Bookmark and Share

Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Chalmers and David Bourget
Assistant editor: Steve Pearce (University of Western Ontario)
Most recently added entries found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 142
  1. added 2014-07-29
    Niall Connolly (2014). BOOK REVIEW The Objects of Thought. Tim Crane. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):517-520.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. added 2014-07-28
    Katrina Sifferd (forthcoming). What Does It Mean to Be a Mechanism? Morse, Non-Reductivism, and Mental Causation. Criminal Law and Philosophy.
    Stephen Morse seems to have adopted a controversial position regarding the mind-body relationship: John Searle’s non-reductivism, which claims that conscious mental states are causal yet not reducible to their underlying brain states. Searle’s position has been roundly criticized, with some arguing the theory taken as a whole is incoherent. In this paper I review these criticisms and add my own, concluding that Searle’s position is indeed contradictory, both internally and with regard to Morse's other views. Thus I argue that Morse (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. added 2014-07-27
    Timothy Allen & Joshua May (forthcoming). Does Opacity Undermine Privileged Access? International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
    Carruthers argues that knowledge of our own propositional attitudes is achieved by the same mechanism used to attain knowledge of other people’s minds. This seems incompatible with “privileged access”—the idea that we have more reliable beliefs about our own mental states, regardless of the mechanism. At one point Carruthers seems to suggest he may be able to maintain privileged access, because we have additional sensory information in our own case. We raise a number of worries for this suggestion, concluding that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. added 2014-07-26
    Colin McLear (forthcoming). The Kantian (Non)-Conceptualism Debate. Philosophy Compass.
    One of the central debates in contemporary Kant scholarship concerns whether Kant endorses a “conceptualist” account of the nature of sensory experience. Understanding the debate is crucial for getting a full grasp of Kant’s theory of mind, cognition, perception, and epistemology. This paper situates the debate in the context of Kant’s broader theory of cognition and surveys some of the major arguments for conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of his critical philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. added 2014-07-25
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism. Symposion.
    According to the explanationist, we can rely on inference to best explanation to justifiably believe familiar skeptical hypotheses are false. On this view, commonsense beliefs about the existence and character of familiar, medium-sized dry goods provides the best explanation of our evidence and so justifies our belief that we're not brains-in-vats. This explanationist approach seems prima facie plausible until we press the explanationist to tell us what the data is that we're trying to explain by appeal to our beliefs about (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. added 2014-07-25
    Barry Smith & Achille C. Varzi (1997). Fiat and Bona Fide Boundaries: Towards an Ontology of Spatially Extended Objects. In Spatial Information Theory. International Conference COSIT ‘97. Springer. 103–119.
    Human cognitive acts are directed towards objects extended in space of a wide range of different types. What follows is a new proposal for bringing order into this typological clutter. The theory of spatially extended objects should make room not only for the objects of physics but also for objects at higher levels, including the objects of geography and of related disciplines. It should leave room for different types of boundaries, including both the bona fide boundaries which we find in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. added 2014-07-24
    Mohan Matthen (2014). Review of Thomas Natsoulas, Consciousness and Perceptual Experience. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.
    A review of Thomas Natsoulas's "Consciousness and Perceptual Experience.".
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. added 2014-07-24
    Angela Mendelovici (2014). Review of Dominic Gregory's Showing, Seeming, and Sensing. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:0-0.
  9. added 2014-07-24
    Rocco J. Gennaro (2013). Defending HOT Theory and The Wide Intrinsicality View: A Reply to Weisberg, Van Gulick, and Seager. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12):82-100.
    This is my reply to Josh Weisberg, Robert Van Gulick, and William Seager, published in JCS vol 20, 2013. This symposium grew out of an author-meets-critics session at the Central APA conference in 2013 on my 2012 book THE CONSCIOUSNESS PARADOX (MIT Press). Topics covered include higher-order thought (HOT) theory, my own "wide intrinsicality view," the problem of misrepresentation, targetless HOTs, conceptualism, introspection, and the transitivity principle.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. added 2014-07-24
    Rocco J. Gennaro (2012). Synesthesia, Experiential Parts, and Conscious Unity. Philosophy Study 2:73-80.
