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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Bourget and David Chalmers
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. Reginald B. Adams & Kestutis Kveraga (2015). Social Vision: Functional Forecasting and the Integration of Compound Social Cues. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):591-610.
    For decades the study of social perception was largely compartmentalized by type of social cue: race, gender, emotion, eye gaze, body language, facial expression etc. This was partly due to good scientific practice, and partly due to assumptions that each type of social cue was functionally distinct from others. Herein, we present a functional forecast approach to understanding compound social cue processing that emphasizes the importance of shared social affordances across various cues. We review the traditional theories of emotion and (...)
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    Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
     Explaining Consciousness?
     Consciousness and Materialism
     Theories of Consciousness
     Consciousness and Content
     Aspects of Consciousness
     Qualia
     Self-Consciousness
     Science of Consciousness
    Intentionality
     Propositional Attitudes
     Content Internalism and Externalism
     Naturalizing Mental Content
     The Nature of Contents
     Aspects of Intentionality
     Representation
     Concepts
     Intentionality, Misc
    Perception
     The Nature of Perceptual Experience
     The Perceptual Relation
     The Contents of Perception
     Sensory Modalities
     Science of Perception
     Perception and the Mind
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Perceptual Qualities
     Color
     Aspects of Perception
     Phil of Perception, General
    Metaphysics of Mind
     Physicalism about the Mind
     Dualism
     Behaviorism
     Functionalism
     Other Psychophysical Theories
     Psychophysical Reduction
     Other Psychophysical Relations
     Mental Causation
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Free Will
     Metaphysics of Mind, Misc
    Mental States and Processes
     Attention
     Belief
     Bodily Experience
     Desire
     Dreams
     Emotions
     Imagination
     Intuition
     Memory
     Mental Actions
     Mental Imagery
     Moral Psychology
     Pain
     Pleasure
     Temporal Experience
     Thought and Thinking
     Mental States, Misc
    Epistemology of Mind
     Self-Knowledge
     The Problem of Other Minds
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Epistemology of Mind, Misc
    Phil of Mind, Miscellaneous
     Phil of Mind, General Works
     Collective Mentality
     Phil of Mind, Misc
    Persons
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Puzzle Cases in Personal Identity
     The Self
     Personal Identity and Values
     Practical Identity
     Human Beings
     The Body
     History: Persons
     Persons, Misc
    Phil of Cognitive Science
     Phil of Artificial Intelligence
     Phil of Psychology
     Phil of Neuroscience
     Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Linguistics
     Phil of Psychiatry and Psychopathology
     Phil of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
     Science of Consciousness
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  2. Adrian Alsmith (2015). Mental Activity & the Sense of Ownership. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):881-896.
    I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that (...)
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    Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
     Explaining Consciousness?
     Consciousness and Materialism
     Theories of Consciousness
     Consciousness and Content
     Aspects of Consciousness
     Qualia
     Self-Consciousness
     Science of Consciousness
    Intentionality
     Propositional Attitudes
     Content Internalism and Externalism
     Naturalizing Mental Content
     The Nature of Contents
     Aspects of Intentionality
     Representation
     Concepts
     Intentionality, Misc
    Perception
     The Nature of Perceptual Experience
     The Perceptual Relation
     The Contents of Perception
     Sensory Modalities
     Science of Perception
     Perception and the Mind
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Perceptual Qualities
     Color
     Aspects of Perception
     Phil of Perception, General
    Metaphysics of Mind
     Physicalism about the Mind
     Dualism
     Behaviorism
     Functionalism
     Other Psychophysical Theories
     Psychophysical Reduction
     Other Psychophysical Relations
     Mental Causation
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Free Will
     Metaphysics of Mind, Misc
    Mental States and Processes
     Attention
     Belief
     Bodily Experience
     Desire
     Dreams
     Emotions
     Imagination
     Intuition
     Memory
     Mental Actions
     Mental Imagery
     Moral Psychology
     Pain
     Pleasure
     Temporal Experience
     Thought and Thinking
     Mental States, Misc
    Epistemology of Mind
     Self-Knowledge
     The Problem of Other Minds
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Epistemology of Mind, Misc
    Phil of Mind, Miscellaneous
     Phil of Mind, General Works
     Collective Mentality
     Phil of Mind, Misc
    Persons
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Puzzle Cases in Personal Identity
     The Self
     Personal Identity and Values
     Practical Identity
     Human Beings
     The Body
     History: Persons
     Persons, Misc
    Phil of Cognitive Science
     Phil of Artificial Intelligence
     Phil of Psychology
     Phil of Neuroscience
     Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Linguistics
     Phil of Psychiatry and Psychopathology
     Phil of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
     Science of Consciousness
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  3. Alon Chasid (forthcoming). Imaginative Content, Design-Assumptions and Immersion. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-14.
