@book{RossKincaidSpurrett2010-WIA, author = {Collins Spurrett Kincaid Ross }, title = {What is Addiction?}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2010}, } @incollection{AMJeannotte2010-AMJNAA, author = {K. N. Schiller A. M. Jeannotte and E. G. DeRenzo L. M. Reeves and D. K. McBride}, booktitle = {Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics}, title = {Neurotechnology as a public good}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, } @unpublished{AllhoffManuscript-ALLNAM, author = {Fritz Allhoff}, abstract = {In \textquotedblleft{}Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge In- The assumption at issue here is the assumption that the formed by Genetics,\textquotedblright Judy Illes and Eric Racine (see this ismind literally is the brain (i.e., is numerically identical to sue) argue that \textquotedblleft{}traditional bioethics analysis\textquotedblright (TBA), as de-.}, title = {Neuroscience and metaphysics}, } @book{Aydede2005-AYDPNE, author = {Murat Aydede}, title = {Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2005}, } @book{Baldwin1940-BALDOP-2, author = {James Mark Baldwin}, title = {Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Including Many of the Principal Conceptions of Ethics, Logic, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Religion, Mental Pathology, Anthropology, Biology, Neurology, Physiology, Economics, Political and Social Philosophy, Philology, Physical Science, and Education, and Giving a Terminology in English, French, German, and Italian}, publisher = {New York, P. Smith}, year = {1940}, } @article{Bara2001-BARNEC, author = {Bruno G. Bara and Ilaria Cutica and Maurizio Tirassa}, abstract = {This work is concerned with the decay of communicative abilities after head trauma. A protocol composed of 16 videotaped scenes was devised in order to investigate the comprehension of several types of communicative actions realized with extralinguistic means, like pointing or clapping. The protocol was administered to 30 closed head injured individuals. The results showed a decreasing performance from simple standard acts, to complex standard acts, deceits, and ironies. The subjects' performance was worse with the scenes reproducing failing, rather than successful, communicative actions. The results are compared with those we previously obtained with a linguistic protocol. A theory of the cognitive processes underlying intentional communication is outlined and used to explain the results.}, title = {Neuropragmatics: Extralinguistic communication after closed head injury}, journal = {Cogprints}, year = {2001}, } @article{Bara2000-BARNBA, author = {Bruno G. Bara and Maurizio Tirassa}, abstract = {There is no abstract for this paper}, title = {Neuropragmatics: Brain and communication}, journal = {Cogprints}, year = {2000}, } @article{Bara1997-BARNNC, author = {Bruno G. Bara and Maurizio Tirassa and Marina Zettin}, abstract = {We are interested in the validation of a cognitive theory of human communication, grounded in a speech acts perspective. The theory we refer to is outlined, and a number of predictions are drawn from it. We report a series of protocols administered to 13 brain-injured subjects and to a comparable control group. The tasks included direct and indirect speech acts, irony, deceits, failures of communication, and theory of mind inferences. All the predicted trends of difficulty are consistently verified; in particular, difficulty increases from direct/indirect speech acts to irony, from irony to deceits, and from deceits to failure recovery. This trend symmetrically shows both in the successful situation and in the failure situation. Further, failure situations prove more difficult to handle than the relevant successful situation. In sharp contrast with previous literature, there is no difference between the subjects' comprehension of direct and indirect speech acts. The results are discussed in the light of our theoretical approach.}, title = {Neuropragmatics: Neuropsychological constraints on formal theories of dialogue}, journal = {Cogprints}, year = {1997}, } @book{Brook2005-BROCAT, author = {Andrew Brook and Kathleen Akins}, abstract = {This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in this volume are clustered around five major themes: data and theory in neuroscience; neural representation and computation; visuomotor transformations; color vision; and consciousness}, title = {Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2005}, } @incollection{Churchland2010-CHUTAC, author = {P. M. Churchland}, booktitle = {Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics}, title = {Toward a cognitive neurobiology of the moral virtues}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, } @book{ClaytonForthcoming-CLATOH, author = {Philip Clayton}, title = {The Oxford Handbook of Science and Religion}, publisher = {Oup}, year = {forthcoming}, } @article{ColomboForthcoming-COLHAI, author = {Matteo Colombo}, abstract = {According to John Haugeland, the capacity for \textquotedblleft{}authentic intentionality\textquotedblright depends on a commitment to constitutive standards of objectivity. One of the consequences of Haugeland\textquoteright{}s view is that a neurocomputational explanation cannot be adequate to understand \textquotedblleft{}authentic intentionality\textquotedblright. This paper gives grounds to resist such a consequence. It provides the beginning of an account of authentic intentionality in terms of neurocomputational enabling conditions. It argues that the standards, which constitute the domain of objects that can be represented, reflect the statistical structure of the environments where brain sensory systems evolved and develop. The objection that I equivocate on what Haugeland means by \textquotedblleft{}commitment to standards\textquotedblright is rebutted by introducing the notion of \textquotedblleft{}florid, self-conscious representing\textquotedblright. Were the hypothesis presented plausible, computational neuroscience would offer a promising framework for a better understanding of the conditions for meaningful representation.}, title = {How \textquotedblleft{}authentic intentionality\textquotedblright can be enabled: A neurocomputational hypothesis}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {forthcoming}, } @incollection{Crawford2010-CRATLO-2, author = {M. B. Crawford}, booktitle = {Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics}, title = {The limits of neuro-talk}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, } @article{Dyck2009-DYCTEE, volume = {37}, number = {4}, author = {Arthur J. Dyck and Carlos Padilla}, abstract = {In Joseph Butler, we have an account of human beings as moral beings that is, as this essay demonstrates, being supported by the recently emerging findings of the neurosciences. This applies particularly to Butler's portrayal of our empathic emotions. Butler discovered their moral significance for motivating and guiding moral decisions and actions before the neurosciences did. Butler has, in essence, added a sixth sense to our five senses: this is the moral sense by means of which we perceive what we ought or ought not do. The moral sense yields relatively reliable moral perceptions when we love our neighbors as ourselves, and when our love for ourselves is genuine. Accurate moral perceptions will be thwarted by self-deceit---{}that is, by a self-partiality devoid of neighbor love, a condition that thwarts genuine self-love. This essay explores the parallels between Butler's understanding of self-deceit and Robert J. Lifton's understanding of "doubling.".}, title = {The empathic emotions and self-love in Bishop Joseph Butler and the neurosciences}, journal = {Journal of Religious Ethics}, year = {2009}, pages = {577-612}, } @book{Ellis2000-ELLTCO, author = {Ralph D. Ellis}, title = {The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, year = {2000}, } @book{Ferretti2007-FERCOT-2, author = {Francesco Ferretti and Massimo Marraffa and Mario De Caro}, title = {Cartographies of the Mind: The Interface between Philosophy and Cognitive Science}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2007}, } @article{Figdor2010-FIGNAT, volume = {77}, number = {3}, author = {Carrie Figdor}, abstract = {Many empirically minded philosophers have used neuroscientific data to argue against the multiple realization of cognitive functions in existing biological organisms. I argue that neuroscientists themselves have proposed a biologically based concept of multiple realization as an alternative to interpreting empirical findings in terms of one{}to{}one structure{}function mappings. I introduce this concept and its associated research framework and also how some of the main neuroscience{}based arguments against multiple realization go wrong. *Received October 2009; revised December 2009. \dag{}To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, 260 English{}Philosophy Building, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242; e{}mail: carrie{}figdor@uiowa.edu.}, title = {Neuroscience and the multiple realization of cognitive functions}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2010}, } @incollection{FitzGerald2010-FITNAE, author = {K. FitzGerald and R. Wurzman}, booktitle = {Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics}, title = {Neurogenetics and ethics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, } @book{Gazzaniga1995-GAZTCN, author = {Michael S. Gazzaniga}, abstract = {The third edition of a work that defines the field of cognitive neuroscience, with extensive new material including new chapters and new contributors.}, title = {The Cognitive Neurosciences}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1995}, } @book{Hall2010-HALWFP, author = {Stephen S. Hall}, abstract = {Wisdom defined (sort of) What is wisdom? ; The wisest man in the world : the philosophical roots of wisdom ; Heart and mind : the psychological roots of wisdom -- Eight neural pillars of wisdom. Emotional regulation : the art of coping ; Knowing what's important : the neural mechanism of establishing value and making a judgment ; Moral reasoning : the biology of judging right from wrong ; Compassion : the biology of loving-kindness and empathy ; Humility : the gift of perspective ; Altruism : social justice, fairness, and the wisdom of punishment ; Patience : temptation, delayed gratification, and the biology of learning to wait for larger rewards ; Dealing with uncertainty : change, "meta-wisdom," and the vulcanization of the human brain -- Becoming wise. Youth, adversity, and resilience : the seeds of wisdom ; Older and wiser : the wisdom of aging ; Classroom, board room, bedroom, back room : everyday wisdom in our everyday world ; Dare to be wise : does wisdom have a future?}, title = {Wisdom: From Philosophy to Neuroscience}, publisher = {Alfred A. Knopf}, year = {2010}, } @unpublished{Jamieson2007-JAMHAC, author = {Graham A. Jamieson}, title = {Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective}, year = {2007}, } @article{Jeffers2010-JEFASL, volume = {44}, number = {2}, author = {Carol S. Jeffers}, title = {A still life is really a moving life: The role of mirror neurons and empathy in animating aesthetic response}, journal = {Journal of Aesthetic Education}, year = {2010}, pages = {pp. 31-39}, } @incollection{Jensen2010-JENLAA, author = {Jeppe Sinding Jensen}, booktitle = {Religious Narrative, Cognition, and Culture: Image and Word in the Mind of Narrative}, title = {Language as an emergent function : Some radical neurological and evolutionary implications}, publisher = {Equinox Pub. Ltd.}, year = {2010}, } @article{Klein2010-KLEIAN, volume = {61}, number = {2}, author = {Colin Klein}, abstract = {fMRI promises to uncover the functional structure of the brain. I argue, however, that pictures of \textquoteleft{}brain activity' associated with fMRI experiments are poor evidence for functional claims. These neuroimages present the results of null hypothesis significance tests performed on fMRI data. Significance tests alone cannot provide evidence about the functional structure of causally dense systems, including the brain. Instead, neuroimages should be seen as indicating regions where further data analysis is warranted. This additional analysis rarely involves simple significance testing, and so justified skepticism about neuroimages does not provide reason for skepticism about fMRI more generally. 1 Introduction 2 Neuroimages Are Statistical Maps 3 The Skeptical Argument 3.1 Evidence and neuroimages 3.2 The problem of causal density 3.3 The problem of arbitrary thresholds 3.4 The problem of vague alternatives 4 Skepticism Is Due to NHST 5 Neuroimages versus Neuroimaging CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?}, title = {Images are not the evidence in neuroimaging}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2010}, } @incollection{Kohls2010-KOHTOO-2, author = {N. Kohls and R. Benedikter}, booktitle = {Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics}, title = {The origins of the modern concept of "neuroscience"}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, } @book{Lane2000-LANCNO-2, author = {Richard D. R. Lane and L. Nadel and G. L. Ahern}, title = {Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Series in Affective Science}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2000}, } @book{Lane2000-LANCNO, author = {Richard D. R. Lane and L. Nadel and G. L. Ahern and J. Allen and Alfred W. Kaszniak}, abstract = {This book, a member of the Series in Affective Science, is a unique interdisciplinary sequence of articles on the cognitive neuroscience of emotion by some of ...}, title = {Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2000}, } @book{Laureys2006-LAUTBO, author = {Steven Laureys}, abstract = {The interest of this is threefold.}, title = {The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {2006}, } @article{Lewis2005-LEWAED, volume = {28}, number = {2}, author = {Marc D. Lewis}, abstract = {The target article developed a dynamic systems framework that viewed the causal basis of emotion as a self-organizing process giving rise to cognitive appraisal concurrently. Commentators on the article evaluated this framework and the principles and mechanisms it incorporated. They also suggested additional principles, mechanisms, modeling strategies, and phenomena related to emotion and appraisal, in place of or extending from those already proposed. There was general agreement that nonlinear causal processes are fundamental to the psychology and neurobiology of emotion.}, title = {An emerging dialogue among social scientists and neuroscientists on the causal bases of emotion}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {223-234}, } @article{Lewis2005-LEWBET, volume = {28}, number = {2}, author = {Marc D. Lewis}, abstract = {Efforts to bridge emotion theory with neurobiology can be facilitated by dynamic systems (DS) modeling. DS principles stipulate higher-order wholes emerging from lower-order constituents through bidirectional causal processes -- offering a common language for psychological and neurobiological models. After identifying some limitations of mainstream emotion theory, I apply DS principles to emotion--{}cognition relations. I then present a psychological model based on this reconceptualization, identifying trigger, self-amplification, and self-stabilization phases of emotion-appraisal states, leading to consolidating traits. The article goes on to describe neural structures and functions involved in appraisal and emotion, as well as DS mechanisms of integration by which they interact. These mechanisms include nested feedback interactions, global effects of neuromodulation, vertical integration, action-monitoring, and synaptic plasticity, and they are modeled in terms of both functional integration and temporal synchronization. I end by elaborating the psychological model of emotion--{}appraisal states with reference to neural processes. Key Words: appraisal; bidirectional causality; cognition; dynamic systems; emotion; neurobiology; part--{}whole relations; self-organization.}, title = {Bridging emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic systems modeling}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {169-194}, } @unpublished{LiebermanManuscript-LIESCN, author = {Matthew D. Lieberman}, abstract = {Social cognitive neuroscience examines social phenomena and processes using cognitive neuroscience research tools such as neuroimaging and neuropsychology. This review examines four broad areas of research within social cognitive neuroscience: (a) understanding others, (b) understanding oneself, (c) controlling oneself, and (d) the processes that occur at the interface of self and others. In addition, this review highlights two core-processing distinctions that can be neurocognitively identified across all of these domains. The distinction between automatic versus controlled processes has long been important to social psychological theory and can be dissociated in the neural regions contributing to social cognition. Alternatively, the differentiation between internally-focused processes that focus on one's own or another's mental interior and externally-focused processes that focus on one's own or another's visible features and actions is a new distinction. This latter distinction emerges from social cognitive neuroscience investigations rather than from existing psychological theories demonstrating that social cognitive neuroscience can both draw on and contribute to social psychological theory.}, title = {Social cognitive neuroscience: A review of core processes}, } @article{Lizardo2007-LIZMNC, volume = {37}, number = {3}, author = {Omar Lizardo}, title = {"Mirror neurons," collective objects and the problem of transmission: Reconsidering Stephen Turner's critique of practice theory}, journal = {Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour}, year = {2007}, pages = {319--{}350}, } @book{Locher2007-LOCEAN, author = {Paul Locher}, abstract = {In this book, well-known scholars describe new and exciting approaches to aesthetics, creativity, and psychology of the arts, approaching these topics from a point of view that is biological or related to biology and answering new questions with new methods and theories. All known societies produce and enjoy arts such as literature, music, and visual decoration or depiction. Judging from prehistoric archaeological evidence, this arose very early in human development. Furthermore, Darwin was explicit in attributing aesthetic sensitivity to lower animals. These considerations lead us to wonder whether the arts might not be evolutionarily based. Although such an evolutionary basis is not obvious on the face of it, the idea has recently elicited considerable attention. The book begins with a consideration of ten theories on the evolutionary function of the arts, and this is followed by several chapters that consider the possible evolutionary function of specific arts such as music and literature. The theory of evolution was first drawn up in biology, but evolution is not confined to biology: genuinely evolutionary theories of sociocultural change can be formulated. That they need to be formulated is shown in several chapters that discuss regular trends in literature and scientific writings. Psychologists have recently rediscovered the obvious fact that thought and perception occur in the brain, so cognitive science moves ever closer to neuroscience. Several chapters give overviews of neurocognitive and neural network approaches to creativity and aesthetic appreciation. The book concludes with two exciting chapters describing brain-scan research on what happens in the brain during creativity and presenting a close examination of the relationship between genetically transmitted mental disorder and creativity.}, title = {Evolutionary And Neurocognitive Approaches to Aesthetics, Creativity And the Arts}, publisher = {Baywood Publishing Company}, year = {2007}, } @unpublished{LogothetisManuscript-LOGNV, author = {Nikos Logothetis}, abstract = {- selected Article Figures/Tables References Purchase PDF (2699 K) doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.09.038..}, title = {Neuroimage volume 39, issue , 1 february 2008, pages 1081-1093 Font size:}, } @article{Lohmar2006-LOHMNA, volume = {5}, number = {1}, author = {Dieter Lohmar}, abstract = {The neurological discovery of mirror neurons is of eminent importance for the phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity. G. Rizzolatti and V. Gallese found in experiments with primates that a set of neurons in the premotor cortex represents the visually registered movements of another animal. The activity of these mirror neurons presents exactly the same pattern of activity as appears in the movement of one's own body. These findings may be extended to other cognitive and emotive functions in humans. I show how these neurological findings might be \textquotedblleft{}translated\textquotedblright phenomenologically into our own experienced sensations, feelings and volitions}, title = {Mirror neurons and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year = {2006}, pages = {5-16}, } @article{Lohmar2005-LOHOTF, volume = {4}, number = {2}, author = {Dieter Lohmar}, abstract = {Weak phantasmata have a decisive and specifically transcendental function in our everyday perception. This paper provides several different arguments for this claim based on evidence from both empirical psychology and phenomenology.}, title = {On the function of weak phantasmata in perception: Phenomenological, psychological and neurological clues for the transcendental function of imagination in perception}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year = {2005}, } @article{Lombardo2009-LOMWNA, volume = {32}, number = {2}, author = {Michael V. Lombardo and Bhismadev Chakrabarti and Simon Baron-Cohen}, title = {What neuroimaging and perceptions of self-other similarity can tell us about the mechanism underlying mentalizing}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2009}, pages = {152-153}, } @article{Lowy1998-LOWDMT, volume = {19}, number = {2}, author = {Adam Lowy}, title = {Donald mender. The myth of neuropsychiatry}, journal = {Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics}, year = {1998}, } @article{Lunstroth2007-LUNEIF, volume = {7}, number = {5}, author = {John Lunstroth and Jan Goldman}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Ethical intelligence from neuroscience: Is it possible?}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2007}, pages = {18 -- 20}, } @article{Lyvers2003-LYVTNO, volume = {1}, author = {Michael Lyvers}, title = {The neurochemistry of psychedelic experiences}, journal = {Science and Consciousness Review}, year = {2003}, } @article{Muuml1999-MUUTLF, volume = {22}, number = {1}, author = {Horst M. M\"u and Ller}, abstract = {(1) Reaction time (RT) studies give only a partial picture of language processing, hence it may be risky to use the output of the computational model to inspire neurophysiological investigations instead of seeking further neurophysiological data to adjust the RT based theory. (2) There is neurophysiological evidence for differences in the cortical representation of different word categories; this could be integrated into a future version of the Levelt model. (3) EEG/MEG coherence analysis allows the monitoring of synchronous electrical activity in large groups of neurons in the cortex; this is especially interesting for activation based network models.}, title = {The lexicon from a neurophysiological view}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {50-51}, } @article{Muuml1999-MUUHNI, volume = {22}, number = {3}, author = {Ralph-Axel M\"u and Ller}, abstract = {The two commentaries appear supportive of the target article. Ujhelyi's commentary can be complemented with recent evidence supporting continuity of language and cognitive evolution in hominids. Gow \& Rodkin's caveats regarding \textquotedblleft{}pathonormal inference\textquotedblright and the single-case methodology are discussed from a developmental neurobiological perspective. Early structural brain lesion and developmental disorders can serve as pathological models of normal neurofunctional variability resulting from neurodevelopmental imprecision. A final point concerns the advantages of integrating multiple structural and functional imaging modalities in neuropsychological studies.}, title = {Homology, neurogenetic imprecision, and lesional complexity}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {573-574}, } @article{Maasen2007-MAASIT, volume = {14}, number = {1-2}, author = {Sabine Maasen}, abstract = {As the cognitive neurosciences set out to challenge our understanding of consciousness, the existing conceptual panoply of meanings attached to the term remains largely unaccounted for. By way of bibliometric analysis, the following study first reveals the breadth and shift of meanings over the last decades, the main tendency being a more 'brainy' concept of consciousness. On this basis, the emergence of consciousness studies is regarded as a 'trading zone' (Galison) in which experimental, philosophical and experiential accounts are dialectically engaged. Outside of academic discourse, a neurocognitive concept of consciousness is embraced by popular self-help literature that sweepingly adopts this new discourse and the novel neuropharmacological tools in the self-help toolbox. Consciousness studies are hence not only the product of epistemological and methodological struggles (scientific dimension) but also part of the current re-alignments regarding the notion of consciously acting selves in society (societal dimension)}, title = {Selves in turmoil - neurocognitive and societal challenges of the self}, publisher = {Imprint Academic}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, year = {2007}, pages = {252-270}, } @article{Macknik2004-MACDVM, volume = {16}, number = {6}, author = {Stephen L. Macknik and Susana Martinez-Conde}, title = {Dichoptic visual masking reveals that early binocular neurons exhibit weak interocular suppression: Implications for binocular vision and visual awareness}, journal = {Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience}, year = {2004}, pages = {1049-1059}, } @article{MacLennan1999-MACNCA-3, volume = {22}, number = {6}, author = {Bruce MacLennan}, abstract = {In the first part of this commentary I argue that a neurophenomenological analysis of color reveals additional asymmetries that preclude undetectable color transformations, without appealing to weak arguments based on Basic Color Categories (BCCs); that is, I suggest additional factors that must be included in \textquotedblleft{}an empirically accurate model of color experience,\textquotedblright and which break the remaining asymmetries. In the second part I discuss the \textquotedblleft{}isomorphism constraint\textquotedblright and the extent to which we may predict the subjective quality of experience from its neurological correlates. Protophenomena are discussed as a way of capturing in a relational structure all of qualitative experience except for the bare fact of subjectivity.