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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Chalmers and David Bourget
Assistant editor: Steve Pearce (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2014-04-17
    Igor Gasparov (2013). Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 18 (1).
    n this paper I would like to defend the three interconnected claims. The first one is based on that fact that the definition of substance dualism proposed recently by Dean Zimmerman needs some essential adjustments in order to capture the genuine spirit of this doctrine. In this paper I will formulate the conditions for the genuine substance dualism in contrast to quasi-dualisms and provide the definition for the genuine substance dualism which I consider to be more appropriate than the Zimmerman's (...)
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  2. added 2014-04-16
    Katalin Farkas (forthcoming). Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge. Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.
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  3. added 2014-04-15
    Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (forthcoming). In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations? In Cain Todd & Sabine Roeser (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford.
    In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue (...)
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  4. added 2014-04-14
    Barry Smith (1987). The Ontology of Epistemology. Reports in Philosophy 11:57-66.
    Ingarden’s puzzle is: how can we come to know what is essentially involved in an act of knowing? As starting point he takes what he holds to be a particular good candidate example of such an act, namely an act of perceiving an apple. Here we have act and object standing in a certain first-level relation to each other. We now in a second level act of reflection, make this first-level relation into an object, and strive to apprehend this object (...)
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  5. added 2014-04-13
    Quassim Cassam (2003). A Priori Concepts. In Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant. Clarendon Press.
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  6. added 2014-04-13
    Timothy Schroeder (2001). Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 21 (4):235-237.
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  7. added 2014-04-11
    Jørn Bjerre (forthcoming). A New Foundation for the Social Sciences? Searle's Misreading of Durkheim. Philosophy of the Social Sciences:0048393114525860.
    The aim of John Searle’s philosophy of society is to provide a foundation for the social sciences. Arguing that the study of social reality needs to be based on a philosophy of language, Searle claims that sociology has little to offer since no sociologist ever took language seriously. Attacking Durkheim head-on, Searle not only claims that Durkheim’s project differs from his own but also that Durkheim’s sociology has serious shortcomings. Opposing Searle, this paper argues that Durkheim’s account of social reality (...)
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  8. added 2014-04-11
    Keith A. Wilson (2014). Review of Charles Travis, Perception: Essays After Frege. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (April).
  9. added 2014-04-10
    Jason Costanzo (forthcoming). Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content (...)
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  10. added 2014-04-09
    David Chalmers (forthcoming). Intensions and Indeterminacy: Reply to Soames, Turner, and Wilson. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    A reply to Scott Soames, Jason Turner, and Mark Wilson, for a symposium in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research on Constructing the World.
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  11. added 2014-04-09
    David Chalmers (forthcoming). Frontloading and Fregean Sense: Reply to Neta, Schroeter, and Stanley. Analysis.
    A reply to Ram Neta, Laura Schroeter, and Jason Stanley, for a symposium in Analysis on Constructing the World.
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  12. added 2014-04-08
    Gregory Bochner (forthcoming). The Anti-Individualist Revolution in the Philosophy of Language. Linguistics and Philosophy:1-30.
    The canonical arguments against the description theory of names are usually taken to have established that the reference of a name as used on a given occasion is not semantically determined by the qualitative descriptions that the speaker may have in mind. The deepest moral of these arguments, on the received view, would be that the speaker’s narrow mental states play no semantic role in fixing reference. My central aim in this paper is to challenge this common understanding by highlighting (...)
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  13. added 2014-04-08
    Kevin Mulligan (1988). Seeing as and Assimilative Perception. Brentano Studien 1:129-52.
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  14. added 2014-04-07
    Jordan Bartol & Stefan Linquist (forthcoming). How Do Somatic Markers Feature in Decision Making? Emotion Review.
    Several recent criticisms of the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) identify multiple ambiguities in the way it has been formulated by its chief proponents. Here we provide evidence that this hypothesis has also been interpreted in various different ways by the scientific community. Our diagnosis of this problem is that SMH lacks an adequate computational-level account of practical decision making. Such an account is necessary for drawing meaningful links between neurological- and psychological-level data. The paper concludes by providing a simple, five-step (...)
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  15. added 2014-04-06
    Christian List, Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes.
    This paper offers a comparison of three different kinds of collective attitudes: aggregate, common, and corporate attitudes. They differ not only in their relationship to individual attitudes – e.g., whether they are “reducible” to individual attitudes – but also in the roles they play in relation to the collectives to which they are ascribed. The failure to distinguish them can lead to confusion, in informal talk as well as in the social sciences. So, the paper’s message is an appeal for (...)
