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  1. E. M. Adams (1965). The Future of the Philosophy of Mind. Southern Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):38-44.
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  2. Zed Adams (ed.) (forthcoming). Mind, Meaning, and Understanding: The Philosophy of John Haugeland.
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  3. Jonas Åkerman (2009). Perspectival Thought: A Plea for Moderate Relativism (BOOK REVIEW). [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 62 (4).
  4. Lilli Alanen (1982). Studies in Cartesian Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. Distributed by Akateeminen Kirjakauppa.
  5. A. H. Almaas (1986/2000). The Void: Inner Spaciousness and Ego Structure. Shambhala.
    In this book Almaas brings together concepts and experiences drawn from contemporary object relations theory, Freudian-based ego psychology, case studies from his own spiritual practice, and teaching from the highest levels of Buddhist and other Eastern practices. He challenges us to look not only at the personality and the content of the mind, but also at the underlying nature of the mind itself.
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  6. Jami L. Anderson & Simon Cushing (eds.) (2013). The Philosophy of Autism. Rowman & Littlefield.
    The Philosophy of Autism examines autism from the tradition of analytic philosophy, working from the premise that so-called autism spectrum disorders raise interesting philosophical questions that need to be and can be addressed in a manner that is clear, jargon-free, and accessible. The goal of the original essays in this book is to provide a philosophically rich analysis of issues raised by autism and to afford dignity and respect to those living with autism by placing it at the center of (...)
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  7. David Bain (2010). Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, Edited by Murat Aydede. [REVIEW] Mind 119 (474):451-456.
    Review of Murat Aydede's edited collection, *Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study".
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  8. Lynne Rudder Baker, Our Place in Nature: Material Persons and Theism.
    One of the deepest assumptions of Judaism and its offspring, Christianity, is that there is an important difference between human persons and everything else that exists in Creation. We alone are made in God’s image. We alone are the stewards of the earth. It is said in Genesis that we have “dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps (...)
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  9. Joe Becker (2008). Conceptualizing Mind and Consciousness: Using Constructivist Ideas to Transcend the Physical Bind. Human Development 51 (3):165-189.
    Philosophers and scientists seeking to conceptualize consciousness, and subjective experience in particular, have focused on sensation and perception, and have emphasized binding – how a percept holds together. Building on a constructivist approach to conception centered on separistic-holistic complexes incorporating multiple levels of abstraction, the present approach reconceptualizes binding and opens a new path to theorizing the emergence of consciousness. It is proposed that all subjective experience involves multiple levels of abstraction, a central feature of conception. This modifies the prevalent (...)
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  10. Joe Becker (2004). Reconsidering the Role of Overcoming Perturbations in Cognitive Development: Constructivism and Consicousness. Human Development 47 (2):77-93.
    Constructivist theory must choose between the hypothesis that felt perturbation drives cognitive development (the priority of felt perturbation) and the hypothesis that the particular process that eventually produces new cognitive structures first produces felt perturbation (the continuity of process). There is ambivalence in Piagetian theory regarding this choice. The prevalent account of constructivist theory adopts the priority of felt perturbation. However, on occasion Piaget has explicitly rejected it, simultaneously endorsing the continuity of process. First, I explicate and support this latter (...)
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  11. Endre Begby (2011). Concepts and Abilities in Anti-Individualism. Journal of Philosophy 108 (10).
  12. Sandra Blakeslee (2007/2008). The Body has a Mind of its Own: New Discoveries About How the Mind-Body Connection Helps Us Master the World. Random House.
    The body mandala, or, How your brain maps the world -- The little man in the brain, or, Why your genitals are even smaller than you think -- Dueling body maps, or, Why you still feel fat after losing weight -- The homunculus in the game, or, When thinking is as good as doing -- Plasticity gone awry, or, When body maps go blurry -- Broken body maps, or, Why Dr. Strangelove couldn't keep his hand down -- The bubble around (...)
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  13. Brand Blanshard (1941). The Nature of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 38 (April):207-215.
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  14. Paul Richard Blum (2012). The Epistemology of Immortality: Searle, Pomponazzi, and Ficino. Studia Neoaristotelica 9 (1):85-102.
    The relationship between body and mind was traditionally discussed in terms of immortality of the intellect, because immateriality was one necessary condition for the mind to be immortal. This appeared to be an issue of metaphysics and religion. But to the medieval and Renaissance thinkers, the essence of mind is thinking activity and hence an epistemological feature. Starting with John Searle’s worries about the existence of consciousness, I try to show some parallels with the Aristotelian Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), and eventually (...)
