti-positivist critique of positivist medicine and arguing that hermeneutic interpretation involves a more radical critique of modern medicine, I examine the supposed consequences of hermeneutical universalism:relativism, skepticism andantirealism which further evaluation reveals to be only potential consequences of (...) hermeneutics. A brief discussion ofphronesis and of the possible texts of medicine concludes the article. (shrink)

Herbert Fingarette [1] argues that alcoholism is not a disease and that the alleged alcoholic under certain circumstances has the power to control his or her drinking disorders. I shall analyze Fingarette's argument and show that his position rests on some logical and conceptual confusions.In analyzing Fingarette's argument for the self-control theory of drinking disorders I conclude that it is problematic for the following reasons: (1) his argument assumes that the identification of a single cause of alcoholism is a necessary (...) condition of its being a disease; (2) unless it is already assumed (a priori) that persons with drinking disorders possess freedom and self-control to the extent that Fingarette assumes they do, then such persons are likely to suffer from apathy or defeatism regarding their condition; (3) even if Fingarette is correct in his criticism of certain health care programs for those with drinking disorders, it does not follow from this that certain theories about the possible causes of such disorders are false; (4) Fingarette's claim that those with drinking disorders are morally responsible for their actions that result from their disorders is problematic, that is, unless it can be shown that such persons act freely; and (5) Fingarette attempts to support the self-control theory of alcoholism by refuting a straw man conception of the disease model of alcoholism. (shrink)

In his story entitled "Toenails," the surgeon Richard Selzer (1982) warns readers that total immersion in medicine is wrongheaded. Rather, to ensure their own health, doctors should discover other passions that permit them periodically to disconnect from medical practice. Selzer's surgeon character devotes his Wednesday afternoons to the public library, where he joins "a subculture of elderly men and women who gather … to read or sleep beneath the world's newspapers" (p. 69). Among these often eccentric personages is Neckerchief, an (...) arthritic man in his 80s who suffers from severe foot pain. His toenails, never trimmed because of his inability to reach them, have grown so long that they curve beneath his toes and .. (shrink)

, Lawrie Reznek argues that disease is not a natural kind term. I raise objections to Reznek's two central arguments for establishing that disease is not a natural kind. In criticizing his a priori, conceptual argument against naturalism, I argue that his conclusion rests on a weaker argument that appeals to the empirical diversity in the symptoms and manifestations of disease. I also raise questions about the account of natural kinds which Reznek utilizes and his point that conventions for classification (...) are excluded by there being natural kinds. Keywords: Disease, natural kind, value judgement CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In terms of Aristotle's intellectual virtues, the process of clinical reasoning and the discipline of clinical medicine are often construed as techne (art), as episteme (science), or as an amalgam or composite of techne and episteme. Although dimensions of process and discipline are appropriately described in these terms, I argue that phronesis (practical reasoning) provides the most compelling paradigm, particularly of the rationality of the physician's knowing and doing in the clinical encounter with the patient. I anchor this argument, moreover, (...) in Pellegrino's philosophy of medicine as a healing relationship, oriented to the end of a right and good healing action for the individual patient. (shrink)

We reply to the Ioannidis's paper "Effectiveness of antidepressants; an evidence based myth constructed from a thousand controlled trials." We disagree that antidepressants have no greater efficacy than placebo. We present the efficacy from hundreds of trials in terms of the percentage of patients with a substantial clinical response (a 50% improvement or more symptomatic reduction). This meta-analysis finds that 42-70% of depressed patients improve with drug and 21%-39% improve with placebo. The response benefit of antidepressant treatment is 33%-11% greater (...) than placebo. Ioannidis argues that it would be vanishingly smaller because systematic biasing in these clinical trials would reduce the drug-placebo difference to zero. Ioannidis' argument that antidepressants have no benefit is eroded by his failures of logic because he does not present any evidence that there are a large number of studies where placebo is substantially more effective than drug. (To reduce to zero, one would also have to show that some of the unpublished studies find placebo better than drug and have substantial systematic or methodological bias). We also present the empirical evidence showing that these methodological concerns generally have the opposite effect of what Ioannidis argues, supporting our contention that the measured efficacy of antidepressants likely underestimates true efficacy.Our most important criticism is Ioannidis’ basic underlying argument about antidepressants that if the existing evidence is imperfect and methods can be criticized, then this proves that antidepressant are not efficacious. He presents no credible evidence that antidepressants have zero effect size. Valid arguments can point out difficulties with the data but do not prove that a given drug had no efficacy. Indeed better evidence might prove it was more efficacious that originally found.We find no empirical or ethical reason why psychiatrists should not try to help depressed patients with drugs and/or with psychotherapeutic/behavioral treatments given evidence of efficacy even though our treatment knowledge has limitations. The immense suffering of patients with major depression leads to ethical, moral, professional and legal obligations to treat patients with the best available tools at our disposal, while diligently and actively monitoring for adverse effects and actively revising treatment components as necessary. (shrink)