}, title = {Neurophenomenological constraints and pushing back the subjectivity barrier}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {961-963}, } @book{Mallgrave2010-MALTAB, author = {Harry Francis Mallgrave}, abstract = {Introduction -- Historical essays -- The humanist brain : Alberti, Vitruvius, and Leonardo -- The enlightened brain : Perrault, Laugier, and Le Roy -- The sensational brain : Burke, Price, and Knight -- The transcendental brain : Kant and Schopenhauer -- The animate brain : Schinkel, B\"o{}tticher, and Semper -- The empathetic brain : Vischer, W\"o{}lfflin, and G\"o{}ller -- The gestalt brain : the dynamics of the sensory field -- The neurological brain : Hayek, Hebb, and Neutra -- The phenomenal brain : Merleau-Ponty, Rasmussen, and Pallasmaa -- Neuroscience and architecture -- Anatomy : architecture of the brain -- Ambiguity : architecture of vision -- Metaphor : architecture of embodiment -- Hapticity : architecture of the senses -- Epilogue: The architect's brain.}, title = {The Architect's Brain: Neuroscience, Creativity, and Architecture}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, year = {2010}, } @incollection{Maquet2006-MAQHCD, author = {Pierre Maquet and P. Ruby and A. Maudoux and G. Albouy and V. Sterpenich and T. Dan-Vu and M. Desseilles and Melanie Boly and Fabien Perrin and Philippe Peigneux and Steven Laureys}, booktitle = {Boundaries of Consciousness}, title = {Human cognition during Rem sleep and the activity profile within frontal and parietal cortices. A reappraisal of functional neuroimaging data}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {2006}, } @unpublished{MarconiManuscript-MARNDI, author = {Diego Marconi}, abstract = {1. The issue - The reflection I am proposing was stimulated by some recent research on the mental processing of proper names. However, the issue I am raising is independent of both the particular nature of such results and the fact that they are accepted as well established. The question I would like to ask is whether (neuro)psychological results on the mental processing of language can falsify (or confirm) semantic theses about natural language. By a semantic thesis I mean something like any of the following.}, title = {Neuropsychological data, intuitions, and semantic theories}, } @incollection{Markic2009-MARNAT, author = {Olga Markic}, booktitle = {Philosophical Insights About Modern Science}, title = {Neuroscience and the image of the mind}, publisher = {Nova Science Publishers, Inc.}, year = {2009}, } @article{Martin2003-MARCNE, volume = {26}, number = {6}, author = {Nadine Martin}, abstract = {Ruchkin et al. offer a compelling case for a model of short-term storage without a separate buffer. Here, I discuss some cognitive neuropsychological data that have been offered in support of and against their model. Additionally, I discuss briefly some new directions in cognitive neuropsychological research that bear on the role of attention in Ruchkin et al.'s model.}, title = {Cognitive neuropsychological evidence for common processes underlying generation and storage of language representations}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2003}, pages = {747-748}, } @article{Martindale2000-MARLRA-2, volume = {23}, number = {4}, author = {Colin Martindale}, abstract = {Page has done connectionist researchers a valuable service in this target article. He points out that connectionist models using localized representations often work as well or better than models using distributed representations. I point out that models using distributed representations are difficult to understand and often lack parsimony and plausibility. In conclusion, I give an example -- the case of the missing fundamental in music -- that can easily be explained by a model using localist representations but can be explained only with great difficulty and implausibility by a model using distributed representations.}, title = {Localist representations are a desirable emergent property of neurologically plausible neural networks}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {485-486}, } @book{Masters1994-MASNTY, author = {Robert E. L. Masters}, abstract = {... ISBN0835607070 ...}, title = {Neurospeak: Transforms Your Body, While You Read}, publisher = {Quest Books}, year = {1994}, } @book{Mathews2009-MATPIA, author = {Debra J. H. Mathews and Hilary Bok and Peter V. Rabins}, abstract = {This book brings together some of the best minds in neurology and philosophy to discuss the concept of personal identity and the moral dimensions of treating ...}, title = {Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives From Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience}, publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press}, year = {2009}, } @unpublished{MaxwellManuscript-MAXISN, author = {Nicholas Maxwell}, abstract = {Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer from. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B, represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C, and as a result fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic". Natural science is neurotic in this sense in so far as a basic aim of science is represented to be to improve knowledge of factual truth as such (aim C), when actually the aim of science is to improve knowledge of explanatory truth (aim B). Science does not suffer too much from this neurosis, but philosophy of science does. Much more serious is the rationalistic neurosis of the social sciences, and of academic inquiry more generally. Freeing social science and academic inquiry from neurosis would have far reaching, beneficial, intellectual, institutional and cultural consequences.}, title = {Is science neurotic?}, } @article{Mayo2008-MAYNAD, volume = {31}, number = {2}, author = {J. Patrick Mayo and Marc A. Sommer}, title = {Neuronal adaptation: Delay compensation at the level of single neurons?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2008}, pages = {210-212}, } @article{McCabe2008-MCCNAT, volume = {24}, number = {3}, author = {Kevin A. McCabe}, title = {Neuroeconomics and the economic sciences}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {2008}, pages = {345-368}, } @unpublished{McCauleyManuscript-MCCRMO, author = {Robert McCauley}, abstract = {University Abstract Philosophers have sought to improve upon the logical empiricists\textquoteright model of scientific reduction. While opportunities for integration between the cognitive and the neural sciences have increased, most philosophers, appealing to the multiple realizability of mental states and the irreducibility of consciousness, object to psychoneural reduction. New Wave reductionists offer a continuum of comparative goodness of intertheoretic mapping for assessing reductions. Their insistence on a unified view of intertheoretic relations obscures epistemically significant crossscientific relations and engenders dismissive conclusions about psychology. Richer, more sensitive accounts of explanatory pluralism and mechanistic explanation in science advocate multi-level approaches in cross-scientific settings and criticize the distance of the standard philosophical objections from working scientists\textquoteright practices and discoveries. The Heuristic Identity Theory, a new, scientifically informed version of the psycho-physical identity theory, incorporates these insights, showing how multiple realizability is an argument for (not against) identities in science and why, therefore, consciousness is not irreducible.}, title = {Reduction: Models of cross-scientific relations and their implications for the psychology-neuroscience interface}, } @article{McCauley1993-MCCBAR, volume = {6}, number = {1}, author = {Robert N. McCauley}, abstract = {Taking inspiration from developments in neurocomputational modeling, Paul Church-land develops his positions in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science. Concerning the former, Churchland relaxes his eliminativism at various points and seems to endorse a traditional identity account of sensory qualia. Although he remains unsympathetic to folk psychology, he no longer seeks the elimination of normative epistemology, but rather its transformation to a philosophical enterprise informed by current developments in the relevant sciences. Churchland supplies suggestive discussions of the character of knowledge, simplicity, explanation, theory, and conceptual change. Many of his treatments turn on his prototype activation model of neural representation, which looks to the notion of a 'prototype' as it is employed in the psychological literature on concept representation, however, this and other features of Churchland's neurocomputational program do not square well with some of his views about cross-scientific relations.}, title = {Brainwork: A review of Paul Churchland's a neurocomputational perspective}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {1993}, pages = {81 -- 96}, } @article{McCollum2002-MCCSOL, volume = {7}, number = {1-2}, author = {Gin McCollum}, abstract = {Nervous systems are intricately organized on many levels of analysis.The intricate organization invites the development of mathematicalsystems that reflect its logical structure. Particular logical structures and choices of invariants within those structures narrowthe ranges of perceptions that are possible and sensorimotorcoordination that may be selected. As in quantum logic, choicesaffect outcomes.Some of the mathematical tools in use in quantum logic havealready also been used in neurobiology, including the mathematicsof ordered structures and a product like a tensor product. Astheoretical neurobiology is developed on its own foundation, wemay expect a rich dialogue between theoretical neurobiology andquantum logic.}, title = {Systems of logical systems: Neuroscience and quantum logic}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, year = {2002}, } @incollection{McCormick2007-MCCPSS, author = {Cheryl M. McCormick}, booktitle = {Consciousness and Cognition: Fragments of Mind and Brain}, title = {Practicing safe stress : A selective overview of the neuroscience research}, publisher = {Elxevier Academic Press}, year = {2007}, } @article{Mcewen2007-MCEPOI, volume = {22}, number = {2}, author = {Fiona Mcewen}, title = {Perspectives on imitation: From neuroscience to social science - edited by Susan Hurley and Nick Chater}, journal = {Mind and Language}, year = {2007}, pages = {207--{}213}, } @article{McGeerForthcoming-MCGWNM, author = {Victoria McGeer}, abstract = { The broad issue in this paper is the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience. That issue arises particularly sharply for cognitive neurospsychology, some of whose practitioners claim a methodological autonomy for their discipline. They hold that behavioural data from neuropsychological impairments are sufficient to justify assumptions about the underlying modular structure of human cognitive architecture, as well as to make inferences about its various components. But this claim to methodological autonomy can be challenged on both philosophical and empirical grounds. A priori considerations about (cognitive) multiple realisability challenge the thesis on philosophical grounds, and neuroscientific findings from developmental disorders substantiate that challenge empirically. The conclusion is that behavioural evidence alone is inadequate for scientific progress since appearances of modularity can be thoroughly deceptive, obscuring both the dynamic processes of neural development and the endstate network architecture of real cognitive systems}, title = {Why neuroscience matters to cognitive neuropsychology}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {forthcoming}, } @article{McGlynn1989-MCGUOD, volume = {11}, author = {S. M. McGlynn and Daniel L. Schacter}, title = {Unawareness of deficits in neuropsychological syndromes}, journal = {Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology}, year = {1989}, pages = {143-205}, } @article{Meegan2008-MEENTF, volume = {8}, number = {1}, author = {Daniel V. Meegan}, abstract = {There is considerable interest in the use of neuroimaging techniques for forensic purposes. Memory detection techniques, including the well-publicized Brain Fingerprinting technique (Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, Inc., Seattle WA), exploit the fact that the brain responds differently to sensory stimuli to which it has been exposed before. When a stimulus is specifically associated with a crime, the resulting brain activity should differentiate between someone who was present at the crime and someone who was not. This article reviews the scientific literature on three such techniques: priming, old/new, and P300 effects. The forensic potential of these techniques is evaluated based on four criteria: specificity, automaticity, encoding flexibility, and longevity. This article concludes that none of the techniques are devoid of forensic potential, although much research is yet to be done. Ethical issues, including rights to privacy and against self-incrimination, are discussed. A discussion of legal issues concludes that current memory detection techniques do not yet meet United States standards of legal admissibility.}, title = {Neuroimaging techniques for memory detection: Scientific, ethical, and legal issues}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2008}, pages = {9 -- 20}, } @article{Meehl1978-MEEPTI, volume = {12}, number = {4}, author = {Paul E. Meehl}, title = {Precognitive telepathy II: Some neurophysiological conjectures and metaphysical speculations}, journal = {No\^u{}s}, year = {1978}, pages = {371-395}, } @article{Mele2007-MELROJ-3, volume = {2007}, number = {3}, author = {Alfred R. Mele}, title = {Review of John Searle, \_Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power\_}, journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews}, year = {2007}, } @unpublished{Michael2010-MICMNA, author = {John Michael}, abstract = {In this paper, I critically assess the thesis that the discovery of mirror neuron systems (MNSs) provides empirical support for the simulation theory (ST) of social cognition. This thesis can be analyzed into two claims: (i) that MNSs are involved in understanding others\textquoteright intentions or emotions; and (ii) that the way in which they do so supports a simulationist viewpoint. I will be giving qualified support to both claims. Starting with (i), I will present theoretical and empirical points in support of the view that MNSs play a substantial role and are perhaps neces\textlnot{}sary although not sufficient for understanding at least some intentions or emo\textlnot{}tions. Turning to (ii), I will argue that the work on MNSs best supports a fairly weak version of ST, according to which social cognition involves simulation simply because conceptual thought in gen\textlnot{}eral has a simulationist component. In elucidating this idea, I appeal to Law\textlnot{}rence Barsalou\textquoteright{}s embodied theory of concepts (1999, 2005). Crucially, the term \textquotedblleft{}simula\textlnot{}tion\textquotedblright here refers not to simulations of a target agent\textquoteright{}s experience, nor even spe\textlnot{}cifically to one\textquoteright{}s own experience in a similar counterfactual situation, but to simulations of experience in general - activating sensory, motor, proprioceptive, affective, and introspective representations that match representations one would have when perceiving, carrying out actions, experiencing emotions, etc. I then sketch an expanded simulationist framework for understanding the contribution of MNSs to social cognition. The ap\textlnot{}peal to empirical work on MNSs in support of ST is therefore a two-edged sword; making this appeal persuasive requires us to modify our understanding of simulation to make it line up with the empirical work.}, title = {Mirror neurons and social cognition: An expanded simulationist framework}, year = {2010}, } @article{Miranda1997-MIRHGA, volume = {45}, number = {2}, author = {E. N. Miranda}, abstract = {A formal neuron has been studied mathematically. The spiking behaviour of a single neuron has been considered and the influence of the other neurons has been replaced by an average activity level. Four different kinds of spiking behaviour are predicted by the model: B (bursts), C (continuous), P (periodic) and S (silent) neurons and several real neurons can be classified within these four categories. Some properties of the spiking neuron are calculated: 1) the time between spikes, 2) the spike train length and 3) the silent time. Because these magnitudes can be measured in the laboratory, an experimental validation of the model is proposed.}, title = {How good are formal neurons for modelling real ones?}, journal = {Acta Biotheoretica}, year = {1997}, } @article{Miu2005-MIUABW, volume = {28}, number = {4}, author = {Andrei C. Miu}, abstract = {The theory put forward by Vallortigara \& Rogers (V\&R) to explain the versatility of directional asymmetries at the population level argues that the strength of lateralization is controlled by social learning. This shaping of behavioral asymmetries by a non-stationary pressure probably involves a marked degree of neuroplasticity. I discuss the limits of neuroplasticity along with the evolution of the corpus callosum.}, title = {Asymmetrical behavior without an asymmetrical brain: Corpus callosum and neuroplasticity}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {608-609}, } @article{Monte1984-MONCNC, volume = {5}, number = {3}, author = {Suzanne M. Monte and Grover M. Hutchins and G. William Moore}, abstract = {There are a large number of exogenous biological and chemical substances with known neoplastic or carcinogenic potential. However, it has also been postulated that external stimuli can influence the body's internal milieu, and thereby induce compensatory excessive growth of cells in the form of hyperplasia or neoplasia. In a recent study, we observed a strong association between chronic hypoxic states and the occurrence of peripheral neuroblastic tumors, a relatively uncommon group of neural neoplasms. In this report we review those findings and formulate an hypothesis to explain why conditions which lead to chronic erythrocytosis may also cause compensatory neoplasia of neural tissues.}, title = {Compensatory neoplasia: Chronic erythrocytosis and neuroblastic tumors}, journal = {Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics}, year = {1984}, } @article{Moore1998-MOOWCA, volume = {21}, number = {2}, author = {David R. Moore and Andrew J. King}, abstract = {A systematic relationship between the acoustic structure and phonemic content of speech raises the possibility that processing strategies similar to those described in animals with highly specialized hearing may also operate in the human brain. This idea could be tested by analyzing animal communication calls into locus equations and using those as stimulus tools in neurophysiological studies of auditory neurons.}, title = {What can auditory neuroethology tell us about speech processing?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1998}, pages = {276-277}, } @article{Morin2004-MORANA, volume = {130}, number = {3}, author = {Alain Morin}, title = {A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness}, journal = {Genetic Social And General Psychology Monographs}, year = {2004}, pages = {197-222}, } @article{Morris2006-MORTOF-3, volume = {45}, author = {David Morris}, abstract = {This review of John Russon's Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of Everyday Life focuses on Russon's position that experience is open (having a developmental, situated and dynamic, rather than fixed, structure) and figured (having a structure inseparable from forms of bodily function), and that mind is something learned in the process of working out experience as figured and open. These themes are drawn together in relation to recent scientific discussions (e.g., of bodily dynamics, mirror neurons, robotic systems and thermodynamics), to show how Russon's view challenges deep philosophical assumptions in prevailing accounts of mind, body and experience.}, title = {The open figure of experience and mind: Review essay of John russon's human experience: Philosophy, neurosis, and the elements of everyday life}, journal = {Dialogue}, year = {2006}, pages = {315-326}, } @article{Morrison2008-MORHEP, volume = {49}, number = {3}, author = {Glenn Morrison}, title = {Human experience: Philosophy, neurosis and the elements of everyday life. By John Russon}, journal = {Heythrop Journal}, year = {2008}, pages = {535--{}536}, } @article{Morrison2008-MORNPC, volume = {31}, number = {4}, author = {Robert G. Morrison and Soohyun Cho}, title = {Neurocognitive process constraints on analogy: What changes to allow children to reason like adults?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2008}, pages = {391-392}, } @incollection{Mortensen1989-MORMIS, author = {Chris Mortensen}, booktitle = {Computers, Brains and Minds}, title = {Mental images: Should cognitive science learn from neurophysiology?}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1989}, } @article{Moss1972-MOSAIT, volume = {21}, number = {3-4}, author = {Melvin L. Moss}, title = {An introduction to the neurobiology of oro-facial growth}, journal = {Acta Biotheoretica}, year = {1972}, } @article{Mouchet2004-MOUABM, volume = {52}, number = {4}, author = {Patrick Mouchet and Jer\^o{}me Yelnik}, abstract = {We used a biophysical model to probe the basic integrative properties of primate pallidal neurons in order to obtain a better understanding of Basal Ganglia physiology. The first results we present here deal mainly with the way dendritic morphology influences these properties. Neuronal morphology has been quantitatatively analyzed in 3D. Single fast excitatory synaptic inputs resulting in AMPA receptors activations have been simulated, without regenerative voltage dependent conductances. Dendrites of both pallidal segments (GPi and GPe) showed a strong dependence of the synaptic efficacy upon distance from soma, but even the most distal dendritic synaptic sites were able to substantially depolarize the cell body. The mean synaptic efficacy was the same in both populations, but the attenuation of propagated post-synaptic potentials was higher in GPi neurons. All these features were very dependent on the dendritic diameters which appear to constitute a key parameter in these neuronal populations both with respect to the integration of afferent information and to the differences between cells in performing this task.}, title = {A biophysical model of neuronal dendrites' integrative properties: Relations to morphological data}, journal = {Acta Biotheoretica}, year = {2004}, } @article{Moulyn1952-MOUROT, volume = {19}, number = {1}, author = {Adrian C. Moulyn}, title = {Reflections on the problem of time in relation to neurophysiology and psychology}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1952}, pages = {33-49}, } @article{Mouras2007-MOUCRO, volume = {30}, number = {2}, author = {Harold Mouras}, title = {Central role of somatosensory processes in sexual arousal as identified by neuroimaging techniques}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2007}, pages = {217-217}, } @article{Mouras2006-MOUTIO-3, volume = {29}, number = {2}, author = {Harold Mouras}, abstract = {Money is a specifically human incentive. However, functional imaging techniques bring striking evidence that neural circuits pertaining to more \textquotedblleft{}natural\textquotedblright addictive and rewarding processes are involved in response to monetary reward. Main results are evoked here, with specific brain responses demonstrated along the different stages of the process. (Published Online~{}April~{}5~{}2006).}, title = {The investigation of neural correlates of monetary reward by using functional neuroimaging techniques}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2006}, pages = {191-191}, } @article{Moutoussis2005-MOUSIM, volume = {390}, number = {11}, author = {K. Moutoussis and Alexander Maier and Semir Zeki and Nikos K. Logothetis}, abstract = {$<$span class='Hi'$>$Moutoussis$<$/span$>$, K., A. Maier, S. Zeki and N. K. Logothetis: Seeing invisible motion: responses of area V5 neurons in the awake-behaving macaque. Soc. for Neurosci. Abstr. 390.11, 1 (11 2005) Abstract.}, title = {Seeing invisible motion: Responses of area v5 neurons in the awake-behaving macaque}, journal = {Soc. For Neurosci. Abstr}, year = {2005}, } @article{Mucciolo1975-MUCNRP, volume = {5}, number = {3}, author = {Laurence F. Mucciolo}, title = {Neurophysiological reduction, psychological explanation and neuropsychology}, journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, year = {1975}, } @article{Mucciolo1974-MUCTIT, volume = {8}, number = {November}, author = {Laurence F. Mucciolo}, title = {The identity thesis and neuropsychology}, journal = {No\^u{}s}, year = {1974}, pages = {327-42}, } @incollection{Muller2009-MLLROS, author = {Franz-Josef M\"u{}ller and Jeanne F. Loring and Paul Christian Baier}, booktitle = {Philosophical Insights About Modern Science}, title = {Reflections on stem cells usage in restoring neurodegenerative damage}, publisher = {Nova Science Publishers, Inc.