    In this paper, I will analyze certain aspects of imaginative content, namely the content of the representational mental state called “imagining.” I will show that fully accounting for imaginative content requires acknowledging that, in addition to imagining, an imaginative project—the overall mental activity we engage in when we imagine—includes another infrastructural component in terms of which content should be explained. I will then show that the phenomenon of imaginative immersion can partly be explained in terms of the proposed infrastructure of (...)
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    Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
     Explaining Consciousness?
     Consciousness and Materialism
     Theories of Consciousness
     Consciousness and Content
     Aspects of Consciousness
     Qualia
     Self-Consciousness
     Science of Consciousness
    Intentionality
     Propositional Attitudes
     Content Internalism and Externalism
     Naturalizing Mental Content
     The Nature of Contents
     Aspects of Intentionality
     Representation
     Concepts
     Intentionality, Misc
    Perception
     The Nature of Perceptual Experience
     The Perceptual Relation
     The Contents of Perception
     Sensory Modalities
     Science of Perception
     Perception and the Mind
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Perceptual Qualities
     Color
     Aspects of Perception
     Phil of Perception, General
    Metaphysics of Mind
     Physicalism about the Mind
     Dualism
     Behaviorism
     Functionalism
     Other Psychophysical Theories
     Psychophysical Reduction
     Other Psychophysical Relations
     Mental Causation
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Free Will
     Metaphysics of Mind, Misc
    Mental States and Processes
     Attention
     Belief
     Bodily Experience
     Desire
     Dreams
     Emotions
     Imagination
     Intuition
     Memory
     Mental Actions
     Mental Imagery
     Moral Psychology
     Pain
     Pleasure
     Temporal Experience
     Thought and Thinking
     Mental States, Misc
    Epistemology of Mind
     Self-Knowledge
     The Problem of Other Minds
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Epistemology of Mind, Misc
    Phil of Mind, Miscellaneous
     Phil of Mind, General Works
     Collective Mentality
     Phil of Mind, Misc
    Persons
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Puzzle Cases in Personal Identity
     The Self
     Personal Identity and Values
     Practical Identity
     Human Beings
     The Body
     History: Persons
     Persons, Misc
    Phil of Cognitive Science
     Phil of Artificial Intelligence
     Phil of Psychology
     Phil of Neuroscience
     Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Linguistics
     Phil of Psychiatry and Psychopathology
     Phil of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
     Science of Consciousness
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  4. Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (2001). Human Rationality and the Psychology of Reasoning: Where Do We Go From Here? British Journal of Psychology 92 (1):193-216.
    British psychologists have been at the forefront of research into human reasoning for 40 years. This article describes some past research milestones within this tradition before outlining the major theoretical positions developed in the UK. Most British reasoning researchers have contributed to one or more of these positions. We identify a common theme that is emerging in all these approaches, that is, the problem of explaining how prior general knowledge affects reasoning. In our concluding comments we outline the challenges for (...)
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    Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
     Explaining Consciousness?
