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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Bourget and David Chalmers
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2016-12-09
    E. Di Bona (forthcoming). Towards a Rich View of Auditory Experience. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    In this paper I will argue that the gender properties expressed by human voices are part of auditory phenomenology. I will support this claim by investigating auditory adaptational effects on such properties and contrasting auditory experiences, before and after the adaptational effects take place. In light of this investigation, I will conclude that auditory experience is not limited to low-level properties. Perception appears to be much more informative about the auditory landscape than is commonly thought.
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  2. added 2016-12-09
    L. Spuybroek, J. Brouwer & S. van Tuinen (2016). In the Thick of Things. In J. Brouwer, S. van Tuinen & L. Spuybroek (eds.), The War of Appearances: Transparency, Opacity, Radiance. V2_Publishing 6-11.
    Short introduction to the V2 publication of "The War of Appearances: Transparency, Opacity, Radiance" (2016). An anthology with Matteo Pasquinelli, Luciana Parisi, Graham Harman, Tomas Saraceno, René ten Bos, Tim Morton, McKenzie Wark, Wim Delvoye, Diana Scherer, Paolo Cirio, Paul Frissen, and Willem Schinkel.
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  3. added 2016-12-09
    Srdan Medimorec & Evan F. Risko (2016). Effects of Disfluency in Writing. British Journal of Psychology 107 (4):625–650.
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  4. added 2016-12-09
    L. Spuybroek, J. Brouwer & S. van Tuinen (2016). In the Thick of Things. In J. Brouwer, S. van Tuinen & L. Spuybroek (eds.), The War of Appearances: Transparency, Opacity, Radiance. V2_Publishing 6-11.
    Short introduction to the V2 publication of "The War of Appearances: Transparency, Opacity, Radiance" (2016). An anthology with Matteo Pasquinelli, Luciana Parisi, Graham Harman, Tomas Saraceno, René ten Bos, Tim Morton, McKenzie Wark, Wim Delvoye, Diana Scherer, Paolo Cirio, Paul Frissen, and Willem Schinkel.
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  5. added 2016-12-09
    L. Spuybroek, J. Brouwer & S. van Tuinen (2016). In the Thick of Things. In J. Brouwer, S. van Tuinen & L. Spuybroek (eds.), The War of Appearances: Transparency, Opacity, Radiance. V2_Publishing 6-11.
    Short introduction to the V2 publication of "The War of Appearances: Transparency, Opacity, Radiance" (2016). An anthology with Matteo Pasquinelli, Luciana Parisi, Graham Harman, Tomas Saraceno, René ten Bos, Tim Morton, McKenzie Wark, Wim Delvoye, Diana Scherer, Paolo Cirio, Paul Frissen, and Willem Schinkel.
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  6. added 2016-12-08
    G. B. James Lascelles, The Mind of the Lord and the Cosmos.
    Instead of the usual dialectics that have now become very familiar to the evolution vs creation polemic, this article examines the different views rationally by adopting an eclectic approach that peruses evidence from secular history, cosmology, existential philosophy, systematic theology, and Biblical manuscripts in order to better understand the mind of God and the cosmos.
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  7. added 2016-12-08
    Bradley Rives (2016). Concepts and Analytic Intuitions. Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):285-314.
  8. added 2016-12-07
    Matthew Frise (forthcoming). Preservationism in the Epistemology of Memory. Philosophical Quarterly.
    Preservationism states that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs it preserves. More precisely: if S formed a justified belief that p at t1 and retains in memory a belief that p until t2, then S's belief that p is prima facie justified via memory at t2. Preservationism is an unchallenged orthodoxy in the epistemology of memory. Advocates include Sven Bernecker, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrath, and Thomas Senor. I develop three dilemmas for it, in (...)
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  9. added 2016-12-07
    Michele Paolini Paoletti (forthcoming). How I (Freely) Raised My Arm. Downward, Structural, Substance Causation. Mind and Matter.