    Synesthesia is the “union of the senses” whereby two or more of the five senses that are normally experienced separately are involuntarily and automatically joined together in experience. For example, some synesthetes experience a color when they hear a sound or see a letter. In this paper, I examine two cases of synesthesia in light of the notions of “experiential parts” and “conscious unity.” I first provide some background on the unity of consciousness and the question of experiential parts. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. added 2014-07-23
    Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). How You Can Reasonably Form Expectations When You're Expecting. Res Philosophica.
    L.A. Paul has argued that an ordinary, natural way of making a decision -- by reflecting on the phenomenal character of the experiences one will have as a result of that decision -- cannot yield rational decision in certain cases. Paul's argument turns on the (in principle) epistemically inaccessible phenomenal character of certain experiences. In this paper I argue that, even granting Paul a range of assumptions, her argument doesn't work to establish its conclusion. This is because, as I argue, (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. added 2014-07-23
    Robert Hopkins (forthcoming). Imagining the Past: On the Nature of Episodic Memory. In Fiona MacPherson Fabian Dorsch (ed.), Memory and Imagination. OUP.
    What kind of mental state is episodic memory? I defend the claim that it is, in key part, imagining the past, where the imagining in question is experiential imagining. To remember a past episode is to experientially imagine how things were, in a way controlled by one’s past experience of that episode. Call this the Inclusion View. I motive this view by appeal both to patterns of compatibilities and incompatibilities between various states, and to phenomenology. The bulk of the paper (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. added 2014-07-23
    Alejandro Pérez Carballo (2014). Structuring Logical Space. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1).
  14. added 2014-07-21
    John Cooper (1998). Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus. In Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory. Princeton University Press. 485–514.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. added 2014-07-20
    Ben Bronner (forthcoming). Maps and Absent Symbols. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    ABSENCE is the claim that if a symbol appears on a map, then absence of the symbol from some map coordinate signifies absence of the corresponding property from the corresponding location. This claim is highly intuitive and widely endorsed. And if it is true, then cartographic representation is strikingly different from linguistic representation. I argue, however, that ABSENCE is false of various maps and we have no reason to believe it is true of any maps. The intuition to the contrary (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. added 2014-07-19
    Mattia Gallotti & John Michael (eds.) (2014). Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition. Springer.
    Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition brings together contributions discussing issues arising from theoretical and empirical research on social ontology and social cognition. It is the first comprehensive interdisciplinary collection in this rapidly expanding area. The contributors draw upon their diverse backgrounds in philosophy, cognitive science, behavioral economics, sociology of science and anthropology. -/- Based largely on contributions to the first Aarhus-Paris conference held at the University of Aarhus in June 2012, the book addresses such questions as: If the (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. added 2014-07-18
    Danny Frederick, Ethical Intuitionism: A Structural Critique.
    I present a structural critique of ethical intuitionism. Ethical intuitionists regard moral knowledge as deriving from moral intuition, moral observation, moral emotion and inference. However, moral intuitions, observations and emotions are cultural artefacts which often differ starkly between cultures. Intuitionists attribute uncongenial moral intuitions, observations or emotions to bias or to intellectual or moral failings; but that leads to sectarian mutual recrimination. Intuitionists try to avoid this by restricting epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those which are widely agreed. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. added 2014-07-18
    Kristina Musholt (2014). Review of "The Self in Question" by Andy Hamilton. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (7).
  19. added 2014-07-17
    Stan Klein (forthcoming). What Memory Is. WIREs Cognitive Science.