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  15. David Bohm (ed.) (1992/1994). Thought as a System. Routledge.
    In Thought as a System , best-selling author David Bohm takes as his subject the role of thought and knowledge at every level of human affairs, from our private reflections on personal identity to our collective efforts to fashion a tolerable civilization. Elaborating upon principles of the relationship between mind and matter first put forward in Wholeness and the Implicate Order , Professor Bohm rejects the notion that our thinking processes neutrally report on what is `out there' in an objective (...)
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  16. Brian Bruya (2010). Apertures, Draw, and Syntax: Remodeling Attention. In Brian Bruya (ed.), Effortless Attention: A New Perspective in the Cognitive Science of Attention and Action. MIT Press.
    Because psychological studies of attention and cognition are most commonly performed within the strict confines of the laboratory or take cognitively impaired patients as subjects, it is difficult to be sure that resultant models of attention adequately account for the phenomenon of effortless attention. The problem is not only that effortless attention is resistant to laboratory study. A further issue is that because the laboratory is the most common way to approach attention, models resulting from such studies are naturally the (...)
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  17. Brian Bruya (ed.) (2010). Effortless Attention: A New Perspective in the Cognitive Science of Attention and Action. MIT Press.
    This is the first book to explore the cognitive science of effortless attention and action. Attention and action are generally understood to require effort, and the expectation is that under normal circumstances effort increases to meet rising demand. Sometimes, however, attention and action seem to flow effortlessly despite high demand. Effortless attention and action have been documented across a range of normal activities--from rock climbing to chess playing--and yet fundamental questions about the cognitive science of effortlessness have gone largely unasked. (...)
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  18. Ian Burkitt (1999). Bodies of Thought: Embodiment, Identity, and Modernity. Sage Publications.
    `The work develops and articulates a brilliant and original central thesis; namely that modern individuals are best understood as complex bodies of thought, as embodied symbolic and material beings. Future work on mind, self, body, society and culture will have to begin with Burkitt's text' - Norman K. Denzin, University of Illinois `After his excellent Social Selves, Ian Burkitt has produced a new theory of embodiment which will become required reading for those working in the areas of social theory, sociology, (...)
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  19. Peter Carruthers (ed.) (2007). The Innate Mind: Foundations and the Future. Oxford University Press, USA.
    Concerned with the fundamental architecture of the mind, this text addresses questions about the existence & extent of human innate abilities, how these inate ...
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  20. Edward S. Casey (2004). Spirit and Soul: Essays in Philosophical Psychology. Spring Publications.
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  21. Kisor K. Chakrabarti (2003). Response to Roy W. Perrett's Review of "Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: The Nyāya Dualist Tradition". Philosophy East and West 53 (4):593-598.
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  22. David J. Chalmers (2008). Mind and Consciousness: Five Questions. In Patrick Grim (ed.), Mind and Consciousness: Five Questions. Automatic Press.
    Growing up, I was a mathematics and science geek. I read everything I could in these areas. Every now and then, something would point in a philosophical direction. Perhaps my most important influence was reading Hofstadter’s Gödel, Escher, Bach as a teenager. I read it initially for the mathematical parts, but it planted a seed for thinking about the mind. Later, Hofstadter and Dennett’s The Mind’s I got me thinking more about the mind–body problem in particular.
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  23. Hugh Chandler (1985). Indeterminate People. Analysis 45 (3):141-145.
    Here is the paper that was attacked by George Rea in his “How many minds…?” paper. Has this issue been resolved? Can there be entities such that there is no definite answer to the question “Are there 13 minds at work here, or 14?” -/- .
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  24. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫13 'Minds'.
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  25. Hugh S. Chandler, -≫Tredecims.
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  26. Stéphane Chauvier (2007). Wittgensteinian Grammar and Philosophy of Mind. In Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (ed.), Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  27. Chung-ying Cheng (1973). Unity and Creativity in Wang Yang-Ming's Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy East and West 23 (1/2):49-72.
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  28. Stephen R. L. Clark (2003). Non-Personal Minds. In Minds and Persons: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  29. Stephen R. L. Clark (2003). Minds and Persons: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  30. Caleb Cohoe (forthcoming). Why the Intellect Cannot Have a Bodily Organ: De Anima III 4. Phronesis.