}, year = {2009}, } @article{Muller2000-MLLABH, volume = {23}, number = {1}, author = {Ralph-Axel M\"u{}ller}, abstract = {Grodzinsky presents interesting data on Broca's aphasia, but because of obsolete ideas about neurofunctional organization and an inadequate review of the neuroimaging literature, he fails to put these data into perspective. Rather than supporting a specific linguistic function of Broca's area, the findings should be viewed in terms of working memory functions of the inferior frontal cortex.}, title = {A big \textquotedblleft{}housing\textquotedblright problem and a trace of neuroimaging: Broca's area is more than a transformation center}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {42-42}, } @article{Mundale1996-MUNINP, volume = {6}, number = {4}, author = {Jennifer Mundale and William P. Bechtel}, abstract = {The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of distinctly teleological functional considerations in brain cartography. Only by invoking teleological criteria can researchers distinguish the fruitful ways of identifying brain components from the myriad of possible ways. One likely reason for reluctance to turn to neuroscience is fear of reduction, but we argue that, in the context of a teleological perspective on function, this concern is misplaced. Adducing such theoretical considerations as top-down and bottom-up constraints on neuroscientific and psychological models, as well as existing cases of productive, multidisciplinary cooperation, we argue that integration of neuroscience into psychology and evolutionary biology is likely to be mutually beneficial. We also show how it can be accommodated methodologically within the framework of an interfield theory.}, title = {Integrating neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology through a teleological conception of function}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {1996}, pages = {481-505}, } @article{Mundy2005-MUNMSA, volume = {28}, number = {5}, author = {Peter Mundy}, abstract = {Research on the affective and neurodevelopmental correlates of infant joint attention skills support several of the hypotheses raised by Tomasello et al. regarding the development of the capacity to share intention with others. In addition, research and theory suggests that self-awareness and self-regulatory processes may play a role in the development of this vital human ability domain.}, title = {Motivation, self-regulation, and the neurodevelopment of intention sharing}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {709-710}, } @article{Munsat1999-MUNNLM, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Stanley Munsat}, abstract = {Gold \& Stoljar pose a dilemma for linguistics should neurobiology win out as the science of mind. The dilemma can be avoided by reestablishing linguistics as an autonomous discipline, rather than a branch of the science of mind. Independent considerations for doing this are presented.}, title = {Neurobiology: Linguistics' millennium bug?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {845-846}, } @article{Musacchio2002-MUSDTE, volume = {3}, number = {3}, author = {J. M. Musacchio}, abstract = {The explanatory gap and theknowledge argument are rooted in the conflationof propositional and phenomenal knowledge. Thebasic knowledge argument is based on theconsideration that ``physical information'' aboutthe nervous system is unable to provide theknowledge of a ``color experience'' (Jackson,1982). The implication is that physicalism isincomplete or false because it leaves somethingunexplained. The problem with Jackson'sargument is that physical information has theform of highly symbolic propositional knowledgewhereas phenomenal knowledge consists in innateneurophysiological processes. In addition totheir fundamental epistemological differences,clinical, anatomical, pathological and brainimaging studies demonstrate that phenomenal andpropositional knowledge are fundamentallydifferent neurobiological processes. Propositional knowledge is phylogeneticallynew, highly symbolic, culturally acquired,exclusively human and expressible in differentnatural and artificial languages. By contrast,phenomenal knowledge (i.e.: knowingwhat-it-is-like to see a color) consists inqualitative experiences and phenomenal conceptsthat provide an internal, language-independentreference to the properties of objects and theneeds of the organism. Language andpropositional knowledge are exclusively humanattributes implemented in specific regions ofthe dominant hemisphere. This contrastssharply with the phylogenicallysensory areas that are common to animals andhumans, which implement qualitativeexperiences. Experiences are hard-wiredneurobiological processes that can neither betransmitted nor re-created through thesymbolism of propositions. Thus, I concludethat the fallacy in the explanatory gap and inthe knowledge argument is a fallacy ofequivocation that results from ignoringfundamental neurobiological differences betweenphenomenal and propositional knowledge}, title = {Dissolving the explanatory gap: Neurobiological differences between phenomenal and propositional knowledge}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {331-365}, } @article{Nachson1999-NACSIN, volume = {20}, number = {2}, author = {Israel Nachson}, title = {Self-deception in neurological syndromes}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, year = {1999}, pages = {117-132}, } @incollection{Nassehi2007-NASGTW, author = {Armin Nassehi}, booktitle = {On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics Vis-?-Vis the Neuroscientific Challenge}, title = {Governing the will in a neurochemical age}, publisher = {Plagrave Macmiilan}, year = {2007}, } @book{Nesbitt1966-NESWNF, author = {Maurice Nesbitt}, title = {Where No Fear Was: A Study in Neurotic Psychology Related to the Christian Experience}, publisher = {London, Epworth P.}, year = {1966}, } @article{Netter2005-NETSOA, volume = {28}, number = {3}, author = {Petra Netter and Martin Reuter and Juergen Hennig}, abstract = {Support for a neurobiological distinction between affiliation (Attachment) and agency (Achievement) was achieved by comparing responses to a dopaminergic (DA) and a serotonergic (5-HT) challenge test. DA responses were similar, but a 5-HT modulation of DA emerged for Achievement and not for Attachment. Molecular genetics performed on Panksepp's dimension \textquotedblleft{}Care\textquotedblright revealed an association with a polymorphism of the DA catabolizing enzyme COMT that was not associated with separation distress.}, title = {Specificity of affiliation supported by neurotransmitter challenge tests and molecular genetics}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {359-360}, } @article{Newberg2000-NEWTNO, volume = {7}, number = {11-12}, author = {Andrew B. Newberg and Eugene G. D'Aquili}, title = {The neuropsychology of religious and spiritual experience}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, year = {2000}, pages = {251-266}, } @article{Nichols1983-NICNAS, volume = {13}, number = {2}, author = {Christopher Nichols}, title = {Neurobiology and social theory: Some common and persistent problems}, journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, year = {1983}, } @article{Nijhawan2008-NIJVPP, volume = {31}, number = {2}, author = {Romi Nijhawan}, title = {Visual prediction: Psychophysics and neurophysiology of compensation for time delays}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2008}, pages = {179-198}, } @article{Nofzinger2000-NOFIFF, volume = {23}, number = {6}, author = {Eric A. Nofzinger}, abstract = {New data are presented showing excellent replicability and test-retest reliability of REM sleep findings from functional brain imaging studies in healthy subjects on which newer brain-based models of human dreaming have been constructed. Preliminary region-of-interest findings related to bottom-up versus dissociable brain systems mediating REM sleep and dreaming are also presented. [Hobson et al.; Solms]$>$.}, title = {Insights from functional neuroimaging studies of behavioral state regulation in healthy and depressed subjects}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {979-980}, } @article{Northoff2008-NORAOE, volume = {7}, number = {4}, author = {Georg Northoff}, abstract = {The James--{}Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and thus instrumental role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a direct and non-instrumental, i.e., constitutional role in emotional feelings; this implies that the environment itself in the gestalt of the person--{}environment relation is constitutive of emotional feeling rather than the bodily representation of the environment. Since the person--{}environment relation is crucial in this approach, I call it the relational concept of emotional feeling. After introducing the relational concept of emotional feeling, the present paper investigates the neurophilosophical question whether current neuroimaging data on human emotion processing and anatomical connectivity are empirically better compatible with the \textquotedblleft{}relational\textquotedblright or the \textquotedblleft{}embodied\textquotedblright concept of emotional feeling. These data lend support to the empirical assumption that neural activity in subcortical and cortical midline regions code the relationship between intero- and exteroceptive stimuli in a relational mode, i.e. their actual balance, rather than in a translational mode, i.e., by translating extero- into interoceptive stimulus changes. Such intero-exteroceptive relational mode of neural coding may have implications for the characterization of emotional feeling with regard to phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. I therefore conclude that the here advanced relational concept of emotional feeling may be considered neurophilosophically more plausible and better compatible with current neuroscientific data than the embodied concept as presupposed in the James--{}Lange theory and its modern neuroscientific and philosophical versions.}, title = {Are our emotional feelings relational? A neurophilosophical investigation of the james--{}lange theory}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year = {2008}, } @article{Northoff2008-NORIAE, volume = {15}, number = {5}, author = {Georg Northoff}, abstract = {Emotion theories in present philosophical discussion propose different models of relationship between feeling and appraisal. The multicomponent model considers appraisal as separate component and distinguishes it from feeling and physiological body changes thus presupposing what may be called 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' appraisal as representational. The recently emerged concept of enactment, in contrast, argues that appraisal is closely linked to feeling and physiological body changes presupposing what can be called 'embodied' and 'embedded' appraisal as relational. The aim of the paper is to investigate which concept of appraisal, the 'disembedded' or the 'embedded' one, is better compatible with current neuroimaging data on emotion processing and thus neurophilosophically more tenable. The 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' concept implies distinct and independent brain regions underlying feeling and appraisal whereas 'embodied' and 'embedded' appraisal implies overlapping and dependent brain regions. Recent neuroimaging studies demonstrate that medial and lateral prefrontal cortical regions are involved in both feeling and appraisal and that there seems to be reciprocal modulation between these regions. Though preliminary, these data suggest that feeling and appraisal are associated with different patterns of neural activity across overlapping and interdependent brain regions. I therefore conclude that current neuroscientific evidence is rather in favor of the 'embodied' and 'embedded' concept of appraisal as relational than the one of 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' appraisal as representational that is presupposed in current multicomponent theories of emotions.}, title = {Is appraisal 'embodied' and 'embedded'? A neurophilosophical investigation of emotions}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, year = {2008}, pages = {68-99}, } @article{Northoff2002-NORWCC, volume = {25}, number = {5}, author = {Georg Northoff}, abstract = {Differential diagnosis of motor symptoms, for example, akinesia, may be difficult in clinical neuropsychiatry. Symptoms may be either of neurologic origin, for example, Parkinson's disease, or of psychiatric origin, for example, catatonia, leading to a so-called \textquotedblleft{}conflict of paradigms.\textquotedblright Despite their different origins, symptoms may appear more or less clinically similar. Possibility of dissociation between origin and clinical appearance may reflect functional brain organisation in general, and cortical-cortical/subcortical relations in particular. It is therefore hypothesized that similarities and differences between Parkinson's disease and catatonia may be accounted for by distinct kinds of modulation between cortico-cortical and cortico-subcortical relations. Catatonia can be characterized by concurrent motor, emotional, and behavioural symptoms. The different symptoms may be accounted for by dysfunction in orbitofrontal-prefrontal/parietal cortical connectivity reflecting \textquotedblleft{}horizontal modulation\textquotedblright of cortico-cortical relation. Furthermore, alteration in \textquotedblleft{}top-down modulation\textquotedblright reflecting \textquotedblleft{}vertical modulation\textquotedblright of caudate and other basal ganglia by GABA-ergic mediated orbitofrontal cortical deficits may account for motor symptoms in catatonia. Parkinson's disease, in contrast, can be characterized by predominant motor symptoms. Motor symptoms may be accounted for by altered \textquotedblleft{}bottom-up modulation\textquotedblright between dopaminergic mediated deficits in striatum and premotor/motor cortex. Clinical similarities between Parkinson's disease and catatonia with respect to akinesia may be related with involvement of the basal ganglia in both disorders. Clinical differences with respect to emotional and behavioural symptoms may be related with involvement of different cortical areas, that is, orbitofrontal/parietal and premotor/motor cortex implying distinct kinds of modulation -- \textquotedblleft{}vertical\textquotedblright and \textquotedblleft{}horizontal\textquotedblright modulation, respectively. Key Words: Bottom-up modulation; catatonia; horizontal modulation; Parkinson's disease; top-down modulation; vertical modulation.}, title = {What catatonia can tell us about \textquotedblleft{}top-down modulation\textquotedblright: A neuropsychiatric hypothesis}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2002}, pages = {555-577}, } @article{Northoff2000-NORAQE, volume = {13}, number = {2}, author = {Georg Northoff}, abstract = {"Quasi-memories," necessarily presupposing a distinction between an "experiencing" and a "remembering" person, are considered by Parfit and Shoemaker as necessary and/or sufficient criteria for personal identity. However, the concept of "q-memories" is rejected by Schechtman since, according to her, neither "content" and "experience" can be separated from each other in "q-memories" ("principal inseparability") nor can they be distinguished from delusions/confabulations ("principal indistinguishability"). The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that, relying on a neurophilosophical approach, both arguments can be rejected. Neuropsychological research shows that "contents" of memories are classified according to the accompanying psychological state such that the same "content" can be classified either as auto- or heterobiographical by the respective "experience." Since "content" and "experience" can be separated from each other, the argument of "principal inseparability" must be rejected on empirical grounds. In addition, as demonstrated in an example of a schizophrenic patient, "q-memories" can be distinguished from delusions/confabulations considering the ability to distinguish between different sources of autobiographical memories as a differential criterion. In conclusion, both arguments by Schechtman against the concept of "q-memories" have to be rejected on the basis of neurophilosophical considerations. Consequently, the concept of "q-memories" can be considered as compatible with current empirical knowledge}, title = {Are "q-memories" empirically realistic? A neurophilosophical approach}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2000}, pages = {191-211}, } @article{Nunez1997-NUNSBM, volume = {20}, number = {4}, author = {Paul L. Nunez}, abstract = {Well-posed questions about information processing may require physiologically based, quantitative models of large scale neocortical dynamic function. \textquotedblleft{}Synchronization\textquotedblright of this dynamics can be viewed in different contexts of the binding problem.}, title = {Synchronization, binding, multiscale dynamic processing, and neuron sociology}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {694-695}, } @article{OMeara1999-OMEBTQ, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {J. Tim O'Meara}, abstract = {Gold \& Stoljar's argument rejecting the \textquotedblleft{}explanatory sufficiency\textquotedblright of the radical neuron doctrine depends on distinguishing it from the trivial neuron doctrine. This distinction depends on the thesis of \textquotedblleft{}supervenience,\textquotedblright which depends on Hume's regularity theory of causation. In contrast, the radical neuron doctrine depends on a physical theory of causation, which denies the supervenience thesis. Insofar as the target article argues by drawing implications from the premise of Humean causation, whereas the radical doctrine depends on the competing premise of physical causation, the resulting critique of the neuron doctrine amounts largely to begging the question of causation.}, title = {Begging the question of causation in a critique of the neuron doctrine}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {846-846}, } @article{Oberman2008-OBECPA, volume = {31}, number = {3}, author = {Lindsay M. Oberman and Alvaro Pascual-Leone}, title = {Cortical plasticity: A proposed mechanism by which genomic factors lead to the behavioral and neurological phenotype of autism spectrum and psychotic-spectrum disorders}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2008}, pages = {276-277}, } @article{Occhionero2000-OCCTAN, volume = {23}, number = {6}, author = {M. Occhionero and M. J. Esposito}, abstract = {The deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is likely to be essential for generating some characteristics of the dream. The heterogeneous nature of NREM sleep makes it difficult to assume that there are different NREM dream triggers. Different cortical and subcortical neurophysiological conditions modulate mentation both in waking and in sleeping without any specific direct triggering factor. [Solms].}, title = {Toward a new neuropsychological isomorphism}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {980-981}, } @incollection{Ohman2000-OHMUEE, author = {A. Ohman and Anders Flykt and Daniel Lundqvist}, booktitle = {Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion}, title = {Unconscious emotion: Evolutionary perspectives, psychophysiological data and neuropsychological mechanisms}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2000}, } @incollection{Ohman2000-HMAUEE, author = {Arne \"O{}hman and Anders Flykt and Daniel Lundqvist}, booktitle = {Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Series in Affective Science}, title = {Unconscious emotion: Evolutionary perspectives, psychophysiological data and neuropsychological mechanisms}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2000}, pages = {296-327}, } @article{Okuda2007-OKUPOP, volume = {30}, number = {3}, author = {Jiro Okuda}, title = {Prospection or projection: Neurobiological basis of stimulus-independent mental traveling}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2007}, pages = {328-329}, } @article{Oomen2003-OOMOBS, volume = {38}, number = {2}, author = {Palmyre M. F. Oomen}, title = {On brain, soul, self, and freedom: An essay in bridging neuroscience and faith}, journal = {Zygon}, year = {2003}, pages = {377-392}, } @article{OrdenManuscript-ORDFNF, author = {Guy C. Orden and Kenneth R. Paap}, title = {Functional neuroimages fail to discover pieces of mind in the parts of the brain}, } @article{Ortmann2008-ORTPN, volume = {24}, number = {3}, author = {Andreas Ortmann}, title = {Prospecting neuroeconomics}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {2008}, pages = {431-448}, } @incollection{Ott2007-OTTSOA, author = {Ulrich Ott}, booktitle = {Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective}, title = {States of absorption: In search of neurobiological foundations}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, pages = {257-270}, } @incollection{Pachalska2010-PACTMR, author = {Maria Pachalska and Bruce Duncan MacQueen}, booktitle = {Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind}, title = {The microgenetic revolution in contemporary neuropsychology and neurolinguistics}, publisher = {State University of New York Press}, year = {2010}, } @article{Padoa-Schioppa2008-PADTSO-2, volume = {24}, number = {3}, author = {Camillo Padoa-Schioppa}, title = {The syllogism of neuro-economics}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {2008}, pages = {449-457}, } @article{Pagel2005-PAGNI, volume = {28}, number = {1}, author = {James F. Pagel}, abstract = {This commentary reviews electrophysiological research suggesting that oscillatory electrical potentials recorded by the EEG could have function at cellular and DNA levels. Evidence supporting the potential functional significance of sleep-state-specific frequencies includes psychoactive neurochemical alteration of CNS electrophysiology, and sleep-state-specific alteration of dreaming. As Walker proposes, physiologic electrical fields are likely to have a functional role in the consolidation of memory.}, title = {Neurosignals -- incorporating CNS electrophysiology into cognitive process}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {75-76}, } @incollection{Panksepp2007-PANANA, author = {Jaak Panksepp}, booktitle = {Consciousness and Cognition: Fragments of Mind and Brain}, title = {Affective neuroscience and the ancestral sources of human feelings}, publisher = {Elxevier Academic Press}, year = {2007}, } @article{Panksepp2007-PANEFO, volume = {30}, number = {1}, author = {Jaak Panksepp}, abstract = {Disregard of primary-process consciousness is endemic in mind science. Most neuroscientists subscribe to ruthless reductionism whereby mental qualities are discarded in preference for neuronal functions. Such ideas often lead to envisioning other animals, and all too often other humans, as unfeeling zombies. Merker correctly highlights how the roots of consciousness exist in ancient neural territories we share, remarkably homologously, with all the other vertebrates. (Published Online~{}May~{}1~{}2007).}, title = {Emotional feelings originate below the neocortex: Toward a neurobiology of the soul}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2007}, pages = {101-103}, } @article{Panksepp2006-PANTAN, volume = {29}, number = {3}, author = {Jaak Panksepp}, abstract = {Cruelty does not emerge from a single emotional system of the brain. Its many cognitive aspects are intermeshed inextricably with the nature of negative affects ranging from fear to suffering. The rewards of cruelty may be counteracted by a variety of neurochemical factors as well as novel social policies.}, title = {The affective neuroeconomics of social brains: One man's cruelty is another's suffering}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2006}, pages = {234-235}, } @incollection{Panksepp2005-PANOTN, author = {Jaak Panksepp}, booktitle = {Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study}, title = {On the neuro-evolutionary nature of social pain, support, and empathy}, publisher = {Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press}, year = {2005}, } @unpublished{PardoManuscript-PARNEL, author = {Michael S. Pardo}, abstract = {Proposed lie-detection technology based on neuroscience poses significant challenges for the law. The law must respond to the science with an adequate understanding of such evidence, its significance, and its limitations. This paper makes three contributions toward those ends. First, it provides an account of the preliminary neuroscience research underlying this proposed evidence. Second, it discusses the nature and significance of such evidence, how such evidence would fit with legal practices and concepts, and its potential admissibility. Finally, it analyzes the constitutional protections that may limit the compelled production of such evidence.}, title = {Neuroscience evidence, legal culture, and criminal procedure}, } @article{Parker1998-PARPCN, volume = {21}, number = {1}, author = {A. Parker}, abstract = {Study of \textquotedblleft{}theory of mind\textquotedblright in nonhuman primates is hampered both by the lack of rigorous methodology that Heyes stresses and by our lack of knowledge of the cognitive neuroscience of nonhuman primate conceptual structure. Recent advances in this field indicate that progress can be made by first asking simpler research questions.}, title = {Primate cognitive neuroscience: What are the useful questions?