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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Bourget and David Chalmers
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2014-10-19
    Robert Schroer (forthcoming). The Goldilocks Problem of the Specificity of Visual Phenomenal Content. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    Existentialist accounts maintain that visual phenomenal content takes the logical form of an existentially quantified sentence. These accounts do not make phenomenal content specific enough. Singularist accounts posit a singular content in which the seen object is a constituent. These accounts make phenomenal content too specific. My account gets the specificity of visual phenomenal content just right. My account begins with John Searle’s suggestion that visual experience represents an object as seen, moves this relation outside the scope of the existential (...)
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  2. added 2014-10-19
    Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Do Intentions for Action Penetrate Visual Experience? Frontiers in Psychology.
  3. added 2014-10-18
    Steven M. Duncan, The Present.
    While the nature of the past and the future have received a lot of attention from recent analytic philosophers, the present has been somewhat neglected. I think the notion of the present is somewhat misunderstood and hope to rectify some of those misunderstandings in this essay. It is high time that this was done. Let's do it now!
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  4. added 2014-10-18
    Steven M. Duncan, In Defense of Temporal Passage.
    In this paper, I endorse and defend the Common Sense View of Time (CSVT), i.e. Presentism plus the A-theory of time, by arguing for the objective reality of temporal passage.
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  5. added 2014-10-17
    Amy Kind (forthcoming). Pessimism About Russellian Monism. In Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Essays on Russellian Monism.
    From the perspective of many philosophers of mind in these early years of the 21st Century, the debate between dualism and physicalism has seemed to have stalled, if not to have come to a complete standstill. There seems to be no way to settle the basic clash of intuitions that underlies it. Recently however, a growing number of proponents of Russellian monism have suggested that their view promises to show us a new way forward. Insofar as Russellian monism might allow (...)
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  6. added 2014-10-16
    Lionel Shapiro (forthcoming). Sellars on the Function of Semantic Vocabulary. British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-20.
    This paper examines two explanations Sellars gives, at successive stages of his career, of how semantic vocabulary (paradigmatically ‘means that ... ’ and ‘is true if and only if ... ’) lets us relate linguistic expressions to extra-linguistic reality. Despite their differences, both explanations reveal a distinctive pragmatist approach. According to Sellars, we do not use semantic vocabulary to describe language- world relations. Rather, our taking language to relate to the world is implicit in the moves (inferential or non-inferential) licensed (...)
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  7. added 2014-10-16
    R. Sorbello, A. Chella, C. Calì, M. Giardina, S. Nishio & H. Ishiguro (2014). Telenoid Android Robot as an Embodied Perceptual Social Regulation Medium Engaging Natural Human–Humanoid Interaction. Robotics and Autonomous System 62:1329-1341.
    The present paper aims to validate our research on human–humanoid interaction (HHI) using the minimalist humanoid robot Telenoid. We conducted the human–robot interaction test with 142 young people who had no prior interaction experience with this robot. The main goal is the analysis of the two social dimensions (‘‘Perception’’ and ‘‘Believability’’) useful for increasing the natural behaviour between users and Telenoid.Weadministered our custom questionnaire to human subjects in association with a well defined experimental setting (‘‘ordinary and goal-guided task’’). A thorough (...)
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  8. added 2014-10-15
    Stan Klein, A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to Take Phenomenological Reality on its Own Terms in the Study of the Mind.
    In this paper I argue for the importance of treating mental experience on its own terms. In defense of “experiential realism” I offer a critique of modern psychology’s all-too-frequent attempts to effect an objectification and quantification of personal subjectivity. The question is “What can we learn about experiential reality from indices that, in the service of scientific objectification, transform the qualitative properties of experience into quantitative indices?” I conclude that such treatment is neither necessary for realizing, nor sufficient for capturing, (...)
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  9. added 2014-10-12
    Murat Aydede (forthcoming). A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure. In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. Oxford University Press.
    [Please send me an email for the penultimate draft] Some sensations are pleasant, some unpleasant, and some are neither. Furthermore, those that are pleasant or unpleasant are so to different degrees. In this essay, I want to explore what kind of a difference is the difference between these three kinds of sensations. I will develop a comprehensive three-level account of sensory pleasure that is simultaneously adverbialist, functionalist and is also a version of an experiential-desire account.