    Downward causation is causation of lower-level effects by higher-level entities. For example, if I am a higher-level entity with respect to my neurons, I can downwardly cause something involving my neurons. Downward causation is associated with emergence. Within an emergentist framework, downward causation is fundamental, irreducible causation of lower-level effects (at the emergence bases) by emergent entities. In this paper, I shall describe and defend a model of downward causation that is based on substance-structural causation: the Downward, Structural, Substance Causation (...)
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  10. added 2016-12-06
    Michael O’Sullivan (forthcoming). ‘The Echo of a Thought in Sight’: Property Perception, Universals and Wittgenstein. International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    Contemporary philosophers of perception, even those with otherwise widely differing beliefs, often hold that universals enter into the content of perceptual experience. This doctrine can even be seen as a trivial inference from the observation that we observe properties – ways that things are – as well as things. I argue that the inference is not trivial but can and should be resisted. Ordinary property perception does not involve awareness of universals. But there are visual experiences which do involve determinate (...)
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  11. added 2016-12-06
    Yus Francisco (2016). Propositional Attitude, Affective Attitude and Irony Comprehension. Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 23 (1):92-116.
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  12. added 2016-12-06
    L. A. Paul (2014). Experience and the Arrow. In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry. 175-193.
    The debate over the temporal arrow is a debate over what fundamental ontology is needed for the temporal asymmetry of the universe, which determines the fact that time seems to be oriented or directed from earlier to later. This temporal asymmetry underlies (or, as some might argue, is the same as) the asymmetrical fact that the past is fixed while the future is open, as well as the global asymmetries of counterfactual, causal and agential direction. I explore the metaphysics of (...)
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  13. added 2016-12-05
    Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41.
    A prominent view of phenomenal consciousness combines two claims: (i) the identity conditions of phenomenally conscious states can be fully accounted for in terms of these states’ representational content; (ii) this representational content can be fully accounted for in non-phenomenal terms. This paper presents an argument against this view. The core idea is that the identity conditions of phenomenally conscious states are not fixed entirely by what these states represent (their representational contents), but depend in part on how they represent (...)
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  14. added 2016-12-05
    Ned Block (1977). Review of Julian Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. [REVIEW] Boston Globe.
    Review of Julian Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind from the Boston Globe, March 6, 1977, p. A17.
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  15. added 2016-12-04
    Alessia Marabini & Luca Moretti, Boghossian's Template and Transmission Failure.
    Within his overarching program aiming to defend an epistemic conception of analyticity, Boghossian (1996 and 1997) has offered a clear-cut explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical truths and logical rules through implicit definition. The explanation is based on a special template or general form of argument. Ebert (2005) has argued that an enhanced version of this template is flawed because a segment of it is unable to transmit warrant from its premises to the conclusion. This (...)
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  16. added 2016-12-04
    Moreira de Carvalho Eros (2016). An Actionist Approach to the Justificational Role of Perceptual Experience. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72 (2-3):545-572.
    In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience can bear rational relation to our empirical thought. In the first part, I elaborate two claims that are central for the justificational role of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is independent from belief. At first sight, these claims seems not to be compatible, since the first one seems to require the truth of content conceptualism, (...)
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  17. added 2016-12-03
    Mekhi Dhesi (2016). In Light of the Theory of Special Relativity is a Passage of Time and the Argument of the Presentist Untenable? Dissertation, University College London
    In light of the Special Theory of Relativity and the Minkowski creation of ‘spacetime’, the universe is taken to be a four-dimensional entity which postulates bodies as existing within a temporally extended reality. The Special Theory of Relativity’s implications liken the nature of the universe to a ‘block’ within which all events coexist equally in spacetime. Such a view strikes against the very essence of presentism, which holds that all that exists is the instantaneous state of objects in the present (...)
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  18. added 2016-12-02
    Christopher Mole (forthcoming). Are There Special Mechanisms of Involuntary Memory? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-15.
    Following the precedent set by Dorthe Berntsen’s 2009 book, Involuntary Autobiographical Memory, this paper asks whether the mechanisms responsible for involuntarily recollected memories are distinct from those that are responsible for voluntarily recollected ones. Berntsen conjectures that these mechanisms are largely the same. Recent work has been thought to show that this is mistaken, but the argument from the recent results to the rejection of Berntsen’s position is problematic, partly because it depends on a philosophically contentious view of voluntariness. Berntsen (...)
