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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Bourget and David Chalmers
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2016-05-25
    Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Brentano's Dual-Framing Theory of Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Brentano’s theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of mind (Thomasson 2000, Caston 2002, Hossack 2002, 2006, Kriegel 2003, 2009, Thomas 2003, Smith 2004, Zahavi 2004, Drummond 2006, Textor 2006, 2013). Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano’s theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano’s theory, as interpreted here, a conscious experience of a tree is a mental state that can (...)
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  2. added 2016-05-25
    Samuel Murray (forthcoming). Responsibility and Vigilance. Philosophical Studies.
    My primary target in this paper is a puzzle that emerges from the conjunction of several seemingly innocent assumptions in action theory and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. The puzzle I have in mind is this. On one widely held account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only for those actions or outcomes over which that agent exercises control. Recently, however, some have cited cases where agents appear to be morally responsible without exercising any control. This leads some (...)
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  3. added 2016-05-24
    Carolyn Dicey Jennings (2015). Consciousness Without Attention. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2):276--295.
    This paper explores whether consciousness can exist without attention. This is a hot topic in philosophy of mind and cognitive science due to the popularity of theories that hold attention to be necessary for consciousness. The discovery of a form of consciousness that exists without the influence of attention would require a change in the way that many global workspace theorists, for example, understand the role and function of consciousness. Against this understanding, at least three forms of consciousness have been (...)
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  4. added 2016-05-23
    Michelle Montague (2015). The Life of the Mind. In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousnss. Oxford University Press
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  5. added 2016-05-21
    Matthew Frise (forthcoming). Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs. Erkenntnis.
    A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two leading internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies (...)
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  6. added 2016-05-20
    Ezequiel Morsella, Godwin Christine, Jantz Tiffany, Krieger Stephen & Gazzaley Adam (forthcoming). Passive Frame Theory: A New Synthesis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.
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  7. added 2016-05-19
    Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Hallucination as Mental Imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    Hallucination is a big deal in contemporary philosophy of perception. The main reason for this is that the way hallucination is treated marks an important stance in one of the most vicious debates in this subdiscipline: the debate between ‘relationalists’ and ‘representationalists’. I argue that if we take hallucinations to be a form of mental imagery (as the literature in neuroscience and psychiatry routinely does), then we have a very straightforward way of arguing against disjunctivism: if hallucination is a form (...)
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  8. added 2016-05-19
    D. Kosson, Y. Suchy, A. Mayer & J. Libby (2002). Facial Affect Recognition in Criminal Psychopaths. Emotion 2:398–411.
    Prior studies provide consistent evidence of deficits for psychopaths in processing verbal emotional material but are inconsistent regarding nonverbal emotional material. To examine whether psychopaths exhibit general versus specific deficits in nonverbal emotional processing, 34 psychopaths and 33 nonpsychopaths identified with Hare's (R. D. Hare, 1991) Psychopathy Checklist-Revised were asked to complete a facial affect recognition test. Slides of prototypic facial expressions were presented. Three hypotheses regarding hemispheric lateralization anomalies in psychopaths were also tested (right-hemisphere dysfunction, reduced lateralization, and reversed (...)
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  9. added 2016-05-18
    James A. Macleod (forthcoming). Belief States in Criminal Law. Oklahoma Law Review 68.
    Belief-state ascription — determining what someone “knew,” “believed,” was “aware of,” etc. — is central to many areas of law. In criminal law, the distinction between knowledge and recklessness, and the use of broad jury instructions concerning other belief states, presupposes a common and stable understanding of what those belief-state terms mean. But a wealth of empirical work at the intersection of philosophy and psychology — falling under the banner of “Experimental Epistemology” — reveals how laypeople’s understandings of mens rea (...)
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  10. added 2016-05-18
    Christoph Teufel & Bence Nanay (forthcoming). How to (and How Not to) Think About Top-Down Influences on Visual Perception. Consciousness and Cognition.
    The question of whether cognition can influence perception has a long history in neuroscience and philosophy. Here, we outline a novel approach to this issue, arguing that it should be viewed within the framework of top-down information-processing. This approach leads to a reversal of the standard explanatory order of the cognitive penetration debate: we suggest studying top-down processing at various levels without preconceptions of perception or cognition. Once a clear picture has emerged about which processes have influences on those at (...)
