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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Chalmers and David Bourget
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2016-07-27
    Markku Roinila (2016). Leibniz's Passionate Knowledge. Blityri (1/2 2015):75-85.
    In §18 of Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, Leibniz says: ”Thus our happiness will never consist, and must never consist, in complete joy, in which nothing is left to desire, and which would dull our mind, but must consist in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections.” -/- This passage is typical in Leibniz’s Nachlass. Universal perfection creates in us joy or pleasure of the mind and its source is our creator, God. When this joy (...)
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  2. added 2016-07-27
    Derek H. Brown (2016). A Study in Deflated Acquaintance Knowledge: Sense-Datum Theory and Perceptual Constancy. In Sorin Costreie (ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy: New Perspectives on the Tradition. Springer 99-125.
    We perceive the objective world through a subjective perceptual veil. Various perceived properties, particularly “secondary qualities” like colours and tastes, are mind-dependent. Although mind-dependent, our knowledge of many facts about the perceptual veil is immediate and secure. These are well-known facets of sense-datum theory. My aim is to carve out a conception of sense-datum theory that does not require the immediate and secure knowledge of a wealth of facts about experienced sense-data (§1). Such a theory is of value on its (...)
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  3. added 2016-07-26
    Reinaldo Bernal (2013). La conscience phénoménale, et pourquoi elle doit voir une nature physique. In Marc Silverstein (ed.), Matériaux scientifiques et philosophiques pour un matérialisme contemporain. Éditions Matériologiques
    Je commence par tenter de clarifier le concept de « conscience phénoménale », suivant la notion de « l’effet ça fait » élaborée par Nagel (1974). Deuxièmement, je défends la réalité de la conscience (phénoménale) en opposition avec l'éliminativisme. Il n’est pas possible de prouver que la conscience est un phénomène réel, mais les éliminativistes ne peuvent pas non plus prouver qu’elle n’en est pas un. Pour le réaliste, la conscience est donnée comme un fait brut. Troisièmement, j’introduis une notion (...)
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  4. added 2016-07-26
    Reinaldo Bernal (2013). Précis of "E-Physicalism. A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness" (English Translation). Ideas Y Valores 62 (152):267-297.
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  5. added 2016-07-24
    Dimitris Kilakos (2016). From Parmenidean Identity to Beyond Classical Idealism and Epistemic Constructivism. Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 48 (2):75-86.
    Rockmore’s paper offers a nice discussion on how classical German idealism provides a plausible account of the Parmenidean insight that thought and being are identical and suggests that idealist epistemic constructivism is arguably the most promising approach to cognition. In this short commentary, I will explore the implications of adopting other interpretations of Parmenidean identity thesis, which arguably lead to different conclusions than the ones drawn by Rockmore. En route to disavow the distinction between ontology and epistemology, I argue that (...)
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  6. added 2016-07-21
    Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma & David Rose (forthcoming). Following the FAD: Folk Attributions and Theories of Actual Causation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    In the last decade, several researchers have proposed theories of actual causation that make use of structural equations and directed graphs. Many of these researchers are committed to a widely-endorsed folk attribution desideratum, according to which an important constraint on the acceptability of a theory of actual causation is agreement between the deliverances of the theory with respect to specific cases and the reports of untutored individuals about those same cases. In the present article, we consider a small collection of (...)
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  7. added 2016-07-21
    César Schirmer dos Santos (2016). O problema da autenticidade do conhecimento: uma breve apresentação. Sképsis 9 (13):85-103.
    Minha proposta, nesta introdução a “Autoconhecimento e os limites da autenticidade”, texto de Sven Bernecker traduzido e publicado neste número de Sképsis, é dar razões para que defensores do anti-individualismo que sejam partidários da estratégia do autoconhecimento básico, no que diz respeito ao debate sobre a compatibilidade entre anti-individualismo e conhecimento de si, mudem de posição, e passem a defender anti-individualismo com teoria da autenticidade.
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  8. added 2016-07-21
    E. Taku (2016). AN INTIMATE INSIGHT ON PSYCHOPATHY AND A NOVEL HERMENEUTIC PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE. SSRN Electronic Journal 9 (7):entire issue.
    This paper is rather a profound hermeneutic enunciation putting into question our present understanding of psychopathy. It further articulates, in complement, a novel theoretical and methodological conceptualisation for a hermeneutic psychological science. Methodology-wise, it puts into question a traditional more or less categorical and mechanical approach to the social and behavioural sciences as it strives to introduce a creative and insightful approach for the articulation of ideas. It rather seeks to construe the scientific method as being more about falsifiability and (...)