    I reconstruct Aristotle’s reasons for thinking that the intellect cannot have a bodily organ. I present Aristotle’s account of the aboutness or intentionality of cognitive states, both perceptual and intellectual. On my interpretation, Aristotle’s account is based around the notion of cognitive powers taking on forms in a special preservative way. Based on this account, Aristotle argues that no physical structure could enable a bodily part or combination of bodily parts to produce or determine the full range of forms that (...)
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  31. Christian Coseru (2009). Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Perhaps no other classical philosophical tradition, East or West, offers a more complex and counter-intuitive account of mind and mental phenomena than Buddhism. While Buddhists share with other Indian philosophers the view that the domain of the mental encompasses a set of interrelated faculties and processes, they do not associate mental phenomena with the activity of a substantial, independent, and enduring self or agent. Rather, Buddhist theories of mind center on the doctrine of no-self (Pāli anatta, Skt.[1] anātma), which postulates (...)
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  32. Mario de Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.) (2007). Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Kleuwer.
  33. Tanya de Villiers-Botha (2011). Peculiarities in Mind ; or, on the Absence of Darwin. South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):282-302.
    A key failing in contemporary philosophy of mind is the lack of attention paid to evolutionary theory in its research projects. Notably, where evolution is incorporated into the study of mind, the work being done is often described as philosophy of cognitive science rather than philosophy of mind. Even then, whereas possible implications of the evolution of human cognition are taken more seriously within the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of cognitive science, its relevance for cognitive science has only been (...)
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  34. Tanya de Villiers-Botha (2007). Why Peirce Matters: The Symbol in Deacon's Symbolic Species. Language Sciences 29 (1):88-108.
    In "Why brains matter: an integrational perspective on The Symbolic Species" Cowley (2002) [Language Sciences 24, 73-95] suggests that Deacon pictures brains as being able to process words qua tokens, which he identifies as the theory's Achilles' heel. He goes on to argue that Deacon's thesis on the co-evolution of language and mind would benefit from an integrational approach. This paper argues that Cowley's criticism relies on an invalid understanding of Deacon's use the concept of "symbolic reference", which he appropriates (...)
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  35. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2009). Taking Affective Explanations to Heart. Social Science Information 48 (3):359-377.
    In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions) is to ascribe a certain stability to the subject’s moods (episodes). The rationale for this (...)
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  36. Ezequiel Di Paolo & Hanne De Jaegher (2012). The Interactive Brain Hypothesis. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.
    Enactive approaches foreground the role of interpersonal interaction in explanations of social understanding. This motivates, in combination with a recent interest in neuroscientific studies involving actual interactions, the question of how interactive processes relate to neural mechanisms involved in social understanding. We introduce the Interactive Brain Hypothesis (IBH) in order to help map the spectrum of possible relations between social interaction and neural processes. The hypothesis states that interactive experience and skills play enabling roles in both the development and current (...)
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  37. James M. Dow, Shoegenstein on Self-Ascription, Immunity to Error and I-as-Subject.
    Contemporary accounts of the self-ascription of experiences are wedded to two basic dogmas. The first is that self-ascription is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person (IEM). The second dogma is that there is distinction between awareness of oneself qua subject and awareness of oneself qua object (the SCS/SCO distinction). In this paper, I urge that these dogmas are groundless. First, I illustrate that claims about immunity to error through misidentification are usually based upon claims about awareness (...)
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  38. Glenn G. Dudley (2002). Infinity and the Brain: A Unified Theory of Mind, Matter, and God. Paragon House.
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  39. Matti Eklund (2010). Book Review. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Timothy Williamson. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88:752-4.
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  40. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Robert D. Rupert's Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines.
  41. Andreas Elpidorou (2009). The Role and Place of Merleau-Ponty in the Dreyfus-McDowell Debate. In Lauren Freeman & Andreas Elpidorou (eds.), In/visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion. Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.
  42. Michael Esfeld & Michael Sollberger (2008). Strukturale Repräsentation – by Andreas Bartels Subjektivität, Intersubjektivität, Personalität. Ein Beitrag Zur Philosophie der Person – by Christian Beyer Bilder Im Geiste. Die Imagery-Debatte – by Verena Gottschling der Blick Von Innen. Zur Transtemporalen Identität Bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen – by Martine Nida-Rümelin Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche Und Unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung – by Michael Pauen Willensfreiheit Und Hirnforschung. Das Freiheitsmodell Des Epistemischen Libertarismus – by Bettina Walde der Mentale Zugang Zur Welt. Realismus, Skeptizismus Und Intentionalität – by Marcus Willaschek. [REVIEW] Dialectica 62 (1):128–135.
