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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Bourget and David Chalmers
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2016-02-05
    S. L. Hart (forthcoming). Proximal Foundations of Jealousy: Expectations of Exclusivity in the Infants First Year of Life. Emotion Review.
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  2. added 2016-02-05
    D. Onu, T. Kessler & J. R. Smith (forthcoming). Admiration: A Conceptual Review. Emotion Review.
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  3. added 2016-02-05
    P. Livet (forthcoming). Emotions, Beliefs, and Revisions. Emotion Review.
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  4. added 2016-02-05
    E. Pulcini (forthcoming). What Emotions Motivate Care? Emotion Review.
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  5. added 2016-02-05
    Aidan McGlynn (forthcoming). Epistemic Entitlement and the Leaching Problem. Episteme:1-14.
  6. added 2016-02-05
    M. T. Boden & R. J. Thompson (forthcoming). Meta-Analysis of the Association Between Emotional Clarity and Attention to Emotions. Emotion Review.
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  7. added 2016-02-05
    A. Fischer & R. Giner-Sorolla (forthcoming). Contempt: Derogating Others While Keeping Calm. Emotion Review.
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  8. added 2016-02-05
    S. Karstedt (2016). The Emotion Dynamics of Transitional Justice: An Emotion Sharing Perspective. Emotion Review 8 (1):50-55.
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  9. added 2016-02-05
    A. Sajo (2016). Emotions in Constitutional Institutions. Emotion Review 8 (1):44-49.
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  10. added 2016-02-05
    H. Conway & J. Stannard (2016). Property and Emotions. Emotion Review 8 (1):38-43.
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  11. added 2016-02-05
    N. Feigenson (2016). Jurors Emotions and Judgments of Legal Responsibility and Blame: What Does the Experimental Research Tell Us? Emotion Review 8 (1):26-31.
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  12. added 2016-02-05
    S. A. Bandes (2016). Remorse and Criminal Justice. Emotion Review 8 (1):14-19.
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  13. added 2016-02-05
    J. Deigh (2016). The Emotional Significance of Punishment. Emotion Review 8 (1):56-61.
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  14. added 2016-02-05
    R. L. Kaplan, I. Van Damme, L. J. Levine & E. F. Loftus (2016). Emotion and False Memory. Emotion Review 8 (1):8-13.
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  15. added 2016-02-05
    T. A. Maroney (2016). A Field Evolves: Introduction to the Special Section on Law and Emotion. Emotion Review 8 (1):3-7.
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  16. added 2016-02-05
    S. Bergman Blix & A. Wettergren (2016). A Sociological Perspective on Emotions in the Judiciary. Emotion Review 8 (1):32-37.
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  17. added 2016-02-05
    P. C. Ellsworth & A. Dougherty (2016). Appraisals and Reappraisals in the Courtroom. Emotion Review 8 (1):20-25.
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  18. added 2016-02-05
    Claudine Verheggen (2013). Triangulation. In Ernie Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), A Companion to Donald Davidson. Wiley-Blackwell 456-471.
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  19. added 2016-02-05
    D. Bischof-Kohler (2012). Empathy and Self-Recognition in Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic Perspective. Emotion Review 4 (1):40-48.
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  20. added 2016-02-05
    K. R. Stueber (2012). Varieties of Empathy, Neuroscience and the Narrativist Challenge to the Contemporary Theory of Mind Debate. Emotion Review 4 (1):55-63.
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  21. added 2016-02-04
    Carrie Figdor (forthcoming). The Rise of Cognitive Science. In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge History of the Philosophy of Mind. Routledge
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  22. added 2016-02-04
    Dominic Alford-Duguid & Michael Arsenault (forthcoming). On the Explanatory Power of Hallucination. Synthese:1-21.
    Pautz has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.
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  23. added 2016-02-04
    Tomasz Wysocki (forthcoming). Arguments Over Intuitions? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    Deutsch 2010 claims that hypothetical scenarios are evaluated using arguments, not intuitions, and therefore experiments on intuitions are philosophically inconsequential. Using the Gettier case as an example, he identifies three arguments that are supposed to point to the right response to the case. In the paper, I present the results of studies ran on Polish, Indian, Spanish, and American participants that suggest that there’s no deep difference between evaluating the Gettier case with intuitions and evaluating it with Deutsch’s arguments. Specifically, (...)