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  11. added 2016-05-18
    Christoph Teufel & Bence Nanay (forthcoming). How to (and How Not to) Think About Top-Down Influences on Visual Perception. Consciousness and Cognition.
    The question of whether cognition can influence perception has a long history in neuroscience and philosophy. Here, we outline a novel approach to this issue, arguing that it should be viewed within the framework of top-down information-processing. This approach leads to a reversal of the standard explanatory order of the cognitive penetration debate: we suggest studying top-down processing at various levels without preconceptions of perception or cognition. Once a clear picture has emerged about which processes have influences on those (...)
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  12. added 2016-05-18
    Christoph Teufel & Bence Nanay (forthcoming). How to (and How Not to) Think About Top-Down Influences on Visual Perception. Consciousness and Cognition.
    The question of whether cognition can influence perception has a long history in neuroscience and philosophy. Here, we outline a novel approach to this issue, arguing that it should be viewed within the framework of top-down information-processing. This approach leads to a reversal of the standard explanatory order of the cognitive penetration debate: we suggest studying top-down processing at various levels without preconceptions of perception or cognition. Once a clear picture has emerged about which processes have influences on those at (...)
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  13. added 2016-05-16
    Vivian Mizrahi (forthcoming). Just a Matter of Taste. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    According to an ordinary view, we distinguish, classify, and appreciate food and beverages according to their taste. However, scientists seem to disagree with this naive view. They maintain that we don't really perceive the lemony taste of a cake or the delicate smoky taste of a single-malt whiskey, because what we ascribe to taste is in reality mostly perceived by smell. As opposed to this scientific consensus regarding taste, I will defend a naive view of taste and deny that olfaction (...)
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  14. added 2016-05-16
    Nilanjan Das & Bernhard Salow (forthcoming). Transparency and the KK Principle. Noûs.
    An important question in contemporary epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that p is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that p. We explain how a “transparency” account of introspection, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that the transparency account of self­-knowledge allows (...)
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  15. added 2016-05-16
    Marc Artiga (forthcoming). Teleosemantic Modeling of Cognitive Representations. Biology and Philosophy:1-23.
    Naturalistic theories of representation seek to specify the conditions that must be met for an entity to represent another entity. Although these approaches have been relatively successful in certain areas, such as communication theory or genetics, many doubt that they can be employed to naturalize complex cognitive representations. In this essay I identify some of the difficulties for developing a teleosemantic theory of cognitive representations and provide a strategy for accommodating them: to look into models of signaling in evolutionary game (...)
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  16. added 2016-05-16
    Simon Prosser (2016). Experiencing Time. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Our engagement with time is a ubiquitous feature of our lives. We are aware of time on many scales, from the briefest flicker of change to the way our lives unfold over many years. But to what extent does this encounter reveal the true nature of temporal reality? To the extent that temporal reality is as it seems, how do we come to be aware of it? And to the extent that temporal reality is not as it seems, why does (...)
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  17. added 2016-05-16
    Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2016). Long-Term (Six Years) Clinical Outcome Discrimination of Patients in the Vegetative State Could Be Achieved Based on the Operational Architectonics EEG Analysis: A Pilot Feasibility Study. The Open Neuroimaging Journal 10:69-79.
    Electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings are increasingly used to evaluate patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) or assess their prognosis outcome in the short-term perspective. However, there is a lack of information concerning the effectiveness of EEG in classifying long-term (many years) outcome in chronic DOC patients. Here we tested whether EEG operational architectonics parameters (geared towards consciousness phenomenon detection rather than neurophysiological processes) could be useful for distinguishing a very long-term (6 years) clinical outcome of DOC patients whose EEGs were registered (...)
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  18. added 2016-05-16
    Janna Hastings, Werner Ceusters, Kevin Mulligan & Barry Smith (2012). Annotating Affective Neuroscience Data with the Emotion Ontology. In Third International Conference on Biomedical Ontology. ICBO 1-5.
    The Emotion Ontology is an ontology covering all aspects of emotional and affective mental functioning. It is being developed following the principles of the OBO Foundry and Ontological Realism. This means that in compiling the ontology, we emphasize the importance of the nature of the entities in reality that the ontology is describing. One of the ways in which realism-based ontologies are being successfully used within biomedical science is in the annotation of scientific research results in publicly available databases. Such (...)
