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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Bourget and David Chalmers
Assistant editor: Steve Pearce (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2014-08-17
    Enrico Grube (2014). Atomism and the Contents of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):13-33.
    Diachronic perceptual atomism is the view that the contents of experience do not involve temporal relations between non-simultaneous events, such as motion, succession, or duration, but only ‘snapshots’of the world. Traditionally, atomism has not been a very popular view. Indeed, many philosophers think that it is obviously false and that the main debate about time consciousness takes place between models which reject atomistic commitments. This antiatomistic sentiment can be traced back to William James’s (1890, p. 628) slogan that ‘a succession (...)
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  2. added 2014-08-15
    Jack Lyons (forthcoming). Critical Notice: Seemings and Justification, Ed. Chris Tucker. [REVIEW] Analysis.
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  3. added 2014-08-15
    Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Unencapsulated Modules and Perceptual Judgment. In A. Raftopoulos J. Zeimbekis (ed.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press.
    To what extent are cognitive capacities, especially perceptual capacities, informationally encapsulated and to what extent are they cognitively penetrable? And why does this matter? Two reasons we care about encapsulation/penetrability are: (a) encapsulation is sometimes held to be definitional of modularity, and (b) penetrability has epistemological implications independent of modularity. I argue that modularity does not require encapsulation; that modularity may have epistemological implications independently of encapsulation; and that the epistemological implications of the cognitive penetrability of perception are messier than (...)
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  4. added 2014-08-15
    Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Experiential Evidence? Philosophical Studies.
    Much of the intuitive appeal of evidentialism results from running together two very difference conceptions of evidence. This is most clear in the case of perceptual justification, where experience is able to provide evidence in one sense of the term, though not in the sense that the evidentialist requires. I argue this, in part, by relying on a new and nonstandard reading of the Sellarsian dilemma.
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  5. added 2014-08-12
    Andrew Sepielli (2014). Should You Look Before You Leap? The Philosophers' Magazine 66:89-93.
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  6. added 2014-08-11
    Daniel Nolan & Alexander Sandgren (forthcoming). Creationism and Cardinality. Analysis.
    Creationism about fictional entities requires a principle connecting what fictions say exist with which fictional entities really exist. The most natural way of spelling out such a principle yields inconsistent verdicts about how many fictional entities are generated by certain inconsistent fictions. Avoiding inconsistency without compromising the attractions of creationism will not be easy.
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  7. added 2014-08-11
    M. Steenhagen (forthcoming). Sehen lassen: Die Praxis des Zeigens. British Journal of Aesthetics:ayu016.
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  8. added 2014-08-11
    Martina Sauer (2014-03-15). Lambert Wiesing, Sehen lassen. Die Praxis des Zeigens, Berlin 2013. [REVIEW] Sehepunkte. Rezensionsjournal für Geschichtswissenschaften 14 (3).
  9. added 2014-08-11
    Lubomira Radoilska (2014). Belief and Agency. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):377-380.
  10. added 2014-08-10
    Jussi Suikkanen, Judgment Internalism and Self-Knowledge.
    Judgment internalism about evaluative judgments is the view that there is a necessary internal connection between evaluative judgments and motivation understood as desires. The debate about judgment internalism has reached a standoff some time ago. In this paper, I outline a new argument for judgment internalism. This argument does not rely on intuitions about cases, but rather it has the form of an inference to the best explanation. I argue that the best philosophical explanations of how we know what we (...)
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  11. added 2014-08-07
    Jim Hopkins (forthcoming). Freud, S. In E. Neukrug (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Theory in Counselling and Psychotherapy. Sage.
    Short biographical account of Freud and some of his ideas, emphasising the role of fictive belief and experience (phantasy) in his account of mental disorder.
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  12. added 2014-08-07
    Jim Hopkins (forthcoming). The Significance of Consilience: Psychoanalysis, Attachment, Neuroscience, and Evolution. In L. Brakel & V. Talvete (eds.), Psychoanalysis and Philosophy of Mind:Unconscious mentality in the 21st century. Karnac.
