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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Chalmers and David Bourget
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2015-02-27
    Kevin Morris (forthcoming). Against Disanalogy-Style Responses to the Exclusion Problem. Philosophia:1-19.
    This paper focuses on an influential line of response to the exclusion problem for nonreductive physicalism, one defended with the most subtlety by Karen Bennett. According to this line of thought, a successful nonreductive response to the exclusion problem, a response that allows one to maintain each of the core components of nonreductive physicalism, may consist in showing that the manner in which the effects of mental causes also have distinct and sufficient physical causes is disanalogous to other types of (...)
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  2. added 2015-02-26
    Assaf Weksler (forthcoming). Retinal Images and Object Files: Towards Empirically Evaluating Philosophical Accounts of Visual Perspective. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-13.
    According to an influential philosophical view I call “the relational properties view” , “perspectival” properties, such as the elliptical appearance of a tilted coin, are relational properties of external objects. Philosophers have assessed this view on the basis of phenomenological, epistemological or other purely philosophical considerations. My aim in this paper is to examine whether it is possible to evaluate RPV empirically. In the first, negative part of the paper I consider and reject a certain tempting way of doing so. (...)
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  3. added 2015-02-26
    Michael Jacovides (2011). Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  4. added 2015-02-26
    Raymond Aaron Younis (1994). Wittgenstein. Cinema Papers 99.
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  5. added 2015-02-26
    Michael Tye (1983). Response: Supervenience, Materialism, and Functionalism: Comments on Horgan. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (Supplement):39-43.
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  6. added 2015-02-25
    Alex Gregory (forthcoming). Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons? In J. Deonna & F. Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press.
    This paper examines the view that desires are beliefs about normative reasons for action. It describes the view, and briefly sketches three arguments for it. But the focus of the paper is defending the view from objections. The paper argues that the view is consistent with the distinction between the direction of fit of beliefs and desires, that it is consistent with the existence of appetites such as hunger, that it can account for counterexamples that aim to show that beliefs (...)
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  7. added 2015-02-25
    Alvin Plantinga (2012). Functionalism and Materialism: A Reply to Tooley. Philosophia Christi 14 (1):49-56.
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  8. added 2015-02-25
    Jonas Dagys (2006). Functionalism in Philosophy of Mind: Methodology or Ontology? Problemos 70:113-125.
    Straipsnyje tiriamos dvi XX a. viduryje iðplëtotos funkcionalistinio sàmonës aiðkinimo kryptys: D. Armstrongo ir D. Lewiso analitinis funkcionalizmas ir H. Putnamo komputacinis funkcionalizmas. Siekiamaparodyti, kad ðios dvi kryptys ið esmës sutampa metodologiniu poþiûriu, taèiau jø atstovai suteikiasavøjø teorijø metodologiniam pagrindui skirtingas ontologines interpretacijas. Sutardami, kad fizikinio bûvio ir funkcinio bûvio sàvokos skiriasi, jie nesutaria dël to, ar funkcinio bûvio sàvokà reikialaikyti iðskirianèia atskirà ontologinæ bûviø kategorijà, ar ði sàvoka iðreiðkia tik skirtingà tø paèiø fizikiniø bûviø identifikavimo realiame pasaulyje bûdà. Ðiame (...)
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  9. added 2015-02-25
    Luca Malatesti (1999). Mental Properties, Functionalism and Reductionism. Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (1).
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  10. added 2015-02-25
    Andrew Hampton Gleeson (1998). Three Dogmas of Functionalism. Dissertation, The Australian National University (Australia)
    This thesis is a critique of functionalism in the philosophy of mind. I distinguish three tenets, or 'dogmas' of functionalism, viz: Mental states are causes of behaviour; Mental states can, in principle, be defined in non-mental terms; We understand everything, or at least everything of importance, about the mental states of people, by subsuming token mental states under one or other mental state type. ;The first dogma is rejected in the form which identifies mental state types with physical types, on (...)
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  11. added 2015-02-25
    Felicity A. Watts (1986). Functionalism, Mind and Meaning. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
    Contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by two complementary views: functionalism--the idea that the mental can be accounted for in terms of abstract causal features of physical systems, and representationalism--the idea that the intentional features of the mental can be accounted for by postulating mental representations. ;Both these views face fundamental criticisms. Functionalism, by equating mental phenomena with abstract causal structures, robs the mental of genuine causal significance. Furthermore, the role of interpretation in the theory undermines its completeness, by using (...)