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1998}, pages = {128-128}, } @article{Parsell2009-PARSMP, volume = {19}, number = {2}, author = {Mitch Parsell}, title = {Steven M. Platek, Julian Paul Keenan and Todd K. Shackelford (eds), evolutionary cognitive neuroscience}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {2009}, } @article{Pascual-Leone2005-PASNAB, volume = {28}, number = {2}, author = {Juan Pascual-Leone}, abstract = {Does Lewis imply that brain processes might be used to replace an as-yet-unavailable substantive organismic neuropsychology? To counteract this reductionist idea I argue for distinguishing between affects and emotions, and discuss a real-life example of implicit emotional appraisal. Failure to use organismic units of processing such as schemes or schemas makes the bridging attempt fall under a reductionist \textquotedblleft{}mereological fallacy.\textquotedblright.}, title = {Not a bridge but an organismic (general and causal) neuropsychology should make a difference in emotion theory}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {213-214}, } @article{Patel2008-PATANS, volume = {31}, number = {5}, author = {Aniruddh D. Patel}, title = {A neurobiological strategy for exploring links between emotion recognition in music and speech}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2008}, pages = {589-590}, } @unpublished{PattersonManuscript-PATBRM, author = {Dennis Patterson}, abstract = {Review of $<$span class='Hi'$>$Bennett$<$/span$>$, M.R. and Hacker, P.M.S., *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience,* 2003, Blackwell Publishing, 480pp, \$39.95 (pbk), ISBN 140510838X.}, title = {Book review, Max Bennett and Peter Hacker, philosophical foundations of neuroscience}, } @article{Patterson2003-PATROM, volume = {2003}, number = {9}, author = {Dennis Patterson}, title = {Review of M.r. Bennett, P.m.S. Hacker, \_Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience\_}, journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews}, year = {2003}, } @incollection{Peper2000-PEPAOE, author = {M. Peper}, booktitle = {The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization}, title = {Awareness of emotions: A neuropsychological perspective}, publisher = {John Benjamins Publishing Company}, year = {2000}, } @article{Pepperberg2005-PEPAAP, volume = {28}, number = {2}, author = {Irene M. Pepperberg}, abstract = {Arbib presents a reasoned explanation for language evolution from nonhuman to human primates, one that I argue can be equally applied to animals trained in forms of interspecies communication. I apply his criteria for language readiness and language (in actuality, protolanguage) to the behavior of a Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus) taught to communicate with humans using rudiments of English speech.}, title = {An avian parallel to primate mirror neurons and language evolution?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {141-141}, } @article{Perovic2007-PERNM, volume = {58}, number = {2}, author = {Slobodan Perovic}, title = {Nicholas Maxwell \textbullet is science neurotic? \textbullet London: Imperial college press, 2004 \textbullet hardback price \$48/\textsterling{}29 \textbullet isbn 1860945007}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2007}, } @article{Perring1999-PERTND, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Christian Perring}, abstract = {Gold \& Stoljar's target article is important because it shows the limitations of neurobiological theories of the mind more powerfully than previous philosophical criticisms, especially those that focus on the subjective nature of experience and those that use considerations from philosophy of language to argue for the holism of the mental. They use less controversial assumptions and clearer arguments, the conclusions of which are applicable to the whole of neuroscience. Their conclusions can be applied to psychiatry to argue that, contrary to many researchers' assumptions, the approaches to both understanding and treating mental disorders must be interdisciplinary.}, title = {The neuron doctrine in psychiatry}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {846-847}, } @article{Perry2000-PERNMO, volume = {23}, number = {6}, author = {E. K. Perry and M. A. Piggott}, abstract = {Based on increasing dream intensity and alterations in neurophysiological activity from waking, through NREM to REM sleep, dreaming appears to correlate with sustained midbrain dopaminergic and basal forebrain cholinergic, in conjunction with decreasing brainstem 5-HT and noradrenergic neuronal activities. This, model, with features in common with the modulatory transmitter models of Hobson et al. and Solms, is consistent with some clinical observations on drug induced alterations in dreaming and transmitter correlates of delusions. [Hobson et al.; Solms].}, title = {Neurotransmitter mechanisms of dreaming: Implication of modulatory systems based on dream intensity}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {990-992}, } @article{Petit2003-PETOTR, volume = {2}, number = {4}, author = {Jean-Luc Petit}, abstract = {The phenomenological theory of constitution promises a solution for the problem of consciousness insofar as it changes the traditional terms of this problem by systematically correlating subject and object in the unifying context of intentional acts. I argue that embodied constitution must depend upon the role of kinesthesia as a constitutive operator. In pursuing the path of intentionality in its descent from an idealistic level of pure constitution to this fully embodied kinesthetic constitution, we are able to gain access to different ontological regions such as physical thing, owned body and shared world. Neuroscience brings to light the somatological correlates of noemata. Bridging the gap between incarnation and naturalisation represents the best way of realizing the foundational program of transcendental phenomenology.}, title = {On the relation between recent neurobiological data on perception (and action) and the Husserlian theory of constitution}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year = {2003}, } @incollection{Petit1999-PETCBM, author = {Jean-Luc Petit}, booktitle = {Naturalizing Phenomenology}, title = {Constitution by movement: Husserl in light of recent neurobiological findings}, publisher = {Stanford: Stanford University Press}, year = {1999}, } @book{Petit1999-PETNP-3, author = {Jean-Luc Petit}, title = {Naturalizing Phenomenology}, publisher = {Stanford: Stanford University Press}, year = {1999}, } @article{Petitot2003-PETNOV, volume = {13}, number = {3-4}, author = {Jean Petitot}, abstract = {We present a neuro-geometrical model for generating the shape of Kanizsa's modal subjective contours which is based on the functional architecture of the primary areas of the visual cortex. We focus on V1 and its pinwheel structure and model it as a discrete approximation of a continuous fibration \ensuremath{\pi}: R \texttimes P \textrightarrow P with base space the space of the retina R and fiber the projective line P of the orientations of the plane. The horizontal cortico-cortical connections of V1 implement what the geometers call the contact structure of the fibration \ensuremath{\pi}, and defines therefore an integrability condition which can be shown to correspond to Field's, Hayes', and Hess' psychophysical concept of association field. We present then a variational model of curved modal illusory contours (in the spirit of previous models due to $<$span class='Hi'$>$Ullman$<$/span$>$, Horn, and Mumford) based on the idea that virtual contours are \textquotedblleft{}geodetic\textquotedblright integral curves of the contact structure.}, title = {Neurogeometry of v1 and Kanizsa contours}, journal = {Axiomathes}, year = {2003}, } @article{Phelps2007-PHETNO, volume = {7}, number = {1}, author = {Elizabeth A. Phelps}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {The neuroscience of a person network}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2007}, pages = {49 -- 50}, } @incollection{Piccinini2007-PICEP, volume = {153}, number = {3}, author = {Gualtiero Piccinini}, booktitle = {Cartographies of the Mind: The Interface between Philosophy and Cognitive Science}, abstract = {According to the computational theory of mind (CTM), mental capacities are explained by inner computations, which in biological organisms are realized in the brain. Computational explanation is so popular and entrenched that it\textquoteright{}s common for scientists and philosophers to assume CTM without argument.}, title = { Computational explanation and mechanistic explanation of mind}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2007}, pages = {343-353}, } @unpublished{PoirierManuscript-POIDS, author = {Pierre Poirier}, abstract = {\`A Harvard durant l\textquoteright{}ann\'e{}e acad\'e{}mique 1940-41, les philosophes-math\'e{}maticiens Quine, Tarski et Carnap d\'e{}battaient de la possibilit\'e d\textquoteright\'e{}tablir une distinction entre les \'e{}nonc\'e{}s analytiques et synth\'e{}tiques qui soit suffisamment mordante pour d\'e{}gager un statut sp\'e{}cial \`a l\textquoteright\'e{}pist\'e{}mologie. Quine et Tarski s\textquoteright{}objectaient \`a la distinction et l\textquoteright{}objection de Quine verra notamment le jour sous le titre fameux \guillemotleft Les deux dogmes de l\textquoteright{}empirisme \guillemotright. Carnap, dans son autobiographie intellectuelle, se souvient avoir alors craint : \guillemotleft are we now back to John Stuart Mill? \guillemotright. Carnap avait compris qu\textquoteright{}une \'e{}pist\'e{}mologie antipsychologiste comme celle du Cercle de Vienne ne peut subsister sans la pr\'e{}sence d\textquoteright{}une distinction de principe entre des \'e{}nonc\'e{}s analytiques et synth\'e{}tiques. Il avait compris qu\textquoteright{}un rejet de la distinction signifiait, \`a court ou moyen terme, un retour \`a l\textquoteright\'e{}pist\'e{}mologie comme \guillemotleft psychologie de la science \guillemotright telle que la pratiquait Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill et Ernst Mach.}, title = {Du stimulus \`a la science, neurocomputationnellement}, } @article{Prabhakaran2007-PRAPAT, volume = {30}, number = {2}, author = {Vivek Prabhakaran and Bart Rypma}, title = {P-FIT and the neuroscience of intelligence: How well does P fit?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2007}, pages = {166-167}, } @article{Preston2008-PRECAT-2, volume = {49}, number = {1}, author = {John Preston}, title = {Cognition and the brain: The philosophy and neuroscience movement - edited by Andrew Brook and Kathleen Akins}, journal = {Philosophical Books}, year = {2008}, pages = {68-71}, } @article{Pribram2008-PRIIHT, volume = {31}, number = {3}, author = {Karl Pribram}, title = {It's high time: Cognitive neuroscience lives}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2008}, pages = {343-344}, } @article{Prinz2003-PRINDR, volume = {12}, number = {4}, author = {Wolfgang Prinz}, title = {Neurons don't represent}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, year = {2003}, pages = {572-573}, } @article{Prochukhanov1979-PROMPO, volume = {28}, number = {1}, author = {R. A. Prochukhanov and I. A. Ravkin}, abstract = {A new approach to the analysis of the neuroendocrine system (NES) is suggested. It is based on the fact of structural and metabolic determination of any effect on cell and cell aggregates. The principle of a common communication channel in the NES is formulated and a possible method of its formalization is proposed.}, title = {Morpho-functional principle of neuroendocrine system analysis}, journal = {Acta Biotheoretica}, year = {1979}, } @unpublished{ProteviManuscript-PROENA, author = {John Protevi}, abstract = {Sociologists have known for some time of the widespread incidence of prosocial behavior in the aftermath of disasters (research summarized in Rodriguez, Trainor, and Quarantelli 2006). They have also criticized the role of media in spreading \textquotedblleft{}disaster myths\textquotedblright which include the idea of widespread anti-social behavior (Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski 2006). In this essay I will investigate the evolutionary theory and neuroscience needed to account for such prosocial behavior, as well as to discuss the political entailments and consequence of media framing emphasizing if not inventing widespread antisocial behavior.}, title = {Evolution, neuroscience, and prosocial behavior in disasters}, } @article{Protopapas1998-PROOTO, volume = {21}, number = {2}, author = {Athanassios Protopapas and Paula Tallal}, abstract = {The arguments for the orderly output constraint concern phylogenetic matters and do not address the ontogeny of combination-specific neurons and the corresponding processing mechanisms. Locus equations are too variable to be strongly predetermined and too inconsistent to be easily learned. Findings on the development of speech perception and underlying auditory processing must be taken into account in the formulation of neural encoding theories.}, title = {On the ontogeny of combination-sensitive neurons in speech perception}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1998}, pages = {280-281}, } @article{Provine2006-PROVAD, volume = {29}, number = {1}, author = {Robert R. Provine}, abstract = {Selection for or against muscle initiates a cascade of centripetal (outside-in), trophically mediated, neurological events through which the environment programs heritable neuromuscular and neuroneuronal connections in a rapid and specific fashion. The velocity, direction, and efficiency of this process are a consequence of the environment acting directly on muscle, the organ of action, and behavioral interface between organism and environment.}, title = {Velocity and direction in neurobehavioral evolution: The centripetal prospective}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2006}, pages = {21-22}, } @article{Pulvermuuml1999-PULTAC, volume = {22}, number = {2}, author = {Friedemann Pulverm\"u and Ller}, abstract = {In this response to multidisciplinary commentaries on the target article, \textquotedblleft{}Words in the brain's language,\textquotedblright additional features of the cell-assembly model are reviewed, as demanded by some of the commentators. Subsequently, methodological considerations on how to perform additional tests of neurobiological language models as well as a discussion of recent data from neuroimaging, neuropsychological, and other behavioral studies in speakers of spoken and sign languages follow. Special emphasis is put on the explanatory power of the cell-assembly model regarding neuropsychological double dissociations. Future perspectives on neural network simulations, neuronal mechanisms of syntax and semantics, and the interaction of attention mechanisms and cell assemblies are pointed out in the final paragraphs.}, title = {Toward a cognitive neuroscience of language}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {307-327}, } @article{Purushothaman2008-PURNOC, volume = {31}, number = {2}, author = {Gopathy Purushothaman and Harold E. Bedell and Haluk \"O{}men and Saumil S. Patel}, title = {Neurophysiology of compensation for time delays: Visual prediction is off track}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2008}, pages = {214-214}, } @article{Quartz2008-QUAFCS, volume = {24}, number = {3}, author = {Steven R. Quartz}, title = {From cognitive science to cognitive neuroscience to neuroeconomics}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {2008}, pages = {459-471}, } @unpublished{Quartz2002-QUASD, author = {Steven Quartz and Jackie Sullivan and Peter Machamer and Andrea Scarantino}, abstract = {Proceedings of the Pittsburgh Workshop in History and Philosophy of Biology, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, March 23-24 2001 Session 5: Development, Neuroscience and Evolutionary Psychology.}, title = {Session 5: Development, neuroscience and evolutionary psychology}, year = {2002}, } @incollection{Rabins2009-RABTAN, author = {Peter V. Rabins and David M. Blass}, booktitle = {Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives From Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience}, title = {Toward a neurobiology of personal identity}, publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press}, year = {2009}, } @article{Radeau2004-RADOVA, volume = {27}, number = {6}, author = {Monique Radeau and C\'e{}cile Colin}, abstract = {The analogy between the rules that subtend ventriloquism and bimodal neurons responding suggests a possible neural mechanism for audiovisual interactions in spatial scene analysis. Perinatal data, such as those on synesthesia, sensory deprivation, and sensory surstimulation, as well as neuroanatomical evidence for transitory intersensory connections in the brain support the view that audition and vision are bound together at birth.}, title = {On ventriloquism, audiovisual neurons, neonates, and the senses}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {889-890}, } @article{Radford2000-RADNAA, volume = {75}, number = {3}, author = {Colin Radford}, abstract = {Glen Hartz argues, that neuroscience reveals that persons moved or frightened by fictional characters believe that they are real, so such behaviour is not irrational. But these beliefs, if they exist, are not rational and, in any case inconsistent with our conscious rational beliefs that fictional characters are not real. So his argument fails to establish that we are not irrational or incoherent when moved or frightened by such characters. It powerfully reinforces the contrary view.}, title = {Neuroscience and anna; a reply to Glenn Hartz}, journal = {Philosophy}, year = {2000}, pages = {437-440}, } @article{Rafalovich2001-RAFPAN, volume = {31}, number = {4}, author = {Adam Rafalovich}, title = {Psychodynamic and neurological perspectives on ADHD: Exploring strategies for defining a phenomenon}, journal = {Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour}, year = {2001}, pages = {397--{}418}, } @article{Raffone2001-RAFANA, volume = {24}, number = {1}, author = {Antonino Raffone and Gezinus Wolters and Jacob M. Murre}, abstract = {We suggest a neurophysiological account of the short-term memory capacity limit based on a model of visual working memory (Raffone \& Wolters, in press). Simulations have revealed a critical capacity limit of about four independent patterns. The model mechanisms may be applicable to working memory in general and they allow a reinterpretation of some of the issues discussed by Cowan.}, title = {A neurophysioiogical account of working memory limits: Between-item segregation and within-chunk integration}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {139-141}, } @unpublished{RamachandranManuscript-RAMAMA, author = {V. S. Ramachandran}, abstract = {Summary Ideomotor apraxia is a cognitive disorder in which the patient loses the ability to accurately perform learned, skilled actions. This is despite normal limb power and coordination. It has long been known that left supramarginal gyrus lesions cause bilateral upper limb apraxia and it was proposed that this area stored a visualkinaesthetic image of the skilled action, which was translated elsewhere in the brain into the pre-requisite movement formula. We hypothesise that, rather than these two functions occurring separately, both are complementary functions of chains of \textquoteleft\textquoteleft{}mirror neurons\textquoteright\textquoteright within the left inferior parietal lobe. We go on to propose that this neural mechanism in the supramarginal gyrus and its projection zones, which originally evolved to allow the creation of a direct map between vision and movement, was subsequently exapted to allow other sorts of cross-domain mapping and in particular those sorts of abstract re-conceptualisation, such as metaphor, that make mankind unique.}, title = {Apraxia, metaphor and mirror neurons}, } @unpublished{RamachandranManuscript-RAMN, author = {V. S. Ramachandran}, abstract = {First Published on: 21 June 2007 To cite this Article: Ramachandran, Vilayanur S., McGeoch, Paul D., Williams, Lisa and Arcilla, Gerard (2007) 'Rapid Relief of Thalamic Pain Syndrome Induced by Vestibular Caloric Stimulation', Neurocase, 13:3, 185 - 188 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/13554790701450446 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13554790701450446..}, title = {Neurocase}, } @unpublished{RamachandranManuscript-RAMAAN, author = {Vilayanur S. Ramachandran}, abstract = {Apotemnophilia, a disorder that blurs the distinction between neurology and psychiatry, is characterized by the intense and longstanding desire for amputation of a speci\textcent{}c limb. Here we present evidence from two individuals suggestive that this condition, long thought to be entirely psychological in origin, actually has a neurological basis. We found heightened skin conductance response..}, title = {Apotemnophilia: A neurological disorder}, } @article{Ratcliffe2008-RATJHT, volume = {44}, number = {3}, author = {Matthew Ratcliffe}, title = {John Hick the new frontier of religion and science: Religious experience, neuroscience and the transcendent. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Pp. XII+228. \textsterling{}53.00 (hbk), \textsterling{}17.99 (pbk). ISBN 0230507700 (hbk); 0230507719 (pbk)}, journal = {Religious Studies}, year = {2008}, pages = {353-357}, } @article{Ratcliffe2003-RATSNA, volume = {39}, number = {3}, author = {Matthew Ratcliffe}, abstract = {In this paper, I consider V. S. Ramachandran's in-principle agnosticism concerning whether neurological studies of religious experience can be taken as support for the claim that God really does communicate with people during religious experiences. Contra Ramachandran, I argue that it is by no means obvious that agnosticism is the proper scientific attitude to adopt in relation to this claim. I go on to show how the questions of whether it is (1) a scientifically testable claim and (2) a plausible hypothesis, serve to open up some important philosophical issues concerning interpretive backgrounds that are presupposed in the assessment of scientific hypotheses. More specifically, I argue that naturalism or scientific objectivism in its various forms is not simply a neutral or default methodological backdrop for empirical inquiry but involves acceptance of a specific ontology, which functions as an implicit and unargued constitutive commitment. Hence, these neurological studies can be employed as a lever with which to disclose something of the ways in which different frameworks of interpretation, both theistic and atheistic, serve differently to structure and give meaning to empirical findings.}, title = {Scientific naturalism and the neurology of religious experience}, journal = {Religious Studies}, year = {2003}, pages = {323-345}, } @article{Ratcliffe2002-RATHAA, volume = {1}, number = {3}, author = {Matthew Ratcliffe}, abstract = {I outline the early Heidegger's views on mood and emotion, and then relate his central claims to some recent finding in neuropsychology. These findings complement Heidegger in a number of important ways. More specifically, I suggest that, in order to make sense of certain neurological conditions that traditional assumptions concerning the mind are constitutionally incapable of accommodating, something very like Heidegger's account of mood and emotion needs to be adopted as an interpretive framework. I conclude by supporting Heidegger's insistence that the sciences constitute a derivative means of disclosing the world and our place within it, as opposed to an ontologically and epistemologically privileged domain of inquiry.}, title = {Heidegger's attunement and the neuropsychology of emotion}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year = {2002}, } @article{Ravenscroft1998-RAVNAT, volume = {13}, number = {1}, author = {Ian Ravenscroft}, title = {Neuroscience and the mind}, journal = {Mind and Language}, year = {1998}, pages = {132-137}, } @article{Ravven2003-RAVSAO, volume = {4}, number = {2}, author = {H. M. Ravven}, abstract = {Spinoza speculated on how ethics could emerge from biology and psychology rather than disrupt them and recent evidence suggests he might have gotten it right. His radical deconstruction and reconstruction of ethics is supported by a number of avenues of research in the cognitive and neurosciences. This paper gathers together and presents a composite picture of recent research that supports Spinoza\textquoteright{}s theory of the emotions and of the natural origins of ethics. It enumerates twelve naturalist claims of Spinoza that now seem to be supported by substantial evidence from the neurosciences and recent cognitive science. I focus on the evidence provided by Lakoff and Johnson in their summary of recent cognitive science in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (1999); by Antonio Damasio in his assessment of the state of affective neuroscience in Descartes\textquoteright Error (1994) and in The Feeling of What Happens (1999) (with passing references to his recent Looking for Spinoza (2003); and by Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and their colleagues in the neural basis of emotional contagion and resonance, i.e., the neural basis of primitive sociality and intersubjectivity, that bear out Spinoza\textquoteright{}s account of social psychology as rooted in the mechanism he called attention to and identified as affective imitation.}, title = {Spinoza\textquoteright{}s anticipation of contemporary affective neuroscience}, journal = {Consciousness and Emotion}, year = {2003}, pages = {257-290}, } @unpublished{RebekkaA2008-REBTNO, author = {Klein Rebekka A.}, abstract = {Abstract This paper deals with the experimental model of altruistic punishment and social norm enforcement which has been created in the research field of neuroeconomics recently. By use of this model, neurobiologists and economists investigate the close relationship between neurobiological mechanisms in the brain and specific patterns of human social behavior. They have experimentally shown that the implementation of a punishment tool in social interaction experiments gives empirical evidence for the great impact of non-selfish behavior on social group interaction and individual strategies of cooperation, competition and collective action. The interpretation of this evidence and their impact on social theory is critically questioned in this paper from a philosophical point of view.