Evidence - its nature and interpretation - is the key to many topical debates and concerns such as global warming, evolution, the search for weapons of mass destruction, DNA profiling, evidence-based medicine. In 2004 University College London launched a cross-disciplinary research programme "Evidence, Inference and Enquiry" to explore the question: "Can there be an integrated multidisciplinary science of evidence?" While this question was hotly contested and no clear final consensus emerged, much was learned on the journey. This book, based on (...) the closing conference of the programme held at the British Academy in December 2007, illustrates the complexity of the subject, with 17 chapters written from a diversity of perspectives including Archaeology, Computer Science, Economics, Education, Health, History, Law, Psychology, Philosophy and Statistics. General issues covered include principles and systems for handling complex evidence, evidence for policy-making, and human evidence-processing, as well as the very possibility of systematising the study of evidence. (shrink)

Despite increasing recognition of the ways in which ethical and social values play a role in science (Kitcher 2001; Longino 1990, 2002), scientists are often still reluctant to acknowledge or discuss ethical and social values at stake in their research. Even when research is closely connected to developing public policy, it is generally held that it should be empirical data, and not the values of scientists, that inform policy. According to this view, scientists need not, and should not, endorse non-epistemic (...) values related to their research, as doing so may bias their assessment of what the evidence is. As a result, debates over science-based policy tend to be construed solely as empirical discussions to be .. (shrink)

In this introductory paper, I try to give an overview of the concept of normativity in its philosophical history and its contemporary interpretations and uses in different fields. From philosophy of logic and mathematics to philosophy of language and mind, and to philosophy of medicine and care, normativity is found as a key concept pointing at the possibility of scientific and technical progress and improvement of human life in the interaction between the individual and his environment.

The notion of home is well known from our everyday experience, and plays a crucial role in all kinds of narratives about human life, but is hardly ever systematically dealt with in the philosophy of medicine and health care. This paper is based upon the intuitively positive connotation of the term “home.” By metaphorically describing the goal of palliative care as “the patient’s coming home,” it wants to contribute to a medical humanities approach of medicine. It is argued that this (...) metaphor can enrich our understanding of the goals of palliative care and its proper objectives. Four interpretations of “home” and “coming home” are explored: (1) one’s own house or homelike environment, (2) one’s own body, (3) the psychosocial environment, and (4) the spiritual dimension, in particular, the origin of human existence. Thinking in terms of coming home implies a normative point of view. It represents central human values and refers not only to the medical-technical and care aspects of health care, but also to the moral context. (shrink)

Medicine does not usually consider the human body from an aesthetic point of view. This article explores the notion of the lived body as aesthetic object in anthropological medicine, concentrating on the views of Buytendijk and Straus on human uprightness and gracefulness. It is argued that their insights constitute a counter-balance to the way the human body is predominantly approached in medicine and medical ethics. In particular, (1) the relationship between anthropological, aesthetic and ethical norms, (2) the possible danger of (...) a naturalistic fallacy, (3) the implications for the care of disabled people and (4) the intrinsic aesthetic quality of the human body are dealt with. (shrink)

This work brings together Philip van der Eijk's previously-published essays on the close connections that existed between medicine and philosophy throughout antiquity. Medical authors such as the Hippocratic writers, Diocles, Galen, Soranus and Caelius Aurelianus elaborated on philosophical methods such as causal explanation, definition and division and applied key concepts such as the notion of nature to their understanding of the human body. Similarly, philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle were highly valued for their contributions to medicine. This interaction was (...) particularly striking in the study of the human soul in its relation to the body, as illustrated by approaches to specific topics such as intellect, sleep and dreams, and diet and drugs. With a detailed introduction surveying the subject as a whole and a new essay on Aristotle's treatment of sleep, this wide-ranging and accessible collection is essential reading for the student of ancient philosophy and science. (shrink)

A number of philosophers of medicine have attempted to provide analyses of health and disease in which the role that values play in those concepts is restricted. There are three ways in which values can be restricted in the concepts of health and disease. They can be: (i) eliminated, (ii) tamed or (iii) corralled. These three approaches correspond, respectively, to the work of Boorse, Lennox, and Wakefield. The concern of each of these authors is that if unrestricted values are allowed (...) to infect our concepts of health and disease, then anything could be construed as healthy or diseased. They believe that, if at all possible, such a result should be avoided. Unfortunately, as I argue, this result is unavoidable and such attempts to limit values in these concepts are destined to fail. I argue for this position by showing how each of these three attempts to provide value-restricted analyses of health and disease fail as analyses of the concepts of health and disease and that they fail because of their attempts to restrict the role of values in their accounts. I also show how, despite their best efforts, each of these analyses are, themselves, value-driven and value-laden. This leads to the conclusion that values infect our concepts of health and disease at all levels. (shrink)

As historians of science increasingly turn to work on recent (post 1945) science, the historiographical and methodological problems associated with the history of contemporary science are debated with growing frequency and urgency. This book brings together authorities on the history, historiography and methodology of recent and contemporary science to review the problems facing historians of contemporary science, technology and medicine and to explore new ways forward. The chapters explore topics which will be of ever increasing interest to historians of postwar (...) science, including the difficulties of accessing and using secret archival material, the interactions between archivists, historians and scientists and the politics of evidence and historical accounts. (shrink)

Major Polish authors writing on the philosophy of medicine in the period under discussion are briefly presented, namely Tytus Chaubiski Wadysaw Biegaski, and Edmund Biernacki. General background of their work and possible influences are described. The views of the above authors on the meaning, scope and importance of the philosophy of medicine are outlined.