  43. Jeremy Evans (forthcoming). The Moral Psychology of Determinism. Philosophical Psychology:1-23.
    In recent years, philosophers and psychologists have resurrected a debate at the intersection of metaphysics and moral psychology. The central question is whether we can conceive of moral agents as deterministic systems unfolding predictably and inevitably under constant laws without psychologically damaging the pro-social attitudes and moral emotions that grease the wheels of social life. These concerns are sparked by recent experiments documenting a decline in the ethical behavior of participants primed with deterministic metaphysics. But this literature has done little (...)
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  44. Stephen Everson (ed.) (1991). Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
    This second Companion deals with the ancient theories of the psyche. The essays range over more than eight hundred years of psychological inquiry and provide critical analyses not only of the ancient discussions of the nature of the psyche and its states, but of such central topics as perception, subjectivity, the explanation of action, and what it is to be a person. In examining the wide variety of psychological theories offered by the ancient thinkers, from the increasingly complex materialism of (...)
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  45. Simon J. Evnine (1989). Understanding Madness? Ratio 2 (1):1-18.
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  46. Carrie Figdor (2009). Semantic Externalism and the Mechanics of Thought. Minds and Machines 19 (1):1-24.
    I review a widely accepted argument to the conclusion that the contents of our beliefs, desires and other mental states cannot be causally efficacious in a classical computational model of the mind. I reply that this argument rests essentially on an assumption about the nature of neural structure that we have no good scientific reason to accept. I conclude that computationalism is compatible with wide semantic causal efficacy, and suggest how the computational model might be modified to accommodate this possibility.
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  47. Jane Friedman (forthcoming). Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 4.
    There has been much discussion about whether traditional epistemology's doxastic attitudes are reducible to degrees of belief. In this paper I argue that what I call the Straightforward Reduction - the reduction of all three of believing p, disbelieving p, and suspending judgment about p, ~p to precise degrees of belief for p, ~p that ought to obey the standard axioms of the probability calculus - cannot succeed. By focusing on suspension of judgment (agnosticism) rather than belief, we can see (...)
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  48. Rainer Funk (1982). Erich Fromm: The Courage to Be Human. Continuum.
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  49. John Furlong (1988). Scientific Psychology as Hermeneutics? Rorty's Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (3):489-503.
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  50. Riccardo Fusaroli, Joanna Raczaszek-Leonardi & Kristian Tylén (2013). Dialog as Interpersonal Synergy. New Ideas in Psychology.
    What is the proper unit of analysis in the psycholinguistics of dialog? While classical approaches are largely based on models of individual linguistic processing, recent advances stress the social coordinative nature of dialog. In the influential interactive alignment model, dialogue is thus approached as the progressive entrainment of interlocutors' linguistic behaviors toward the alignment of situation models. Still, the driving mechanisms are attributed to individual cognition in the form of automatic structural priming. Challenging these ideas, we outline a dynamical framework (...)
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  51. Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi (2008). The (in)Visibility of Others: A Reply to Herschbach. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):237-244.
    In his article 'Folk Psychological and Phenomenological Accounts of Social Perception' (this issue), Mitchell Herschbach raises some critical questions concerning our phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity. We welcome Herschbach's comments in the spirit of constructive criticism, but also think that he has missed some crucial aspects of our argumentation. We take this opportunity to amplify and clarify our views.
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  52. Irwin Goldstein (1981). Cognitive Pleasure and Distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.
    Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".
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  53. Simone Gozzano (2008). In Defence of Non-Conceptual Content. Axiomathes 18 (1).
    In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have the same fine (...)
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  54. Simone Gozzano (2007). The Beliefs of Mute Animals. In Mario De Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartography of the Mind. Kluwer.
    In this paper I argue that it is possible to attribute beliefs and other intentional states to mute animals. This kind of attribution is substantial, in that it does not allow for some minimal form of co referential failure.
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  55. Richard Gray (2004). What Synaesthesia Really Tells Us About Functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):64-69.
    J. A. Gray et al. have recently argued that synaesthesia can be used as a counterexample to functionalism. They provide empirical evidence which they hold supports two anti-functionalist claims: disparate functions share the same types of qualia and the effects of synaesthetic qualia are, contrary to what one would expect from evolutionary considerations, adverse to those functions with which those types of qualia are normally linked. I argue that the empirical evidence they cite does not rule out functionalism, rather the (...)