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  19. added 2016-05-15
    Anil Gomes & Craig French, Still Particular: A Reply to Ganson and Mehta.
    We are grateful to Ganson and Mehta (forthcoming) for their reply to our defence of phenomenal particularism against the objections raised by Mehta in his (2014). Their reply clarifies the nature of their objections to phenomenal particularism and helps identify the locus of our disagreements. In what follows we aim to defend phenomenal particularism against the objections raised in their reply.
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  20. added 2016-05-14
    Fabian Dorsch (2016). Hume. In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge 40-54.
    This chapter overviews Hume’s thoughts on the nature and role of imagining and focusses primarily on three important distinctions that Hume draws among our conscious mental episodes: (i) between impressions and ideas; (ii) between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination; and (iii), among the ideas of the imagination, between ideas of the judgement and ideas of the fancy. In addition, the chapter considers Hume’s views on the imagination as a faculty of producing ideas, as well as on (...)
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  21. added 2016-05-14
    Fabian Dorsch (2005). Imagination and the Will. Dissertation, University College London
    The principal aim of my thesis is to provide a unified theory of imagining, that is, a theory which aspires to capture the common nature of all central forms of imagining and to distinguish them from all paradigm instances of non-imaginative phenomena. The theory which I intend to put forward is a version of what I call the Agency Account of imagining and, accordingly, treats imaginings as mental actions of a certain kind. More precisely, it maintains that imaginings are mental (...)
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  22. added 2016-05-13
    Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). Perceptual Acquaintance and the Seeeming Relationality of Hallucinations. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    In recent years, it has become popular again to endorse relationalism about perception.1 According to this view, perceptions are essentially relational experiences and thus di er in nature from non-relational hallucinations. In this article, I assume that relationalism is true. The issue that I am generally interested in is rather which version of relationalism we should endorse, given that perceptions are relational. The standard answer to this question is Acquaintance Relationalism, the view that perceptions are relational in so far as (...)
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  23. added 2016-05-13
    Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). The Phenomenology of Attitudes and the Salience of Rational Role and Determination. Philosophical Explorations.
    The recent debate on cognitive phenomenology has largely focused on phenomenal aspects connected to the content of thoughts. By contrasts, aspects pertaining to their attitude have often been neglected, despite the fact that they are distinctive of the mental kind of thought concerned and, moreover, also present in experiences and thus less contentious than purely cognitive aspects. My main goal is to identify two central and closely related aspects of attitude that are phenomenologically salient and shared by thoughts with experiences, (...)
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  24. added 2016-05-13
    Fabian Dorsch (2016). Seeing-In as Aspect Perception. In Gary Kemp & Gabriele Mras (eds.), Wollheim, Wittgenstein, and Pictorial Representation: Seeing-as and Seeing-in. Routledge
  25. added 2016-05-12
    Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen (forthcoming). How Valuable Could a Material Object Be? Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    Arguments for substance dualism—the theory that we are at least partly non-material beings—abound. Many such arguments begin with our capacity to engage in conscious thought and end with dualism. Such are familiar. But there is another route to dualism. It begins with our moral value and ends with dualism. In this article, we develop and assess the prospects for this new style of argument. We show that, though one extant version of the argument does not succeed, there may yet be (...)
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  26. added 2016-05-11
    Martin Smith (forthcoming). Intuitionistic Probability and the Bayesian Objection to Dogmatism. Synthese.
    Given a few assumptions, the probability of a conjunction is raised, and the probability of its negation is lowered, by conditionalising upon one of the conjuncts. This simple result appears to bring Bayesian confirmation theory into tension with the prominent dogmatist view of perceptual justification – a tension often portrayed as a kind of ‘Bayesian objection’ to dogmatism. In a recent paper, David Jehle and Brian Weatherson observe that, while this crucial result holds within classical probability theory, it fails within (...)
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  27. added 2016-05-10
    Anja Berninger (forthcoming). Thinking Sadly: In Favor of an Adverbial Theory of Emotions. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    Introspective as well as empirical evidence indicates that emotions shape our thinking in numerous ways. Yet, this modificatory aspect of emotions has received relatively little interest in the philosophy of emotion. I give a detailed account of this aspect. Drawing both on the work of William James and adverbialist conceptions of perception, I sketch a theory of emotions that takes these aspects into consideration and suggest that we should understand emotions as manners of thinking.