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  19. added 2016-12-02
    Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience. European Journal of Philosophy.
    In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P.F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson’s thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson’s discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences if (...)
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  20. added 2016-12-02
    Elliot Samuel Paul & Dustin Stokes (forthcoming). Attributing Creativity. In Berys Gaut & Matthew Kieran (eds.), Creativity and Philosophy. Routledge
    Three kinds of things may be creative: persons, processes, and products. The standard definition of creativity, used nearly by consensus in psychological research, focuses specifically on products and says that a product is creative if and only if it is new and valuable. We argue that at least one further condition is necessary for a product to be creative: it must have been produced by the right kind of process. We argue furthermore that this point has an interesting epistemological implication: (...)
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  21. added 2016-12-02
    Christopher Morgan (forthcoming). The Paradox of Thought in Advance. Philosophy and Theology.
    This paper uses a paradox inherent in any solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness to argue for God’s existence. The paper assumes we are “thought machines”, reading the state of a relevant physical medium and then outputting corresponding thoughts. However, the existence of such a thought machine is impossible, since it needs an infinite number of point-representing sensors to map the physical world to conscious thought. This paper shows that these sensors cannot exist, and thus thought cannot come solely (...)
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  22. added 2016-12-02
    Jared Warren & Daniel Waxman (forthcoming). A Metasemantic Challenge for Mathematical Determinacy. Synthese:1-19.
    This paper investigates the determinacy of mathematics. We begin by clarifying how we are understanding the notion of determinacy before turning to the questions of whether and how famous independence results bear on issues of determinacy in mathematics. From there, we pose a metasemantic challenge for those who believe that mathematical language is determinate, motivate two important constraints on attempts to meet our challenge, and then use these constraints to develop an argument against determinacy and discuss a particularly popular approach (...)
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  23. added 2016-12-02
    Sean Allen-Hermanson (forthcoming). So THAT'S What It's Like! In Companion to the Philosophy of Animal Minds. Routledge
    Many philosophers have held that we cannot say what it is like to be a bat as they present a fundamentally alien form of life. Another view held by some philosophers, bat scientists, and even many laypersons is that echolocation is, somehow, at least in part, a kind of visual experience. Either way, bat echolocation is taken to be something very mysterious and exotic. I utilize empirical and intuitive considerations to support an alternative view making a much more mundane contention (...)
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  24. added 2016-11-29
    Adam Bear & Joshua Knobe (forthcoming). Normality: Part Descriptive, Part Prescriptive. Cognition.
    People’s beliefs about normality play an important role in many aspects of cognition and life (e.g., causal cognition, linguistic semantics, cooperative behavior). But how do people determine what sorts of things are normal in the first place? Past research has studied both people’s representations of statistical norms (e.g., the average) and their representations of prescriptive norms (e.g., the ideal). Four studies suggest that people’s notion of normality incorporates both of these types of norms. In particular, people’s representations of what is (...)
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  25. added 2016-11-29
    Matthew Baddorf (forthcoming). Phenomenal Consciousness, Collective Mentality, and Collective Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies.
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  26. added 2016-11-28
    Joshua Stein (2014). The View From Vector Space: An Account of Conceptual Geography. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (1):71-91.
  27. added 2016-11-27
    Alfred Gierer (2008). Was ist der Mensch? In D. Ganten, V. Gerhardt, J. Nida-Rümelin & J. C. Heilinger (eds.), Was ist der Mensch? Humanprojekt der BBAW. De Gruyter 103-105.