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  9. added 2016-07-21
    Sven Bernecker (2016). Autoconhecimento e os limites da autenticidade. Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 9 (13):105-125.
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  10. added 2016-07-20
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (forthcoming). Odors, Objects and Olfaction. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Olfaction represents odors, if it represents anything at all. Does olfaction also represent ordinary objects like cheese, fish and coffee-beans? Many think so. It is argued here that such a view is in error. Instead, we should affirm an austere account of the intentional objects of olfaction: olfactory experience is about odors, not objects. Visuocentric thinking about olfaction has tempted some philosophers to say otherwise.
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  11. added 2016-07-20
    Uriah Kriegel (2016). Precis of The Varieties of Consciousness. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7:240-246.
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  12. added 2016-07-19
    Neil McDonnell, Causal Exclusion and the Limits of Proportionality.
    Causal exclusion arguments are taken to threaten the autonomy of the special sciences, and the causal efficacy of mental properties. A recent line of response to these arguments has appealed to "independently plausible" and "well grounded" theories of causation to rebut key premises. In this paper I consider two papers which proceed in this vein and show that they share a common feature: they both require causes to be proportional (in Yablo's sense) to their effects. I argue that this feature (...)
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  13. added 2016-07-19
    Derek Clayton Baker, The Abductive Case for Humeanism Over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire.
    A number of philosophers have offered quasi-perceptual theories of desire, according to which to desire something is roughly to “see” it as having value or providing reasons. These are offered as alternatives to the more traditional Humean Theory of Motivation, which denies that desires have a representational aspect. This paper examines the various considerations offered by advocates to motivate quasi-perceptualism. It argues that Humeanism is in fact able to explain the same data that the quasi-perceptualist can explain, and in one (...)
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  14. added 2016-07-18
    Doris Gerber (forthcoming). The Concept of Action and the Relevance of Intentional Collective Action in History. Brill.
    _ Source: _Page Count 13 The article starts with the theses that it is the very concept of action that is at stake in many debates between philosophers and historians. Whereas in philosophy actions are conceptualized by reference to their beginning, namely their motives or intentions, in historiography the consequences of actions are much more in the focus of interest. Especially the debate about the dualism of structure and agency is characterized by different concepts of action. In the article it (...)
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  15. added 2016-07-18
    Svetlana Nagumanova (forthcoming). The Varieties of Consciousness By U. Kriegel. [REVIEW] Analysis:anw054.
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  16. added 2016-07-18
    Matteo Bianchin (forthcoming). Intentions and Intentionality. Philosophy and Public Issues – Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche.
    Michael Thompson recently advanced a “naïve action theory” as an alternative to the “sophisticated” accounts of action displayed by ordinary folk psychology. In what follows I defend the plausibility of intentional psychology and folk psychological explanations. I do this in two ways. First I question that naïve explanations are more naïve than the ones provided by folk psychology and suggest that the latter are phenomenologically prior to the former. Second, I focus on the role of intentionality in deliberation and action (...)
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  17. added 2016-07-18
    Doris Gerber (forthcoming). The Concept of Action and the Relevance of Intentional Collective Action in History. New Content is Available for Journal of the Philosophy of History.
    _ Source: _Page Count 13 The article starts with the theses that it is the very concept of action that is at stake in many debates between philosophers and historians. Whereas in philosophy actions are conceptualized by reference to their beginning, namely their motives or intentions, in historiography the consequences of actions are much more in the focus of interest. Especially the debate about the dualism of structure and agency is characterized by different concepts of action. In the article it (...)
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  18. added 2016-07-18
    Henk Bij de Weg, Collective Intentionality and Individual Action. My Website.
    People often do things together and form groups in order to get things done that they cannot do alone. In short they form a collectivity of some kind or a group, for short. But if we consider a group on the one hand and the persons that constitute the group on the other hand, how does it happen that these persons work together and finish a common task with a common goal? In the philosophy of action this problem is often (...)
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  19. added 2016-07-18
    Kirk Ludwig (2016). Corporate Speech in Citizens United Vs. Federal Election Commission. SpazioFilosofico 16:47-79.
    In its January 20th, 2010 decision in Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission, the United States Supreme Court ruled that certain restrictions on independent expenditures by corporations for political advocacy violate the First Amendment of the Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Justice Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority, (...)
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  20. added 2016-07-18
    Doris Gerber (2016). The Concept of Action and the Relevance of Intentional Collective Action in History. Journal of the Philosophy of History 10 (2):235-247.