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  10. added 2014-10-11
    Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). Deciding as Intentional Action: Control Over Decisions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    Common-sense folk psychology and mainstream philosophy of action agree about decisions: these are under an agent's direct control, and are thus intentional actions for which agents can be held responsible. I begin this paper by presenting a problem for this view. In short, since the content of the motivational attitudes that drive deliberation and decision remains open-ended until the moment of decision, it is unclear how agents can be thought to exercise control over what they decide at the moment of (...)
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  11. added 2014-10-11
    Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). Conscious Action/Zombie Action. Noûs.
    I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying (that is, experiences of directing effort towards the satisfaction of an intention) are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying (that is, actual effort directed towards the satisfaction of an intention). I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, (...)
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  12. added 2014-10-10
    Terence Rajivan Edward (forthcoming). From the Myth of the Given to Radical Conceptual Diversity. Organon F.
    This paper evaluates the following argument, suggested in the writings of Donald Davidson: if there is such a thing as the given, then there can be alternative conceptual schemes; there cannot be alternative conceptual schemes; therefore there is no such thing as the given.
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  13. added 2014-10-10
    Brendan Dill & Richard Holton (2014). The Addict in Us All. Frontiers in Psychiatry 5 (139):01-20.
    In this paper, we contend that the psychology of addiction is similar to the psychology of ordinary, non-addictive temptation in important respects, and explore the ways in which these parallels can illuminate both addiction and ordinary action. The incentive salience account of addiction proposed by Robinson and Berridge (1993; 2001; 2008) entails that addictive desires are not in their nature different from many of the desires had by non-addicts; what is different is rather the way that addictive desires are acquired, (...)
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  14. added 2014-10-07
    Niels Skovgaard Olsen, Logical Omniscience and Acknowledged Vs. Consequential Commitments. Questions, Discourse and Dialogue: 20 Years After Making It Explicit, Proceedings of AISB50.
    The purpose of this paper is to consider the explanatory resources that Robert Brandom‟s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. 12.
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  15. added 2014-10-07
    Paul Piwek, Towards a Computational Account of Inferentialist Meaning.
    Both in formal and computational natural language semantics, the classical correspondence view of meaning – and, more specifically, the view that the meaning of a declarative sentence coincides with its truth conditions – is widely held. Truth (in the world or a situation) plays the role of the given, and meaning is analysed in terms of it. Both language and the world feature in this perspective on meaning, but language users are conspicuously absent. In contrast, the inferentialist semantics that Robert (...)
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  16. added 2014-10-07
    Jared A. Millson, Queries and Assertions in Minimally Discursive Practices. Questions, Discourse and Dialogue: 20 Years After Making It Explicit, Proceedings of AISB50.
    Robert Brandom’s normative-pragmatic theory is intended to represent the minimal set of practical abilities whose exhibition qualifies creatures as speaking a language. His model of a minimally discursive practice (MDP) is one in which participants, devoid of logical vocabulary, are only capable of making assertions and drawing inferences. This paper argues that Brandom’s purely assertional practices are not MDPs and that speech acts of asking questions (queries) must be included in any practice that counts as an MDP. The upshot of (...)
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  17. added 2014-10-04
    Shannon Spaulding (forthcoming). On Whether We Can See Intentions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others’ mental states, i.e., that we perceive others’ mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.
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  18. added 2014-10-03
    Adam Elga & Agustin Rayo, Fragmentation and Information Access.
    In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses. Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes. Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how .
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  19. added 2014-10-01
    Aaron Smuts, How Much Should We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?
    It is widely assumed that we can meaningfully talk about emotional reactions as being appropriate or inappropriate. Much of the discussion has focused on one kind of appropriateness, that of fittingness. An emotional response is appropriate only if it fits its object. For instance, fear only fits dangerous things. There is another dimension of appropriateness that has been relatively ignored — proportionality. For an emotional reaction to be appropriate not only must the object fit, the reaction should be of the (...)
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  20. added 2014-10-01
    Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Skepticism About Other Minds. In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury.
    In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.
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  21. added 2014-10-01
    Carolyn Dicey Jennings & Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Action Without Attention. Analysis:anu096.