    Der Text ist eines von achtzig Kurzessays zum Thema „Was ist der Mensch“, zu denen unsere Arbeitsgruppe „Humanprojekt“ der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften eingeladen hat. So genau Aussagen inhaltlicher Naturwissenschaft oft sind, auf der metatheoretischen Ebene bleibt die Gesamtheit unseres Wissens, und damit auch die Stellung des Menschen in der Natur deutungsfähig und deutungsbedürftig; sie ist mit verschiedenen, natürlich nicht mit allen, philosophischen, kulturellen und religiösen Interpretationen vereinbar; erkenntnislogisch gesehen dürfen und können wir wählen. Worum es dabei eigentlich geht, ist (...)
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  28. added 2016-11-26
    Alexey Bakhirev, THE MAIN MIND PARADOX. WHY THERE IS NO POINT IN BACKING UP BRAIN AND PERSONALITY.
    Attempts to reproduce animateness using appliances generates a paradox that provides a new view to life and death, that differs from both religious and atheistic visions.
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  29. added 2016-11-26
    Alexey Bakhirev, NEW PRINCIPLE FOR ENCODING INFORMATION TO CREATE SUBJECTIVE REALITY IN ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS.
    The paper outlines an analysis of two types of information - ordinary and subjective, consideration is given to the difference between the concepts of intelligence and perceiving mind. It also provides description of some logical functional features of consciousness. A technical approach is proposed to technical obtaining of subjective information by changing the signal’s time degree of freedom to the spatial one in order to obtain the "observer" function in the system and information signals appearing in relation to it, that (...)
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  30. added 2016-11-26
    Majid Davoody Beni (forthcoming). The Code Model of Biosemiotics and the Fate of the Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation. Biosemiotics:1-9.
    In this paper I am advocating a structuralist theory of mental representation. For a structuralist theory of mental representation to be defended satisfactorily, the naturalistic and causal constraints have to be satisfied first. The more intractable of the two, i.e., the naturalistic constraint, indicates that to account for the mental representation, we should not invoke “a full-blown interpreting mind”. So, the aim of the paper is to show how the naturalistic and causal constraints could be satisfied. It aims to offer (...)
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  31. added 2016-11-26
    Rocco J. Gennaro (2016). H.O.T. Theory, Concepts, and Synesthesia: A Reply to Adams and Shreve. Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (443-448).
    Rocco J. Gennaro ABSTRACT: In response to Fred Adams and Charlotte Shreve’s paper entitled “What Can Synesthesia Teach Us about Higher Order Theories of Consciousness?”, previously published in Symposion, I argue that H.O.T. theory does have the resources to account for synesthesia and the specific worries that they advance in their paper, such as the...
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  32. added 2016-11-26
    Napoleon Mabaquiao Jr (2015). Searle's and Penrose's Non-Computational Frameworks for Naturalizing the Mind. Philosophia 16 (1).
    John Searle and Roger Penrose are two staunch critics of computationalism who nonetheless believe that with the right framework the mind can be naturalized. While they may be successful in showing the shortcomings of computationalism, I argue that their alternative non-computational frameworks equally fail to carry out the project to naturalize the mind. The main reason is their failure to resolve some fundamental incompatibilities between mind and science. Searle tries to resolve the incompatibility between the subjectivity of consciousness and the (...)
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  33. added 2016-11-25
    Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). The Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning. Inquiry.
    First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.
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  34. added 2016-11-24
    Guillermo Del Pinal & Kevin Reuter (2016). Dual Character Concepts in Social Cognition: Commitments and the Normative Dimension of Conceptual Representation. Cognitive Science 40 (8).
    The concepts expressed by social role terms such as artist and scientist are unique in that they seem to allow two independent criteria for categorization, one of which is inherently normative. This study presents and tests an account of the content and structure of the normative dimension of these “dual character concepts.” Experiment 1 suggests that the normative dimension of a social role concept represents the commitment to fulfill the idealized basic function associated with the role. Background information can affect (...)
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  35. added 2016-11-23
    Italo Testa (2016). Dewey’s Social Ontology: A Pragmatist Alternative to Searle’s Approach to Social Reality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua second nature that offers us an account of intentionality, social statuses, institutions, and norms in terms of habituations. Such an account offers us a promising alternative to contemporary intentionalist and deontic approaches to social ontology such as Searle’s. Furthermore, it could be the basis of a social ontology better suited to explain both the maintenance and the transformation of social reality. In the first part I (...)