     Consciousness and Materialism
     Theories of Consciousness
     Consciousness and Content
     Aspects of Consciousness
     Qualia
     Self-Consciousness
     Science of Consciousness
    Intentionality
     Propositional Attitudes
     Content Internalism and Externalism
     Naturalizing Mental Content
     The Nature of Contents
     Aspects of Intentionality
     Representation
     Concepts
     Intentionality, Misc
    Perception
     The Nature of Perceptual Experience
     The Perceptual Relation
     The Contents of Perception
     Sensory Modalities
     Science of Perception
     Perception and the Mind
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Perceptual Qualities
     Color
     Aspects of Perception
     Phil of Perception, General
    Metaphysics of Mind
     Physicalism about the Mind
     Dualism
     Behaviorism
     Functionalism
     Other Psychophysical Theories
     Psychophysical Reduction
     Other Psychophysical Relations
     Mental Causation
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Free Will
     Metaphysics of Mind, Misc
    Mental States and Processes
     Attention
     Belief
     Bodily Experience
     Desire
     Dreams
     Emotions
     Imagination
     Intuition
     Memory
     Mental Actions
     Mental Imagery
     Moral Psychology
     Pain
     Pleasure
     Temporal Experience
     Thought and Thinking
     Mental States, Misc
    Epistemology of Mind
     Self-Knowledge
     The Problem of Other Minds
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Epistemology of Mind, Misc
    Phil of Mind, Miscellaneous
     Phil of Mind, General Works
     Collective Mentality
     Phil of Mind, Misc
    Persons
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Puzzle Cases in Personal Identity
     The Self
     Personal Identity and Values
     Practical Identity
     Human Beings
     The Body
     History: Persons
     Persons, Misc
    Phil of Cognitive Science
     Phil of Artificial Intelligence
     Phil of Psychology
     Phil of Neuroscience
     Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Linguistics
     Phil of Psychiatry and Psychopathology
     Phil of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
     Science of Consciousness
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  5. Robert Cowan (2015). Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject’s perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception’s epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically ‘downgrades’ their experience. On the (...)
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    Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
     Explaining Consciousness?
     Consciousness and Materialism
     Theories of Consciousness
     Consciousness and Content
     Aspects of Consciousness
     Qualia
     Self-Consciousness
     Science of Consciousness
    Intentionality
     Propositional Attitudes
     Content Internalism and Externalism
     Naturalizing Mental Content
     The Nature of Contents
     Aspects of Intentionality
     Representation
     Concepts
     Intentionality, Misc
    Perception
     The Nature of Perceptual Experience
     The Perceptual Relation
     The Contents of Perception
     Sensory Modalities
     Science of Perception
     Perception and the Mind
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Perceptual Qualities
     Color
     Aspects of Perception
     Phil of Perception, General
    Metaphysics of Mind
     Physicalism about the Mind
     Dualism
     Behaviorism
     Functionalism
     Other Psychophysical Theories
     Psychophysical Reduction
     Other Psychophysical Relations
     Mental Causation
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Free Will
     Metaphysics of Mind, Misc
    Mental States and Processes
     Attention
     Belief
     Bodily Experience
     Desire
     Dreams
     Emotions
     Imagination
     Intuition
     Memory
     Mental Actions
     Mental Imagery
     Moral Psychology
     Pain
     Pleasure
     Temporal Experience
     Thought and Thinking
     Mental States, Misc
    Epistemology of Mind
     Self-Knowledge
     The Problem of Other Minds
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Epistemology of Mind, Misc
    Phil of Mind, Miscellaneous
     Phil of Mind, General Works
     Collective Mentality
     Phil of Mind, Misc
    Persons
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Puzzle Cases in Personal Identity
     The Self
     Personal Identity and Values
     Practical Identity
     Human Beings
     The Body
     History: Persons
     Persons, Misc
    Phil of Cognitive Science
     Phil of Artificial Intelligence
     Phil of Psychology
     Phil of Neuroscience
     Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Linguistics
     Phil of Psychiatry and Psychopathology
     Phil of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
     Science of Consciousness
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  6. Jonathan Evans (1984). Heuristic and Analytic Processes in Reasoning. British Journal of Psychology 75 (4):451-468.
    A general two-stage theory of human inference is proposed. A distinction is drawn between heuristic processes which select items of task information as ‘relevant’, and analytic processes which operate on the selected items to generate inferences or judgements. These two stages are illustrated in a selective review of work on both deductive and statistical reasoning. Factors identified as contributing to heuristic selection include perceptual salience, linguistic suppositions and semantic associations. Analytic processes are considered to be context dependent: people reason from (...)
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    Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
     Explaining Consciousness?
