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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Bourget and David Chalmers
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2016-09-29
    Bernd Lahno & Amrei Lahno, Team Reasoning as a Guide to Coordination. Munich Discussion Paper No 2014-8.
    A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium selection in simple coordination games. In this paper we analyze and discuss the solution concept for common coordination problems as incorporated in the theory of Team Reasoning (TR). Special consideration is given to TR’s concept of opportunistic choice and to the resulting restrictions in using private information. We report results from a laboratory experiment in which teams were given a chance to coordinate on a particular pattern (...)
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  2. added 2016-09-29
    Bernd Lahno (2013). Welches Vertrauen? In Alfred Hirsch, Peter Bojanic & Zeljko Radinovic (eds.), Vertrauen und Transparenz – für ein neues Europa. Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade 139162.
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  3. added 2016-09-29
    Bernd Lahno (2005). Vertrauen. In Uwe Mummert (ed.), Emotionen, Markt und Moral. Lit-Verlag 93-120.
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  4. added 2016-09-28
    Tim Crane, REVIEW: Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation, by Jaegwon Kim.
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  5. added 2016-09-28
    Neil McDonnell (forthcoming). Causal Exclusion and the Limits of Proportionality. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Causal exclusion arguments are taken to threaten the autonomy of the special sciences, and the causal efficacy of mental properties. A recent line of response to these arguments has appealed to “independently plausible” and “well grounded” theories of causation to rebut key premises. In this paper I consider two papers which proceed in this vein and show that they share a common feature: they both require causes to be proportional to their effects. I argue that this feature is a bug, (...)
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  6. added 2016-09-28
    Mariusz Grygianiec (forthcoming). How To Get Rid of Closure. Diametros:1-17.
    Sophie Gibb has recently invented a very interesting strategy against Kim’s causal exclusion argument. This strategy adopts the powers theory of causation and an interpretation of mental causation in terms of double prevention. Gibb’s strategy results both in invalidating the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain in most of its formulations and in disarming the argument in question. In my paper, I present a general procedure for the opponents of reductive physicalism which enables them to _grapple successfully_ (...)
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  7. added 2016-09-28
    Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (forthcoming). Weighing the Aim of Belief Again. Logos and Episteme.
    In his influential discussion of the aim of belief, David Owens argues that any talk of such an ‘aim’ is at best metaphorical. In order for the ‘aim’ of belief to be a genuine aim, it must be weighable with other aims in deliberation, but Owens claims that this is impossible. In previous work, I have pointed out that if we look at a broader range of deliberative contexts involving belief, it becomes clear that the putative aim of belief is (...)
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  8. added 2016-09-28
    Ulrich Diehl (ed.) (2016). Thomas Nagel, Wie ist es, eine Fledermaus zu sein? Reclam.
    Kann ein Mensch wirklich verstehen, wie es ist, eine Fledermaus zu sein? Natürlich nicht. Er kann sich nur vorstellen, wie es sich anfühlen könnte. Nagel zeigt damit dem Menschen die Grenzen seiner Erkenntnis- und Empathiefähigkeit auf. Radikal, provokativ und erhellend zugleich, ist der Essay von 1974 einer der am häufigsten zitierten philosophischen Aufsätze des 20. Jahrhunderts. Ulrich Diehl erklärt in einem Nachwort die besondere Bedeutung und spannende Wirkungsgeschichte dieses Klassikers der Philosophie des Geistes.
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  9. added 2016-09-28
    Andrew Russo (2016). Kim’s Dilemma: Why Mental Causation is Not Productive. Synthese 193 (7):2185-2203.
    Loewer has argued that the nonreductive physicalist should respond to the exclusion problem by endorsing the overdetermination entailed by their view. Kim’s argument against this reply is based on the premise that mental causation must be a productive relation in order to sustain human agency. In this paper, I challenge the premise that mental causation is a productive relation by appealing to the underlying double prevention structure of the physiological mechanisms of human action. Since the causal pathways from an agent’s (...)