    This paper applies Bayesian confirmation theory to psychoanalytic theory, observing that since the turn of the century psychoanalysis had gained support from developmental psychology (particularly attachment theory), neuroscience, and evolutionary thinking. -/- I argue that these converging sources of support indicate that the combination of relatively low predictive power and broad explanatory scope that characterise the theories of both Freud and Darwin suggest that Freud's theory, like Darwin's, may strike deeply into natural phenomena. The same argument, however, suggests that conclusive (...)
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  13. added 2014-08-07
    Jessica Pepp (forthcoming). A Puzzle About Lying. In Eliot Michaelson Andreas Stokke (ed.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, and Ethics. OUP.
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  14. added 2014-08-06
    Jim Hopkins (forthcoming). Kantian Neuroscience and Radical Interpretation. In Festschfrift. not yet determined.
    This is an unedited version of a paper written in 2012 and accepted for publication in a forthcoming Festschrift for Mark Platts. In it I argue that the Helmholtz/Bayes tradition of free energy neuroscience begun by Geoffrey Hinton and his colleagues, and now being carried forward by Karl Friston and his, can be seen as a fulfilment of the Quine/Davidson program of radical interpretation, and also of Quine’s conception of a naturalized epistemology. This program, in turn, is rooted in Helmholtz’s (...)
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  15. added 2014-08-06
    Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier (forthcoming). Why Are We Still Being Hornswoggled? Dissolving the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Topoi.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett (2012; 1996, 2001; 1991) and Patricia Churchland (1996; 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness is a uniquely Hard Phenomenon. That is; there is no non-question begging argument for the (...)
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  16. added 2014-08-06
    Benjamin Jarvis (forthcoming). Representing as Adapting. Acta Analytica:1-23.
    In this paper, I recommend a creature-level theory of representing. On this theory, a creature (basically) represents some entity just in case the creature adapts its behavior to that entity. Adapting is analyzed in terms of establishing new patterns of behavior. The theory of representing as adapting is contrasted with traditional causal and informational theories of mental representation. Moreover, I examine the theory in light of Putnam-Burge style externalism; I show that Putnam-Burge style externalism follows from and is explained by (...)
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  17. added 2014-08-06
    Vincenzo Fano, Enrico Giannetto, Giulia Giannini & Pierluigi Graziani (2012). Complessità E Riduzionismo. ISONOMIA - Epistemologica Series Editor.
    The enormous increasing of connections between people and the noteworthy enlargement of domains and methods in sciences have augmented extraordinarily the cardinality of the set of meaningful human symbols. We know that complexity is always on the way to become complication, i.e. a non-tractable topic. For this reason scholars engage themselves more and more in attempting to tame plurality and chaos. In this book distinguished scientists, philosophers and historians of science reflect on the topic from a multidisciplinary point of view. (...)
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  18. added 2014-08-04
    Joseph P. DeMarco & Paul J. Ford (forthcoming). Neuroethics and the Ethical Parity Principle. Neuroethics:1-9.
    Neil Levy offers the most prominent moral principles that are specifically and exclusively designed to apply to neuroethics. His two closely related principles, labeled as versions of the ethical parity principle (EPP), are intended to resolve moral concerns about neurological modification and enhancement [1]. Though EPP is appealing and potentially illuminating, we reject the first version and substantially modify the second. Since his first principle, called EPP (strong), is dependent on the contention that the mind literally extends into external props (...)
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  19. added 2014-08-04
    Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). Recent Work on the Normativity of Belief. Analysis.
    This is a survey of recent debates concerning the normativity of belief. We explain what the thesis that belief is normative involves, consider arguments for and against that thesis, and explore its bearing on debates in metaethics.
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  20. added 2014-08-04
    Paul Silva (forthcoming). On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One's Beliefs. Erkenntnis.