    Wayne Wu argues that attention is necessary for action: since action requires a solution to the ‘Many-Many Problem’, and since only attention can solve the Many-Many Problem, attention is necessary for action. We question the first of these two steps and argue that it is based on an oversimplified distinction between actions and reflexes. We argue for a more complex typology of behaviors where one important category is action that does not require a solution to the Many-Many Problem, and so (...)
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  22. added 2014-10-01
    Andreas Keller & Benjamin D. Young, Olfactory Consciousness Across Disciplines. Olfactory Consciousness Across Disciplines.
    Although vision is the de facto model system of consciousness research, studying olfactory consciousness has its own advantages, as this collection of articles emphatically demonstrates. One advantage of olfaction is its computational and phenomenological simplicity, which facilitates the identification of basic principles. Other researchers study olfactory consciousness not because of its simplicity, but because of its unique features. Together, olfaction's simplicity and its distinctiveness make it an ideal system for testing theories of consciousness. In this research topic, the results of (...)
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  23. added 2014-09-28
    Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). Moral Perception: High-Level Perception or Low-Level Intuition? In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking.
    Here are four examples of “seeing.” You see that something green is wriggling. You see that an iguana is in distress. You see that someone is wrongfully harming an iguana. You see that torturing animals is wrong. The first is an example of low-level perception. You visually represent color and motion. The second is an example of high-level perception. You visually represent kind properties and mental properties. The third is an example of moral perception. You have an impression of moral (...)
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  24. added 2014-09-26
    Adam Morton, Space and Sound: A Two Component Theory of Pitch Perception.
    I identify two components in the perception of musical pitches, which make pitch perception more like colour perception than it is usually taken to be. To back up this implausible claim I describe a programme whereby individuals can learn to identify the components in musical tones. I also claim that following this programme can affect one's pitch-recognition capacities.
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  25. added 2014-09-26
    Ben Blumson (2014). Resemblance and Representation. Open Book Publishers.
    It’s a platitude – which only a philosopher would dream of denying – that whereas words are connected to what they represent merely by arbitrary conventions, pictures are connected to what they represent by resemblance. The most important difference between my portrait and my name, for example, is that whereas my portrait and I are connected by my portrait’s resemblance to me, my name and I are connected merely by an arbitrary convention. The first aim of this book is to (...)
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  26. added 2014-09-24
    Pascal Massie (2013). Touching, Thinking, Being: The Sense of Touch in Aristotle's De Anima and its Implications. Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 17:74-101.
  27. added 2014-09-22
    Susan Brower-Toland (2014). &Quot;william Ockham on the Scope and Limits of Consciousness&Quot;. Vivarium 52:197-219.
  28. added 2014-09-19
    Tim O'Keefe (forthcoming). Hedonistic Theories in Antiquity. In Guy Fletcher (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being.
    Focuses on the theories of the Epicureans and Cyrenaics in light of Plato's and Aristotle's criticisms of hedonism. Closes with a brief discussion of how the Pyrrhonian skeptical conception of the telos compares to the Epicureans'.
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  29. added 2014-09-18
    Benjamin Kozuch & Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Correlation, Causation, Constitution: On the Interplay Between the Science and Philosophy of Consciousness. In S. M. Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Consciousness. John Benjamins.
    Consciousness is a natural phenomenon, the object of a flourishing area of research in the natural sciences – research whose primary goal is to identify the neural correlates of consciousness. This raises the question: why is there need for a philosophy of consciousness? As we see things, the need for a philosophy of consciousness arises for two reasons. First, as a young and energetic science operating as yet under no guiding paradigm, the science of consciousness has been subject to considerable (...)
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  30. added 2014-09-18
    Vasilis Tsompanidis (forthcoming). Explaining Tensed Belief. In C. Majolino & K. Paykin-Arroučs (eds.), Telling Time: Moments, Events, Duration. Issues in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, 5.
    I attempt to set the stage for a constructive analysis of the nature and function of tensed belief as a distinct psychological type. After introducing tensed beliefs, I describe the philosophical issues that implicate them, including Prior’s “thank goodness it’s over” argument against the B-theory of time. I proceed to flesh out, and then argue against, two traditional treatments of tensed belief from the philosophy of time: the A-theoretic view, which starts from present facts or properties, and Hugh Mellor's B-theoretic (...)
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  31. added 2014-09-18
    Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Perceptual Learning, the Mere Exposure Effect and Aesthetic Antirealism. Leonardo.