    I argue that our current practice of ascribing the term “memory” to mental states and processes lacks epistemic warrant. Memory, according to the “received view”, is any state or process that results from the sequential stages of encoding, storage and retrieval. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical and conceptual considerations to make (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. added 2014-07-17
    Panos Theodorou (forthcoming). Pain, Pleasure, and the Intentionality of Emotions as Experiences of Values: A New Phenomenological Perspective. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    The article starts with a brief overview of the kinds of approaches that have been attempted for the presentation of Phenomenology’s view on the emotions. I then pass to Husserl’s unsatisfactory efforts to disclose the intentionality of emotions and their intentional correlation with values. Next, I outline the idea of a new, “normalized phenomenological” approach of emotions and values. Pleasure and pain, then, are first explored as affective feelings (reell lived-experiences). In the cases examined, it is shown that, primordially, pleasure (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. added 2014-07-17
    Philip Goff (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem. In L. Jaskolla (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
  22. added 2014-07-17
    Philip Goff (forthcoming). Against Constitutive Russellian Monism. In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.
  23. added 2014-07-17
    Brian Epstein (2015). The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford.
    We live in a world of crowds and corporations, artworks and artifacts, legislatures and languages, money and markets. These are all social objects — they are made, at least in part, by people and by communities. But what exactly are these things? How are they made, and what is the role of people in making them? In The Ant Trap, Brian Epstein rewrites our understanding of the nature of the social world and the foundations of the social sciences. Epstein explains (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. added 2014-07-17
    Brian Epstein (2010). The Diviner and the Scientist: Revisiting the Question of Alternative Standards of Rationality. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78 (4):1048-1086.
    Are the standards of reasoning and rationality in divination, religious practice, and textual exegesis different from those in the sciences? Can there be different standards of reasoning and rationality at all? The intense “rationality debate” of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s focused on these questions and the related problems of relativism across cultures and systems of practice. Although philosophers were at the center of these debates at the time, they may appear to have abandoned the question in recent years. On (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. added 2014-07-16
    Mohan Matthen, Representationalism Defended.
    This is a comment on Frances Egan's paper, "How to Think About Mental Content." Egan distinguishes mathematical and cognitive content; she accepts the former and rejects the latter. In this comment, which was delivered at the Oberlin Colloquium in 2012, I defend cognitive content.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. added 2014-07-15
    B. Cutter & M. Tye (forthcoming). Pains and Reasons: Why It is Rational to Kill the Messenger. Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behavior. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at getting rid of the experience of pain rather than its intentional object. If (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. added 2014-07-13
    Emar Maier, Why My I is Your You: On the Communication of de Se Attitudes.
    The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem for “participant- neutral” analyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: when you tell me “I am an idiot”, you express a first person de se attitude, but as a result I form a different, second person attitude, viz. that you are an idiot. I argue that when we take seriously the asymmetry between speaker and hearer in semantics this problem disappears. To prove this (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. added 2014-07-13
    Paul Bernier (2014). Diversité du représentationnalisme de la conscience. Philosophiques 41 (1):37-56.
    This article discusses various versions of Consciousness Representationalism. Its main purpose is to defend an interpretation of the Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness (SRTC) according to which the content of a conscious state is a de re proposition which is constituted, in part, by the very conscious state itself. I first undescore some important problems for the Representational Theory of Consciousness (RTC), which is one of the most influential approach in the literature. I argue that the main rival theory, the Higher-Order (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. added 2014-07-12
    Benjamin D. Young (2014). Smelling Phenomenal. Frontiers in Psychology 5 (713):doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00713.
    Qualitative-consciousness arises at the sensory level of olfactory processing and pervades our experience of smells to the extent that qualitative character is maintained whenever we are aware of undergoing an olfactory experience. Building upon the distinction between Access and Phenomenal Consciousness the paper offers a nuanced distinction between Awareness and Qualitative-consciousness that is applicable to olfaction in a manner that is conceptual precise and empirically viable. Mounting empirical research is offered substantiating the applicability of the distinction to olfaction and showing (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. added 2014-07-11
    Chris Tucker (forthcoming). Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification. In Michael Bergmann & Brett Coppenger (eds.), Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press.