}, title = {The (neuro-)biology of altruistic punishment a philosophical investigation of a concept of human social behavior}, year = {2008}, } @article{Rees2001-REENOV, volume = {11}, number = {2}, author = {Geraint Rees}, title = {Neuroimaging of visual awareness in patients and normal subjects}, journal = {Current Opinion in Neurobiology}, year = {2001}, pages = {150-156}, } @article{Revonsuo1999-REVNAT, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Antti Revonsuo}, abstract = {Explanatory problems in the philosophy of neuroscience are not well captured by the division between the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. The actual problem is, instead, whether mechanistic biological explanations across different levels of description can be extended to account for psychological phenomena. According to cognitive neuroscience, some neural levels of description at least are essential for the explanation of psychological phenomena, whereas, in traditional cognitive science, psychological explanations are completely independent of the neural levels of description. The challenge for cognitive neuroscience is to discover the levels of description appropriate for the neural explanation of psychological phenomena.}, title = {Neuroscience and the explanation of psychological phenomena}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {847-849}, } @book{Revonsuo1994-REVCIP, author = {Antti Revonsuo and Matti Kamppinen}, abstract = {Consciousness seems to be an enigmatic phenomenon: it is difficult to imagine how our perceptions of the world and our inner thoughts, sensations and feelings could be related to the immensely complicated biological organ we call the brain. This volume presents the thoughts of some of the leading philosophers and cognitive scientists who have recently participated in the discussion of the status of consciousness in science. The focus of inquiry is the question: "Is it possible to incorporate consciousness into science?" Philosophers have suggested different alternatives -- some think that consciousness should be altogether eliminated from science because it is not a real phenomenon, others that consciousness is a real, higher-level physical or neurobiological phenomenon, and still others that consciousness is fundamentally mysterious and beyond the reach of science. At the same time, however, several models or theories of the role of conscious processing in the brain have been developed in the more empirical cognitive sciences. It has been suggested that non-conscious processes must be sharply separated from conscious ones, and that the necessity of this distinction is manifested in the curious behavior of certain brain-damaged patients. This book demonstrates the dialogue between philosophical and empirical points of view. The writers present alternative solutions to the brain-consciousness problem and they discuss how the unification of biological and psychological sciences could thus become feasible. Covering a large ground, this book shows how the philosophical and empirical problems are closely interconnected. From this interdisciplinary exploration emerges the conviction that consciousness can and should be a natural part of our scientific world view}, title = {Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience}, publisher = {Lawrence Erlbaum}, year = {1994}, } @unpublished{Ribeiro2003-RIBDMN, author = {Anna Christina Ribeiro}, abstract = {$<$/b$>$Both macaque monkeys and humans have been shown to have what are called \textquoteleft{}mirror neurons\textquoteright, a class of neurons that respond to goal-related motor-actions, both when these actions are performed by the subject and when they are performed by another individual observed by the subject. Gallese and Goldman (1998) contend that mirror neurons may be seen as \textquoteleft{}a part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind- reading ability\textquoteright, and that of the two competing theories of mind-reading, mirror neurons lend support to simulation theory. I here offer four reasons why I think mirror neurons do not provide support for simulation theory over its contender, theory theory}, title = {Do mirror neurons support a simulation theory of mind-reading?}, year = {2003}, } @article{Richardson2004-RICAEN, volume = {7}, number = {3}, author = {Pamela Richardson}, abstract = {Fieldwork experiences in the summer of 2003 resulted in confusion regarding the ethical positioning of myself (the interviewer) in relation to the multiple 'actants' that constituted the research subject(s). This paper explores some of these personal issues and conflicts in order to clarify, gain perspective on and critique the nature (and indeed the 'Nature') of my fieldwork. The multiple positioning of participants within networks of agricultural and social ethics is addressed. I borrow Lewis Holloway's idea of relational ethical identity, in order to resituate and rethink the interviews in terms of actor-network theory. This paper argues that ethical identities and ethical 'natures' can be understood as relationally constructed and constituted within networks. The ways in which notions of (un)ethical agricultural relations shaped each interview experience are also explored. Specifically, how did my ideas of (un)ethical farming influence my 'ethical take' on how different farmers operated? I also argue that all encounters are ethically charged and, as such, encounters result in emotional tensions.}, title = {Agricultural ethics, neurotic natures and emotional encounters: An application of actor-network theory}, journal = {Ethics, Place and Environment}, year = {2004}, pages = {195 -- 201}, } @article{Rietveld2008-RIETSB, volume = {18}, number = {3}, author = {Erik Rietveld}, abstract = {For Merleau-Ponty,consciousness in skillful coping is a matter of prereflective \textquoteleft{}I can\textquoteright and not explicit \textquoteleft{}I think that.\textquoteright The body unifies many domain-specific capacities. There exists a direct link between the perceived possibilities for action in the situation (\textquoteleft{}affordances\textquoteright) and the organism\textquoteright{}s capacities. From Merleau-Ponty\textquoteright{}s descriptions it is clear that in a flow of skillful actions, the leading \textquoteleft{}I can\textquoteright may change from moment to moment without explicit deliberation. How these transitions occur, however, is less clear. Given that Merleau-Ponty suggested that a better understanding of the self-organization of brain and behavior is important, I will re-read his descriptions of skillful coping in the light of recent ideas on neurodynamics. Affective processes play a crucial role in evaluating the motivational significance of objects and contribute to the individual\textquoteright{}s prereflective responsiveness to relevant affordances.}, title = {The Skillful Body as a Concernful System of Possible Actions: Phenomena and Neurodynamics}, journal = {Theory \& Psychology}, year = {2008}, pages = {341-361}, } @incollection{Riva2006-RIVBPM, author = {Prof G. Riva}, booktitle = {Riva, Prof. G. (2006) Being-in-the-World-With: Presence Meets Social and Cognitive Neuroscience}, abstract = {In this chapter we will discuss the concepts of \textquotedblleft{}presence\textquotedblright (Inner Presence) and \textquotedblleft{}social presence\textquotedblright (Co-presence) within a cognitive and ecological perspective. Specifically, we claim that the concepts of \textquotedblleft{}presence\textquotedblright and \textquotedblleft{}social presence\textquotedblright are the possible links between self, action, communication and culture. In the first section we will provide a capsule view of Heidegger\textquoteright{}s work by examining the two main features of the Heideggerian concept of \textquotedblleft{}being\textquotedblright: spatiality and \textquotedblleft{}being with\textquotedblright. We argue that different visions from social and cognitive sciences -- Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Enactive Approach, Situated Simulation, Covert Imitation - and discoveries from neuroscience -- Mirror and Canonical Neurons - have many contact points with this view. In particular, these data suggest that our conceptual system dynamically produces contextualized representations (simulations) that support grounded action in different situations. This is allowed by a common coding -- the motor code -- shared by perception, action and concepts. This common coding also allows the subject for natively recognizing actions done by other selves within the phenomenological contents. In this picture we argue that the role of presence and social presence is to allow the process of self-identification through the separation between \textquotedblleft{}self\textquotedblright and \textquotedblleft{}other,\textquotedblright and between \textquotedblleft{}internal\textquotedblright and \textquotedblleft{}external\textquotedblright. Finally, implications of this position for communication and media studies are discussed by way of conclusion.}, title = {Being-in-the-world-with: Presence meets social and cognitive neuroscience}, publisher = {[Book Chapter]}, year = {2006}, } @article{Rizzolatti1998-RIZWHT, volume = {21}, number = {4}, author = {Giacomo Rizzolatti}, abstract = {The evolutionary continuity between the prespeech functions of premotor cortex and its new linguistic functions, the main thesis of MacNeilage's target article, is confirmed by the recent discovery of \textquotedblleft{}mirror\textquotedblright neurons in monkeys and a corresponding action-observation/action-execution matching system in humans. Physiological data (and other considerations) appear to indicate, however, that brachiomanual gestures played a greater role in language evolution than MacNeilage would like to admit.}, title = {What happened to homo habilis? (Language and mirror neurons)}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1998}, pages = {527-528}, } @article{Roberts1997-ROBCIN, volume = {20}, number = {3}, author = {Bill Roberts and Paul Cordo and Stevan Harnad}, title = {Controversies in neuroscience V: Persistent pain: Neuronal mechanisms and clinical implications: Introduction}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {0-0}, } @article{Robinson2004-ROBPFO, volume = {79}, number = {1}, author = {Daniel N. Robinson}, title = {Philosophical foundations of neuroscience by M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker oxford: Blackwell publishing; 2003. XVII +461pp}, journal = {Philosophy}, year = {2004}, pages = {141-146}, } @article{RochaForthcoming-ROCSAS, author = {James Rocha}, title = {Sean A. Spence, the actor's brain: Exploring the cognitive neuroscience of free will}, journal = {Journal of Value Inquiry}, year = {forthcoming}, } @article{Rocha2003-ROCFAF, volume = {4}, number = {1}, author = {M. Rocha and D. A. Furtado and J. R. L. Menezes and C. Hedin-Pereira}, abstract = {The emergence of functional maturity in the brain relies upon the interplay between form and function during its developmental history. This interaction continues throughout life and changes in neuronal function lead to changes in diverse structural scales in the brain. Both regulatory genes, which define compartments in the nervous system, and activity-dependent processes cooperate to determine neuronal phenotype and tissue structure. The influence of electrical activity as a regulator of early developmental events such as proliferation and migration is being considered. Spontaneous neuronal activity may influence early axonal and dendritic arbor formation and activity blockade alters branch density both for axon arbors and dendrites. Although large-scale changes in axon morphology may occur until late stages of development, the remodeling of axon and dendrite morphology in terms of their terminal arborization area is less pronounced than initially thought. Electrical (or neural ) activity is important for synapse stabilization and circuit formation and sensory experience performs a refinement of neuronal shape. This fine-tuning appears to be a dynamical process sustained into adulthood, with smaller scale changes occurring mainly at the dendritic spine level. These subcellular compartments are now believed to restrict biochemical changes in dendrites to particular synapses during (or undergoing ) synaptic plasticity. Events at dendritic spines underlie alterations in the morphology of individual neurons that will ultimately affect the function of complex neuronal networks.}, title = {Form and function: A neuronal dialog}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2003}, } @article{Ros1996-ROSBZV, volume = {27}, number = {1}, author = {Arno Ros}, title = {Bemerkungen zum verh\"a{}ltnis zwischen neurophysiologie und psychologie}, journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science}, year = {1996}, } @article{Rose2002-ROSTNN, volume = {10}, author = {J. D. Rose}, title = {The neurobehavioral nature of fishes and the question of awareness and pain}, journal = {Reviews in Fisheries Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {1-38}, } @unpublished{RosenbergManuscript-ROSLFC, author = {Alex Rosenberg}, abstract = {1. From developmental molecular biology to neurogenomics 2. More than you wanted to know about short term and long term implicit memory 3. How are explicit memories stored? 4. How the brain recalls memories 5. Each explicit memory is just a lot of implicit memories 6. Is \textquoteleft{}knowledge how\textquoteright computable? 7. Computationalism and neuroscience..}, title = {Lessons for cognitive science from neurogenomics}, } @incollection{Rosenberger2009-ROSQPA, author = {Robert Rosenberger}, booktitle = {New Waves in Philosophy of Technology}, title = {Quick-freezing philosophy: An analysis of imaging technologies in neurobiology}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, year = {2009}, } @article{Ross2008-ROSTSO-5, volume = {24}, number = {3}, author = {Don Ross}, title = {Two styles of neuroeconomics}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {2008}, pages = {473-483}, } @article{Ross2003-ROSNMO, volume = {26}, number = {4}, author = {Helen E. Ross}, abstract = {Lehar argues that a simple Neuron Doctrine cannot explain perceptual phenomena such as size constancy but he fails to discuss existing, more complex neurological models. Size models that rely purely on scaling for distance are sparse, but several models are also concerned with other aspects of size perception such as geometrical illusions, relative size, adaptation, perceptual learning, and size discrimination.}, title = {Neurological models of size scaling}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2003}, pages = {425-425}, } @article{Rothenberger2006-ROTHFI, volume = {29}, number = {6}, author = {Aribert Rothenberger and Veit Roessner and Tobias Banaschewski}, abstract = {Tourette Syndrome (TS) and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) are highly associated and often it is difficult to differentiate their symptomatology. In TS, habit forming neuronal systems may form habits of their own -- sometimes similar to ritualized behavior. However, whereas in OCD merely the \textquotedblleft{}affect-loop\textquotedblright is touched, in TS the \textquotedblleft{}sensorimotor-loop\textquotedblright plays the major role, although some overlap can be seen in the clinical spectrum between TS and OCD. The latter is mainly related to the \textquotedblleft{}just-right\textquotedblright phenomenon which shows a clear developmental course. An analogous behavioral model for TS and OCD with reference to \textquotedblleft{}just-right\textquotedblright is suggested. (Published Online~{}February~{}8~{}2007).}, title = {Habit formation in tourette syndrome with associated obsessive-compulsive behavior: At the crossroads of neurobiological modelling}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2006}, pages = {627-628}, } @article{Rubinstein2008-RUBCON, volume = {24}, number = {3}, author = {Ariel Rubinstein}, abstract = {Neuroeconomics is examined critically using data on the response times of subjects who were asked to express their preferences in the context of the Allais Paradox. Different patterns of choice are found among the fast and slow responders. This suggests that we try to identify types of economic agents by the time they take to make their choices. Nevertheless, it is argued that it is far from clear if and how neuroeconomics will change economics.}, title = {Comments on neuroeconomics}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {2008}, pages = {485-494}, } @book{Russell2002-RUSNAT, author = {Robert J. Russell}, title = {Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action}, publisher = {Center for Ttheology and the Natural Sciences}, year = {2002}, } @unpublished{RyderManuscript-RYDNAT-2, author = {Dan Ryder}, abstract = {Chapter 1: Discussion of my a posteriori strategy and the nature of representation in models. Chapter 2: Presentation of the SINBAD theory of the cerebral cortex. Chapter 3: Demonstration of how SINBAD networks develop into genuinely representational models. Application of the theory to equivocal representation, misrepresentation, empty representation, and twin cases. Chapter 4: Representata as sources of correlation, a solution to the problem of teleological indeterminacy, useful vs. true representation, objectivity. Chapter 5: The non-representational use of representations in the brain in occurrent belief (i.e. judgement) and occurrent desire, Swampman, propositional content, the non-occurrent attitudes, inference and psychological explanation. Chapter 6: SINBAD representation as a kind of mental representation, summary \& conclusion.}, title = {Neurosemantics: A theory (book in progress)}, } @incollection{Ryder2006-RYDOTO, author = {Dan Ryder}, booktitle = {Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays}, title = {On thinking of kinds: A neuroscientific perspective}, publisher = {Oup}, year = {2006}, } @article{Ryder2004-RYDREM, volume = {141}, number = {2}, author = {Dan Ryder}, title = {Review essay: Meditations on first neuroscience: Critical notice of mark Changizi's the brain from 25,000 feet}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2004}, } phdthesis{Ryder2002-RYDNAT, author = {Dan Ryder}, title = {Neurosemantics: A Theory}, school = {University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill}, year = {2002}, } @article{Rypma2001-RYPFNO, volume = {24}, number = {1}, author = {Bart Rypma and John D. E. Gabrieli}, abstract = {Cowan argues that the true short-term memory (STM) capacity limit is about 4 items. Functional neuroimaging data converge with this conclusion, indicating distinct neural activity patterns depending on whether or not memory task-demands exceed this limit. STM for verbal information within that capacity invokes focal prefrontal cortical activation that increases with memory load. STM for verbal information exceeding that capacity invokes widespread prefrontal activation in regions associated with executive and attentional processes that may mediate chunking processes to accommodate STM capacity limits.}, title = {Functional neuroimaging of short-term memory: The neural mechanisms of mental storage}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {143-144}, } @article{Sagoff2007-SAGFTA, volume = {7}, number = {5}, author = {Mark Sagoff}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Further thoughts about the human neuron mouse}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2007}, pages = {51 -- 52}, } @article{Samuels1998-SAMWBW, volume = {13}, number = {4}, author = {Richard Samuels}, title = {What brains won't tell us about the mind: A critique of the neurobiological argument against representational nativism}, journal = {Mind and Language}, year = {1998}, pages = {548-570}, } @article{Sarpeshkar1998-SARAVD, volume = {10}, number = {7}, author = {Rahul Sarpeshkar}, abstract = {We review the pros and cons of analog and digital computation. We propose that computation that is most efficient in its use of resources is neither analog computation nor digital computation but, rather, a mixture of the two forms. For maximum efficiency, the information and information-processing resources of the hybrid form must be distributed over many wires, with an optimal signal-to-noise ratio per wire. Our results suggest that it is likely that the brain computes in a hybrid fashion and that an underappreciated and important reason for the efficiency of the human brain, which consumes only 12 W, is the hybrid and distributed nature of its architecture.}, title = {Analog versus digital: Extrapolating from electronics to neurobiology}, journal = {Neural Computation}, year = {1998}, pages = {1601--1638}, } @article{Schacter1996-SCHIMA-2, volume = {93}, author = {Daniel Schacter}, title = {Illusory memories: A cognitive neuroscience analysis}, journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences}, year = {1996}, pages = {13527-13533}, } @incollection{Schacter1995-SCHIMA, author = {Daniel L. Schacter}, booktitle = {The Cognitive Neurosciences}, title = {Implicit memory: A new frontier for cognitive neuroscience}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1995}, } @article{Schacter1990-SCHTAC, volume = {12}, author = {Daniel L. Schacter}, title = {Toward a cognitive neuropsychology of awareness: Implicit knowledge and anosognosia}, journal = {Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology}, year = {1990}, pages = {155-78}, } @article{Schaffner2008-SCHTMA, volume = {75}, number = {5}, author = {Kenneth F. Schaffner}, abstract = {This article considers claims that biology should seek general theories similar to those found in physics but argues for an alternative framework for biological theories as collections of prototypical interlevel models that can be extrapolated by analogy to different organisms. This position is exemplified in the development of the Hodgkin{}Huxley giant squid model for action potentials, which uses equations in specialized ways. This model is viewed as an \textquotedblleft{}emergent unifier.\textquotedblright Such unifiers, which require various simplifications, involve the types of heuristics discussed in Wimsatt\textquoteright{}s writings on reduction, but with a twist. Here, the heuristics are used to generate emergent rather than reductive explanations. \dag{}To contact the author, please write to: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; e{}mail: kfs@pitt.edu.}, title = {Theories, models, and equations in biology: The heuristic search for emergent simplifications in neurobiology}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, } @book{Scharff2001-SCHTPC-5, author = {David E. Scharff}, title = {The Psychoanalytic Century: Freud's Legacy for the Future}, publisher = {Other Press}, year = {2001}, } @article{Schick2005-SCHNE, volume = {5}, number = {2}, author = {Ari Schick}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Neuro exceptionalism?}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2005}, pages = {36 -- 38}, } @article{Schilhab2007-SCHIET, author = {Theresa Schilhab}, title = {Interactional expertise through the looking glass: A Peek at mirror neurons}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, year = {2007}, } @article{Schipper2008-SCHOAE, volume = {24}, number = {3}, author = {Burkhard C. Schipper}, title = {On an evolutionary foundation of neuroeconomics}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {2008}, pages = {495-513}, } @article{Schlosser2008-SCHFAN, volume = {117}, number = {468}, author = {Markus E. Schlosser}, title = {Review of "Freedom and neurobiology: Reflections on free will, language, and political power", by John R. Searle}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2008}, pages = {1127-30}, } @unpublished{Schmaus2004-SCHEAN-2, author = {Warren Schmaus}, abstract = {There is a lack of connection between the cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary approaches to the study of the mind, in philosophy as well as the sciences. For instance, although Millikan may display a thorough understanding of evolutionary theory in her arguments for the adaptive value of substance concepts, she gives scant attention to what could be the neural substrates of these concepts. Neuroscience research calls into question her assumption that substance concepts play a role in practical skills and suggests that conceptual knowledge in the brain may be organized by perceptual features rather than by individuals and natural kinds.}, title = {Evolutionary and neuroscience approaches to the study of cognition}, year = {2004}, } @article{Schore2005-SCHDAN, volume = {28}, number = {2}, author = {Allan N. Schore}, abstract = {Lewis describes the developmental core of dynamic systems theory. I offer recent data from developmental neuroscience on the sequential experience-dependent maturation of components of the limbic system over the stages of infancy. Increasing interconnectivity within the vertically integrated limbic system allows for more complex appraisals of emotional value. The earliest organization of limbic structures has an enduring impact on all later emotional processing.