     Consciousness and Materialism
     Theories of Consciousness
     Consciousness and Content
     Aspects of Consciousness
     Qualia
     Self-Consciousness
     Science of Consciousness
    Intentionality
     Propositional Attitudes
     Content Internalism and Externalism
     Naturalizing Mental Content
     The Nature of Contents
     Aspects of Intentionality
     Representation
     Concepts
     Intentionality, Misc
    Perception
     The Nature of Perceptual Experience
     The Perceptual Relation
     The Contents of Perception
     Sensory Modalities
     Science of Perception
     Perception and the Mind
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Perceptual Qualities
     Color
     Aspects of Perception
     Phil of Perception, General
    Metaphysics of Mind
     Physicalism about the Mind
     Dualism
     Behaviorism
     Functionalism
     Other Psychophysical Theories
     Psychophysical Reduction
     Other Psychophysical Relations
     Mental Causation
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Free Will
     Metaphysics of Mind, Misc
    Mental States and Processes
     Attention
     Belief
     Bodily Experience
     Desire
     Dreams
     Emotions
     Imagination
     Intuition
     Memory
     Mental Actions
     Mental Imagery
     Moral Psychology
     Pain
     Pleasure
     Temporal Experience
     Thought and Thinking
     Mental States, Misc
    Epistemology of Mind
     Self-Knowledge
     The Problem of Other Minds
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Epistemology of Mind, Misc
    Phil of Mind, Miscellaneous
     Phil of Mind, General Works
     Collective Mentality
     Phil of Mind, Misc
    Persons
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Puzzle Cases in Personal Identity
     The Self
     Personal Identity and Values
     Practical Identity
     Human Beings
     The Body
     History: Persons
     Persons, Misc
    Phil of Cognitive Science
     Phil of Artificial Intelligence
     Phil of Psychology
     Phil of Neuroscience
     Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Linguistics
     Phil of Psychiatry and Psychopathology
     Phil of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
     Science of Consciousness
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  7. Anna Farennikova (2015). Perception of Absence and Penetration From Expectation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):621-640.
    I argue that perception of absence presents a top-down effect from expectations on perception, but then show that this cognitive effect is atypical and indirect. This calls into question usefulness of some of the existing notions of cognitive penetrability of perception and generates new questions about indirect cognitive influences on perception.
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    Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
     Explaining Consciousness?
     Consciousness and Materialism
     Theories of Consciousness
     Consciousness and Content
     Aspects of Consciousness
     Qualia
     Self-Consciousness
     Science of Consciousness
    Intentionality
     Propositional Attitudes
     Content Internalism and Externalism
     Naturalizing Mental Content
     The Nature of Contents
     Aspects of Intentionality
     Representation
     Concepts
     Intentionality, Misc
    Perception
     The Nature of Perceptual Experience
     The Perceptual Relation
     The Contents of Perception
     Sensory Modalities
     Science of Perception
     Perception and the Mind
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Perceptual Qualities
     Color
     Aspects of Perception
     Phil of Perception, General
    Metaphysics of Mind
     Physicalism about the Mind
     Dualism
     Behaviorism
     Functionalism
     Other Psychophysical Theories
     Psychophysical Reduction
     Other Psychophysical Relations
     Mental Causation
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Free Will
     Metaphysics of Mind, Misc
    Mental States and Processes
     Attention
     Belief
     Bodily Experience
     Desire
     Dreams
     Emotions
     Imagination
     Intuition
     Memory
     Mental Actions
     Mental Imagery
     Moral Psychology
     Pain
     Pleasure
     Temporal Experience
     Thought and Thinking
     Mental States, Misc
    Epistemology of Mind
     Self-Knowledge
     The Problem of Other Minds
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Epistemology of Mind, Misc
    Phil of Mind, Miscellaneous
     Phil of Mind, General Works
     Collective Mentality
     Phil of Mind, Misc
    Persons
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Puzzle Cases in Personal Identity
     The Self
     Personal Identity and Values
     Practical Identity
     Human Beings
     The Body
     History: Persons
     Persons, Misc
    Phil of Cognitive Science
     Phil of Artificial Intelligence
     Phil of Psychology
     Phil of Neuroscience
     Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Linguistics
     Phil of Psychiatry and Psychopathology
     Phil of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
     Science of Consciousness
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  8. Shaun Gallagher (2015). Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):865-879.
    This article addresses questions about the sense of agency and its distinction from the sense of ownership in the context of understanding schizophrenic thought insertion. In contrast to “standard” approaches that identify problems with the sense of agency as central to thought insertion, two recent proposals argue that it is more correct to think that the problem concerns the subject’s sense of ownership. This view involves a “more demanding” concept of the sense of ownership that, I will argue, ultimately depends (...)
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    Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
     Explaining Consciousness?