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  10. added 2016-09-28
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  11. added 2016-09-28
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  12. added 2016-09-28
    William S. Robinson (2015). Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  13. added 2016-09-28
    William S. Robinson (2015). Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  14. added 2016-09-28
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  15. added 2016-09-28
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  16. added 2016-09-28
    William S. Robinson (2015). Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  17. added 2016-09-28
    William S. Robinson (2015). Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  18. added 2016-09-28
    William S. Robinson (2015). Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  19. added 2016-09-28
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  20. added 2016-09-28
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  21. added 2016-09-28
    William S. Robinson (2015). Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  22. added 2016-09-28
    William S. Robinson (2015). Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  23. added 2016-09-28
    William S. Robinson (2015). Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  24. added 2016-09-28
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  25. added 2016-09-28
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  26. added 2016-09-28
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  27. added 2016-09-28
    William S. Robinson (2015). Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  28. added 2016-09-28
    William S. Robinson (2015). Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  29. added 2016-09-28
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  30. added 2016-09-28
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  31. added 2016-09-28
    William S. Robinson (2015). Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  32. added 2016-09-28
    William S. Robinson (2015). Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  33. added 2016-09-28
    William S. Robinson (2015). Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
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  34. added 2016-09-28
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  35. added 2016-09-28
    Eric Scott Jones, A Whiteheadian Critique of Jaegwon Kim's Analysis of the Mind-Body Problem.
    The first section of the dissertation examines Kim's views on the nature of physical reality, causation, physical causal closure, and experience. For example, I find that Kim's views of experience are limited by his inheritance from classical empiricism. Instead, a radical empiricism in the tradition of James and Whitehead is the proper philosophical position. Because Kim lacks this radical empiricism, he locates the source of his mental realism not in direct experience, as I do, but in practical reason. During my (...)
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  36. added 2016-09-28
    Gabriel M. A. Segal, The Causal Inefficacy of Content.
    The paper begins with the assumption that psychological event tokens are identical to or constituted from physical events. It then articulates a familiar apparent problem concerning the causal role of psychological properties. If they do not reduce to physical properties, then either they must be epiphenomenal or any effects they cause must also be caused by physical properties, and hence be overdetermined. It then argues that both epiphenomenalism and over-determinationism are prima facie perfectly reasonable and relatively unproblematic views. The paper (...)
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  37. added 2016-09-28
    Sven Bernecker (2009). Memory: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press Uk.
    In this book, Sven Bernecker investigates the defining characteristics of memory and the issues essential to understanding it. The book gives a comprehensive philosophical account of memory and illuminates issues central to contemporary discussions of metaphysics and epistemology such as personal identity, causation, mental content, and justification. Bernecker argues that remembering something, unlike knowing something, does not require having a belief. There are also instances where one has a memory but no justification for what one remembers. These surprising results suggest (...)
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  38. added 2016-09-28
    Stephen Yablo (2008). Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Thoughts is a collection of twelve essays by Stephen Yablo which together constitute a modern-day examination of Cartesian themes in the metaphysics of mind. Yablo offers penetrating discussions of such topics as the relation between the mental and the physical, mental causation, the possibility of disembodied existence, the relation between conceivability and possibility, varieties of necessity, and issues in the theory of content arising out of the foregoing. The collection represents almost all of Yablo's work on these topics, and features (...)
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  39. added 2016-09-28
    Louise M. Antony, John Heil & Alfred Mele (1996). Mental Causation. Philosophical Review 105 (4):564.
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  40. added 2016-09-28
    Tim Crane, Mental Causation.
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  41. added 2016-09-27
    Tim Jankowiak (forthcoming). Intentionality and Sensory Consciousness in Kant in Advance. Journal of Philosophical Research.
    According to “intentionalist” interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism, Kant’s empirical objects are to be understood as mere intentional objects. This interpretation requires a corresponding account of intentionality and intentional objects. This paper defends an account of how the intentionalist should understand the intentional structures at work in the sensory consciousness of physical bodies. First a relational conception of intentionality (articulated in terms of an object’s presence to consciousness) is distinguished from a non-relational conception (articulated in terms of representational content). I (...)