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  24. added 2016-02-03
    Pendaran Roberts (forthcoming). An Ecumenical Response to Color Contrast Cases. Synthese:1-18.
    Intrapersonal variation due to color contrast effects has been used to argue against the following intuitive propositions about the colors: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate color of the same grade all over at the same time (Incompatibility); external objects are actually colored (Realism); and the colors of objects are mind-independent (Objectivism). In this article, I provide a defense of Incompatibility, Realism, and Objectivism from intrapersonal variation arguments that rely on color contrast effects. I provide a (...)
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  25. added 2016-02-02
    Fabian Hundertmark (2016). Mentale Gehalte und erweiterter Geist: Warum das Argument der Nichtabgeleitetheit scheitert. In Jan G. Michel, Kim J. Boström & Michael Pohl (eds.), Ist der Geist im Kopf?: Beiträge zur These des erweiterten Geistes. Mentis 133-160.
    Der These des erweiterten Geistes zufolge befinden sich manche mentalen Repräsentationen außerhalb der körperlichen Grenzen der Wesen, zu denen sie gehören. Einer der stärksten Einwände gegen diese These stellt das Argument der Nichtabgeleitetheit von Frederick Adams, Ken Aizawa und Jerry Fodor dar. Dieses Argument setzt voraus, dass genuine mentale Repräsentationen nichtabgeleitete Gehalte haben – ihre semantischen Eigenschaften sind also nicht durch Absichten, Wünsche oder Konventionen konstituiert. Repräsentationen mit nichtabgeleitetem Gehalt finden sich jedoch, so das Argument weiter, nur innerhalb der körperlichen (...)
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  26. added 2016-02-01
    Erica Cosentino & Francesco Ferretti (2015). Cognitive Foundations of the Narrative Self. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia E Psicologia 6 (2):311-324.
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  27. added 2016-01-30
    Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). Effort and Displeasure in People Who Are Hard of Hearing. Ear and Hearing.
    Listening effort helps explain why people who are hard of hearing are prone to fatigue and social withdrawal. However, a one-factor model that cites only effort due to hardness of hearing is insufficient as there are many who lead happy lives despite their disability. This paper explores other contributory factors, in particular motivational arousal and pleasure. The theory of rational motivational arousal predicts that some people forego listening comprehension because they believe it to be impossible and hence worth no effort (...)
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  28. added 2016-01-30
    Monima Chadha (forthcoming). Inner Awareness is Essential to Consciousness: A Buddhist-Abhidharma Perspective. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    This paper defends the realist representationalist version of the Buddhist-Abhidharma account of consciousness. The account explains the intentionality and the phenomenality of conscious experiences by appealing to the doctrine of self-awareness. Concerns raised by Buddhist Mādhyamika philosophers about the compatibility of reflexive awareness and externality of the objects of perception are addressed. Similarly, the Hindu critiques on the incoherence of the Buddhist doctrine of reflexive awareness with the doctrines of no-self and momentariness are also answered.
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  29. added 2016-01-30
    Sam Clarke (2016). Investigating What Felt Shapes Look Like. I-Perception 7 (1).
    A recent empirical study claims to show that the answer to Molyneux’s question is negative, but, as John Schwenkler points out, its findings are inconclusive: Subjects tested in this study probably lacked the visual acuity required for a fair assessment of the question. Schwenkler is undeterred. He argues that the study could be improved by lowering the visual demands placed on subjects, a suggestion later endorsed and developed by Kevin Connolly. I suggest that Connolly and Schwenkler both underestimate the difficulties (...)
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  30. added 2016-01-30
    John Schwenkler (2015). Commentary: “Multimodal Theories of Recognition and Their Relation to Molyneux's Question”. Frontiers in Psychology 6 (1792).