}, title = {Developmental affective neuroscience describes mechanisms at the core of dynamic systems theory}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {217-218}, } @incollection{Schore2001-SCHTRB, author = {Allan N. Schore}, booktitle = {The Psychoanalytic Century: Freud's Legacy for the Future}, title = {The right brain as the neurobiological substratum of Freud's dynamic unconscious}, publisher = {Other Press}, year = {2001}, pages = {61-88}, } @book{Schouten2007-SCHTMO-13, author = {Maurice Kenneth Davy Schouten and Huibert Looren de Jong}, abstract = {The Matter of the Mind addresses and illuminates the relationship between psychology and neuroscience by focusing on the topic of reduction. Written by leading philosophers in the field Discusses recent theorizing in the mind-brain sciences and reviews and weighs the evidence in favour of reductionism against the backdrop of recent important advances within psychology and the neurosciences Collects the latest work on central topics where neuroscience is now making inroads in traditional psychological terrain, such as adaptive behaviour, reward systems, consciousness, and social cognition.}, title = {The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience, and Reduction}, publisher = {Blackwell Pub.}, year = {2007}, } @article{Schreiner1998-SCHILF, volume = {21}, number = {2}, author = {Christoph E. Schreiner}, abstract = {A tendency of auditory cortical neurons to respond at the beginning of major transitions in sounds rather than providing a continuously updated spectral-temporal profile may impede the generation of combination-sensitivity for certain classes of stimuli. Potential consequences of the cortical encoding of voiced stop-consonants on representational principles derived from orderly output constraints are discussed.}, title = {Input limitations for cortical combination-sensitive neurons coding stop-consonants?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1998}, pages = {284-284}, } @article{Schulkin2007-SCHEAW, volume = {5}, number = {1}, author = {Jay Schulkin}, abstract = {Earlier views associated cognition with the cortex, and the will with sub-cortical non-cognitive structures. But an emerging perspective is that cognition runs throughout the central nervous sys- tem, including areas typically linked to motor control. It is an important realization that perceptual/effector systems are pregnant with cognitive resources. Staying the course to achieve one 's goals amidst diverse pulls is the primary function of the will. One adaptation is to pre-commit oneself to future recursive actions consistent with one's plans. Diverse brain regions are tied to the conflicts of competing interests that require willpower to persevere towards our longer-term goals. While it is debatable to what extent we are conscious of our willpower and its causal efficacy, the concept of the will is a fundamental category in understanding our mental architecture and a piece of our evolutionary history.}, title = {Effort and will: A cognitive neuroscience perspective}, journal = {Mind and Matter}, year = {2007}, pages = {111-126}, } @incollection{Schulkin2006-SCHAEA-3, author = {Jay Schulkin}, booktitle = {A Companion to Pragmatism}, title = {Aesthetic experience and the neurobiology of inquiry}, publisher = {Blackwell Pub.}, year = {2006}, } @article{Schulkin2005-SCHMSR, volume = {3}, number = {1}, author = {Jay Schulkin}, abstract = {The moral sentiments adumbrated by Adam Smith and Charles Darwin reflect some of our basic social appraisals of each other. One set of moral appraisals reflects disgust and withdrawal, a form of contempt. Another set of moral appraisals reflects active concern responses, an appreciation of the experiences (sympathy for some- one)of other individuals and approach related behaviors. While no one set of neural structures is designed for only moral appraisals, a diverse set of neural regions that include the gustatory/visceral neural axis, basal ganglia and iverse neocortical sites underlie moral judgment.}, title = {Moral sensibility,visceral representations,and social cohesion: A behavioral neuroscience perspective}, journal = {Mind and Matter}, year = {2005}, pages = {31-56}, } @article{Seltzer2001-SELCAN, volume = {14}, number = {2}, author = {Benjamin Seltzer and Jennifer J. Vasterling and Charles W. Mathias and Angela Brennan}, title = {Clinical and neuropsychological correlates of impaired awareness of deficits in alzheimer disease and Parkinson disease: A comparative study}, journal = {Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology, and Behavioral Neurology}, year = {2001}, pages = {122-129}, } @article{Seltzer2009-SELNFO, volume = {32}, number = {1}, author = {Leslie J. Seltzer and Seth D. Pollak}, title = {Neuroendocrine features of attachment in infants and nonhuman primates}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2009}, pages = {41-42}, } @article{Semenza2009-SEMTNO, volume = {24}, number = {4}, author = {Carlo Semenza}, abstract = {The difference between common and proper names seems to derive from specific semantic characteristics of proper names. In particular, proper names refer to specific individual entities or events, and unlike common names, rarely map onto more general semantic characteristics (attributes, concepts, categories). This fact makes the link proper names have with their reference particularly fragile. Processing proper names seems, as a consequence, to require special cognitive and neural resources. Neuropsychological findings show that proper names and common names follow functionally distinct processing pathways. These pathways are neurally distinct and differently sensitive to focal or generalized brain damage, cognitive changes with age or lack of organic resources. Their precise location, depending on specific tasks, is still partly unknown.}, title = {The neuropsychology of proper names}, journal = {Mind and Language}, year = {2009}, pages = {347-369}, } @article{Semenza2004-SEMUHC, volume = {6}, number = {1}, author = {Carlo Semenza}, title = {Unconscious how? Concluding remarks to the new York meeting on the "unconscious in cognitive neuroscience and psychoanalysis"}, journal = {Neuro-Psychoanalysis}, year = {2004}, pages = {87-89}, } @book{Semin2008-SEMEGS, author = {G. R. Semin and Eliot R. Smith}, abstract = {In recent years there has been an increasing awareness that a comprehensive understanding of language, cognitive and affective processes, and social and interpersonal phenomena cannot be achieved without understanding the ways these processes are grounded in bodily states. The term \textquoteleft{}embodiment\textquoteright captures the common denominator of these developments, which come from several disciplinary perspectives ranging from neuroscience, cognitive science, social psychology, and affective sciences. For the first time, this volume brings together these varied developments under one umbrella and furnishes a comprehensive overview of this intellectual movement in the cognitive-behavioral sciences.}, title = {Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2008}, } @article{Sewards2000-SEWVAD, volume = {9}, number = {1}, author = {Terence V. Sewards and Mark A. Sewards}, abstract = {It has been shown that visual awareness in the blind hemifield of hemianopic cats that have undergone unilateral ablations of visual cortex can be restored by sectioning the commissure of the superior colliculus or by destroying a portion of the substantia nigra contralateral to the cortical lesion (the Sprague effect). We propose that the visual awareness that is recovered is due to synchronized oscillatory activities in the superior colliculus ipsilateral to the cortical lesion. These oscillatory activities are normally partially suppressed by the inhibitory, GABAergic contralateral nigrotectal projection, and the destruction of the substantia nigra, or the sectioning of the collicular commissure, disinhibits the collicular neurons, causing an increase in the extent of oscillatory activity and/or synchronization between activities at different sites. This increase in the oscillatory and synchronized character is sufficient for the activities to give rise to visual awareness. We argue that in rodents and lower vertebrates, normal visual awareness is partly due to synchronized oscillatory activities in the optic tectum and partly due to similar activities in visual cortex. It is only in carnivores and primates that visual awareness is wholly due to cortical activities. Based on von Baerian recapitulation theory, we propose that, even in humans, there is a period in early infancy when visual awareness is partially due to activities in the superior colliculus, but that this awareness gradually disappears as the nigrotectal projection matures}, title = {Visual awareness due to neuronal activities in subcortical structures: A proposal}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, year = {2000}, pages = {86-116}, } @book{Shalom1985-SHATBC, author = {Albert Shalom}, title = {The Body-Mind Conceptual Framework and the Problem of Personal Identity}, publisher = {Humanities Press}, year = {1985}, } @article{Shapiro2009-SHAMSO, volume = {167}, number = {3}, author = {Lawrence Shapiro}, abstract = {The discovery of mirror neurons has been hailed as one of the most exciting developments in neuroscience in the past few decades. These neurons discharge in response to the observation of others\textquoteright actions. But how are we to understand the function of these neurons? In this paper I defend the idea that mirror neurons are best conceived as components of a sensory system that has the function to perceive action. In short, mirror neurons are part of a hitherto unrecognized \textquotedblleft{}sixth sense\textquotedblright. In this spirit, research should move toward developing a psychophysics of mirror neurons.}, title = {Making sense of mirror neurons}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2009}, } @article{Shaw2002-SHADNC-2, volume = {25}, number = {5}, author = {Christopher A. Shaw}, abstract = {The target article suggests that the neurological disorders catatonia and Parkinson's disease share similar behavioral features that nevertheless reflect different forms of abnormal information processing. However, emerging research on Parkinson's disease and related age-dependent neurodegenerative disorders suggests that no simplistic notions about processing will be correct for all stages of the disease.}, title = {Do neurodegenerative cascades in Parkinson's disease really reflect bottom-up processing?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2002}, pages = {591-591}, } @article{Sherer2005-SHENBO, volume = {20}, number = {4}, author = {Mark Sherer and Tessa Hart and John Whyte and Toad G. Nick and Stuart A. Yablon}, title = {Neuroanatomic basis of impaired self-awareness after traumatic brain injury: Findings from early computed tomography}, journal = {Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation. Special Issue}, year = {2005}, pages = {287-300}, } @incollection{Shields2010-SHIPQT, author = {George W. Shields}, booktitle = {Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind}, title = {Panexperientialism, quantum theory, and neuroplasticity}, publisher = {State University of New York Press}, year = {2010}, } @article{Shimamura2000-SHITAC, volume = {9}, number = {2}, author = {A. P. Shimamura}, abstract = {The relationship between metacognition and executive control is explored. According to an analysis by Fernandez-Duque, Baird, and Posner (this issue), metacognitive regulation involves attention, conflict resolution, error correction, inhibitory control, and emotional regulation. These aspects of metacognition are presumed to be mediated by a neural circuit involving midfrontal brain regions. An evaluation of the proposal by Fernandez-Duque et al. is made, and it is suggested that there is considerable convergence of issues associated with metacognition, executive control, working memory, and frontal lobe function. By integrating these domains and issues, significant progress could be made toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition}, title = {Toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, year = {2000}, pages = {313-323}, } @article{Siddall1997-SIDCID, volume = {20}, number = {3}, author = {Philip J. Siddall}, title = {Central inhibitory dysfunctions in neuropathic pain: What is the relationship between basic science and clinical practice?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {465-465}, } @article{Silverstein2003-SILCCA-2, volume = {26}, number = {1}, author = {Steven M. Silverstein and William A. Phillips}, abstract = {The additional arguments and evidence supplied by the commentaries strengthen the hypothesis that underactivity of NMDA receptors produces impaired cognitive coordination in schizophrenia. This encourages the hope that though the distance from molecules to mind is great, it can nevertheless be traversed. We therefore predict that in this decade or the next molecular psychology will be seen to be as fundamental to our understanding of mind as molecular biology is to our understanding of life.}, title = {Cognitive coordination and its neurobiological bases: A new continent to explore}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2003}, pages = {110-125}, } @incollection{Simons2007-SIMBNA, author = {Daniel J. Simons and Deborah E. Hannula and David E. Warren and Steven W. Day}, booktitle = {The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness}, title = {Behavioral, neuroimaging, and neuropsychological approaches to implicit perception}, publisher = {Cambridge}, year = {2007}, } @article{Sinigaglia2008-SINMNT, volume = {15}, number = {s 10-11}, author = {Corrado Sinigaglia}, abstract = {Despite the impressive body of evidence supporting the existence of a mirror neuron (MN) system for action, the original claim regarding its crucial role in action understanding remains controversial. Emma Borg has recently launched a sharp attack on this claim, with the aim of demonstrating that neither the original version nor the subsequent revisions of the MN hypothesis tell us very much about how intentional attribution actually works. In this article I take up the challenge she issues in the title of her paper (If Mirror Neurons are the Answer, What was the Question?) and argue that what MNs offer is not as Borg claims 'an extremely limited' picture of action understanding but rather an enriched picture that brings to light aspects of social cognition hitherto ignored in the mind-reading literature, showing how intentional motor components of action can shape social cognition prior to and apart from any forms of deliberate mentalizing.}, title = {Mirror neurons: This is the question}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, year = {2008}, pages = {70-92}, } @article{Sirois2008-SIRPON, volume = {31}, number = {3}, author = {Sylvain Sirois and Michael Spratling and Michael S. C. Thomas and Gert Westermann and Denis Mareschal and Mark H. Johnson}, title = {Pr\'e{}cis of neuroconstructivism: How the brain constructs cognition}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2008}, pages = {321-331}, } @article{Skoyles2008-SKOWOB, author = {Dr John R. Skoyles}, abstract = {Commonsense says we are isolated. After all, our bodies are physically separate. But Seneca\textquoteright{}s colamus humanitatem, and John Donne\textquoteright{}s observation that \textquotedblleft{}no man is an island\textquotedblright suggests we are neither entirely isolated nor separate. A recent discovery in neuroscience---{}that of mirror neurons---{}argues that the brain and the mind is neither built nor functions remote from what happens in other individuals. What are mirror neurons? They are brain cells that process both what happens to or is done by an individual, and, as it were, its perceived \textquotedblleft{}refl ection,\textquotedblright when that same thing happens or is done by another individual. Thus, mirror neurons are both activated when an individual does a particular action, and when that individual perceives that same action done by another. The discovery of mirror neurons suggests we need to radically revise our notions of human nature since they offer a means by which we may not be so separated as we think. Humans unlike other apes are adapted to mirror interact nonverbally when together. Notably, our faces have been evolved to display agile and nimble movements. While this is usually explained as enabling nonverbal communication, a better description would be nonverbal commune based upon mirror neurons. I argue we cherish humanity, colamus humanitatem, because mirror neurons and our adapted mirror interpersonal interface blur the physical boundaries that separate us.}, title = {Why our brains cherish humanity: Mirror neurons and colamus humanitatem}, journal = {Cogprints}, year = {2008}, } @book{Slezak1989-SLECBA, author = {Peter Slezak}, title = {Computers, Brains and Minds}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1989}, } @article{Snead2007-SNENEA, volume = {7}, number = {9}, author = {Carter Snead}, title = {Neuroimaging, entrapment, and the predisposition to crime}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2007}, pages = {60 -- 61}, } @article{Sokolov2002-SOKNBO, volume = {25}, number = {2}, author = {Evgeni N. Sokolov}, abstract = {The depiction of pictures as specified points in a functional space is achieved by vector encoding. Picture-selective neurons are added to the declarative memory in the process of learning. New neurons are recruited from stem cells through their proliferation and differentiation. Electrical stimulation of the temporo-parietal cortex produces subjective scenes of the past similar to imagery.}, title = {Neuronal basis of imagery}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2002}, pages = {210-210}, } @book{Solignac1982-SOLTCN, author = {Pierre Solignac}, title = {The Christian Neurosis}, publisher = {Crossroad}, year = {1982}, } @incollection{Solms2000-SOLAPC, author = {Mark Solms}, booktitle = {Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps}, title = {A psychoanalytic contribution to contemporary neuroscience}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, year = {2000}, pages = {67-95}, } @unpublished{Soosaar2004-SOOROB, author = {Andres Soosaar}, abstract = {This review tries to give overview of key issues of Bennett and Hacker's neurophilosophy and theoretical physiology attempt and to estimate possibilities of that neurophilosophy to be accepted by real neuro and life sciences.}, title = {Review of Bennett and Hacker, philosophical foundations of neuroscience}, year = {2004}, } @article{Sorrell1991-SORAAN, volume = {31}, number = {3}, author = {Martin Sorrell and David M. G. Halpin}, title = {Art and neurology}, journal = {British Journal of Aesthetics}, year = {1991}, } @article{Spence2001-SPEACF, volume = {8}, number = {2-3}, author = {Sean A. Spence}, title = {Alien control: From phenomenology to cognitive neurobiology}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology}, year = {2001}, pages = {163-172}, } @article{Spiegler2008-SPICOT, volume = {24}, number = {3}, author = {Ran Spiegler}, title = {Comments on the potential significance of neuroeconomics for economic theory}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {2008}, pages = {515-521}, } @article{Sporns2000-SPOSAT, volume = {23}, number = {4}, author = {Olaf Sporns}, abstract = {Cognition and behavior are the result of neural processes occurring at multiple levels of organization. Synthetic computational approaches are capable of bridging the gaps between multiple organizational levels and contribute to our understanding of how neural structures give rise to specific dynamical states. Such approaches are indispensable for formulating the theoretical foundations of cognitive neuroscience.}, title = {Synthetic approaches to cognitive neuroscience}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {548-549}, } @unpublished{SprevakManuscript-SPRCOC, author = {Mark Sprevak}, abstract = {Kanaan and McGuire elegantly describe three challenges facing the use of fMRI to uncover cognitive mechanisms. They shows how these challenges ramify in the case of identifying the mechanisms responsible for psychiatric disorders. In this commentary, I would like to raise another difficulty for fMRI that also appears to ramify in similar cases. This is that there are good reasons for doubting one of the assumptions on which many fMRI studies are based: that neural mechanisms are always and everywhere sufficient for cognition. I suggest that in the case of the mechanisms underlying psychiatric disorders, this assumption should be doubted. I do not dispute that a malfunctioning neural mechanism is likely to be a necessary component of a psychiatric disorder---{}as Kanaan and McGuire say, the experimental evidence from cognitive neuropsychiatry gives us excellent reasons to think that this is so. My question is whether a story only in terms of these neural mechanisms is sufficient to explain the mechanism of a psychiatric disorder. Is the reduction, projected by cognitive neuropsychiatry, of psychiatric disorders to disorders in neural functioning even in principle possible? Drawing on recent concerns about the location of mental states, I argue that such a reduction is likely to fail. Even if the considerable problems raised by Kanaan and McGuire for fMRI could be addressed, we have no reason to think that the mechanisms involved in psychiatric disorders are entirely neural, and that fMRI, or even a perfect science-fiction brain-scanner, would be capable of uncovering them. Psychiatric disorders, like numerous other cognitive processes, are liable to cross the brain--{}world boundary in such a promiscuous way as to be resistant to neural reduction.}, title = {Commentary on 'conceptual challenges in the neuroimaging of psychiatric disorders'}, } @article{StaitiForthcoming-STADLP, author = {Andrea Staiti}, title = {Dieter Lohmar, ph\"a{}nomenologie der schwachen phantasie. Untersuchungen der psychologie, cognitive science, neurologie und ph\"a{}nomenologie zur funktion der phantasie in der wahrnehmung}, journal = {Husserl Studies}, year = {forthcoming}, } @unpublished{StappManuscript-STAPFO, author = {Henry Stapp}, abstract = {The problem at issue here is the nature of connection between the features of the experiments described in psychological/mentalistic terms and the features described in spacio-temporally-based physical terms. This question is an aspect of the long-standing problem of the relationship between mind and matter, which has a history dating back to the time of the ancient Greeks. The issue was rekindled by the rise of Newtonian physics during the seventeenth century, and it generated a huge body of speculation and argumentation during the second half of the twentieth century. It is neither appropriate nor feasible try to review or explain here the complexities of contemporary philosophical opinions on this question, except to say that the reigning view is \textquotedblleft{}materialism,\textquotedblright and that: (1), there is no agreement among its proponents as to how to make rational good sense of this doctrine (Horgan, 1994); and (2), the doctrine, and its supporters, seem, nevertheless, to have strongly influenced the thinking of many neuroscientists. The central thesis of materialism is that: \textquotedblleft{}The human body is a causally complete physico-chemical system: although the body is highly susceptible to external causal influences, all physical events in the body, and all bodily movements are fully explainable in physico-chemical terms.\textquotedblright (Horgan, 1994:472)}, title = {Philosophical foundations of neuroscience}, } @unpublished{StappManuscript-STAPIN, author = {Henry P. Stapp}, abstract = {Classical physics is a theory of nature that originated with the work of Isaac Newton in the seventeenth century and was advanced by the contributions of James Clerk Maxwell and Albert Einstein. Newton based his theory on the work of Johannes Kepler, who found that the planets appeared to move in accordance with a simple mathematical law, and in ways wholly determined by their spatial relationships to other objects. Those motions were apparently independent of our human observations of them}, title = {Physics in neuroscience}, } @article{Stapp2005-STAQPI, volume = {360}, number = {1458}, author = {Henry P. Stapp}, abstract = {Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suf{}ce to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and {}elds, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. \textquoteleft{}feeling\textquoteright, \textquoteleft{}knowing\textquoteright and \textquoteleft{}effort\textquoteright) are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classic physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, owing to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analysing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classic-physics-based predecessor, is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics. It is able to represent more adequately than classic concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function..}, title = {Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: A neurophysical model of mind €{}brain interaction}, journal = {Philosophical Transactions-Royal Society of London. Biological Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {1309-1327}, } @unpublished{Stapp2003-STATOI, author = {Henry P. Stapp}, abstract = {Neuroscience is an important component of the scientific attack on the problem of consciousness. However, most neuroscientists, viewing our discussions, see only conflict and discord, and no reason why quantum theory has any great relevance the dynamics of the conscious brain. It is therefore worthwhile, in this first plenary talk of the 2003 Tucson conference on \textquotedblleft{}Quantum Approaches to the Understanding of Consciousness,\textquotedblright to focus on the central issue, which is the crucial role of \textquotedblleft{}The Observer,\textquotedblright and specifically, \textquotedblleft{}The Mind of The Observer\textquotedblright in contemporary physical theory. I shall therefore review here this radical departure of present-day basic physics from the principles of classical physics, and then spell out some of its ramifications for neuroscience}, title = {"The observer" in physics and neuroscience}, year = {2003}, } @article{Stein2006-STETCN, volume = {11}, number = {8}, author = {Dan J. Stein and Mark Solms and Jack van Honk}, title = {The cognitive-affective neuroscience of the unconscious}, journal = {CNS Spectrums}, year = {2006}, pages = {580-583}, } @article{Steinmetz2000-STEHIT, volume = {23}, number = {2}, author = {Joseph E. Steinmetz and Gabrielle B. Britton and John T. Green}, abstract = {While feed-forward mechanisms may be ubiquitous in biological systems that form the substrates of Pavlovian conditioning, the control system proposed by Domjan, Cusato \& Villarreal seems too elaborate for Pavlovian conditioning of simple skeletal muscle responses. We discuss here how the known neural substrates of classical eyeblink conditioning can be described in feed-forward terms, but argue that the monitor/comparator part of the system is not necessary and perhaps could even be detrimental to simple, nonsocial forms of Pavlovian conditioning.