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  36. added 2016-11-23
    Cornel du Toit (2016). Panpsychism, Pan-Consciousness and the Non-Human Turn: Rethinking Being as Conscious Matter. Hts Theological Studies 72 (4):1-11.
    It is not surprising that in a time of intensified ecological awareness a new appreciation of nature and the inanimate world arises. Two examples are panpsychism and deep incarnation. Consciousness studies flourish and are related to nature, the animal world and inorganic nature. A metaphysics of consciousness emerges, of which panpsychism is a good example. Panpsychism or panconsciousness or speculative realism endows all matter with a form of consciousness, energy and experience. The consciousness question is increasingly linked to the quantum (...)
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  37. added 2016-11-22
    Keren Gorodeisky (forthcoming). Value First: Comments on Mohan Matthen’s ‘The Pleasure of Art’. Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (1).
    While I welcome Mohan Matthen’s insistence that art is connected to aesthetic pleasure, I worry about his commitment to viewing pleasure as prior to, and constitutive of, the value of art. I raise my reservations by (i) dispelling his criticism of the reversed explanatory direction, and (ii) showing problems for his commitment. As an alternative, I offer an account of pleasure that explains it in terms of the independent value of art—an account that is free of the problems Matthen raises (...)
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  38. added 2016-11-22
    Patrice Philie (2016). Intentionality and Content in McDowell. Metaphilosophy 47 (4-5):656-678.
    In its most general form, the issue of intentionality takes the following shape: How can something be about something else? In basic cases, this relation is one between a subjective occurrence and a state of affairs, allowing the problem of intentionality to be articulated in this manner: What makes it the case that a subjective occurrence has the capacity to be about something external to it? The views of John McDowell on intentionality form the focus of this article. They are (...)
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  39. added 2016-11-22
    E. Di Bona (2015). Narrative and Essayistic Temporalities. In Ch Wampole S. Ercolino (ed.), Narration and Reflection, Special Issue of Compar(a)ison: An International Journal of Comparative Literature. Peter Lang 49-62.
    The issues of this essay concern whether there are ways of experiencing time that are specific to narration and whether such ways can also be applied to the experience of time in reflection. In order to tackle these issues, we shall compare and contrast the experience of time in life with both the temporal experiences of narration and the temporal experiences of reflection. We shall begin, then, with a discussion on what the “experience of time” is, in the attempt of (...)
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  40. added 2016-11-22
    E. Di Bona (2014). The Method of Contrast and the Perception of Causality in Audition. In Fabio Bacchini at al (ed.), New Advances in Causation, Agency and Moral Responsibility. 79-93.
  41. added 2016-11-21
    Axel Mueller (2014). Löst Brandoms Inferentialismus bedeutungsholistische Kommunikationsprobleme? Zeitschrift Für Semiotik 34 (3-4):141-185.
    This article analyzes whether Brandom’s ISA (inferential-substitutional-anaphoric) semantics as presented in Making It Explicit (MIE) and Articulating Reasons (AR) can cope with problems resulting from inferentialism’s near-implied meaning holism. Inferentialism and meaning holism entail a radically perspectival conception of content as significance for an individual speaker. Since thereby its basis is fixed as idiolects, holistic inferentialism engenders a communication-problem. Brandom considers the systematic difference in information among individuals as the „point“ of communication and thus doesn’t want to diminish these effects (...)
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  42. added 2016-11-20
    Cameron Boult (forthcoming). An Explanatory Challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism. Episteme.
    Epistemological Disjunctivism is a view about paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. Duncan Pritchard claims that it is particularly well suited to accounting for internalist and externalist intuitions. A number of authors have disputed this claim, arguing that there are problems for Pritchard’s way with internalist intuitions. I share the worry. However, I don’t think it has been expressed as effectively as it can be. My aim in this paper is to present a new way of formulating the worry, in terms (...)