  31. added 2016-01-29
    William A. Bauer (forthcoming). Physical Intentionality, Extrinsicness, and the Direction of Causation. Acta Analytica:1-21.
    The Physical Intentionality Thesis claims that dispositions share the marks of psychological intentionality; therefore, intentionality is not exclusively a mental phenomenon. Beyond the standard five marks, Alexander Bird introduces two additional marks of intentionality that he argues dispositions do not satisfy: first, thoughts are extrinsic; second, the direction of causation is that objects cause thoughts, not vice versa. In response, this paper identifies two relevant conceptions of extrinsicness, arguing that dispositions show deep parallels to thoughts on both conceptions. Then, it (...)
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  32. added 2016-01-28
    Bryan Frances (forthcoming). Ontology, Composition, Quantification, and Action. Analysis.
    The literature on material composition has largely ignored the composition of actions and events. I argue that this is a mistake. I present a set of individually plausible yet jointly inconsistent claims regarding the connection between quantification and existence, the composition of physical entities, and the logical forms of action sentences.
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  33. added 2016-01-28
    Ryan Ogilvie & Peter Carruthers (forthcoming). Opening Up Vision: The Case Against Encapsulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
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  34. added 2016-01-28
    Emar Maier (forthcoming). Attitudes and Mental Files in Discourse Representation Theory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    I present a concrete DRT-based syntax and semantics for the representation of mental states in the style of Kamp. This system is closely related to Recanati’s Mental Files framework, but adds a crucial distinction between anchors, the analogues of mental files, and attitudes like belief, desire and imagination. Attitudes are represented as separate compartments that can be referentially dependent on anchors. I show how the added distinctions help defend the useful notion of an acquaintance-based mental file against Ninan’s :368–377 2015) (...)
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  35. added 2016-01-28
    Maria Alvarez (2015). Ryle on Motives and Dispositions. In D. Dolby (ed.), Ryle on Mind and Language. Palgrave 74-96.
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  36. added 2016-01-28
    Leibel Morosow, The Answer to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.
    Some people are dualists and some are materialists, but for some reason they can't convince each other, they always seem to be talking past each other, so what is going on?
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  37. added 2016-01-27
    Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). The Pleasure of Art. Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (1).
    This paper presents a new account of pleasure. Aesthetic engagement for pleasure is a distinct psychological structure, marked by a characteristic self-reinforcing motivation. Pleasure figures in this structure in two ways: In the short run, when we are in contact with particular artefacts on particular occasions, pleasure keeps aesthetic engagement running smoothly. Over longer periods, it plays a critical role in shaping how we engage with objects to get this kind of pleasure from them. This account is yoked to a (...)
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  38. added 2016-01-27
    Cathal O'Madagain (2016). Husserl and Davidson on the Social Origin of Our Concept of Objectivity. In Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran (eds.), Discovering the 'We': The Phenomenology of Sociality. Routledge
    Davidson and Husserl both arrived independently at a startling conclusion: that we need to interact with others in order to acquire the concept of objectivity, or to realize that the world we are in exists independently of us. Here I discuss both of their arguments, and argue that there are problems with each. However, I then I argue that each thinker provided us with one key insight that can be combined to provide a more compelling argument for the claim. Finally (...)
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  39. added 2016-01-26
    Isidora Stojanovic (2015). Speaking About Oneself. In Stephan Torre & Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press 200-219.
    It has long been known (cf. Frege 1918, Castañeda 1968, Anscombe 1975 , Perry 1977, 1979, Lewis 1981) that de se attitudes, that is beliefs, desires, hopes etc. that one has about oneself as oneself,1 are interestingly different fromthe attitudes that one holds in a third-personal mode about some individual, who might or might not turn out to be them. Frege suggested that Dr. Lauben’s belief that he has been wounded is a belief that only Dr. Lauben himself can entertain. (...)
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  40. added 2016-01-26
    William Jaworski (2014). Swinburne on Substances, Properties, and Structures. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6:17-28.