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  28. added 2016-05-10
    Demian Whiting (forthcoming). On the Appearance and Reality of Mind. Journal of Mind and Behavior.
    According to what I will call the “appearance-is-reality doctrine of mind,” conscious mental states are identical to how they subjectively appear or present themselves to us in our experience of them. The doctrine has had a number of supporters but to date has not received from its proponents the comprehensive and systematic treatment that might be expected. In this paper I outline the key features of the appearance-is-reality doctrine along with the case for thinking that doctrine to be true. I (...)
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  29. added 2016-05-10
    Alexandros Tillas, Gottfried Vosgerau, Tim Seuchter & Silvano Zipoli Caiani (forthcoming). Can Affordances Explain Behavior? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    In this paper we secure the explanatory value of affordances by treating them as relational properties and as inherently linked to unintentional movements and possible intentional actions. We distinguish between Basic affordances, which are related to unintentional movements, and Complex affordances, which are subjective and executively controlled by individuals. The linkage between affordances and motor intentions allows for accounting for the infinite number of affordances that any given object potentially has. Appealing to objective systematic contingencies that provide the actor with (...)
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  30. added 2016-05-09
    Peter V. Forrest (forthcoming). Can Phenomenology Determine the Content of Thought? Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    According to a number of popular intentionalist theories in philosophy of mind, phenomenology is essentially and intrinsically intentional: phenomenal properties are identical to intentional properties of a certain type, or at least, the phenomenal character of an experience necessarily fixes a type of intentional content. These views are attractive, but it is questionable whether the reasons for accepting them generalize from sensory-perceptual experience to other kinds of experience: for example, agentive, moral, aesthetic, or cognitive experience. Meanwhile, a number of philosophers (...)
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  31. added 2016-05-09
    Michelle Montague (2016). Cognitive Phenomenology and Conscious Thought. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):167-181.
    How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing (...)
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  32. added 2016-05-08
    G. Lakoff (forthcoming). Author Reply: Reply to Commentaries on Language and Emotion. Emotion Review.
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  33. added 2016-05-08
    J. K. Hartshorne (forthcoming). Comment: Acquiring Metaphors. Emotion Review.
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  34. added 2016-05-08
    D. Roberson & L. Whitaker (forthcoming). Comment on "Language and Emotion": Metaphor, Morality and Contested Concepts. Emotion Review.
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  35. added 2016-05-08
    G. Lakoff (forthcoming). Language and Emotion. Emotion Review.
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  36. added 2016-05-08
    A. Wood, G. Lupyan & P. Niedenthal (forthcoming). Why Do We Need Emotion Words in the First Place? Commentary on Lakoff. Emotion Review.
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  37. added 2016-05-08
    C. Goddard (forthcoming). Comment: Lakoff on Metaphor - More Heat Than Light. Emotion Review.
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  38. added 2016-05-08
    I. Leemans (forthcoming). Comment: Embodied Emotions From a Dutch Historical Perspective. Emotion Review.
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  39. added 2016-05-08
    L. Aziz-Zadeh & V. Gamez-Djokic (forthcoming). Comment: The Interaction Between Metaphor and Emotion Processing in the Brain. Emotion Review.
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  40. added 2016-05-05
    Alexander Sandgren (2016). Cruel Intensions: An Essay on Intentional Identity and Intentional Attitudes. Dissertation, The Australian National University
    Some intentional attitudes (beliefs, fears, desires, etc.) have a common focus in spite of there being no object at that focus. For example, two beliefs may be about the same witch even when there are no witches, different astronomers had beliefs directed at Vulcan, even though there is no such planet. This relation of having a common focus, whether or not there is an actual concrete object at that focus, is called intentional identity. In the first part of this thesis (...)
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  41. added 2016-05-04
    Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Emotions, Me, Myself and I. International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
    Abstract We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a subject and her emotions. But how intimate is the relation between emotions and the self? I first explain why interesting claims about this relation must locate it at the level of emotional intentionality. Given that emotions have a complex intentional structure—they are (...)