    According to the orthodox account of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, basing one's belief in P on one's source of propositional justification to believe P suffices for having a doxastically justified belief. But in an increasingly recognized work, John Turri (2010) argues that the orthodox view fails and proposes a new view according to which having propositional justification depends on having the ability to acquire doxastic justification. Turri's novel position has surprisingly far-reaching epistemological consequences, ruling out some common (...)
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  21. added 2014-08-04
    J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (forthcoming). Varieties of Cognitive Achievement. Philosophical Studies.
    According to robust virtue epistemology (RVE), knowledge is type-identical with a particular species of cognitive achievement. The identification itself is subject to some criticism on the (alleged) grounds that it fails to account for the anti-luck features of knowledge. Although critics have largely focused on environmental luck, the fundamental philosophical problem facing RVE is that it is not clear why it should be a distinctive feature of cognitive abilities that they ordinarily produce beliefs in a way that is safe. We (...)
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  22. added 2014-08-04
    Franck Lihoreau (2014). Revelation and The Essentiality of Essence. Symposion 1 (1):69-75.
    It is usually agreed that the Revelation Thesis about experience – the idea that the knowledge we gain by having an experience somehow “reveals” the essence, or nature, of this experience – only requires that we know the essence of the experience, not that we know, of this essence, that it is the essence of the experience. I contest this agreement. In the light of what I call the “Essentiality of Essence Principle”– the principle that whatever is in the essence (...)
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  23. added 2014-08-02
    Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson, Theories of Sensory Affect: Compare and Contrast.
    Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, critically (...)
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  24. added 2014-08-01
    Justin Tiehen (forthcoming). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  25. added 2014-07-31
    Joel Smith, Perceptual Recognition, Emotion, and Value.
    I outline an account of perceptual knowledge and assess the extent to which it can be employed in a defence of perceptual accounts of emotion and value recognition. I argue that considerations ruling out lucky knowledge give us some reason to doubt its prospects in the case of value recognition. I also discuss recent empirical work on cultural and contextual influences on emotional expression, arguing that a perceptual account value recognition is consistent with current evidence.
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  26. added 2014-07-31
    Joel Smith, Vision and the Ontology of Emotion and Expression.
    I offer an account of the ontology of emotions and their expressions, drawing some morals for the view that we can see others' emotions in virtue of seeing their expressions.
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  27. added 2014-07-31
    Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & John Michael (forthcoming). Why Desire Reasoning is Developmentally Prior to Belief Reasoning. Mind and Language.
    The predominant view in developmental psychology is that young children are able to reason with the concept of desire prior to being able to reason with the concept of belief. We propose an explanation of this phenomenon that focuses on the cognitive tasks that competence with the belief and desire concepts enable young children to perform. We show that cognitive tasks that are typically considered fundamental to our competence with the belief and desire concepts can be performed with the concept (...)
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  28. added 2014-07-31
    Costas Pagondiotis (forthcoming). COGNITIVE (IM)PENETRABILITY OF VISION: RESTRICTING VISION Vs. RESTRICTING COGNITION. In J. Zeimbekis & A. Raftopoulos (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. OUP.
  29. added 2014-07-31
    B. J. C. Madison (2014). Review of Mikkel Gerken's Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:xx-yy.
  30. added 2014-07-30
    Peter Dennis (forthcoming). Criteria for Indefeasible Knowledge: John Mcdowell and 'Epistemological Disjunctivism'. Synthese:1-15.
    Duncan Pritchard has recently defended a view he calls ‘epistemological disjunctivism’, largely inspired by John McDowell. I argue that Pritchard is right to associate the view with McDowell, and that McDowell’s ‘inference-blocking’ argument against the sceptic succeeds only if epistemological disjunctivism is accepted. However, Pritchard also recognises that epistemological disjunctivism appears to conflict with our belief that genuine and illusory experiences are indistinguishable (the ‘distinguishability problem’). Since the indistinguishability of experiences is the antecedent in the inference McDowell intends to block, (...)