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  56. Richard Gray (2001). Cognitive Modules, Synaesthesia and the Constitution of Psychological Natural Kinds. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):65-82.
    Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be thought of as constituting a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of most or all of nine specified properties. The challenge to this considered here comes from synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is a type of cross-modal association: input to one sensory modality reliably generates an additional sensory output that is usually generated by the input to a distinct sensory modality. The most common form of synaesthesia manifests Fodor's nine specified properties of modularity, and (...)
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  57. Lorna Green (2003). Beyond Chance and Necessity. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17 (4):270-286.
    These essays propose a new "Copernican Revolution": Consciousness, not matter, is basic in the universe. They are non-technical, simply and clearly written.
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  58. Paul Gyllenhammer (2006). Kathleen V. Wider: The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4).
  59. Michael Hampe (2007). Thinking, Calculation and Rationality: Remarks on Hobbes' Philosophy of Mind as a Paradigm of Failing Scientism. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 89 (1):47-59.
    Looking at Hobbes' theory of thinking as calculation and truth by convention shows that a certain type of scientism of the mind leads to fundamental problems. If truth is the artefact of social conventions about signs, and if thinking is nothing but the syntactical transformations of sign, a theory of thinking must have both: a strong concept of natural computation and a social theory of establishing sign-conventions. Hobbes does not, like modern physicalist theories of the mind, have both.
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  60. Graham Harman (2009). Zero-Person and the Psyche. In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium. Benjamins.
    This article claims that the familiar distinction between “first-person” and “third-person” perspectives is not a very strong distinction, given that both are perspectives. Quite apart from any perspective we might take on things there are the things themselves, in what the author calls their “zero-person” reality. Appealing to an unorthodox reading of Brentano, Husserl, and Heidegger, the author makes a lengthy critique of David Chalmers for remaining a reductionist in the physical realm even as he opposes reductionism for minds. In (...)
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  61. Larry Hauser (1999). Samuel Guttenplan, Ed., a Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Minds and Machines 9 (2):300-303.
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  62. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (2007/1972). Hegel's Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press,.
    Hegel is an immensely important yet difficult philosopher. His Philosophy of Mind is one of the main pillars of his thought. Michael Inwood, highly respected for his previous work on Hegel, presents this central work to the modern reader in an accurate new translation supported by a philosophically sophisticated editorial introduction and elucidating scholarly commentary.
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  63. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1971). Hegel's Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the 'Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences' (1830). Oxford,Clarendon Press.
    Hegel is an immensely important yet difficult philosopher. His Philosophy of Mind is one of the main pillars of his thought. Michael Inwood, highly respected for his previous work on Hegel, presents this central work to the modern reader in an accurate new translation supported by a philosophically sophisticated editorial introduction and elucidating scholarly commentary.
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  64. K. Mitch Hodge (2011). Why Immortality Alone Will Not Get Me to the Afterlife. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):395-410.
    Recent research in the cognitive science of religion suggests that humans intuitively believe that others survive death. In response to this finding, three cognitive theories have been offered to explain this: the simulation constraint theory (Bering, 2002); the imaginative obstacle theory (Nichols, 2007); and terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Rothschild, & Abdollahi, 2008). First, I provide a critical analysis of each of these theories. Second, I argue that these theories, while perhaps explaining why one would believe in his own personal immortality, (...)
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  65. Jim Hopkins (2012). Rules, Privacy, and Physicalism. In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. OUP.
    Wittgenstein's arguments about rule-following and private language turn both on interpretation and what he called our 'pictures' of the mind. His remarks about these can be understood in terms of the conceptual metaphor of the mind as a container, and enable us to give a better account of physicalism.
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  66. Daniel D. Hutto (2007). The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 82 (60):43-68.
    This paper promotes the view that our childhood engagement with narratives of a certain kind is the basis of sophisticated folk psychological abilities —i.e. it is through such socially scaffolded means that folk psychological skills are normally acquired and fostered. Undeniably, we often use our folk psychological apparatus in speculating about why another may have acted on a particular occasion, but this is at best a peripheral and parasitic use. Our primary understanding and skill in folk psychology derives from and (...)
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  67. Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Turning Hard Problems on Their Heads. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):75-88.