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  12. added 2015-02-25
    J. I. Biro & Robert W. Shahan (1982). Mind, Brain, and Function Essays in the Philosophy of Mind.
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  13. added 2015-02-25
    Kate Gordon (1908). Wright's Ethical Significance of Feeling, Pleasure, and Happiness in Modern Non-Hedonistic Systems. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 5 (8):217.
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  14. added 2015-02-24
    Raymond Aaron Younis (1998). The Idea of the Postmodern. [REVIEW] European Journal of Cultural Studies 1 (2):294-299.
  15. added 2015-02-23
    Alexander Schlegel, Prescott Alexander, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, Peter Ulric Tse & Thalia Wheatley (2015). Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness Potentials with Non-Conscious Volition. Consciousness and Cognition 33:196-203.
    The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP indexes unconscious processes that may actually cause both volitional movement and (...)
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  16. added 2015-02-23
    Stewart Goetz (2012). Is N. T. Wright Right About Substance Dualism? Philosophia Christi 14 (1):183-192.
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  17. added 2015-02-23
    John Cooper (2007). The Bible and Dualism Once Again: A Reply to Joel B. Green and Nancey Murphy. Philosophia Christi 9 (2):459-472.
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  18. added 2015-02-23
    John Moore (2007). Heresy in Medieval France: Dualism in Aquitaine and the Agenais, 1000-1249. [REVIEW] The Medieval Review 5.
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  19. added 2015-02-23
    Jonas Dagys (2006). Descartes’ Argument for Dualism in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Problemos 69:95-103.
    Straipsnyje analitinës filosofijos poþiûriu analizuojamas Descartes’o sàmonës ir kûno skirtingumo árodymas, siekiant atskleisti jo panaðumus su ðiuolaikinëje sàmonës filosofijoje populiariu Davido Chalmerso pateiktu „zombio“ mintiniu eksperimentu ir juo grindþiamu dualizmo árodymu. Siekiama parodyti, kad ðiuolaikinis modaline semantikos analize grindþiamas árodymo variantas yra techniðkai sudë-tingesnis ir atsparesnis fizikalistinei kritikai, taèiau jis paremtas nutylëta ir nepagrásta episteminio sà-vokø skaidrumo prielaida, kuri iðskirstina kaip viena originalaus dekartiðko árodymo silpnybiø. Tai leidþia tvirtinti, kad Antoine’o Arnauld kritika, pateikta Descartes’o árodymui, lygiai taip pat sëkmingaitaikytina ir (...)
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  20. added 2015-02-23
    Stewart Goetz (2000). Questions About Emergent Dualism. Philosophia Christi 2 (2):175-182.
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  21. added 2015-02-23
    W. Charlton (1984). GOSLING, J. C. B. And TAYLOR, C. C. W. "The Greeks on Pleasure". [REVIEW] Mind 93:603.
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  22. added 2015-02-23
    William J. Edgar (1975). Eric P. Polten. Critique of the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory: A Refutation of Scientific Materialism and an Establishment of Mind-Matter Dualism by Means of Philosophy and Scientific Method. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 9 (4):319.
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  23. added 2015-02-23
    Rudolf Metz (1932). Lovejoy, Arthur, The Revolt against Dualism. [REVIEW] Société Française de Philosophie, Bulletin 37:149.
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  24. added 2015-02-23
    H. Davis (1931). The Revolt Against Dualism by Arthur O. Lovejoy. [REVIEW] Isis 15:190-193.
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  25. added 2015-02-23
    R. I. Aaron (1931). LOVEJOY, A. O. - The Revolt Against Dualism. [REVIEW] Mind 40:221.
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  26. added 2015-02-23
    J. Drever (1920). WOHLGEMUTH, A. -Pleasure-Unpleasure: An Experimental Investigation of the Feeling-Elements. [REVIEW] Mind 29:359.
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  27. added 2015-02-22
    Eric Nelson (2003). Steven Galt Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 23:171-173.
  28. added 2015-02-21
    Michael Pauen (forthcoming). The Functional Mapping Hypothesis. Topoi:1-12.
    Dissociation thought experiments like Zombie and Inverted Spectrum cases play an essential role in the qualia debate. Critics have long since argued that these cases raise serious epistemic issues, undermining first person access to phenomenal states also in normal subjects. Proponents have denied this because, due to their phenomenal experience, normal subjects have epistemic abilities that Zombies don’t have. Here I will present a modified version of these thought experiments: Part-time Zombies and Part-time Inverts switch between normal and abnormal states (...)
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  29. added 2015-02-21
    Daniel Giberman (2015). Is Mereology a Guide to Conceivability? Mind 124 (493):121-146.