    Classical acquaintance theory is any version of classical foundationalism that appeals to acquaintance in order to account for non-inferential justification. Such theories are well suited to account for a kind of infallible non-inferential justification. Why am I justified in believing that I’m in pain? An initially attractive (partial) answer is that I’m acquainted with my pain. But since I can’t be acquainted with what isn’t there, acquaintance with my pain guarantees that I’m in pain. What’s less clear is whether, given (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. added 2014-07-09
    Kenneth Noe (forthcoming). Intensive Magnitudes, Temporality, and Sensus Communis in Kant’s Aesthetics. International Philosophical Quarterly 55.
  32. added 2014-07-07
    Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Unwitting Self-Awareness? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  33. added 2014-07-07
    Lisa Botolotti & Ema Sullivan-Bissett (2014). Review of New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure by Nikolaj Nottelmann. [REVIEW] Dialectica 68 (1):141-146.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. added 2014-07-06
    Assaf Weksler, Visual Perspective: A Philosophical Challenge to Vision Science.
    According to an influential philosophical view I call “the relational properties view” (RPV), “2D” properties, such as the elliptical appearance of a tilted coin, are relational properties of external objects. Vision scientists typically hold that 2D properties are properties of patterns of light striking the retina (or of regions in the retina). Call this view RET. RET conflicts with RPV. The present paper has two objectives. The first is to argue that there is no genuine conflict between vision science and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. added 2014-07-03
    Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor, Multisensory Integration Workshop Full Report.
    This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the multisensory integration workshop at the University of Toronto on May 9th and 10th, 2014: 1. What Is Multisensory Integration? 2. Do Multisensory Percepts Involve Emergent Features? 3. What Can Multisensory Processing Tell Us about Multisensory Awareness? 4. Is Language Processing a Special Kind of Multisensory Integration? 5. What Is the Purpose of Multisensory Integration?
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. added 2014-07-03
    Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor, Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question Five.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: What is the purpose of multisensory integration?
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. added 2014-07-03
    Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor, Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question Three.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: What can multisensory processing tell us about multisensory awareness?
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. added 2014-07-03
    Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor, Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question One.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: What is multisensory integration?
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. added 2014-07-03
    Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor, Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question Four.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: Is language processing a special kind of multisensory integration?
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. added 2014-07-03
    Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor, Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question Two.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: Do multisensory percepts involve emergent features?
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. added 2014-07-03
    Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). The Meanings of Metacognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Noetic feelings, like the feeling of certainty and the tip-of-the-tongue state, have an interesting place in our cognitive economy. Joelle Proust’s account of these feelings emphasizes the procedural guidance they supply, while arguing that this guidance does not depend on any conceptual ability to attribute mental states. I argue that she has made a strong case for their procedural value but hasn’t conclusively shown that they work in a way that is independent of our capacities for mental state attribution.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. added 2014-07-02
    Luca Moretti (forthcoming). Phenomenal Conservatism. Analysis.
    I review recent work on Phenomenal Conservatism, the position introduced by Michael Huemer according to which if it seems that P to a subject S, in absence of defeaters S has thereby some degree of justification for believing P.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. added 2014-07-01
    John Sutton (2014). The Collaborative Emergence of Group Cognition: Commentary on Paul E. Smaldino, “The Cultural Evolution of Emergent Group-Level Traits”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):277-78.
    We extend Smaldino’s approach to collaboration and social organization in cultural evolution to include cognition. By showing how recent work on emergent group-level cognition can be incorporated within Smaldino’s framework, we extend that framework’s scope to encompass collaborative memory, decision-making, and intelligent action. We argue that beneficial effects arise only in certain forms of cognitive interdependence, in surprisingly fragile conditions.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. added 2014-06-30
    Nicholas Shea (forthcoming). Exploitable Isomorphism and Structural Representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64 (2).