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  31. added 2014-07-30
    Tsung-Hsing Ho (2013). Kant and McDowell on Skepticism and Disjunctivism. In Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltburgerlicher Absicht: Akten Des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010. 761-770.
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  32. added 2014-07-29
    Niall Connolly (2014). BOOK REVIEW The Objects of Thought. Tim Crane. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):517-520.
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  33. added 2014-07-28
    Katrina Sifferd (forthcoming). What Does It Mean to Be a Mechanism? Morse, Non-Reductivism, and Mental Causation. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-17.
    Stephen Morse seems to have adopted a controversial position regarding the mind-body relationship: John Searle’s non-reductivism, which claims that conscious mental states are causal yet not reducible to their underlying brain states. Searle’s position has been roundly criticized, with some arguing the theory taken as a whole is incoherent. In this paper I review these criticisms and add my own, concluding that Searle’s position is indeed contradictory, both internally and with regard to Morse's other views. Thus I argue that Morse (...)
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  34. added 2014-07-27
    Timothy Allen & Joshua May (forthcoming). Does Opacity Undermine Privileged Access? International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
    [Critical Notice] Carruthers argues that knowledge of our own propositional attitudes is achieved by the same mechanism used to attain knowledge of other people’s minds. This seems incompatible with “privileged access”—the idea that we have more reliable beliefs about our own mental states, regardless of the mechanism. At one point Carruthers seems to suggest he may be able to maintain privileged access, because we have additional sensory information in our own case. We raise a number of worries for this suggestion, (...)
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  35. added 2014-07-26
    Colin McLear (forthcoming). The Kantian (Non)-Conceptualism Debate. Philosophy Compass.
    One of the central debates in contemporary Kant scholarship concerns whether Kant endorses a “conceptualist” account of the nature of sensory experience. Understanding the debate is crucial for getting a full grasp of Kant’s theory of mind, cognition, perception, and epistemology. This paper situates the debate in the context of Kant’s broader theory of cognition and surveys some of the major arguments for conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of his critical philosophy.
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  36. added 2014-07-25
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism. Symposion.
    According to the explanationist, we can rely on inference to best explanation to justifiably believe familiar skeptical hypotheses are false. On this view, commonsense beliefs about the existence and character of familiar, medium-sized dry goods provides the best explanation of our evidence and so justifies our belief that we're not brains-in-vats. This explanationist approach seems prima facie plausible until we press the explanationist to tell us what the data is that we're trying to explain by appeal to our beliefs about (...)
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  37. added 2014-07-25
    Barry Smith & Achille C. Varzi (1997). Fiat and Bona Fide Boundaries: Towards an Ontology of Spatially Extended Objects. In Spatial Information Theory. International Conference COSIT ‘97. Springer. 103–119.
    Human cognitive acts are directed towards objects extended in space of a wide range of different types. What follows is a new proposal for bringing order into this typological clutter. The theory of spatially extended objects should make room not only for the objects of physics but also for objects at higher levels, including the objects of geography and of related disciplines. It should leave room for different types of boundaries, including both the bona fide boundaries which we find in (...)
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  38. added 2014-07-24
    Angela Mendelovici (2014). Review of Dominic Gregory's Showing, Seeming, and Sensing. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:0-0.
  39. added 2014-07-24
    Mohan Matthen (2014). Review of Thomas Natsoulas, Consciousness and Perceptual Experience. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.
    A review of Thomas Natsoulas's "Consciousness and Perceptual Experience.".
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  40. added 2014-07-24
    Rocco J. Gennaro (2013). Defending HOT Theory and The Wide Intrinsicality View: A Reply to Weisberg, Van Gulick, and Seager. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12):82-100.
    This is my reply to Josh Weisberg, Robert Van Gulick, and William Seager, published in JCS vol 20, 2013. This symposium grew out of an author-meets-critics session at the Central APA conference in 2013 on my 2012 book THE CONSCIOUSNESS PARADOX (MIT Press). Topics covered include higher-order thought (HOT) theory, my own "wide intrinsicality view," the problem of misrepresentation, targetless HOTs, conceptualism, introspection, and the transitivity principle.