    _ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 2, pp 235 - 247 The article starts with the theses that it is the very concept of action that is at stake in many debates between philosophers and historians. Whereas in philosophy actions are conceptualized by reference to their beginning, namely their motives or intentions, in historiography the consequences of actions are much more in the focus of interest. Especially the debate about the dualism of structure and agency is characterized by different concepts of (...)
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  21. added 2016-07-18
    Alessandro Salice (2015). There Are No Primitive We-Intentions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):695-715.
    John Searle’s account of collective intentions in action appears to have all the theoretical pros of the non-reductivist view on collective intentionality without the metaphysical cons of committing to the existence of group minds. According to Searle, when we collectively intend to do something together, we intend to cooperate in order to reach a collective goal. Intentions in the first-person plural form therefore have a particular psychological form or mode, for the we-intender conceives of his or her intended actions as (...)
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  22. added 2016-07-18
    Ivan Mladenovic (2014). Collective Intentionality, Rationality, and Institutions. Rivista di Estetica 57:67-86.
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  23. added 2016-07-18
    Kirk Ludwig (2013). Truth in the Theory of Meaning. In Kirk Ludwig & Ernest Lepore (eds.), A Companion to Davidson. Wiley-Blackwell 175-190.
    This chapter reviews interpretations of Davidson's project in the theory of meaning and argues against a variety of views according to which Davidson intended to reduce meaning to some variety of truth conditions or replace the project of giving a theory of meaning with a theory of truth, and in support of interpreting him as offering an indirect way of achieving the goals of the traditional project by appeal to knowledge of facts about a semantic theory of truth for the (...)
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  24. added 2016-07-18
    Kirk Ludwig (2011). Triangulation Triangulated. In Cristina Amoretti & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Triangulation: from an epistemological point of view. 69-95.
    Appeal to triangulation occurs in two different contexts in Davidson’s work. In the first, triangulation—in the trigonometric sense—is used as an analogy to help explain the central idea of a transcendental argument designed to show that we can have the concept of objective truth only in the context of communication with another speaker. In the second, the triangulation of two speakers responding to each other and to a common cause of similar responses is invoked as a solution to the problem (...)
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  25. added 2016-07-18
    Kirk Ludwig (2011). Donald Davidson. In Barry Lee (ed.), Key Thinkers in the Philosophy of Language. Continuum 199-224.
    This chapter reviews Donald Davidson's contributions to the philosophy of language, and especially to the theory of meaning.
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  26. added 2016-07-18
    Kirk Ludwig & Ernest Lepore (2007). The Reality of Language: On the Davidson-Dummett Debate. In Randall Auxier & Lewis Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett: The Library of Living Philosophers. 185-214.
    This chapter identifies the central issue between Michael Dummett and Donald Davidson on the role of convention in language and argues they are not as far apart in the end as they take themselves to be.
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  27. added 2016-07-18
    Elisabeth Pacherie & Jérôme Dokic, From Mirror Neurons to Joint Actions.
    The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their potential role in the evolution of specifically human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an evaluation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves provide a (...)
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  28. added 2016-07-18
    Pascal Engel, Croyances Collectives Et Intentions Partagées.
    Draft as of 2001 of a book chapter a^ppeared in 2005. This paper gives an account of the belief/ acceptance distrinction applied to the issue of collective beliefs and intentionality in terms of the "doctrinal dilemma" proposed by some legal theorists.
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  29. added 2016-07-18
    Elisabeth Pacherie, Is Collective Intentionality Really Primitive?
    This paper offers a critical discussion of Searle's account of collective intentionality. It argues Bratman's alternative account avoids some of the shortcomings of Searle's account, over-intellectualizes collective intentionality and imposes an excessive cognitive burden on participating agents.Tthe capacities needed to sustain collective intentionality are examined in an attempt to show that we can preserve the gist of Bratman's account in a cognitively more parsimonious way.
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  30. added 2016-07-18
    Kirk Ludwig (1999). Meaning, Truth and Interpretation. In Ursula Zeglen (ed.), Discussions with Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning and Knowledge. 27-46.
    This paper distinguishes two projects in Davidson's theory of meaning, an initial project of providing a compositional meaning theory for a natural language for which a Tarski-style truth theory is pressed into service and an extended project that aims to illuminate the basis of meaning in its relation to the neutrally described behavioral evidence in terms of which an interpretive truth theory for a language can ultimately be confirmed, and then argues that having distinguished the two projects we can see (...)