    Zombies are unconscious objects with conscious physical micro-duplicates. If zombies are possible then physicalism is false. It has been argued that zombies are possible if conceivable for an agent with ideal rationality. At any rate, they are possible only if so conceivable. This essay uses a mereological constraint to highlight the fine-grained differences between actually conscious physical objects and certain of their actually consciousness-incapable proper parts. These mereological considerations form the basis of an argument by dilemma that zombies are inconceivable. (...)
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  30. added 2015-02-21
    Adam Pautz (2004). The Hard Core of the Mind-Body Problem: Essays on Sensory Consciousness and the Secondary Qualities. Dissertation, New York University
    The mind-body problem is one of the last great intellectual mysteries facing humankind. The hard core of the mind-body problem is the problem of qualitative character: the what-it's-likeness of conscious states. What is the nature of qualitative character? Can it be explained in terms of the intentional content of experience? What is the nature of the so-called secondary qualities---colors, sounds, smells, and so on? Finally, is Physicalism about qualitative character correct? In other words, are a person's qualitative mental properties determined, (...)
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  31. added 2015-02-21
    Don A. Merrell (2001). Contemporary Conceivability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind: A Critique. Dissertation, University of Arkansas
    This dissertation assesses the value of Cartesian conceivability arguments, with particular attention given to three contemporary debates surrounding the mind-body problem. ;Saul Kripke's separability argument utilized new developments surrounding the nature of necessity and the reference of proper names. For all its merit, the Kripkean separability argument is open to serious criticisms. I examine several standard objections to Kripke's arguments and maintain that none are successful. I also maintain, however, that it is possible to show, contrary to what Kripke presupposes, (...)
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  32. added 2015-02-21
    Katalin Balog (1998). Conceivability Arguments. Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
    The dissertation addresses the mind-body problem, and in particular, the problem of how to fit phenomenal consciousness into the rest of reality. Phenomenal consciousness---the what it's like feature of experience---can appear to the scientifically inclined philosopher to be deeply mysterious. It is difficult to understand how the swirl of atoms in the void, the oscillation of field values, the firing of synapses, or anything physical can add up to the smells, tastes, feelings, moods, and so forth that comprise our phenomenal (...)
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  33. added 2015-02-21
    Michael K. Lacewing (1995). Dualism a Feminist Perspective.
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  34. added 2015-02-21
    Andrew Melnyk (1990). One World and the Many Sciences a Defence of Physicalism.
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  35. added 2015-02-21
    Eli Cohen (1980). Cartesian Dualism and the Problem of Human Unity. Dissertation, City University of New York
    The problem of Cartesian dualism is viewed as falling under a more general problem: the problem of human unity. This problem is both ancient and modern: whether a human being is a substantial unity of soul and body or merely a contingent one. I compare Aristotle's and Descartes's response to this problem. My thesis is that an important factor in generating Cartesian dualism is the rejection implicit in Descartes's metaphysical codification of the new mathematical science of nature, namely, the rejection (...)
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  36. added 2015-02-20
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Knowledge and Awareness. Analysis.
    This paper takes a critical look at the idea that knowledge involves reflective access to reasons that provide rational support. After distinguishing between different kinds of awareness, I argue that the kind of awareness involved in awareness of reasons is awareness of something general rather than awareness of something that instances some generality. Such awareness involves the exercise of conceptual capacities and just is knowledge. Since such awareness is knowledge, this kind of awareness cannot play any interesting role in a (...)
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  37. added 2015-02-18
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). An Argument for External World Skepticism From the Appearance/Reality Distinction. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion (i.e., that S doesn’t know that p) without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge (...)
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  38. added 2015-02-18
    Frank Hofmann (2011). Consciousness Revisited. Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW] Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (1).
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  39. added 2015-02-18
    Robert Schroer (2003). The Phenomenal Character of Visual Consciousness. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
    Like all forms of perceptual consciousness, visual consciousness has a felt or "phenomenal" character---there is something that it is like to be visually conscious. In this thesis, I develop a physicalist account of the phenomenal character of visual consciousness. ;I begin by defending a version of Representationalism that I call "Environmental Representationalism". According to Environmental Representationalism the phenomenal similarities and differences obtaining between visual experiences are similarities and differences in the representational claims these experiences make about the surrounding environment. Environmental (...)
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  40. added 2015-02-18
    Alison J. Simmons (1994). Making Sense: The Problem of Phenomenal Qualities in Late Scholastic Aristotelianism and Descartes. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
    It is no surprise that the phenomenal qualities of our sensory experience pose recalcitrant philosophical problems for a physical materialist metaphysics. The colors of flowers as we experience them by sight, the taste of a ripe peach, and the smell of fresh-cut grass are undeniably part of the experienced world; yet in their phenomenal mode, they do not seem well-placed in the physicist's world of particles and energy fields. It seems, prima facie, that the metaphysical programs found in earlier science (...)