    It has been argued that some recent experimental findings about the mere exposure effect can be used to argue for aesthetic antirealism: the view that there is no fact of the matter about aesthetic value. The aim of this paper is to assess this argument and point out that this strategy, as it stands, does not work. But we may still be able to use experimental findings about the mere exposure effect in order to engage with the aesthetic realism/antirealism debate. (...)
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  32. added 2014-09-18
    Bence Nanay (forthcoming). The History of Vision. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
    According to an influential view within art history, the way the ancient Greeks saw the world was importantly different from the way we now see the world and part of what art history should study is exactly how human vision has changed in the course of history. If the ancients did see the world differently from the way we do now, then in order to understand and evaluate their art, we need to understand how they perceived it (and how this (...)
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  33. added 2014-09-18
    Vasilis Tsompanidis (2011). Tensed Belief. Dissertation, University of California Santa Barbara
    Human beings seem to capture time and the temporal properties of events and things in thought by having beliefs usually expressed with statements using tense, or notions such as ‘now’, ‘past’ or ‘future’. Tensed beliefs like these seem indispensable for correct reasoning and timely action. For instance, my belief that my root canal is over seems inexpressible with a statement that does not use tense or a temporal indexical. However, the dominant view on the nature of time is that it (...)
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  34. added 2014-09-15
    Kristina Musholt (forthcoming). Review of S. Prosser & F. Recanati (Eds) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. CUP. [REVIEW] Mind.
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  35. added 2014-09-15
    Kristina Musholt (forthcoming). Thinking About Oneself. MIT Press.
  36. added 2014-09-14
    Peter B. Todd, The Entangled State of God and Humanity. Asheville Jung Center Webinar Series, 22.
    As the title, The Entangled State of God and Humanity suggests, this webinar dispenses with the pre-Copernican, patriarchal, anthropomorphic image of God while presenting a case for a third millennium theology illuminated by insights from archetypal depth psychology, quantum physics, neuroscience and evolutionary biology. It attempts to smash the conceptual barriers between science and religion. The published work of C.G. Jung, Wolfgang Pauli, David Bohm and Teilhard de Chardin outline a process whereby matter evolves in increasing complexity from sub-atomic particles (...)
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  37. added 2014-09-13
    Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Phenomenal Concepts. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Phenomenal concepts are the concepts that we deploy when – but arguably not only when – we introspectively examine, focus on, or take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences. They refer to phenomenal properties (or qualities) and they do so in a subjective (first-personal) and direct (non-relational) manner. It is through the use of such concepts that the phenomenal character of our experiences is made salient to us. Discourse about the nature of phenomenal concepts plays an important role (...)
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  38. added 2014-09-11
    Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Emotion et moi, et moi, et moi. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger.
    Ma discussion est structurée autour de l’examen de trois thèses concernant le rapport entre émotions et moi. J’examine d'abord la thèse selon laquelle toute émotion renferme une forme de réflexivité en ce qu’elle est intentionnellement dirigée vers le sujet qui la ressent. Le moi est ici considéré être l’objet particulier de toute émotion. Je me consacre à l’examen d’une deuxième thèse, plus subtile, qui considère que les émotions sont réflexives en ce qu’elles portent toujours sur d’autres états psychologiques du sujet. (...)
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  39. added 2014-09-11
    E. Sonny Elizondo (forthcoming). More Than a Feeling. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing (...)
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  40. added 2014-09-11
    Rupert Brown, Jesse Allpress, Roger Giner Sorolla, Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2014). Two Faces of Shame: Moral Shame and Image Shame Differently Predict Positive and Negative Responses to Ingroup Wrongdoing. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40 (10):1270-1284.
    This article proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: Guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterized by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened moral essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three correlational studies are reported, set in the context of atrocities committed by (British) ingroup members during the Iraq war (Ns = 147, 256, 399). Results showed that the two forms (...)
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  41. added 2014-09-10
    Timothy Lane & Owen Flanagan (forthcoming). Neuroexistentialism, Eudaimonics, and Positive Illusions. In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Mind and Society: Cognitive Science Meets the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. SYNTHESE Philosophy Library Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, & Philosophy of Science. Springer Science+Business.