    Much of the difficulty in assessing theories of consciousness stems from their advocates not supplying adequate or convincing characterisations of the phenomenon (or data) they hope to explain. Yet, to make any reasonable assessment this is precisely what is required, for it is not as if our ‘pre-theoretical’ intuitions are philosophically innocent. I attempt to reveal, using a recent debate between Chalmers and Dennett as a foil, why, in approaching this topic, we cannot characterise the data purely first-personally or third-personally (...)
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  68. Jenann Ismael (2010). Me, Again. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press.
    Thought about the self raises some very special problems. Some of these concern indexical reference quite generally, but there is one having to do with identity over time that seems to be unique to the self. I use an historical exchange between Anscombe and Descartes to bring out the problem, and propose a resolution that casts light both on why self-directed thought presents a unique epistemic predicament and where Descartes’ cogito may have gone wrong.
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  69. Alfred Ivry, Arabic and Islamic Psychology and Philosophy of Mind. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  70. Frank Jackson (2004). Mind, Morality, and Explanation: Selected Collaborations. Oxford University Press.
    Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith have been at the forefront of philosophy in Australia for much of the last two decades, and their collaborative work has had widespread influence throughout the world. Mind, Morality, and Explanation collects the best of that work in a single volume, showcasing their seminal contributions to philosophical psychology, the theory of psychological and social explanation, moral theory, and moral psychology.
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  71. Carolyn Dicey Jennings (2012). The Subject of Attention. Synthese 189 (3):535-554.
    The absence of a common understanding of attention plagues current research on the topic. Combining the findings from three domains of research on attention, this paper presents a univocal account that fits normal use of the term as well as its many associated phenomena: attention is a process of mental selection that is within the control of the subject. The role of the subject is often excluded from naturalized accounts, but this paper will be an exception to that rule. The (...)
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  72. Albert A. Johnstone (2012). The Deep Bodily Roots of Emotion. Husserl Studies 28 (3):179-200.
    This article explores emotions and their relationship to ‘somatic responses’, i.e., one’s automatic responses to sensations of pain, cold, warmth, sudden intensity. To this end, it undertakes a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of the first-hand experience of eight basic emotions, briefly exploring their essential aspects: their holistic nature, their identifying dynamic transformation of the lived body, their two-layered intentionality, their involuntary initiation and voluntary espousal. The fact that the involuntary tensional shifts initiating emotions are irreplicatable voluntarily, is taken to show that (...)
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  73. Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). Value, Affect, and Drive. In Peter Kail & Manuel Dries (eds.), Nietzsche on Mind and Nature. Oxford.
    Nietzsche associates values with affects and drives: he not only claims that values are explained by drives and affects, but sometimes appears to identify values with drives and affects. This is decidedly odd: the agent's reflectively endorsed ends, principles, commitments--what we would think of as the agent's values--seem not only distinct from, but often in conflict with, the agent's drives. Consequently, it is unclear how we should understand Nietzsche's concept of value. This essay attempts to dispel these puzzles by reconstructing (...)
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  74. Paul Katsafanas (2005). Nietzsche's Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):1–31.
    I show that Nietzsche's puzzling and seemingly inconsistent claims about consciousness constitute a coherent and philosophically fruitful theory. Drawing on some ideas from Schopenhauer and F.A. Lange, Nietzsche argues that conscious mental states are mental states with conceptually articulated content, whereas unconscious mental states are mental states with non-conceptually articulated content. Nietzsche's views on concepts imply that conceptually articulated mental states will be superficial and in some cases distorting analogues of non-conceptually articulated mental states. Thus, the claim that conscious states (...)
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  75. Walter Arnold Kaufmann (1980/1991). Discovering the Mind. Transaction Publishers.
    v. 1. Goethe, Kant, and Hegel -- v.2. Nietzsche, Heideger, and Buber -- v. 3. Freud, Adler, and Jung.
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  76. Julian Kiverstein & Mirko Farina (forthcoming). Do Sensory Substitution Extend the Conscious Mind? In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in interaction: the role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness". Amsterdam: John Benjamins. John Benjamins.
    Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness? Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have supposed that the answer must obviously be «yes » to this question. However, a growing number of philosophers working in 4e (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognitive science have begun to challenge this assumption, arguing instead that consciousness supervenes on the whole embodied animal in dynamic interaction with the environment. We call views that share this claim dynamic sensorimotor theories of consciousness (DSM). Clark (2009) a founder and (...)