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  16. added 2014-04-06
    Hubert Van Maele (1994). Academy of Consciousness Studies Princeton University June 26 to July 9, 1994. Foundations of Physics 24 (1).
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  17. added 2014-04-03
    Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Testimony and Other Minds. Erkenntnis:1-11.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
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  18. added 2014-04-03
    Luca Moretti (forthcoming). The Dogmatist, Moore's Proof and Transmission Failure. Analysis.
    According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, if you have an experience as if P, you acquire immediate prima facie justification for believing P. Pryor contends that dogmatism validates Moore’s infamous proof of a material world. Against Pryor, I argue that if dogmatism is true, Moore’s proof turns out to be non-transmissive of justification according to one of the senses of non-transmissivity defined by Crispin Wright. This type of non-transmissivity doesn’t deprive dogmatism of its apparent antisceptical bite.
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  19. added 2014-04-03
    Stanley B. Klein (forthcoming). Autonoesis and Belief in a Personal Past: An Evolutionary Theory of Episodic Memory Indices. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    In this paper I discuss philosophical and psychological treatments of the question “how do we decide that an occurrent mental state is a memory and not, say a thought or imagination?” This issue has proven notoriously difficult to resolve, with most proposed indices, criteria and heuristics failing to achieve consensus. Part of the difficulty, I argue, is that the indices and analytic solutions thus far offered seldom have been situated within a well-specified theory of memory function. As I hope to (...)
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  20. added 2014-04-03
    Gabriel Vacariu (2014). More Troubles with Cognitive Neuroscience. Einstein's Theory of Relativity and the Hyperverse. University of Bucharest Publishing Company.
    In Part I, Chapter 1, I introduce the EDWs perspective (from my book published in 2012)2. In Part II, I investigate more troubles with cognitive neuroscience. (For other troubles of this “science”, see Vacariu 2012, Vacariu and Vacariu 2013) In Chapter 2, I analyze in detail a particular aspect of human visual perception: spatial cognition. In order to be able to offer more arguments on the idea that cognitive neuroscience is a pseudoscience, I need to investigate spatial cognition, an essential (...)
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  21. added 2014-04-03
    Gerald D. Wasserman & C. U. M. Smith (1996). A Philosophy of Matter and Mind: A New Look at an Old Major Topic in Philosophy. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 18 (2):241.
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  22. added 2014-04-02
    Shen-yi Liao, Nina Strohminger & Chandra Sekhar Sripada (forthcoming). Empirically Investigating Imaginative Resistance. British Journal of Aesthetics.
    Imaginative resistance refers to a phenomenon in which people resist engaging in particular prompted imaginative activities. Philosophers have primarily theorized about this phenomenon from the armchair. In this paper, we demonstrate the utility of empirical methods for investigating imaginative resistance. We present two studies that help to establish the psychological reality of imaginative resistance, and to uncover one factor that is significant for explaining this phenomenon but low in psychological salience: genre. Furthermore, our studies have the methodological upshot of showing (...)
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  23. added 2014-04-02
    R. G. Kuehni & C. L. Hardin (forthcoming). Color Matching and Color Naming: A Response to Roberts and Schmidtke. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-7.
    In their article ‘In defense of incompatibility, objectivism, and veridicality about color’ P. Roberts and K. Schmidtke offer the results of an experiment supposed to show that if selection of colored samples representing unique hues for subjects (naming) has a greater inter-subject variability than identification of sample pairs with no perceptual difference between them (matching) the result provides support for the philosophical concept of color realism. On examining the results in detail, we find that, according to standard statistical methodology, the (...)
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  24. added 2014-04-02
    Frederic Peters (forthcoming). Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues. Axiomathes:1-21.
    Within the philosophy of mind, consciousness is currently understood as the expression of one or other cognitive modality, either intentionality (representation per se), transparency (immediacy of cognitive content consequent upon the unawareness of underlying representational processes), subjectivity (first-person perspective) or reflexivity (autonoetic awareness). However, neither intentionality, subjectivity nor transparency adequately distinguishes conscious from nonconscious cognition. Consequently, the only genuine index or defining characteristic of consciousness is reflexivity, the capacity for autonoetic or self-referring, self-monitoring awareness. But the identification of reflexivity as (...)
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  25. added 2014-04-02
    Oisín Deery (forthcoming). Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism? Philosophical Explorations:1-18.
    Many philosophers think not only that we are free to act otherwise than we do, but also that we experience being free in this way. Terry Horgan argues that such experience is compatibilist: it is accurate even if determinism is true. According to Horgan, when people judge their experience as incompatibilist, they misinterpret it. While Horgan’s position is attractive, it incurs significant theoretical costs. I sketch an alternative way to be a compatibilist about experiences of free agency that avoids these (...)