    Mind, Brain, and Free Will, Richard Swinburne’s stimulating new book, covers a great deal of territory. I’ll focus on some of the positions Swinburne defends in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers are likely to have reservations about the arguments he uses to defend them, and others will think his basic position is unmotivated. My goal in this brief discussion is to articulate some of the reasons why.
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  41. added 2016-01-26
    William Jaworski (2013). Hylomorphism and Resurrection. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5:197-224.
    Hylomorphism provides an attractive framework for addressing issues in philosophical anthropology. After describing a hylomorphic theory that dovetails with current work in philosophy of mind and in scientific disciplines such as biology and neuroscience, I discuss how this theory meshes with Christian eschatology, the doctrine of resurrection in particular.
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  42. added 2016-01-26
    William Jaworski (2012). Powers, Structures, and Minds. In Ruth Groff & John Greco (eds.), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. Routledge 145-171.
    Powers often depend on structures. It is because of the eye’s structure that it confers the power of sight; destroy that structure, and you destroy the power. I sketch an antireductive yet broadly naturalistic account of the relation between powers and structures. Powers, it says, are embodied in structures. When applied to philosophy of mind, this view resembles classic emergentist theories. I nevertheless argue that it differs from them in crucial respects that insulate it from the problems that beset them (...)
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  43. added 2016-01-26
    George Bealer (1995). Concept. In Jaegwon Kim & Ernest Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics. Basil Blackwell 89-90.
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  44. added 2016-01-26
    George Bealer (1991). Intentionality. In Hans Burkhardt & Barry Smith (eds.), The Handbook of Ontology and Metaphysics. Philosophia Verlag 400-404.
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  45. added 2016-01-25
    Miguel Ángel Sebastián (forthcoming). Functions and Mental Representation: The Theoretical Role of Representations and its Real Nature. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...)
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  46. added 2016-01-25
    Richard Woodward (forthcoming). Fictionality and Photography. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
    In Mimesis as Make-Believe, Kendall Walton gave a pioneering account of the nature of fictionality, which holds that what it is for p to be fictional is for there to exist a prescription to imagine that p. But Walton has recently distanced himself from his original analysis, and now holds that prescriptions to imagine are merely necessary conditions on fictionality. Many of the alleged counterexamples that have prompted Walton's retreat are drawn from the field of photography, and it is upon (...)
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  47. added 2016-01-25
    A. H. Burlton Allen (1930). Pleasure and Instinct: A Study in the Psychology of Human Action.
    Description from a book review by J. G. Beebe-Center: "Mr. Allen's book develops in detail the view that pleasure and unpleasure are essentially manifestations of the progression and thwarting of impulses. Part one is a brief summary of the principal theories of feeling. Part two is devoted to "sensory" or "bodily" pleasure and unpleasure. These forms of feeling, it is argued, 'depend on an analogue of conation existing in the organism, a nisus to maintain, or to carry out to the (...)
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  48. added 2016-01-25
    Paul Bousfield (1926). Pleasure and Pain: A Theory of the Energic Foundation of Feeling.
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  49. added 2016-01-24
    John Schwenkler (forthcoming). Self-Knowledge and its Limits. Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    This is a review essay of Quassim Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans (Oxford, 2014) and John Doris, Talking to Our Selves (Oxford, 2015). In it I question whether Cassam succeeds in his challenge to Richard Moran's account of first-personal authority, and whether Doris is right that experimental evidence for unconscious influences on behavior generates skeptical worries on accounts that regard accurate self-knowledge as a precondition of agency.
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  50. added 2016-01-24
    Pengmin Qin, Georg Northoff, Timothy Lane & et al (2016). Spontaneous Activity in Default-Mode Network Predicts Ascriptions of Self-Relatedness to Stimuli. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience:xx-yy.
    Spontaneous activity levels prior to stimulus presentation can determine how that stimulus will be perceived. It has also been proposed that such spontaneous activity, particularly in the default-mode network (DMN), is involved in self-related processing. We therefore hypothesised that pre-stimulus activity levels in the DMN predict whether a stimulus is judged as self-related or not. Method: Participants were presented in the MRI scanner with a white noise stimulus that they were instructed contained their name or another. They (...)
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1 — 50 / 211