    An interesting feature of some sets of representations is that their structure mirrors the structure of the items they represent. Founding an account of representational content on isomorphism, homomorphism or structural resemblance has proven elusive, however, largely because these relations are too liberal when the candidate structure over representational vehicles is unconstrained. Furthermore, in many cases where there is a clear isomorphism, it is not relied on in the way the representations are used. That points to a potential resolution: that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. added 2014-06-29
    Brian Gordon & Georg Theiner (forthcoming). Scaffolded Joint Action as a Micro–Foundation of Organizational Learning. In Charles B. Stone & Lucas Bietti (eds.), Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past. Psychology Press.
    Organizational learning, at the broadest levels, as it has come to be understood within the organization theory and management literatures, concerns the experientially driven changes in knowledge processes, structures, and resources that enable organizations to perform skillfully in their task environments (Argote and Miron–Spektor, 2011). In this chapter, we examine routines and capabilities as an important micro–foundation for organizational learning. Adopting a micro–foundational approach in line with Barney and Felin (2013), we propose a new model for explaining how routines and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. added 2014-06-28
    Jordi Fernández (2014). Memory and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):373-390.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the view that judgments based on episodic memory are immune to error through misidentification. I will put forward a proposal about the contents of episodic memories according to which a memory represents a perception of a past event. I will also offer a proposal about the contents of perceptual experiences according to which a perceptual experience represents some relations that its subject bears to events in the external world. The combination of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. added 2014-06-27
    Katharina Nieswandt & Ulf Hlobil (eds.) (forthcoming). G. E. M. Anscombe: Aufsätze. Suhrkamp.
    Die Wittgenstein-Schülerin Elizabeth Anscombe zählt zu den einflussreichsten Philosophinnen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Mit der Monographie Absicht begründete sie die analytische Handlungstheorie, viele ihrer Abhandlungen gelten als Klassiker, aber nur wenige liegen bislang in deutscher Übersetzung vor. Der vorliegende Band füllt diese Lücke: Er versammelt zwölf von Anscombes wichtigsten Aufsätzen, die thematisch von der praktischen Philosophie über die Metaphysik und die Philosophie des Geistes bis hin zu Aristoteles- und Wittgenstein-Interpretationen reichen, also das ganze Spektrum ihres Denkens repräsentieren. Die Anmerkungen und Erläuterungen (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. added 2014-06-27
    Casey O'Callaghan (2013). Hearing, Philosophical Perspectives. In H. Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. SAGE. 388-390.
    Hearing and auditory perception are rapidly developing topics in the philosophy of perception. Recent work has focused on characterizing what we hear and on similarities and differences between audition and other modalities. Future work should address how theorizing about audition impacts theorizing about perception more generally. This entry concerns questions about the objects and contents of hearing. It includes discussion of the spatial content of audition, of the role of time and pitch in the individuation of auditory objects, and of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. added 2014-06-26
    William E. S. McNeill (forthcoming). Inferentialism and Our Knowledge of Others' Minds. Philosophical Studies.
    Our knowledge of each others’ mental features is sometimes epistemically basic or non-inferential. The alternative to this claim is Inferentialism, the view that such knowledge is always epistemically inferential. Here, I argue that Inferentialism is not plausible. My argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Given the nature of the task involved in recognizing what mental features others have on particular occasions, and our capacity to perform that task, we should not expect always to find good (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. added 2014-06-26
    James Russell (2014). Episodic Memory as Re-Experiential Memory: Kantian, Developmental, and Neuroscientific Currents. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):391-411.
    Recent work on the early development of episodic memory in my laboratory has been fuelled by the following assumption: if episodic memory is re-experiential memory then Kant’s analysis of the spatiotemporal nature of experience should constrain and positively influence theories of episodic memory development. The idea is that re-experiential memory will “inherit” these spatiotemporal features. On the basis of this assumption, Russell and Hanna (Mind and Language 27(1):29–54, 2012) proposed that (a) the spatial element of re-experience is egocentric and (b) (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 142