}, title = {How is the feed-forward Pavlovian control system instantiated in neurobiology?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {267-267}, } @article{Stemmer2000-STENIT-2, author = {Brigitte Stemmer and Paul Walter Sch\"o{}nle}, abstract = {One of the great challenges of the new millennium is the continuing search of how the mind works. Although a relatively young field, the study of neuropragmatics can greatly contribute to this search by its interdisciplinary nature, the possibility to be applied to different research meth-ods and by the opportunity to study its nature by taking vastly different perspectives.}, title = {Neuropragmatics in the 21st century}, journal = {[Journal (Paginated)]}, year = {2000}, } @article{Steriade2000-STENBO, volume = {23}, number = {6}, author = {M. Steriade}, abstract = {Although the cerebral cortex is deprived of messages from the external world in REM sleep and because these messages are inhibited in the thalamus, cortical neurons display high rates of spontaneous firing and preserve their synaptic excitability to internally generated signals during this sleep stage. The rich activity of neocortical neurons during NREM sleep consists of prolonged spike-trains that impose rhythmic excitation onto connected cells in the network, eventually leading to a progressive increase in their synaptic responsiveness, as in plasticity processes. Thus, NREM sleep may be implicated in the consolidation of memory traces acquired during wakefulness. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Vertes \& Eastman].}, title = {Neuronal basis of dreaming and mentation during slow-wave (non-REM) sleep}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {1009-1011}, } @article{Steriade2004-STEBNI, volume = {27}, number = {6}, author = {Mircea Steriade}, abstract = {I propose that hyperactivity (or increased numbers) of neurons in the brainstem reticular core promote hallucinations by excessive excitation, coupled with disinhibition, of target thalamocortical neurons. This idea stems from animal experiments using kainate-induced overexcitation of midbrain reticular neurons leading to hallucinatory-type behavior during wakefulness, as well as from data in schizophrenic patients showing an increased number of neurons in mesopontine cholinergic neurons.}, title = {Brainstem-thalamic neurons implicated in hallucinations}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {806-807}, } @book{Sternberg2010-STEMBM, author = {Eliezer J. Sternberg}, abstract = {Introduction -- The mischievous neuron -- The shadow of determinism -- The essential freedom -- A tempest in the brain -- Neurological disturbance -- The seat of the will -- The somatic-marker hypothesis -- The readiness potential -- The grand illusion -- Neuronal destiny -- The revolution of the brain -- Seeds of corruption -- Morality's end -- The depths of consciousness -- A challenge for experience -- The boundlessness of reason -- Rise of the moral agent -- The palace of the mind.}, title = {My Brain Made Me Do It: The Rise of Neuroscience and the Threat to Moral Responsibility}, publisher = {Prometheus Books}, year = {2010}, } @unpublished{Stieg2008-STINCR, author = {Chuck Stieg}, abstract = {Along with advances in brain technologies comes the ability to enhance the cognitive and affective states of normal people. In this essay, I examine a relatively young technology used in cognitive neuroscience called transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). I explain what it is, how it works and what some of its applications are. I suggest that a potential source of reservation one might have regarding brain-altering enhancement is the threat it seemingly poses to the subjective importance of mental states. I then consider the possibility of its being used as an enhancement device and question the authenticity of abilities of individuals that are enhanced by use of TMS. I conclude that judgments regarding the appropriateness of such neurocognitive enhancements should be considered on a case by case basis.}, title = {Neuroethical considerations regarding transcranial magnetic stimulation}, year = {2008}, } @article{Stoerig2001-STOTNO, volume = {929}, author = {Petra Stoerig}, title = {The neuroanatomy of phenomenal vision: A psychological perspective}, journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {176-94}, } @article{Stoerig1993-STOTVS, volume = {14}, number = {2}, author = {Petra Stoerig and Stephan Brandt}, abstract = {To see whether the mental and the neural have common attributes that could resolve some of the traditional dichotomies, we review neuroscientific data on the visual system. The results show that neuronal and perceptual function share a parallel and hierarchical architecture which is manifest not only in the anatomy and physiology of the visual system, but also in normal perception and in the deficits caused by lesions in different parts of the system. Based on the description of parallel hierarchical levels of active information processing in the visual brain, we suggest a concept of dissociable levels of perception, advocating that the phenomenal perception and recognition is realized in the functional integrity of a network of reciprocal cortico-cortical connections. The properties shared by neuronal and perceptional functions provide a basis for a neuromental monism in which both functions are attributed a causal role.}, title = {The visual system and levels of perception: Properties of neuromental organization}, journal = {Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics}, year = {1993}, } @incollection{Stoet2008-STOTIH, author = {Gijsbert Stoet and Lawrence Snyder}, booktitle = {Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior}, title = {Task-switching in human and nonhuman primates: Understanding rule encoding and control from behavior to single neurons}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2008}, } @article{Stohr2007-STOROL, volume = {2007}, number = {4}, author = {Karen Stohr}, title = {Review of Leslie Paul Thiele, \_The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, and Narrative\_}, journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews}, year = {2007}, } @article{Stokes1993-STOMMA, volume = {87}, author = {Douglas M. Stokes}, title = {Mind, matter, and death: Cognitive neuroscience and the problem of survival}, journal = {Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research}, year = {1993}, pages = {41-84}, } @unpublished{StoljarManuscript-STOAND, author = {Daniel Stoljar}, abstract = {It is widely held that a successful theory of the mind will be neuroscientific. In this paper we ask, first, what this claim means, and, secondly, whether it is true. In answer to the first question, we argue that the claim is ambiguous between two views--{}one plausible but unsubstantive, and one substantive but highly controversial. In answer to the second question, we argue that neither the evidence from neuroscience itself nor from other scientific and philosophical considerations supports the controversial view.}, title = {A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience}, } @article{Stoljar1998-STOOBA, volume = {13}, number = {1}, author = {Daniel Stoljar and Ian Gold}, title = {On biological and cognitive neuroscience}, journal = {Mind and Language}, year = {1998}, pages = {110-31}, } @article{Stone2001-STOFRA, volume = {1}, number = {2}, author = {Anna Stone and Tim Valentine and Rob Davis}, title = {Face recognition and emotional Valence: Processing without awareness by neurologically intact participants does not simulate Covert recognition in prosopagnosia}, journal = {Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience}, year = {2001}, pages = {183-191}, } @article{Stone2000-STOAPA, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Tony Stone and Martin Davies}, abstract = {\_Two notions of autonomy are distinguished. The respective\_ \_denials that psychology is autonomous from neurobiology are neuron\_ \_doctrines, moderate and radical. According to the moderate neuron\_ \_doctrine, inter-disciplinary interaction need not aim at reduction. It is\_ \_proposed that it is more plausible that there is slippage from the\_ \_moderate to the radical neuron doctrine than that there is confusion\_ \_between the radical neuron doctrine and the trivial version.\_}, title = {Autonomous psychology and the moderate neuron doctrine}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {849-850}, } @article{Stoop2000-STONNI, volume = {48}, number = {2}, author = {R. Stoop and K. Schindler and L. A. Bunimovich}, abstract = {We discuss a generic scenario along which complex spiking behavior evolves in biologically realistic neural networks. Our nonlinear dynamics approach is based directly on rat neocortical in vitro recordings. Using this experimental data, we obtain a full overview on the possible spiking behaviors of pyramidal neurons that are engaged in binary interactions. Universality arguments imply that the observed spiking behaviors are largely independent from the specific properties of individual neurons; theoretical arguments and numerical experiments indicate that they should be observable in in vivo neocortical neuron networks.}, title = {Noise-driven neocortical interaction: A simple generation mechanism for complex neuron spiking}, journal = {Acta Biotheoretica}, year = {2000}, } @article{Streri2007-STRTMR, volume = {30}, number = {2}, author = {Arlette Streri and Coralie Sann}, title = {The multiple relations between vision and touch: Neonatal behavioral evidence and adult neuroimaging data}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2007}, pages = {220-221}, } @article{Striedter2006-STRENL, volume = {29}, number = {1}, author = {Georg F. Striedter}, abstract = {Overall, most of the reviewers agree that Principles of Brain Evolution was a welcome addition to the field, and kindly describe it as carefully researched and lucidly written. Thereafter, they note some gaps~--~{}principally, adaptive scenarios, microevolutionary studies, and computational models. I here admit to those deficiencies but explain why they exist and how they might be filled. In addition, one commentator criticizes my analysis of hominin brain evolution, and another finds my principle of \textquotedblleft{}large equals well-connected\textquotedblright to be inconsistent with the data. I rebut those two critiques. Hopefully, this process of critique and counterpoint will stimulate some readers to pursue the mentioned thoughts and to engage in new research.}, title = {Evolutionary neuroscience: Limitations and prospects}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2006}, pages = {25-31}, } @article{Stuart2009-STUAIG, volume = {19}, number = {2}, author = {Susan Stuart}, title = {Alvin I. Goldman, simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology and neuroscience of mindreading}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {2009}, } @article{Sullivan2009-SULTMO, volume = {167}, number = {3}, author = {Jacqueline A. Sullivan}, abstract = {Descriptive accounts of the nature of explanation in neuroscience and the global goals of such explanation have recently proliferated in the philosophy of neuroscience (e.g., Bechtel, Mental mechanisms: Philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007; Bickle, Philosophy and neuroscience: A ruthlessly reductive account. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 2003; Bickle, Synthese, 151, 411--{}434, 2006; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and with them new understandings of the $<$span class='Hi'$>$experimental$<$/span$>$ practices of neuroscientists have emerged. In this paper, I consider two models of such practices; one that takes them to be reductive; another that takes them to be integrative. I investigate those areas of the neuroscience of learning and memory from which the examples used to substantiate these models are culled, and argue that the multiplicity of $<$span class='Hi'$>$experimental$<$/span$>$ protocols used in these research areas presents specific challenges for both models. In my view, these challenges have been overlooked largely because philosophers have hitherto failed to pay sufficient attention to fundamental features of $<$span class='Hi'$>$experimental$<$/span$>$ practice. I demonstrate that when we do pay attention to such features, evidence for reduction and integrative unity in neuroscience is simply not borne out. I end by suggesting some new directions for the philosophy of neuroscience that pertain to taking a closer look at the nature of neuroscientific experiments.}, title = {The multiplicity of experimental protocols: A challenge to reductionist and non-reductionist models of the unity of neuroscience}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2009}, } @article{Susa1995-SUSMNI, volume = {43}, number = {4}, author = {Isabella Susa and Jean-Louis Martiel}, abstract = {Neurones with active conductance on dendrites integrate synaptic signals and modulate generation of axon spikes in a nonlinear way. Owing to experimental difficulties, modelling provides invaluable insight for the comprehension of neurone behaviour particularly when dendrites are excitable. We used experimental data obtained for the Anterior Gastric Receptor neurone (AGR neurone), which controls the lobster gastric mill activity, to derive a set of partial differential equations for the membrane voltage. Simulation showed that upon varying the intensity of stimulation on the dendrite, the response pattern between dendrites and axon activity continuously changes. In addition, when only half of the dendritic tree is active, axon firing exhibits regular oscillations and bursting activity. We discuss these results in relation with the experimental work done on the AGR neurone.}, title = {Modelling nonlinear integration of synaptic signals by neurones}, journal = {Acta Biotheoretica}, year = {1995}, } @article{Sutton1999-SUTTCN, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {John Sutton}, abstract = {According to Gold \& Stoljar, one cannot consistently be both reductionist about psychoneural relations and invoke concepts developed in the psychological sciences. I deny the utility of their distinction between biological and cognitive neuroscience, suggesting that they construe biological neuroscience too rigidly and cognitive neuroscience too liberally. Then, I reject their characterization of reductionism. Reductions need not go down past neurobiology straight to physics, and cases of partial, local reduction are not neatly distinguishable from cases of mere implementation. Modifying the argument from unification as reduction, I defend a position weaker than the radical but stronger than the trivial neuron doctrine.}, title = {The churchlands' neuron doctrine: Both cognitive and reductionist}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {850-851}, } @incollection{Swaab2010-SWADIN, author = {D. F. Swaab}, booktitle = {Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics}, title = {Developments in neuroscience}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, } @unpublished{SymonsManuscript-SYMSOV, author = {John Symons}, abstract = {The following analysis shows how developments in epistemic logic can play a nontrivial role in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that the striking correspondence between two modes of identification, as distinguished in the epistemic context, and two cognitive systems distinguished by neuroscientific investigation of the visual system (the \textquotedblleft{}where\textquotedblright and \textquotedblleft{}what\textquotedblright systems) is not coincidental, and that it can play a clarificatory role at the most fundamental levels of neuroscientific theory.}, title = {Systems of visual identification in neuroscience: Lessons from epistemic logic}, } @article{Symons2001-SYMWCN, volume = {2}, number = {2}, author = {John Symons}, abstract = {Horgan\textquoteright{}s perceptive discussion of Freudian psychology, Prozac and evolutionary biology cannot mitigate the problems that seriously weaken his book (Horgan, 1999). While he certainly manages to deflate some of the more outrageous hype surrounding the scientific and often not-so-scientific study of the mind, his criticism of the brain and behavioral sciences contains a number of flaws, some of which I will address below. My response focuses on his discussion of neuroscience. As we shall see, the three mysteries that Horgan believes cripple neuroscience are certainly not as serious as he insists.}, title = {What can neuroscience explain?}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2001}, } @book{Szasz2002-SZATMO, author = {Thomas S. Szasz}, abstract = {... ISBN0275956032 ...}, title = {The Meaning of Mind: Language, Morality, and Neuroscience}, publisher = {Syracuse University Press}, year = {2002}, } @article{Szymanik2007-SZYANO, volume = {45}, number = {9}, author = {Jakub Szymanik}, title = {A Note on some Neuroimaging Study of Natural Language Quantifiers Comprehension}, journal = {Neuropsychologia}, year = {2007}, pages = {2158-2160}, } @article{Taliaferro1997-TALSOS, volume = {40}, number = {1}, author = {Charles Taliaferro}, title = {Saving our souls: Hacking's archaeology and Churchland's neurology}, journal = {Inquiry}, year = {1997}, pages = {73 -- 94}, } @book{Tallis2004-TALWTM, author = {Raymond C. Tallis}, abstract = {Taking a series of key words such as calculation, language, information and memory, Professor Tallis shows how their misuse has lured a whole generation into...}, title = {Why the Mind Is Not a Computer: A Pocket Lexicon of Neuromythology}, publisher = {Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic}, year = {2004}, } @article{Tamburrini2005-TAMMEA, volume = {15}, number = {3-4}, author = {Guglielmo Tamburrini and Edoardo Datteri}, abstract = {Cybernetics promoted machine-supported investigations of adaptive sensorimotor behaviours observed in biological systems. This methodological approach receives renewed attention in contemporary robotics, cognitive ethology, and the cognitive neurosciences. Its distinctive features concern machine experiments, and their role in testing behavioural models and explanations flowing from them. Cybernetic explanations of behavioural events, regularities, and capacities rely on multiply realizable mechanism schemata, and strike a sensible balance between causal and unifying constraints. The multiple realizability of cybernetic mechanism schemata paves the way to principled comparisons between biological systems and machines. Various methodological issues involved in the transition from mechanism schemata to their machine instantiations are addressed here, by reference to a simple sensorimotor coordination task. These concern the proper treatment of ceteris paribus clauses in experimental settings, the significance of running experiments with correct but incomplete machine instantiations of mechanism schemata, and the advantage of operating with real machines ??? as opposed to simulated ones ??? immersed in real environments.}, title = {Machine experiments and theoretical modelling: From cybernetic methodology to neuro-robotics}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {2005}, } @book{Tart1981-TARTMO-2, author = {Charles T. Tart}, title = {The Metaphors Of Consciousness}, publisher = {New York: Plenum Press}, year = {1981}, } @incollection{Tart1981-TARTRO, author = {Charles T. Tart}, booktitle = {The Metaphors Of Consciousness}, title = {Transpersonal realities or neurophysiological illusions}, publisher = {New York: Plenum Press}, year = {1981}, } @article{Temple2002-TEMTDC, volume = {25}, number = {6}, author = {Elise Temple}, abstract = {Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of developmental disorders and normal cognition that include children are becoming increasingly common and represent part of a newly expanding field of developmental cognitive neuroscience. These studies have illustrated the importance of the process of development in understanding brain mechanisms underlying cognition and including children in the study of the etiology of developmental disorders.}, title = {The developmental cognitive neuroscience approach to the study of developmental disorders}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2002}, pages = {771-771}, } @article{Tersman2008-TERTRO, volume = {86}, number = {3}, author = {Folke Tersman}, abstract = {A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases (cases where the subjects had to imagine that they must use some direct form of violence) elicited greater activity in certain areas of the brain associated with emotions compared with the other cases. It has been argued (e.g., by Peter Singer) that these results undermine the reliability of our moral intuitions, and therefore provide an objection to methods of moral reasoning that presuppose that they carry an evidential weight (such as the idea of reflective equilibrium). I distinguish between two ways in which Greene's findings lend support for a sceptical attitude towards intuitions. I argue that, given the first version of the challenge, the method of reflective equilibrium can easily accommodate the findings. As for the second version of the challenge, I argue that it does not so much pose a threat specifically to the method of reflective equilibrium but to the idea that moral claims can be justified through rational argumentation in general.}, title = {The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscience}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, pages = {389 -- 405}, } @article{Thagard2007-THATMP, volume = {24}, number = {4}, author = {Paul Thagard}, title = {The moral psychology of conflicts of interest: Insights from affective neuroscience}, journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy}, year = {2007}, pages = {367--{}380}, } @article{Thai2009-THACFP, volume = {9}, number = {1}, author = {N. J. Thai and J. B. Talcott}, title = {Considerations for pediatric neuroimaging at the translational coalface}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2009}, pages = {18 -- 20}, } @article{Thayer2005-THATIO-2, volume = {28}, number = {2}, author = {Julian F. Thayer and Richard D. Lane}, abstract = {Lewis makes a compelling case for a dynamical systems approach to emotion and neurobiology. These models involve both excitatory and inhibitory processes. It appears that a critical role for inhibitory processes is implied but not emphasized in Lewis's model. We suggest that a greater understanding of inhibitory processes both at the psychological and neurobiological levels might further enhance Lewis's model.}, title = {The importance of inhibition in dynamical systems models of emotion and neurobiology}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {218-219}, } @article{Theoret2005-THOMAC, volume = {28}, number = {2}, author = {Hugo Th\'e{}oret and Shirley Fecteau}, abstract = {The notion that manual gestures played an important role in the evolution of human language was strengthened by the discovery of mirror neurons in monkey area F5, the proposed homologue of human Broca's area. This idea is central to the thesis developed by Arbib, and lending further support to a link between motor resonance mechanisms and language/communication development is the case of autism and congenital blindness. We provide an account of how these conditions may relate to the aforementioned theory.}, title = {Making a case for mirror-neuron system involvement in language development: What about autism and blindness?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {145-146}, } @book{Thiele2006-THITHO, author = {Leslie Paul Thiele}, abstract = {The Heart of Judgment explores the nature, historical significance, and contemporary relevance of practical wisdom. Primarily a work in moral and political thought, it also relies extensively on the latest research in cognitive neuroscience to confirm and extend our understanding of the faculty of judgment. Ever since the ancient Greeks first discussed practical wisdom, the faculty of judgment has been an important topic for philosophers and political theorists. It remains one of the virtues most demanded of our public officials. The greater the liberties and responsibilities accorded to citizens in democratic regimes, the more the health and welfare of society rest upon their exercise of good judgment. While giving full credit to the roles played by reason and deliberation in good judgment, the book underlines the central importance of intuition, emotion, and worldly experience.