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  26. added 2014-04-02
    Marta Jorba & Agustin Vicente (forthcoming). Cognitive Phenomenology, Access to Contents, and Inner Speech. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    In this paper we introduce two issues relevantly related to the cognitive phenomenology debate, which, to our minds, have not been yet properly addressed: the relation between access and phenomenal consciousness in cognition and the relation between conscious thought and inner speech. In the first case, we ask for an explanation of how we have access to thought contents, and in the second case, an explanation of why is inner speech so pervasive in our conscious thinking. We discuss the prospects (...)
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  27. added 2014-04-02
    Marcus P. Adams (forthcoming). The Wax and the Mechanical Mind: Reexamining Hobbes's Objections to Descartes's Meditations. British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
    Many critics, Descartes himself included, have seen Hobbes as uncharitable or even incoherent in his Objections to the Meditations on First Philosophy. I argue that when understood within the wider context of his views of the late 1630s and early 1640s, Hobbes's Objections are coherent and reflect his goal of providing an epistemology consistent with a mechanical philosophy. I demonstrate the importance of this epistemology for understanding his Fourth Objection concerning the nature of the wax and contend that Hobbes's brief (...)
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  28. added 2014-04-02
    Christopher Mole (forthcoming). Dead Reckoning in the Desert Ant: A Defence of Connectionist Models. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-14.
    Dead reckoning is a feature of the navigation behaviour shown by several creatures, including the desert ant. Recent work by C. Randy Gallistel shows that some connectionist models of dead reckoning face important challenges. These challenges are thought to arise from essential features of the connectionist approach, and have therefore been taken to show that connectionist models are unable to explain even the most primitive of psychological phenomena. I show that Gallistel’s challenges are successfully met by one recent connectionist model, (...)
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  29. added 2014-04-02
    Tobias Rosefeldt (2014). Commentary on Chapter 15 of Patricia Kitcher's Kant's Thinker. Kantian Review 19 (1):127-133.
    I argue that Patricia Kitcher's Kant-inspired account of self-consciousness overintellectualizes the requirements for rational cognition. Kitcher claims that a person can only believe something on the ground of another belief if she is able to recognize the grounding belief as grounding the first belief and as one of her own. I criticize this claim by arguing that (i) someone can believe something for a certain reason without recognizing this reason as a reason (the possibility of unreflected reasons), and that (ii) (...)
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  30. added 2014-04-02
    Ralf Busse (2014). Review: Kitcher, Kant's Thinker, Transcendental Apperception: Consciousness or Self-Consciousness? [REVIEW] Kantian Review 19 (1):109-117.
    A core thesis of Kitcher's is that thinking about objects requires awareness of necessary connections between one's object-directed representations and that this is what Kant means by the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue that Kant's main point is the spontaneity or of combination rather than the requirement of reflexive awareness of combination, that Kitcher provides no plausible account of how recognition of representations should be constituted and that in fact Kant himself appears to lack the theoretical resources to clearly (...)
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  31. added 2014-04-02
    Siri Leknes & Brock Bastian (2014). The Benefits of Pain. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):57-70.
    Pain is most often an unpleasant experience that alerts us to actual or possible tissue damage. However, insisting that pain is always bad news may hinder understanding of pain’s many facets. Despite its unpleasantness – or perhaps because of it – pain is known to enhance the perceived value of certain activities, such as punishment or endurance sports. Here, we review evidence for a series of mechanisms involved in putative benefits of pain. A byproduct of pain’s attention-grabbing quality can be (...)
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  32. added 2014-04-02
    Olivier Massin (2014). Pleasure and Its Contraries. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):15-40.
    What is the contrary of pleasure? “Pain” is one common answer. This paper argues that pleasure instead has two natural contraries: unpleasure and hedonic indifference. This view is defended by drawing attention to two often-neglected concepts: the formal relation of polar opposition and the psychological state of hedonic indifference. The existence of mixed feelings, it is argued, does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure.
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  33. added 2014-04-02
    Sara Protasi (2014). Loving People for Who They Are (Even When They Don't Love You Back). European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4).
    The debate on love's reasons ignores unrequited love, which—I argue—can be as genuine and as valuable as reciprocated love. I start by showing that the relationship view of love cannot account for either the reasons or the value of unrequited love. I then present the simple property view, an alternative to the relationship view that is beset with its own problems. In order to solve these problems, I present a more sophisticated version of the property view that integrates ideas from (...)