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  31. added 2016-07-17
    Sergio Farias de SouzaFilho (2014). The Open-Endedness Objection Against Sophisticated Dispositionalism. Perspectiva Filosófica 41 (1):49-56.
    Sophisticated dispositionalism proposes a naturalist reduction of mental content by claiming that the semantic content of a mental symbol is determined by the causes of the occurrence of this symbol under ideal conditions, i.e., conditions under which only the referent of a symbol can cause its tokening. However, Paul Boghossian developed the open-endedness objection in order to show that it is not possible to specify these ideal conditions in non-semantic terms, entailing that the naturalist reduction of mental content proposed by (...)
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  32. added 2016-07-16
    Maarten Steenhagen (forthcoming). False Reflections. Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Philosophers and psychologists often assume that mirror reflections are optical illusions. According to many authors, what we see in a mirror appears to be behind it. I discuss two strategies to resist this piece of dogma. As I will show, the conviction that mirror reflections are illusions is rooted in a confused conception of the relations between location, direction, and visibility. This conception is unacceptable to those who take seriously the way in which mirrors contribute to our experience of the (...)
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  33. added 2016-07-16
    Finlay Malcolm & Michael Scott (forthcoming). Faith, Belief and Fictionalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Is propositional religious faith constituted by belief? Recent debate has focussed on whether faith may be constituted by a positive non-doxastic cognitive state, which can stand in place of belief. This paper sets out and defends the doxastic theory. We consider and reject three arguments commonly used in favour of non-doxastic theories of faith: (1) the argument from religious doubt; (2) the use of ‘faith’ in linguistic utterances; and (3) the possibility of pragmatic faith. We argue that belief is required (...)
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  34. added 2016-07-15
    John Robertson (1990). XV—Hume on Practical Reason. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90 (1):267-282.
  35. added 2016-07-14
    Paul Smart, Richard Heersmink & Robert Clowes (forthcoming). The Cognitive Ecology of the Internet. In Stephen Cowley & Frederic Vallée-Tourangeau (eds.), Cognition Beyond the Brain: Computation, Interactivity and Human Artifice (2nd ed.). Springer
    In this chapter, we analyze the relationships between the Internet and its users in terms of situated cognition theory. We first argue that the Internet is a new kind of cognitive ecology, providing almost constant access to a vast amount of digital information that is increasingly more integrated into our cognitive routines. We then briefly introduce situated cognition theory and its species of embedded, embodied, extended, distributed and collective cognition. Having thus set the stage, we begin by taking an embedded (...)
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  36. added 2016-07-14
    Santiago Echeverri (2016). Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Austere relationism rejects the orthodox analysis of hallucinations and illusions as incorrect perceptual representations. In this article, I argue that illusions of optimal motion present a serious challenge for this view. First, I submit that austere-relationist accounts of misleading experiences cannot be adapted to account for IOMs. Second, I show that any attempt at elucidating IOMs within an austere-relationist framework undermines the claim that perceptual experiences fundamentally involve relations to mind-independent objects. Third, I develop a representationalist model of IOMs. The (...)
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  37. added 2016-07-13
    Myrto Mylopoulos & Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). Agentive Phenomenology. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press
    In this chapter we reflect on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology – that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. Our discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 80s (section 1). As we will see, much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and philosophy draws motivation from this work, and the questions it raises. After discussing empirical (...)
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  38. added 2016-07-13
    François Kammerer (2016). Conscious Experiences as Ultimate Seemings: Renewing the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. Argumenta 1 (2):233-243.
    The Phenomenal Concept Strategy is a popular strategy used to support physicalism in the realm of conscious experience. This Strategy accounts for dualist intuitions but uses the ways in which we think about our experiences to explain these intuitions in a physicalist framework, without any appeal to ontological dualism. In this paper, I will raise two issues related to the currently available versions of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. First, most of the theories belonging to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy posit that (...)
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  39. added 2016-07-13
    Michael Cholbi (2016). Review of Cassam, "Self-Knowledge for Humans". [REVIEW] Philosophy 91 (3):441-46.
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  40. added 2016-07-13
    Robert Francescotti (2014). Physicalism and the Mind. Springer.
    This book addresses a tightly knit cluster of questions in the philosophy of mind. There is the question: Are mental properties identical with physical properties? An affirmative answer would seem to secure the truth of physicalism regarding the mind, i.e., the belief that all mental phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. If the answer is negative, then the question arises: Can this solely in virtue of relation be understood as some kind of dependence short of identity? And answering (...)