     Consciousness and Materialism
     Theories of Consciousness
     Consciousness and Content
     Aspects of Consciousness
     Qualia
     Self-Consciousness
     Science of Consciousness
    Intentionality
     Propositional Attitudes
     Content Internalism and Externalism
     Naturalizing Mental Content
     The Nature of Contents
     Aspects of Intentionality
     Representation
     Concepts
     Intentionality, Misc
    Perception
     The Nature of Perceptual Experience
     The Perceptual Relation
     The Contents of Perception
     Sensory Modalities
     Science of Perception
     Perception and the Mind
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Perceptual Qualities
     Color
     Aspects of Perception
     Phil of Perception, General
    Metaphysics of Mind
     Physicalism about the Mind
     Dualism
     Behaviorism
     Functionalism
     Other Psychophysical Theories
     Psychophysical Reduction
     Other Psychophysical Relations
     Mental Causation
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Free Will
     Metaphysics of Mind, Misc
    Mental States and Processes
     Attention
     Belief
     Bodily Experience
     Desire
     Dreams
     Emotions
     Imagination
     Intuition
     Memory
     Mental Actions
     Mental Imagery
     Moral Psychology
     Pain
     Pleasure
     Temporal Experience
     Thought and Thinking
     Mental States, Misc
    Epistemology of Mind
     Self-Knowledge
     The Problem of Other Minds
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Epistemology of Mind, Misc
    Phil of Mind, Miscellaneous
     Phil of Mind, General Works
     Collective Mentality
     Phil of Mind, Misc
    Persons
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Puzzle Cases in Personal Identity
     The Self
     Personal Identity and Values
     Practical Identity
     Human Beings
     The Body
     History: Persons
     Persons, Misc
    Phil of Cognitive Science
     Phil of Artificial Intelligence
     Phil of Psychology
     Phil of Neuroscience
     Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Linguistics
     Phil of Psychiatry and Psychopathology
     Phil of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
     Science of Consciousness
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  9. Rachel Goodman (forthcoming). Against the Mental Files Conception of Singular Thought. Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2):1-25.
    It has become popular of late to identify the phenomenon of thinking a singular thought with that of thinking with a mental file. Proponents of the mental files conception of singular thought claim that one thinks a singular thought about an object o iff one employs a mental file to think about o. I argue that this is false by arguing that there are what I call descriptive mental files, so some file-based thought is not singular thought. Descriptive mental files (...)
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    Phil of Consciousness
     Phil of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
     Explaining Consciousness?
     Consciousness and Materialism
     Theories of Consciousness
     Consciousness and Content
     Aspects of Consciousness
     Qualia
     Self-Consciousness
     Science of Consciousness
    Intentionality
     Propositional Attitudes
     Content Internalism and Externalism
     Naturalizing Mental Content
     The Nature of Contents
     Aspects of Intentionality
     Representation
     Concepts
     Intentionality, Misc
    Perception
     The Nature of Perceptual Experience
     The Perceptual Relation
     The Contents of Perception
     Sensory Modalities
     Science of Perception
     Perception and the Mind
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Perceptual Qualities
     Color
     Aspects of Perception
     Phil of Perception, General
    Metaphysics of Mind
     Physicalism about the Mind
     Dualism
     Behaviorism
     Functionalism
     Other Psychophysical Theories
     Psychophysical Reduction
     Other Psychophysical Relations
     Mental Causation
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Free Will
     Metaphysics of Mind, Misc
    Mental States and Processes
     Attention
     Belief
     Bodily Experience
     Desire
     Dreams
     Emotions
     Imagination
     Intuition
     Memory
     Mental Actions
     Mental Imagery
     Moral Psychology
     Pain
     Pleasure
     Temporal Experience
     Thought and Thinking
     Mental States, Misc
    Epistemology of Mind
     Self-Knowledge
     The Problem of Other Minds
     Perceptual Knowledge
     Epistemology of Mind, Misc
    Phil of Mind, Miscellaneous
     Phil of Mind, General Works
     Collective Mentality
     Phil of Mind, Misc
    Persons
     Theories of Personal Identity
     Puzzle Cases in Personal Identity
     The Self
     Personal Identity and Values
     Practical Identity
     Human Beings
     The Body
     History: Persons
     Persons, Misc
    Phil of Cognitive Science
     Phil of Artificial Intelligence
     Phil of Psychology
     Phil of Neuroscience
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  10. Rachel Goodman (2016). Against the Mental Files Conception of Singular Thought. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):437-461.