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  42. added 2016-05-04
    Nick Young (forthcoming). Hearing Spaces. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    ABSTRACTIn this paper I argue that empty space can be heard. This position contrasts with the generally held view that the only things that can be heard are sounds, their properties, echoes, and perhaps sound sources. Specifically, I suggest that when sounds reverberate in enclosed environments we auditorily represent the volume of space surrounding us. Clearly, we can learn the approximate size of an enclosed space through hearing a sound reverberate within it, and so any account that denies that we (...)
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  43. added 2016-05-03
    Olivier Massin (forthcoming). Bad by Nature, An Axiological Theory of Pain. In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge
    This chapter defends an axiological theory of pain according to which pains are bodily episodes that are bad in some way. Section 1 introduces two standard assumptions about pain that the axiological theory constitutively rejects: (i) that pains are essentially tied to consciousness and (ii) that pains are not essentially tied to badness. Section 2 presents the axiological theory by contrast to these and provides a preliminary defense of it. Section 3 introduces the paradox of pain and (...)
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  44. added 2016-05-03
    Olivier Massin (forthcoming). Brentano on Sensations and Sensory Qualities. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge
    This chapter has three sections. The first introduces Brentano’s view of sensations by presenting the intentional features of sensations irreducible to features of the sensory objects. The second presents Brentano’s view of sensory objects —which include sensory qualities— and the features of sensations that such objects allow to explain, such as their intensity. The third section presents Brentano’s approach to sensory pleasures and pains, which combines both appeal to specific modes of reference and to specific (...) qualities. (shrink)
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  45. added 2016-05-03
    Myrto Mylopoulos & Elisabeth Pacherie (forthcoming). Intentions and Motor Representations: The Interface Challenge. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    A full account of purposive action must appeal not only to propositional attitude states like beliefs, desires, and intentions, but also to motor representations, i.e., non-propositional states that are thought to represent, among other things, action outcomes as well as detailed kinematic features of bodily movements. This raises the puzzle of how it is that these two distinct types of state successfully coordinate. We examine this so-called “Interface Problem”. First, we clarify and expand on the nature and role of motor (...)
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  46. added 2016-05-03
    Olivier Massin & Marion Hämmerli (forthcoming). Is Purple a Red and Blue Chessboard? Brentano on Colour Mixtures. The Monist 100 (1).
    Can we maintain that purple seems composed of red and blue without giving up the impenetrability of the red and blue parts that compose it? Brentano thinks we can. Purple, according to him, is a chessboard of red and blue tiles which, although individually too small to be perceived, are together indistinctly perceived within the purple. After a presentation of Brentano’s solution, we raise two objections to it. First, Brentano’s solution commits him to unperceivable intentional objects (the chessboard’s tiles). Second, (...)
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  47. added 2016-05-03
    Olivier Massin (forthcoming). Desires, Values and Norms. In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press
    The thesis defended, the “guise of the ought”, is that the formal objects of desires are norms (oughts to be or oughts to do) rather than values (as the “guise of the good” thesis has it). It is impossible, in virtue of the nature of desire, to desire something without it being presented as something that ought to be or that one ought to do. This view is defended by pointing to a key distinction between values and norms: (...)
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  48. added 2016-05-03
    Miklós Márton & János Tőzsér (2016). Physicalism and the Privacy of Conscious Experience. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 4 (1):73-88.
    The aim of the paper is to show that the privacy of conscious experience is inconsistent with any kind of physicalism. That is, if you are a physicalist, then you have to deny that more than one subject cannot undergo the very same conscious experience. In the first part of the paper we define the concepts of privacy and physicalism. In the second part we delineate two thought experiments in which two subjects undergo the same kind of conscious experience in (...)
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  49. added 2016-05-02
    Bolesław Czarnecki, Knowledge-How (Reference Entry). Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.
    The entry is intended as an advanced introduction to the topic of knowledge-how. It starts with a list of overviews, monographs and collections, followed by selected 20th century discussions. The last two sections contain sources pertaining to Ryle's own work on the topic as well as work by other influential thinkers, and themes that are sometimes associated with knowledge-how. The remaining seven sections survey the contemporary literature on knowledge-how from three perspectives: (i) generic desiderata for accounts of knowledge-how, (ii) specific (...)
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  50. added 2016-05-02
    Joel Krueger (forthcoming). Intentionality. In G. Stanghellini, M. Broome, A. Fernandez, P. Fusar Poli, Raballo A. & R. Rosfort (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford University Press
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