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  41. added 2014-07-24
    Rocco J. Gennaro (2012). Synesthesia, Experiential Parts, and Conscious Unity. Philosophy Study 2:73-80.
    Synesthesia is the “union of the senses” whereby two or more of the five senses that are normally experienced separately are involuntarily and automatically joined together in experience. For example, some synesthetes experience a color when they hear a sound or see a letter. In this paper, I examine two cases of synesthesia in light of the notions of “experiential parts” and “conscious unity.” I first provide some background on the unity of consciousness and the question of experiential parts. I (...)
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  42. added 2014-07-23
    Robert Hopkins (forthcoming). Imagining the Past: On the Nature of Episodic Memory. In Fiona MacPherson Fabian Dorsch (ed.), Memory and Imagination. OUP.
    What kind of mental state is episodic memory? I defend the claim that it is, in key part, imagining the past, where the imagining in question is experiential imagining. To remember a past episode is to experientially imagine how things were, in a way controlled by one’s past experience of that episode. Call this the Inclusion View. I motive this view by appeal both to patterns of compatibilities and incompatibilities between various states, and to phenomenology. The bulk of the paper (...)
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  43. added 2014-07-23
    Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). How You Can Reasonably Form Expectations When You're Expecting. Res Philosophica.
    L.A. Paul has argued that an ordinary, natural way of making a decision -- by reflecting on the phenomenal character of the experiences one will have as a result of that decision -- cannot yield rational decision in certain cases. Paul's argument turns on the (in principle) epistemically inaccessible phenomenal character of certain experiences. In this paper I argue that, even granting Paul a range of assumptions, her argument doesn't work to establish its conclusion. This is because, as I argue, (...)
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  44. added 2014-07-23
    Alejandro Pérez Carballo (2014). Structuring Logical Space. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1).
  45. added 2014-07-21
    John Cooper (1998). Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus. In Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory. Princeton University Press. 485–514.
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  46. added 2014-07-20
    Ben Bronner (forthcoming). Maps and Absent Symbols. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    ABSENCE is the claim that if a symbol appears on a map, then absence of the symbol from some map coordinate signifies absence of the corresponding property from the corresponding location. This claim is highly intuitive and widely endorsed. And if it is true, then cartographic representation is strikingly different from linguistic representation. I argue, however, that ABSENCE is false of various maps and we have no reason to believe it is true of any maps. The intuition to the contrary (...)
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  47. added 2014-07-19
    Mattia Gallotti & John Michael (eds.) (2014). Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition. Springer.
    Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition brings together contributions discussing issues arising from theoretical and empirical research on social ontology and social cognition. It is the first comprehensive interdisciplinary collection in this rapidly expanding area. The contributors draw upon their diverse backgrounds in philosophy, cognitive science, behavioral economics, sociology of science and anthropology. -/- Based largely on contributions to the first Aarhus-Paris conference held at the University of Aarhus in June 2012, the book addresses such questions as: If the (...)
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  48. added 2014-07-18
    Danny Frederick, Ethical Intuitionism: A Structural Critique.
    I present a structural critique of ethical intuitionism. Ethical intuitionists regard moral knowledge as deriving from moral intuition, moral observation, moral emotion and inference. However, moral intuitions, observations and emotions are cultural artefacts which often differ starkly between cultures. Intuitionists attribute uncongenial moral intuitions, observations or emotions to bias or to intellectual or moral failings; but that leads to sectarian mutual recrimination. Intuitionists try to avoid this by restricting epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those which are widely agreed. (...)
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  49. added 2014-07-18
    Kristina Musholt (2014). Review of "The Self in Question" by Andy Hamilton. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (7).
  50. added 2014-07-17
    Philip Goff (forthcoming). Against Constitutive Russellian Monism. In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.
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