    It has become popular of late to identify the phenomenon of thinking a singular thought with that of thinking with a mental file. Proponents of the mental files conception of singular thought claim that one thinks a singular thought about an object o iff one employs a mental file to think about o. I argue that this is false by arguing that there are what I call descriptive mental files, so some file-based thought is not singular thought. Descriptive mental files (...)
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  11. Aidan Gray (2016). Minimal Descriptivism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):343-364.
    Call an account of names satisfactionalist if it holds that object o is the referent of name a in virtue of o’s satisfaction of a descriptive condition associated with a. Call an account of names minimally descriptivistif it holds that if a competent speaker finds ‘a=b’ to be informative, then she must associate some information with ‘a’ which she does not associate with ‘b’. The rejection of both positions is part of the Kripkean orthodoxy, and is also built into extant (...)
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  12. Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma & David Rose (forthcoming). Following the FAD: Folk Attributions and Theories of Actual Causation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    In the last decade, several researchers have proposed theories of actual causation that make use of structural equations and directed graphs. Many of these researchers are committed to a widely-endorsed folk attribution desideratum, according to which an important constraint on the acceptability of a theory of actual causation is agreement between the deliverances of the theory with respect to specific cases and the reports of untutored individuals about those same cases. In the present article, we consider a small collection of (...)
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  13. Gary Lupyan (2015). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in the Age of Prediction: Predictive Systems Are Penetrable Systems. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):547-569.
    The goal of perceptual systems is to allow organisms to adaptively respond to ecologically relevant stimuli. Because all perceptual inputs are ambiguous, perception needs to rely on prior knowledge accumulated over evolutionary and developmental time to turn sensory energy into information useful for guiding behavior. It remains controversial whether the guidance of perception extends to cognitive states or is locked up in a “cognitively impenetrable” part of perception. I argue that expectations, knowledge, and task demands can shape perception at multiple (...)
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  14. Gary Lupyan (2015). Reply to Macpherson: Further Illustrations of the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):585-589.
    My reply to Macpherson begins by addressing whether it is effects of cognition on early vision or perceptual performance that I am interested in. I proceed to address Macpherson’s comments on evidence from cross-modal effects, interpretations of linguistic effects on image detection, evidence from illusions, and the usefulness of predictive coding for understanding cognitive penetration. By stressing the interactive and distributed nature of neural processing, I am committing to a collapse between perception and cognition. Following such a collapse, the very (...)
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  15. Francesco Marchi (2015). Cognitive Penetrability of Social Perception: A Case for Emotion Recognition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):617-620.
    Adams & Kveraga argue that social visual perception is cognitively penetrable by extending a top-down model for visual object recognition to visual perception of social cues. Here I suggest that, in their view, a clear link between the top-down contextual influences that modulate social visual perception and the perceptual experience of a subject is missing. Without such a link their proposal is consistent with explanations that need not involve cognitive penetration of perceptual experience but only modifications of perceptual judgments formed (...)
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  16. Vivian Mizrahi (forthcoming). Just a Matter of Taste. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    According to an ordinary view, we distinguish, classify, and appreciate food and beverages according to their taste. However, scientists seem to disagree with this naive view. They maintain that we don't really perceive the lemony taste of a cake or the delicate smoky taste of a single-malt whiskey, because what we ascribe to taste is in reality mostly perceived by smell. As opposed to this scientific consensus regarding taste, I will defend a naive view of taste and deny that olfaction (...)
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  17. Michelle Montague (2013). Intentionality. In Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage
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  18. Michael Murez & François Recanati (2016). Mental Files: An Introduction. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):265-281.
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  19. Myrto Mylopoulos & Elisabeth Pacherie (forthcoming). Intentions and Motor Representations: The Interface Challenge. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    A full account of purposive action must appeal not only to propositional attitude states like beliefs, desires, and intentions, but also to motor representations, i.e., non-propositional states that are thought to represent, among other things, action outcomes as well as detailed kinematic features of bodily movements. This raises the puzzle of how it is that these two distinct types of state successfully coordinate. We examine this so-called “Interface Problem”. First, we clarify and expand on the nature and role of motor (...)