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  77. Daniel Kolak (ed.) (1994). From Plato to Wittgenstein: The Historical Foundations of Mind. Wadsworth Pub. Co..
  78. John-Michael Kuczynski (2010). Intensionality, Modality, Rationality: Some Presemantic Considerations. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (8):2314-2346.
    On the basis of arguments put forth by (Kripke, 1977a) and (Kripke, 1980), it is widely held that one can sometimes rationally accept propositions of the form "P and not-P" and also that there are necessary a posteriori truths. We will find that Kripke's arguments for these views appear probative only so long as one fails to distinguish between semantics and presemantics—between the literal meanings of sentences, on the one hand, and the information on the basis of which one identifies (...)
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  79. Mark Kulstad, Leibniz's Philosophy of Mind. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  80. Miriam Kyselo (forthcoming). Locked-in Syndrome and BCI - Towards an Enactive Approach to the Self. Neuroethics.
    It has been argued that Extended Cognition (EXT), a recently much discussed framework in the philosophy of cognition, would serve as the theoretical basis to account for the impact of Brain Computer Interfaces (BCI) on the self and life of patients with Locked-in Syndrome (LIS). In this paper I will argue that this claim is unsubstantiated, EXT is not the appropriate theoretical background for understanding the role of BCI in LIS. I will critically assess what a theory of the extended (...)
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  81. Hugh LaFollette (1996). Personal Relationships: Love, Identity and Morality. Blackwell.
    "This admirably clear and engaging work ... is broadly accessible... and is informed by social science research. Yet it is also thoroughly philosophical, delving into problems in ethics, epistemology, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language.... Let us hope that LaFollette continues to tackle these problems with the clarify and rigor he shows here.".
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  82. Marc Lange (2000). Salience, Supervenience, and Layer Cakes in Sellars's Scientific Realism, McDowell's Moral Realism, and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):213-251.
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  83. Eric LaRock (2012). An Empirical Case Against Central State Materialism. Philosophia Christi 14 (2).
    I argue on empirical grounds (1) that consciousness is not nothing but a self-scanning mechanism in the central nervous system; (2) that consciousness is not reducible to an epistemic ability, such as the ability to recognize an object; (3) that mind could not merely be a (material) cause that is apt to bring about a certain range of behaviors; and (4) that recent empirical investigations reveal new problems and new evidence that should compel advocates of causal functionalism (of the sort (...)
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  84. Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis (2007). Linguistic Determinism and the Innate Basis of Number. In Peter Carruthers (ed.), The Innate Mind: Foundations and the Future.
    Strong nativist views about numerical concepts claim that human beings have at least some innate precise numerical representations. Weak nativist views claim only that humans, like other animals, possess an innate system for representing approximate numerical quantity. We present a new strong nativist model of the origins of numerical concepts and defend the strong nativist approach against recent cross-cultural studies that have been interpreted to show that precise numerical concepts are dependent on language and that they are restricted to speakers (...)
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  85. Henry Laycock (1969). Persons. By Roland Puccetti. London & Toronto: Macmillan Co. Of Canada Ltd., 1968. Pp. 145. $7.95. Dialogue 8 (02):344-346.
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  86. Beatrice Longuenesse (2012). Two Uses of 'I' as Subject? In Simon Prosser & François Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error through Misidentification.
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  87. Laureano Luna & Christopher Small (2009). Intentionality and Computationalism. A Diagonal Argument. Mind and Matter 7 (1):81-90.
    Computationalism is the claim that all possible thoughts are computations, i.e. executions of algorithms. The aim of the paper is to show that if intentionality is semantically clear, in a way defined in the paper, then computationalism must be false. Using a convenient version of the phenomenological relation of intentionality and a diagonalization device inspired by Thomson's theorem of 1962, we show there exists a thought that canno be a computation.
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  88. Napoleon M. Mabaquiao (2005). Husserl's Theory of Intentionality. Philosophia 34 (1):24-49.
    This essay is a critical examination of how Edmund Husserl, in his appropriation of Franz Brentano’s concept of intentionality into his phenomenology, deals with the very issues that shaped Brentano’s theory of intentionality. These issues concern the proper criterion for distinguishing mental from physical phenomena and the right explanation for the independence of the intentionality of mental phenomena from the existence or non-existence of their objects. Husserl disagrees with Brentano’s views that intentionality is the distinguishing feature of all mental phenomena (...)