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  42. added 2016-09-27
    Franziska Köder & Maier Emar (forthcoming). When You Isn't You. The Attraction of Self­-Ascription in Children’s Interpretation of Pronouns in Reported Speech. Glossa.
    In language comprehension, 'you' is a de se pronoun, which means that its interpretation is guided by a simple de se rule ('you' = self-ascription by addressee), while the interpretation of other pronouns requires more complicated reasoning. This predicts that 'you' should be easier to process than 'I' or 'he', especially for children. But not all occurrences of 'you' can be correctly interpreted via self-ascription. We consider two cases where 'you' does not indicate self-ascription: interpretation as an eavesdropper and 'you' (...)
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  43. added 2016-09-27
    Franziska Köder & Maier Emar (forthcoming). When You Isn't You. The Attraction of Self­-Ascription in Children’s Interpretation of Pronouns in Reported Speech. Glossa.
    In language comprehension, 'you' is a de se pronoun, which means that its interpretation is guided by a simple de se rule ('you' = self-ascription by addressee), while the interpretation of other pronouns requires more complicated reasoning. This predicts that 'you' should be easier to process than 'I' or 'he', especially for children. But not all occurrences of 'you' can be correctly interpreted via self-ascription. We consider two cases where 'you' does not indicate self-ascription: interpretation as an eavesdropper and 'you' (...)
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  44. added 2016-09-27
    Bernd Lahno (2007). Rational Choice and Rule-Following Behavior. Rationality and Society 19 (4):425-450.
    While Rational Choice Theory (RC) may be understood as a theory of choice, which does not necessarily reflect actual deliberative processes, rule-following behavior is definitely based on a certain form of delibera- tion. This article aims at clarifying the relationship between the two. Being guided by instrumental rules, i.e., rules reducible to the maximiza- tion principle, is perfectly consistent with the fundamental behavioral assumptions of RC. But human individuals use other forms of rules in decision making, especially tie-breaking rules and (...)
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  45. added 2016-09-26
    Michael R. Starks, The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle.
    I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic (...)
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  46. added 2016-09-26
    Justin Tiehen (2016). Physicalism Requires Functionalism: A New Formulation and Defense of the Via Negativa. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):3-24.
    How should ‘the physical’ be defined for the purpose of formulating physicalism? In this paper I defend a version of the via negativa according to which a property is physical just in case it is neither fundamentally mental nor possibly realized by a fundamentally mental property. The guiding idea is that physicalism requires functionalism, and thus that being a type identity theorist requires being a realizer-functionalist. In §1 I motivate my approach partly by arguing against Jessica Wilson's no fundamental mentality (...)
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  47. added 2016-09-26
    Ronald Endicott (2016). Functionalism, Superduperfunctionalism, and Physicalism: Lessons From Supervenience. Synthese 193 (7):2205-2235.
    Philosophers almost universally believe that concepts of supervenience fail to satisfy the standards for physicalism because they offer mere property correlations that are left unexplained. They are thus compatible with non-physicalist accounts of those relations. Moreover, many philosophers not only prefer some kind of functional-role theory as a physically acceptable account of mind-body and other inter-level relations, but they use it as a form of “superdupervenience” to explain supervenience in a physically acceptable way. But I reject a central part of (...)
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  48. added 2016-09-26
    Bradford Saad (2016). How to Befriend Zombies: A Guide for Physicalists. Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2353-2375.
    Though not myself a physicalist, I develop a new argument against antiphysicalist positions that are motivated by zombie arguments. I first identify four general features of phenomenal states that are candidates for non-physical types; these are used to generate different types of zombie. I distinguish two antiphysicalist positions: strict dualism, which posits exactly one general non-physical type, and pluralism, which posits more than one such type. It turns out that zombie arguments threaten strict dualism and some pluralist positions as much (...)
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  49. added 2016-09-26
    Andreas Elpidorou (2015). A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature (...)
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  50. added 2016-09-26
    Andreas Elpidorou (2015). A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature (...)
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