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  43. added 2016-11-20
    Joachim Keppler (2016). On the Universal Mechanism Underlying Conscious Systems and the Foundations for a Theory of Consciousness. Open Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):346-367.
    In this article, I present a novel approach to the scientific understanding of consciousness. It is based on the hypothesis that the full range of phenomenal qualities is built into the frequency spectrum of a ubiquitous background field and proceeds on the assumption that conscious systems employ a universal mechanism by means of which they are able to extract phenomenal nuances selectively from this field. I set forth that in the form of the zero-point field (ZPF) physics can offer a (...)
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  44. added 2016-11-19
    Andrew Peet (forthcoming). Etiology, Understanding, and Testimonial Belief. Synthese:1-21.
    The etiology of a perceptual belief can seemingly affect its epistemic status. There are cases in which perceptual beliefs seem to be unjustified because the perceptual experiences on which they are based are caused, in part, by wishful thinking, or irrational prior beliefs. It has been argued that this is problematic for many internalist views in the epistemology of perception, especially those which postulate immediate perceptual justification. Such views are unable to account for the impact of an experience’s etiology on (...)
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  45. added 2016-11-19
    Douglas I. Campbell, Jack Copeland & Zhuo-Ran Deng (forthcoming). The Inconceivable Popularity of Conceivability Arguments. Philosophical Quarterly.
    Famous examples of conceivability arguments include (i) Descartes’ argument for mind-body dualism, (ii) Kripke's ‘modal argument’ against psychophysical identity theory, (iii) Chalmers’ ‘zombie argument’ against materialism, and (iv) modal versions of the ontological argument for theism. In this paper, we show that for any such conceivability argument, C, there is a corresponding ‘mirror argument’, M. M is deductively valid and has a conclusion that contradicts C's conclusion. Hence, a proponent of C—henceforth, a ‘conceivabilist’—can be warranted in holding that C's premises (...)
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  46. added 2016-11-19
    Graham Peebles (forthcoming). Representationalism and Blindsight. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    According to representationalism, phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. According to first-person reports, blindsighters have no phenomenal character in the scotoma, even though their abilities suggest that they have conscious visual representations in the scotoma. The traditional representationalist response is that the representations in the scotoma are either non-conscious or non-visual. Drawing on empirical work, I consider the interpretation that blindsighters are unable to represent—and thus lack the phenomenal character of—luminance in the scotoma. However, they maintain the capacity to represent (...)
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  47. added 2016-11-18
    Jacob Beck (2017). Can Bootstrapping Explain Concept Learning? Cognition 158:110–121.
    Susan Carey's account of Quinean bootstrapping has been heavily criticized. While it purports to explain how important new concepts are learned, many commentators complain that it is unclear just what bootstrapping is supposed to be or how it is supposed to work. Others allege that bootstrapping falls prey to the circularity challenge: it cannot explain how new concepts are learned without presupposing that learners already have those very concepts. Drawing on discussions of concept learning from the philosophical literature, this article (...)
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  48. added 2016-11-18
    Roberto Sá Pereira (2016). What We Can Learn About Phenomenal Concepts From Wittgenstein’s Private Language. Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (2).
    This paper is both systematic and historical in nature. From a historical viewpoint, I aim to show that to establish Wittgenstein’s claim that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” there is an enthymeme in Wittgenstein’s private language argument overlooked in the literature, namely Wittgenstein’s suggestion that both perceptual and bodily experiences are transparent in the relevant sense that one cannot point to a mental state and wonder “what is that?” From a systematic viewpoint, I aim to show (...)
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  49. added 2016-11-16
    Davide Bordini (forthcoming). Is There Introspective Evidence for Phenomenal Intentionality? Philosophical Studies.
    The so-called transparency of experience (TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects. TE is quite popular among philosophers of mind and has traditionally been used to motivate Representationalism, i.e., the view that phenomenal character is in some strong way dependent on intentionality. However, more recently, others have appealed to TE to go the opposite way and support the phenomenal intentionality view (...)
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  50. added 2016-11-16
    Jacob Berger (2016). Review of Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content by Eva Schmidt. [REVIEW] Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):600-606.
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