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  41. added 2015-02-17
    Bénédicte Veillet (forthcoming). The Cognitive Significance of Phenomenal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Knowledge of what it’s like to have perceptual experiences, e.g. of what it’s like to see red or taste Turkish coffee, is phenomenal knowledge; and it is knowledge the substantial or significant nature of which is widely assumed to pose a challenge for physicalism. Call this the New Challenge to physicalism. The goal of this paper is to take a closer look at the New Challenge. I show, first, that it is surprisingly difficult to spell out clearly and neutrally what (...)
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  42. added 2015-02-17
    Glenn Carruthers (forthcoming). Difficulties for Extending Wegner and Colleagues’ Model of the Sense of Agency to Deficits in Delusions of Alien Control. Avant: Trend in Interdisciplinary Studies.
    Wegner and colleagues have offered an explanation of the sense of agency over one’s bodily actions. If the orthodox view is correct and there is a sense of agency deficit associated with delusions of alien control, then Wegner and colleagues’ model ought to extend to an explanation of this deficit. Data from intentional binding studies opens up the possibility that an abnormality in representing the timing of mental events leads to a violation of the principle of priority in those suffering (...)
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  43. added 2015-02-17
    Brian Key (forthcoming). Fish Do Not Feel Pain and its Implications for Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness. Biology and Philosophy:1-17.
    Phenomenal consciousness or the subjective experience of feeling sensory stimuli is fundamental to human existence. Because of the ubiquity of their subjective experiences, humans seem to readily accept the anthropomorphic extension of these mental states to other animals. Humans will typically extrapolate feelings of pain to animals if they respond physiologically and behaviourally to noxious stimuli. The alternative view that fish instead respond to noxious stimuli reflexly and with a limited behavioural repertoire is defended within the context of our current (...)
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  44. added 2015-02-17
    Glenn Carruthers (forthcoming). Difficulties for Extending Wegner and Colleagues’ Model of the Sense of Agency to Deficits in Delusions of Alien Control. Avant: Trend in Interdisciplinary Studies.
    Wegner and colleagues have offered an explanation of the sense of agency over one’s bodily actions. If the orthodox view is correct and there is a sense of agency deficit associated with delusions of alien control, then Wegner and colleagues’ model ought to extend to an explanation of this deficit. Data from intentional binding studies opens up the possibility that an abnormality in representing the timing of mental events leads to a violation of the principle of priority in those suffering (...)
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  45. added 2015-02-17
    Fernando Martinez-Manrique & Agustin Vicente (2015). The Activity View of Inner Speech. Frontiers in Psychology 6: doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00232.
    We distinguish two general approaches to inner speech (IS) –the ‘format’ and the ‘activity’ views–, and defend the activity view. The format view grounds the utility of IS on features of the representational format of language, and is related to the thesis that the proper function of IS is to make conscious thinking possible. IS appears typically as a product constituted by representations of phonological features. The view also has implications for the idea that passivity phenomena in cognition may be (...)
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  46. added 2015-02-17
    Michael Traynor (2014). Phenomenal Experience and the Metaphysics of Persistence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):381-388.
    I will adapt part of an argument in Prosser to the case of persistence, to conclude that our experience does not favour any particular theory of persistence—our immediate experience cannot rightly be considered as evidence in this context. Even if it does in fact seem that objects persist by enduring, this cannot be because they do in fact endure; and if things do in fact persist by perduring, this should not be considered to be in spite of appearances. Thus any (...)
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  47. added 2015-02-17
    Bernard Kobes (2005). The "One-Experience" Account of Phenomenal Unity: A Review of Michael Tye's "Consciousness and Persons". [REVIEW] Psyche 11.
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  48. added 2015-02-17
    Garry Young (2005). Do Carruthers’ Examples of Absent-Mindedness Show Arbitrariness with Regard to Phenomenal Content? Anthropology and Philosophy 6 (1/2):89-101.
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  49. added 2015-02-17
    Peter Carruthers (2005). Précis of Phenomenal Consciousness. Anthropology and Philosophy 6 (1/2):19-33.
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  50. added 2015-02-17
    Torin Alter (2005). Review of P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa & D. Stoljar , There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. [REVIEW] Psyche 11.
    The titular ‘Mary’ refers to Jackson’s famous protagonist. Her story takes place in the future, when all physical facts have been discovered. This includes “everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles” . Mary learns all this by watching lectures on a monochromatic television monitor. But she spends her life in a black-and-white room and has no color experiences. Then she (...)
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