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  20. Josef Perner & Brian Leahy (2016). Mental Files in Development: Dual Naming, False Belief, Identity and Intensionality. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):491-508.
    We use mental files to present an analysis of children's developing understanding of identity in alternative naming tasks and belief. The core assumption is that younger children below the age of about 4 years create different files for an object depending on how the object is individuated. They can anchor them to the same object, hence think of the same object whether they think of it as a rabbit or as an animal. However, the claim is, they cannot yet link (...)
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  21. Joëlle Proust (2015). Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):717-743.
    Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed (...)
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  22. Aaron Schurger & Sebo Uithol (2015). Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):761-778.
    The idea that intentions make the difference between voluntary and non-voluntary behaviors is simple and intuitive. At the same time, we lack an understanding of how voluntary actions actually come about, and the unquestioned appeal to intentions as discrete causes of actions offers little if anything in the way of an answer. We cite evidence suggesting that the origin of actions varies depending on context and effector, and argue that actions emerge from a causal web in the brain, rather than (...)
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  23. András Szigeti (2015). Why Change the Subject? On Collective Epistemic Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):843-864.
    This paper argues that group attitudes can be assessed in terms of standards of rationality and that group-level rationality need not be due to individual-level rationality. But it also argues that groups cannot be collective epistemic agents and are not collectively responsible for collective irrationality. I show that we do not need the concept of collective epistemic agency to explain how group-level irrationality can arise. Group-level irrationality arises because even rational individuals can fail to reason about how their attitudes will (...)
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  24. Alexandros Tillas, Gottfried Vosgerau, Tim Seuchter & Silvano Zipoli Caiani (forthcoming). Can Affordances Explain Behavior? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    In this paper we secure the explanatory value of affordances by treating them as relational properties and as inherently linked to unintentional movements and possible intentional actions. We distinguish between Basic affordances, which are related to unintentional movements, and Complex affordances, which are subjective and executively controlled by individuals. The linkage between affordances and motor intentions allows for accounting for the infinite number of affordances that any given object potentially has. Appealing to objective systematic contingencies that provide the actor with (...)
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  25. Peter B. Todd, A Copernican Revolution in Science and Religion Towards a Third Millennium Spirituality:The Entangled State of God and Humanity. Symposium Conference Paper, C. G. Jung Society of Melbourne, May 21, 2016.
    As the title, The Entangled State of God and Humanity suggests, this lecture dispenses with the pre-Copernican, patriarchal, anthropomorphic image of God while presenting a case for a third millennium theology illuminated by insights from archetypal depth psychology, quantum physics, neuroscience and evolutionary biology. It attempts to smash the conceptual barriers between science and religion and in so doing, it may contribute to a Copernican revolution which reconciles both perspectives which have been apparently irreconcilable opposites since the sixteenth century. The (...)
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  26. Josefa Toribio (2015). Social Vision: Breaking a Philosophical Impasse? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):611-615.
    I argue that findings in support of Adams and Kveraga’s functional forecast model of emotion expression processing help settle the debate between rich and sparse views of the content of perceptual experience. In particular, I argue that these results in social vision suggest that the distinctive phenomenal character of experiences involving high-level properties such as emotions and social traits is best explained by their being visually experienced as opposed to being brought about by perceptual judgments.
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  27. Jona Vance (2015). Cognitive Penetration and the Tribunal of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):641-663.
    Perception purports to help you gain knowledge of the world even if the world is not the way you expected it to be. Perception also purports to be an independent tribunal against which you can test your beliefs. It is natural to think that in order to serve these and other central functions, perceptual representations must not causally depend on your prior beliefs and expectations. In this paper, I clarify and then argue against the natural thought above. All perceptual systems (...)
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  28. Tillmann Vierkant (2015). Is Willpower Just Another Way of Tying Oneself to the Mast? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):779-790.
    This paper argues against the intuition that willpower and so called ‘tying to the mast’ strategies are fundamentally different types of mental actions to achieve self control. The argument for this surprising claim is that at least on the most plausible account of willpower an act of willpower consists in an intentional mental action that disables the mental agent and thereby creates a mental tie. The paper then defends this claim against the objection that tying to the mast strategies do (...)
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  29. Alberto Voltolini (2016). Tim Crane, The Objects of Thought. Dialectica 70 (2):245-252.
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