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  34. added 2014-04-02
    Samantha Matherne (2014). The Kantian Roots of Merleau-Ponty's Account of Pathology. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):124-149.
    One of the more striking aspects of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (1945) is his use of psychological case studies in pathology. For Merleau-Ponty, a philosophical interpretation of phenomena like aphasia and psychic blindness promises to shed light not just on the nature of pathology, but on the nature of human existence more generally. In this paper, I show that although Merleau-Ponty is surely a pioneer in this use of pathology, his work is deeply indebted to an earlier philosophical study (...)
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  35. added 2014-04-02
    Hilton Jr (2014). 'High Desire', or 'Merely' an Addiction? A Response to Steele Et Al. Socioaffective Neuroscience and Psychology 4.
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  36. added 2014-04-02
    Jonathan Cohen & Matthew Fulkerson (2014). Affect, Rationalization, and Motivation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):103-118.
    Recently, a number of writers have presented an argument to the effect that leading causal theories make available accounts of affect’s motivational role, but at the cost of failing to understand affect’s rationalizing role. Moreover, these writers have gone on to argue that these considerations support the adoption of an alternative (“evaluationist”) conception of pleasure and pain that, in their view, successfully explains both the motivational and rationalizing roles of affective experience. We believe that this argument from rationalization is ineffective (...)
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  37. added 2014-04-02
    David Bain & Michael Brady (2014). Pain, Pleasure, and Unpleasure. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):1-14.
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  38. added 2014-04-02
    Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Katsunori Miyahara (2014). Perception and the Problem of Access to Other Minds. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of social cognition do not consider the central question of social cognition to be the problem of access to other minds. These perceptual accounts draw heavily on phenomenological philosophy and propose that others' mental states are “directly” given in the perception of the others' expressive behavior. Furthermore, these accounts contend that phenomenological insights into the nature of social perception lead to the dissolution of the access problem. We argue, (...)
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  39. added 2014-04-02
    Madalena D’Oliveira-Martins (2012). The New Feminine Emotional Codes in Hochschild. Cultura 9 (1):235-247.
    For some years now, amongst contemporary Western societies (where capitalism and globalization have a great influence), the presence and developmentof a well-defined and peculiar emotional culture has become clear. The appropriate use and management of emotions, support a system of relations and codes that draw new limits between public and private life and between people and their actions. Arlie Russell Hochschild has studied the dynamics of emotions, aiming to define their distinctive languages. Interactions between the public and the individual realm (...)
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  40. added 2014-04-02
    Natalie Depraz (2001). The Husserlian Theory of Intersubjectivity as Alterology. Emergent Theories and Wisdom Traditions in the Light of Genetic Phenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):5-7.
  41. added 2014-04-02
    M. Sullivan (1999). Does Psychiatry Need the Husserlian Detour? Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):2-3.
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  42. added 2014-04-02
    Ian Owen & Neil Morris (1999). The Husserlian Phenomenology of Consciousness and Cognitive Science: We Can See the Path but Nobody is on It. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):2-3.
  43. added 2014-04-02
    Jean Naudin, Caroline Gros-Azorin, Aaron Mishara, Osborne P. Wiggins, M. Schwartz & J. -M. Azorin (1999). The Use of the Husserlian Reduction as a Method of Investigation in Psychiatry. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):2-3.
  44. added 2014-04-02
    R. Horner (1999). Emmanuel Levinas, Discovering Existence with Husserl. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:142-143.
  45. added 2014-04-02
    Cesare Cozzo (1996). Criteri ed enunciati psicologici. In Rosaria Egidi (ed.), Wittgenstein e il Novecento. Donzelli. 65-83.
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  46. added 2014-04-02
    Savas L. Tsohatzidis (1993). Emotional States and Linguistic Events: A Study of Conceptual Misconnections. Pragmatics and Cognition 1 (2):229-243.
  47. added 2014-04-01
    Justin Tiehen (forthcoming). The Role Functionalist Theory of Absences. Erkenntnis.
    Functionalist theories have been proposed for just about everything: mental states, dispositions, moral properties, truth, causation, and much else. The time has come for a functionalist theory of nothing. Or, more accurately, a role functionalist theory of those absences (omissions, negative events) that are causes and effects.
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  48. added 2014-04-01
    Alyssa Ney (2012). The Causal Contribution of Mental Events. In Hill Christopher & Gozzano Simone (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. 230.
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  49. added 2014-04-01
    P. Castell (1994). Moore's Paradox and Partial Belief'. European Review of Philosophy 1:45-53.
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  50. added 2014-04-01
    Francesco Orilia (1994). A Note on Gödel's Ontological Argument. European Review of Philosophy 1:125-131.
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