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  41. added 2016-07-12
    Lorenzo Sleakes, The Logic of Interactive Dualism.
    The assumption that known physical laws are sufficient for explaining mental phenomena is flawed from the outset. Qualities such as phenomenal redness do not exist within the known physical laws so by definition they are incomplete. Now assuming a new law was added that could explain how some physical property or vibration causes or is associated with phenomenal redness it would not be enough because it still wouldn’t explain how different qualities are bound together into a subjective unity. Assuming more (...)
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  42. added 2016-07-12
    Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti (forthcoming). Metaphilosophy in Practice: The Responsibility of Psychopathic Offenders as a Case Study. Anthropology and Philosophy.
    We argue that philosophy has an important role to play in bridging certain social practices with certain scientific advancements. Specifically, we describe such a role by focusing on the issue of how and whether neuropsychological data concerning psychopathic offenders reflect on their criminal culpability. We offer some methodological requirements for this type of philosophical application. In addition, we show how it might help in addressing the problem of determining the criminal responsibility of psychopathic offenders.
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  43. added 2016-07-12
    Pierre Jacob (1992). X—Externalism and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1):203-220.
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  44. added 2016-07-11
    Eric Marcus (forthcoming). To Believe is to Know That You Believe. Dialectica.
    Most agree that believing a proposition normally or ideally results in believing that one believes it, at least if one considers the question of whether one believes it. I defend a much stronger thesis. It is impossible to believe without knowledge of one’s belief. I argue, roughly, as follows. Believing that p entails that one is able to honestly assert that p. But anyone who is able to honestly assert that p is also able to just say—i.e., authoritatively, yet not (...)
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  45. added 2016-07-11
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). What is an Intention? Amazon Digital Services LLC.
    In this briskly written volume, a case is made that a value is a belief as to how one live one's life if one's psychological architecture is to retain its integrity, and a case is thereby made that intention is an operationalized value. This analysis makes it possible to distinguish between minds that do and minds that do not host selves. (Selves are minds that have values; minds that are not selves do not.) The relationship between weakness of the will (...)
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  46. added 2016-07-10
    John-Michael Kuczynski (unknown2016). What Are Emotions? Mazon Digital Services LLC.
    Scholars and laymen generally assume that emotions are not judgments---that whereas judgments are expressions of rationality, emotions are expressions of irrationality. In this concise volume, it is shown that emotions are in fact judgments, with the qualification that emotions are hewed to egocentric frame of reference, whereas garden-variety judgments are hewed to a non-egocentric frame of reference.
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  47. added 2016-07-10
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). Philosophical Foundations of Psychoanalysis and Psychiatry. Amazon Digital Services LLC.
    In this work, it is made clear: -/- (1) What it is to rationalize and how rationalization is possible; (2) What it is to repress and how repression is possible; (3) How internal conflict is possible, how it is related to anxiety and other affective states, and how internal conflict causes blindness; (4) Why it is that conceptualized self-awareness is repression-resistant (though not repression-proof) and non-conceptualized self-awareness is not repression-resistant; (5) How rationalization is necessary for repression and vice versa; (6) (...)
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  48. added 2016-07-10
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). Neurosis Vs. Psychosis: And Other Psychoanalytic Vignettes. JOHN-MICHAEL KUCZYNSKI.
    Some psychoanalytic truths are identified and some of their practical corollaries are identified.
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  49. added 2016-07-10
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). Two Kinds of Mental Illness. JOHN-MICHAEL KUCZYNSKI.
    Someone afflicted by mental illness is neurotic if he sees his symptoms as symptoms and psychotic if does not. A neurosis is therefore an 'ego-dystonic' mental illness, meaning that the viewpoint embodied in one's symptoms is not the viewpoint of the ego of the afflicted party. And a psychosis is therefore an 'ego-syntonic' illness, meaning that the viewpoint embodied in the symptoms coincides with that of the afflicted party's ego. Whereas ego-syntonic illnesses are unqualifiedly debilitating, ego-dystonic are sometimes adaptive and, (...)
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  50. added 2016-07-10
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). Obsessive Fear as Unconscious Desire. JOHN-MICHAEL KUCZYNSKI.
    Obsessive fears are unconscious desires. The woman who is obsessively afraid that her phone is tapped actually wants her phone to be tapped; that is, she wants someone to pay attention to her. A neurotic fear of such and such is actually an unconscious desire for such and such, this being the topic of this brutally honest exchange.
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1 — 50 / 202