    There is a distinctive form of existential anxiety, neuroexistential anxiety, which derives from the way in which contemporary neuroscience provides copious amounts of evidence to underscore the Darwinian message—we are animals, nothing more. One response to this 21st century existentialism is to promote Eudaimonics, a version of ethical naturalism that is committed to promoting fruitful interaction between ethical inquiry and science, most notably psychology and neuroscience. We argue that philosophical reflection on human nature and social life reveals that while working (...)
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  42. added 2014-09-10
    Kevin Connolly (forthcoming). Multisensory Perception as an Associative Learning Process. Frontiers in Psychology.
    Suppose that you are at a live jazz show. The drummer begins a solo. You see the cymbal jolt and you hear the clang. But in addition seeing the cymbal jolt and hearing the clang, you are also aware that the jolt and the clang are part of the same event. Casey O’Callaghan (forthcoming) calls this awareness “intermodal feature binding awareness.” Psychologists have long assumed that multimodal perceptions such as this one are the result of a subpersonal feature binding mechanism (...)
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  43. added 2014-09-10
    Todd Moody (2014). Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: The State of the Argument. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (3-4):177-190.
  44. added 2014-09-10
    Anna-Mari Rusanen & Samuli Poyhonen (2012). Concepts in Change. Science and Education 22 (6):1389–1403.
    In this article we focus on the concept of concept in conceptual change. We argue that (1) theories of higher learning must often employ two different notions of concept that should not be conflated: psychological and scientific concepts. The usages for these two notions are partly distinct and thus straightforward identification between them is unwarranted. Hence, the strong analogy between scientific theory change and individual learning should be approached with caution. In addition, we argue that (2) research in psychology and (...)
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  45. added 2014-09-09
    David Liggins (2014). Constructive Methodological Deflationism, Dialetheism and the Liar. Analysis 74 (4):566-574.
    Thanks to the work of Kendall Walton, appeals to the notion of pretence (or make-believe) have become popular in philosophy. Now the notion has begun to appear in accounts of truth. My aim here is to assess one of these accounts, namely the ‘constructive methodological deflationism’ put forward by Jc Beall. After introducing the view, I argue that Beall does not manage to overcome the problem of psychological implausibility. Although Beall claims that constructive methodological deflationism supports dialetheism, I argue that (...)
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  46. added 2014-09-07
    Daniel Brunson (2007). Memory and Peirce's Pragmatism. Cognitio-Estudos 4 (2):71-80.
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  47. added 2014-09-06
    T. Parent, Content Externalism and Equivocal Inference.
    This paper evaluates Boghossian’s inference argument against externalist introspective self-knowledge. Boghossian’s objection is that such knowledge does not preclude (what I call) “self-blind equivocation,” i.e., equivocation that is introspectively undetectable. Such equivocation remains possible, since externalism implies that the content of ‘water’ (and of the concept it expresses) might change from premise to premise, owing to “slow switches” between twin environments. Moreover, because the change owes to environmental differences, the resulting equivocation would not be introspectively discernible. In reply I argue (...)
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  48. added 2014-09-05
    Birgitta Dresp & Jean Durup (2009). A Plastic Temporal Brain Code for Conscious State Generation. Neural Plasticity 2009:1-15.
    Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.’s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran’s remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg’s Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance model (...)
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  49. added 2014-09-04
    Drew McDermott, The Logic of Qualia.
    Logic is useful as a neutral formalism for expressing the contents of mental representations. It can be used to extract crisp conclusions regarding the higher-order theory of phenomenal consciousness developed in (McDermott 2001, 20007). A key aspect of conscious perceptions is their connection to the distinction between appearance and reality. Perceptions must often be corrected. To do so requires that the logic of perception be able to represent the logical structure of judgment events, that is, to include the formulas of (...)
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  50. added 2014-09-04
    Laureano Luna (forthcoming). Minds Vs. Machines. On Saka's Basic Blindspot Theorem. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence.
    Under the name of ‘Basic Blindspot Theorem’, Paul Saka has proposed in the special issue on mind and paradox of this journal a Gödelian argument to the effect that no cognitive system can be complete and correct. We show that while the argument is successful as regards mechanical and formal systems, it may fail with respect to minds, so contributing to draw a boundary between the former and the latter. The existence of such a boundary may lend support to Saka’s (...)
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