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  89. Alasdair Macintyre (1982). How Moral Agents Became Ghosts or Why the History of Ethics Diverged From That of the Philosophy of Mind. Synthese 53 (2):295 - 312.
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  90. Patrick T. Mackenzie (2003). Mind, Body, and Freedom. Humanity Books.
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  91. Nicholas Maxwell (1966). Physics and Common Sense. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (February):295-311.
    In this paper I set out to solve the problem of how the world as we experience it, full of colours and other sensory qualities, and our inner experiences, can be reconciled with physics. I discuss and reject the views of J. J. C. Smart and Rom Harré. I argue that physics is concerned only to describe a selected aspect of all that there is – the causal aspect which determines how events evolve. Colours and other sensory qualities, lacking causal (...)
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  92. Lewis Mehl-Madrona & Gordon Pennycook (2009). Construction of an Aboriginal Theory of Mind and Mental Health. Anthropology of Consciousness 20 (2):85-100.
    Most research on aboriginal mind and mental health has sought to apply or confirm preexisting European-derived theories among aboriginal people. Culture has been underappreciate. An understanding of uniquely aboriginal models for mind and mental health might lead to more effective and robust interventions. To address this issue, a core group of elders from five separate regions of North America was developed to help determine how aboriginal people conceived of mind, self, and identity before European contact. The process utilized for this (...)
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  93. Michele Merritt, Somogy Varga & Mog Stapleton (forthcoming). Editorial Introduction: Socializing the Extended Mind. Cognitive Systems Research.
  94. Prakash Mondal (2011). Can Internalism and Externalism Be Reconciled in a Biological Epistemology of Language? Biosemiotics.
    This paper is an attempt at exploring the possibility of reconciling the two interpretations of biolinguistics which have been recently projected by Koster(Biolinguistics 3(1):61–92, 2009). The two interpretations—trivial and nontrivial—can be roughly construed as non-internalist and internalist conceptions of biolinguistics respectively. The internalist approach boils down to a conception of language where language as a mental grammar in the form of I-language grows and functions like a biological organ. On the other hand, under such a construal consistent with Koster’s (Biolinguistics (...)
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  95. Michelle Montague (2009). The Content of Perceptual Experience. In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind.
  96. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (ed.) (2004). The Third Wittgenstein: The Post-Investigations Works. Ashgate.
    This book also provides new and illuminating accounts of difficult concepts, such as patterns of life, experiencing meaning, meaning blindness, lying and ...
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  97. Olaf L. Müller, Consciousness Without Physical Basis. A Metaphysical Meditation on the Immortality of the Soul.
    Can we conceive of a mind without body? Does, for example, the idea of the soul's immortality make sense? Certain versions of materialism deny such questions; I shall try to prove that these versions of materialism cannot be right. They fail because they cannot account for the mental vocabulary from the language of brains in the vat. Envatted expressions such as "I think", "I believe", etc., do not have to be reinterpreted when we translate them to our language; they are (...)
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  98. Anders Nes (2008). Are Only Mental Phenomena Intentional? Analysis 68 (299):205–215.
    I question Brentano's thesis that all and only mental phenomena are intentional. The common gloss on intentionality in terms of directedness does not justify the claim that intentionality is sufficient for mentality. One response to this problem is to lay down further requirements for intentionality. For example, it may be said that we have intentionality only where we have such phenomena as failure of substitution or existential presupposition. I consider a variety of such requirements for intentionality. I argue they either (...)
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  99. Gregory Nixon (2007). Jay's *Songs of Experience*. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):125-7.
    ‘Experience is the best teacher’ goes the cliché without ever making clear just want is meant by that slippery first term. ‘Experience is never remembered unaltered’ goes another. Is experience something to be undergone, like a journey, or is it perhaps the relational immediacy between organism and environment? What do we reference when we use the term experience? -/- Martin Jay, renowned intellectual historian from UC Berkeley, here examines these questions in a grand survey of the term’s use throughout the (...)
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  100. Anthony O'Hear (1997). Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation. Oxford University Press.
    In this controversial new book O'Hear takes a stand against the fashion for explaining human behavior in terms of evolution. He contends that while the theory of evolution is successful in explaining the development of the natural world in general, it is of limited value when applied to the human world. Because of our reflectiveness and our rationality we take on goals and ideals which cannot be justified in terms of survival-promotion or reproductive advantage. O'Hear examines the nature of human (...)
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