}, title = {The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, and Narrative}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2006}, } @incollection{ThompsonForthcoming-THONAC, author = {Evan Thompson}, booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Science and Religion}, abstract = {Scientific investigation of the mind, known since the nineteen-seventies as \textquoteleft{}cognitive science\textquoteright, is an interdisciplinary field of research comprising psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of mind. The presence of philosophy in this list is telling. Cognitive science, although institutionally well established, is not a theoretically settled field, unlike molecular biology or high-energy physics. Rather, it includes a variety of competing research programmes - the computational theory of mind (also known as classical cognitive science), connectionism, and dynamical and embodied approaches - whose underlying conceptions of mentality and its relation to biology, on the one hand, and to culture, on the other, are often strikingly different (see Clark, 2001, for a useful overview)}, title = {Neurophenomenology and contemplative experience}, publisher = {Oup}, year = {forthcoming}, } @article{Thompson2004-THOLAM, volume = {3}, number = {4}, author = {Evan Thompson}, abstract = {~~{}This talk, delivered at De l''autopoi\`e{}se \`a la neuroph\'e{}nom\'e{}nologie: un hommage \`a Francisco Varela; from autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: a tribute to Francisco Varela, June 18--{}20, at the Sorbonne in Paris, explicates several links between Varela''s neurophenomenology and his biological concept of autopoiesis}, title = {Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to francisco Varela}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {381-398}, } @incollection{Thompson2005-ANTNAI, author = {Evan Thompson and A. Lutz and D. Cosmelli}, booktitle = {Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement}, title = {Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2005}, } @book{Thorp1980-THOFWA, author = {John Thorp}, title = {Free Will: A Defense Against Neurophysiological Determinism}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {1980}, } @article{Tiitinen2001-TIIHTI, volume = {24}, number = {1}, author = {Hannu Tiitinen}, abstract = {Cowan's analysis of human short-term memory (STM) and attention in terms of processing limits in the range of 4 items (or \textquotedblleft{}chunks\textquotedblright) is discussed from the point of view of cognitive neuroscience. Although, Cowan already provides many important theoretical insights, we need to learn more about how to build further bridges between cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience.}, title = {How to interface cognitive psychology with cognitive neuroscience?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {148-149}, } @article{Todorovic1998-TODIDO, volume = {21}, number = {6}, author = {Dejan Todorovic}, abstract = {It is argued that the notion of bridge locus is compatible with distributed representation and brain interconnectivity. Isomorphism is not a dogmatic condition on explanatory adequacy but a refutable hypothesis, superior to Dennett's proposed alternatives. The assumption of type-type neuro-perceptual correspondences is more parsimonious than multiple realizability.}, title = {In defense of neuro-perceptual isomorphism}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1998}, pages = {774-775}, } @article{Tolbert2003-TOLNAG, volume = {4}, number = {1}, author = {Leslie P. Tolbert and Lynne A. Oland and Thomas C. Christensen and Anita R. Goriely}, abstract = {The shapes of neurons and glial cells dictate many important aspects of their functions. In olfactory systems, certain architectural features are characteristics of these two cell types across a wide variety of species. The accumulated evidence suggests that these common features may play fundamental roles in olfactoryinformation processing. For instance, the primary olfactory neuropil in most vertebrate and invertebrate olfactory systems is organized into discrete modules called glomeruli. Inside each glomerulus, sensory axons and CNS neurons branch and synapse in patterns that are repeated across species. In many species, moreover, the glomeruli are enveloped by a thin and ordered layer of glial processes. Theglomerular arrangement reflects the processing of odor information in modules that encode the discrete molecular attributes of odorant stimuli being processed. Recent studies of the mechanisms that guide the development of olfactory neurons and glial cells have revealed complex reciprocal interactions between these two cell types, which may be necessary for the establishment of modular compartments. Collectively, the findings reviewed here suggest that specialized cellular architecture plays key functional roles in the detection, analysis, and discrimination of odors at early steps in olfactory processing.}, title = {Neuronal and glial morphology in olfactory systems: Significance for information-processing and underlying developmental mechanisms}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2003}, } @article{Tomasino2004-TOMANA, volume = {27}, number = {3}, author = {Barbara Tomasino and Corrado Corradi-Dell'Acqua and Alessia Tessari and Caterina Spiezio and Raffaella Ida Rumiati}, abstract = {In his article Grush proposes a potentially useful framework for explaining motor control, imagery, and perception. In our commentary we will address two issues that the model does not seem to deal with appropriately: one concerns motor control, and the other, the visual and motor imagery domains. We will consider these two aspects in turn.}, title = {A neuropsychological approach to motor control and imagery}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {419-419}, } @article{Toombs2003-TOOHEC, volume = {34}, number = {4}, author = {E. Toombs}, abstract = {During the latter part of the nineteenth century our description of nerve cell structure underwent a relatively unrecognized, though fundamental, transformation-a quiet revolution of sorts. The central problem facing scientists in neurology (the study of the nervous system) was a related pair: are nerve cells continuous with each other or not, and how is information conducted? Microscope resolution and staining techniques were inadequate at the time to yield definitive proof either way. I contend that explanatory coherence provides a means to elucidate this instance of theory change in the history of science. The means of elucidation will be Thagard's computational model of explanatory coherence, ECHO ().}, title = {Harmony, explanatory coherence and the debate between the reticular theory and neuron theory of nerve cell structure: Echo's resolution of a quiet revolution}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C}, year = {2003}, pages = {615-632}, } @article{Tovino2007-TOVFNA, volume = {7}, number = {9}, author = {Stacey A. Tovino}, abstract = {Under the umbrella of the burgeoning neurotransdisciplines, scholars are using the principles and research methodologies of their primary and secondary fields to examine developments in neuroimaging, neuromodulation and psychopharmacology. The path for advanced scholarship at the intersection of law and neuroscience may clear if work across the disciplines is collected and reviewed and outstanding and debated issues are identified and clarified. In this article, I organize, examine and refine a narrow class of the burgeoning neurotransdiscipline scholarship; that is, scholarship at the interface of law and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).}, title = {Functional neuroimaging and the law: Trends and directions for future scholarship}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2007}, pages = {44 -- 56}, } @article{Tranel1999-TRATNO, volume = {22}, number = {2}, author = {Daniel Tranel and Antonio R. Damasio}, abstract = {Recent investigations have explored how large-scale systems in the brain operate in the processes of retrieving knowledge for words and concepts. Much of the crucial evidence derives from lesion studies, because word retrieval and concept retrieval can be clearly dissociated in brain-damaged individuals. We discuss these findings from the perspective of our neurobiological framework, which is cited in Pulverm\"u{}ller's target article.}, title = {The neurobiology of knowledge retrieval}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {303-303}, } @article{Trappenberg1999-TRAGOA, volume = {22}, number = {4}, author = {Thomas P. Trappenberg and Raymond M. Klein}, abstract = {The functional schema in the Findlay \& Walker target article presents an understanding of oculomotor behavior primarily at an algorithmic level of analysis. Although such an analysis is an important first step, present knowledge of the neuroscientific substrate for oculomotor behavior is sufficiently advanced to support, if not warrant, computationally explicit models explaining how oculomotor behavior is implemented by this substrate. The literature contains a growing number of examples of this strategy, which we illustrate using our work.}, title = {Generating oculomotor and neuronal behavior in a neural field model of the superior colliculus}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {700-701}, } @article{Trillenberg1997-TRIDOI, volume = {20}, number = {2}, author = {P. Trillenberg and K. Wessel}, title = {Detection of input sequences in the cerebellum: Clinical and neuroimaging aspects}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {267-267}, } @article{Truog2009-TRUTIO-2, volume = {19}, number = {4}, author = {Franklin G. Miller Robert D. Truog}, title = {The incoherence of determining death by neurological criteria: Reply to John Lizza}, journal = {Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal}, year = {2009}, pages = {pp. 397-399}, } @unpublished{TurnerManuscript-TURIAC-2, author = {Mark Turner}, abstract = {The fourth of four lectures at the Coll\`e{}ge de France in 2000 on the subject of conceptual mappings and conceptual structure.}, title = {Imagination and creativity: Lectures at the college de France, 4: The cognitive neuroscience of creativity (l'imagination et la cr\'e{}ativit\'e: Conf\`e{}rences au coll\`e{}ge de France, 4: La neuroscience cognitive de la cr\'e{}ativit\'e)}, } @article{Turner2007-TURMNA, volume = {37}, number = {3}, author = {Stephen P. Turner}, title = {Mirror neurons and practices: A response to Lizardo}, journal = {Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour}, year = {2007}, pages = {351--{}371}, } @article{Ullman1999-ULLTFN, volume = {22}, number = {6}, author = {Michael T. Ullman}, abstract = {Clahsen has presented an impressive range of psycholinguistic data from German regular and irregular inflection to support the view that lexical memory and the combinatorial operations of grammar are subserved by distinct mental mechanisms. Most of the data are convincing and important. I particularly applaud Clahsen's effort to extend this lexical/grammatical dichotomy from mind to brain. Here I discuss some problems with the evidence presented by Clahsen in support of a neural lexical/grammatical dichotomy, and offer some additional evidence to reinforce this neural distinction.}, title = {The functional neuroanatomy of inflectional morphology}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {1041-1042}, } @unpublished{UnknownManuscript-UNKPAA, author = {Unknown}, abstract = {\textquotedblleft[I]t has become next to impossible for a single mind fully to command more than a small specialized portion of it. I can see no other escape from this dilemma [\textellipsis] than that some of us should venture to..}, title = {Phenomenology as another toolbox for neuroscientists?}, } @unpublished{UnknownManuscript-UNKPNA, author = {Unknown}, abstract = {As a young medical student, I was frustrated by the rather mechanistic, though undoubtedly therapeutic, way in which I was taught. It seemed to want me to approach patients clinically, and though with respect also with a distance which reduced simple human contact. We were not expected to be interested in what it was like to be ill, but rather to elicit the correct signs and symptoms in order to diagnose. At the time I was also reading more widely, within literature and philosophy, searching -- in part -- for a more humane perspective. Much philosophy was beyond me -- and still is -- but then, as a young man I found myself sympathetic to the phenomenological approach. In medicine, by day, I learnt lists of diseases and their presentation, whilst by night I would read of other approaches respectful of the first person experience, which might help me reach what it was like to live, say, with a chronic neurological impairment.}, title = {Phenomenology, neuroscience and impairment}, } @article{Urban1997-URBSCO, volume = {20}, number = {3}, author = {Laszlo A. Urban}, title = {Sympathetic component of neuropathic pain: Animal models and clinical diagnosis}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {468-469}, } @article{Usher2004-USHCOR, volume = {19}, number = {2}, author = {Matthew Usher}, title = {Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations?}, journal = {Mind and Language}, year = {2004}, pages = {241-248}, } @article{vandenBosch1999-VANITT, volume = {4}, number = {4}, author = {Alexander P. M. van den Bosch}, abstract = {How can new drug lead suggestions beinferred from neurophysiological models? This paperaddresses this question based on a case study ofresearch into Parkinson''s disease at the GroningenUniversity Department of Pharmacy. It is argued thatneurophysiological box-and-arrow models can beunderstood as qualitative differential equationmodels. An inference task is defined to helpunderstand and possibly aid the discovery andexplanation of new drug lead suggestions.}, title = {Inference to the best manipulation -- a case study of qualitative reasoning in neuropharmacy}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, year = {1999}, } @unpublished{vanGelderManuscript-VANBNW, author = {Tim van Gelder}, abstract = {A Neurocomputational Perspective , it comes of age as philosophy of mind as well. This book demands to be read by connectionists who wish to understand the philosophical context and ramifications of their work, and by philosophers who wish to understand connectionism and the nature of mind more generally.}, title = {Brave neurocomputational world}, } @article{vanHooff2008-VANNTF, volume = {8}, number = {1}, author = {Johanna C. van Hooff}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Neuroimaging techniques for memory detection: Scientific, ethical, and legal issues}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2008}, pages = {25 -- 26}, } @incollection{VanMeter2010-VANN-3, author = {J. VanMeter}, booktitle = {Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics}, title = {Neuroimaging}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, } @article{Varela1995-VARNAM, volume = {3}, number = {4}, author = {F. Varela}, title = {Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, year = {1995}, pages = {330-49}, } @book{Velmans2000-VELIPC, author = {Max Velmans}, abstract = {... ISBN9027251339 ...}, title = {Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, year = {2000}, } @article{Verleger1998-VERTAI, volume = {21}, number = {1}, author = {Rolf Verleger}, abstract = {In this response, I will first summarize my 1988 argument on the issue of expectancy. Second, I will re-evaluate that argument in the light of the findings made by Sommer et al. and by others. Third, I will describe some other problems with the 1988 views. Fourth, I will outline the direction in which I feel that a hypothesis on the P3 complex should be pursued further.}, title = {Toward an integration of p3 research with cognitive neuroscience}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1998}, pages = {150-152}, } @article{Viamontes2007-VIATIT, volume = {37}, number = {4}, author = {George I. Viamontes and Bernard D. Beitman}, title = {This issue: The neurobiology of the unconscious}, journal = {Psychiatric Annals}, year = {2007}, pages = {222-224}, } @article{Vickery1999-VICSPI, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Richard M. Vickery}, abstract = {The complexity of modern neurobiology in even a comparatively restricted area such as use-dependent synaptic plasticity is underestimated by the authors. This leads them to reject a neurobiological model of learning as conceptually parasitic on the psychology of conditioning, on the basis of objections that are shown to be unsustainable. An argument is also advanced that neurobiologists hold an intermediate version of the neuron doctrine rather than a conflated one. In this version, neurobiologists believe that psychology will eventually be underpinned by neurobiology but are agnostic about the extent of upheaval that this will produce in psychology.}, title = {Synaptic plasticity is complex; neurobiologists are not}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {853-854}, } @article{Vincent2009-VINNAR, author = {Nicole A. Vincent}, abstract = {Could neuroimaging evidence help us to assess the degree of a person\textquoteright{}s responsibility for a crime which we know that they committed? This essay defends an affirmative answer to this question. A range of standard objections to this high-tech approach to assessing people\textquoteright{}s responsibility is considered and then set aside, but I also bring to light and then reject a novel objection---{}an objection which is only encountered when functional (rather than structural) neuroimaging is used to assess people\textquoteright{}s responsibility.}, title = {Neuroimaging and Responsibility Assessments}, journal = {Neuroethics}, year = {2009}, } @article{Vladusich2008-VLATAC-2, volume = {31}, number = {3}, author = {Tony Vladusich}, title = {Towards a computational neuroscience of autism-psychosis spectrum disorders}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2008}, pages = {282-283}, } @article{vonStein2000-VONEFA, volume = {23}, number = {3}, author = {Astrid von Stein and Johannes Sarnthein}, abstract = {We have performed a set of experiments that correlate EEG spectral parameters with cognitive functions. The tasks (visual perception, supramodal object recognition, short-term memory) were chosen so that the cortical area involved extended over different length scales. The extent of the cognitive neuronal assemblies correlated inversely with the frequency where EEG synchronization was found. This provides a further relation between experiment and the theory put forward in the Nunez target article.}, title = {EEG frequency and the size of cognitive neuronal assemblies}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {413-414}, } @article{Wachbroit2008-WACTPF, volume = {8}, number = {1}, author = {Robert Wachbroit}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {The prospects for neuro-exceptionalism: Transparent lies, naked minds}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2008}, pages = {3 -- 8}, } @incollection{Wallis2008-WALSNA, author = {Jonathan D. Wallis}, booktitle = {Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior}, title = {Single neuron activity underlying behavior-guiding rules}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2008}, } @article{Warmbr1991-WARBNA, volume = {69}, number = {1}, author = {Ken Warmbr}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Behaviourism, neuroscience and translational indeterminacy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1991}, pages = {67 -- 81}, } @article{Warmbrod1991-WARBNA-2, volume = {69}, number = {1}, author = {Ken Warmbr{}d}, title = {Behaviourism, neuroscience and translational indeterminacy}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1991}, pages = {67 -- 81}, } @article{Weber2008-WEBCWM, volume = {75}, number = {5}, author = {Marcel Weber}, abstract = {This article examines the role of experimental generalizations and physical laws in neuroscientific explanations, using Hodgkin and Huxley\textquoteright{}s electrophysiological model from 1952 as a test case. I show that the fact that the model was partly fitted to experimental data did not affect its explanatory status, nor did the false mechanistic assumptions made by Hodgkin and Huxley. The model satisfies two important criteria of explanatory status: it contains invariant generalizations and it is modular (both in James Woodward\textquoteright{}s sense). Further, I argue that there is a sense in which the explanatory heteronomy thesis holds true for this case. \dag{}To contact the author, please write to: SNF{}Professorship for Philosophy of Science, University of Basel, Missionsstrasse 21, 4003 Basel, Switzerland; e{}mail: marcel.weber@unibas.ch.}, title = {Causes without mechanisms: Experimental regularities, physical laws, and neuroscientific explanation}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, } @unpublished{Weber2004-WEBIIN-2, author = {Marcel Weber}, abstract = {I examine some philosophical arguments as well as current empirical research in molecular neurobiology in order to throw some new light on the question of whether neurological processes are deterministic or indeterministic. I begin by showing that the idea of an autonomous biological indeterminism violates the principle of the supervenience of biological properties on physical properties. If supervenience is accepted, quantum mechanics is the only hope for the neuro-indeterminist. But this would require that indeterministic quantum-mechanical effects play a role in the functioning of the nervous system. I examine several candidates of molecular processes where this could, in theory, be the case. It turns out that there is good news from recent work on ion channels. Unfortunately (for the indeterminist), this good news is neutralised at once by bad news.}, title = {Indeterminism in neurobiology: Some good and some bad news}, year = {2004}, } @article{Weiss2003-WEINSA, volume = {26}, number = {6}, author = {Sabine Weiss and Horst M. Mueller}, abstract = {In their target article, Ruchkin et al. propose sustained neuronal interaction of prefrontal and posterior cortex involved in memory-storage mechanisms with respect to electrophysiological findings on the relationship of short-term and long-term memory processes. We will evaluate this claim in light of recent evidence from our laboratory on EEG coherence analysis of memory processes accompanying language comprehension.}, title = {Neuronal synchronization accompanying memory processing}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2003}, pages = {759-760}, } @book{Weitze1997-WEIAV, author = {Marc-Denis Weitze}, title = {Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy}, publisher = {Hawthorne: De Gruyter}, year = {1997}, } @incollection{Weitze1997-WEISEU, author = {Marc-Denis Weitze}, booktitle = {Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy}, title = {Searle, Edelman und die evolution Des bewusstseins: Mit neurobiologischen argumenten}, publisher = {Hawthorne: De Gruyter}, year = {1997}, } @article{Wenstrup1998-WENCNA, volume = {21}, number = {2}, author = {Jeffrey J. Wenstrup}, abstract = {Combination-sensitive neurons serve as the fundamental processing unit in Sussman and colleagues' proposal for the neural representation of stop consonants. This commentary describes recent studies in the mustached bat that show how ubiquitous and flexible this neural strategy can be. Sussman et al.'s proposal is an important contribution to a neuroethological consideration of speech perception.}, title = {Combination-sensitive neurons: A flexible neural strategy for analyzing correlated elements in sounds}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1998}, pages = {286-287}, } @article{Werner2004-WERSCO-2, author = {M. D. Gerhard Werner}, abstract = {Under the assumption that nervous systems form a distinct category among the objects in Nature, applying metaphors of psychological and behavioral science disciplines is flawed and invites confusion. Moreover, such practices obscure and detract from the primary task of Neurophysiology: to investigate the intrinsic properties of nervous systems, uncontaminated with concepts borrowed from other disciplines. A comprehensive fundamental theory of nervous systems is expected to have the character of high dimensional nonlinear systems in which state space transitions, set in motion by external influences, self-organize to dynamic state space configuration with consequences for behavior.}, title = {Siren call of metaphor: Subverting the proper task of system neuroscience}, journal = {[Journal (Paginated)] (in Press)}, year = {2004}, } @unpublished{WerningManuscript-WERCFL, author = {Markus Werning and M. Werning}, title = {Conceptual fingerprints: Lexical decomposition by means of frames -- a neuro-cognitive model}, } @book{White1992-WHITEO-4, author = {Elliott White}, title = {The End of the Empty Organism: Neurobiology and the Sciences of Human Action}, publisher = {Praeger}, year = {1992}, } @article{Wilczynski2001-WILBAC, volume = {24}, number = {2}, author = {Walter Wilczynski}, title = {Brain allometry: Correlated variation in cytoarchitectonics and neurochemistry?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {297-298}, } @article{Wilke2007-WILTNB, volume = {30}, number = {2}, author = {Marko Wilke}, title = {The neuronal basis of intelligence: A Riddle, wrapped in a mystery?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2007}, pages = {172-173}, } @article{Wilke2006-WILHRA, volume = {29}, number = {2}, author = {Marko Wilke}, abstract = {Blair boldly proposes a model integrating different aspects of intelligence. Its real-life value can be put to the test by using programs designed to develop children's abilities in areas predicted to be crucial for minimizing adverse outcome. Until support from such programs is available, the model is an interesting hypothesis, albeit with remarkable possible repercussions. As such, it seems worthy of further development. (Published Online~{}April~{}5~{}2006).}, title = {How relevant are fluid cognition and general intelligence? A developmental neuroscientist's perspective on a new model}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2006}, pages = {143-143}, } @incollection{Wilkins2008-WILCCA-4, author = {Lee Wilkins}, booktitle = {Media Ethics Beyond Borders: A Global Perspective}, title = {Connecting care and duty : How neuroscience and feminist ethics can contribute to understanding professional moral development}, publisher = {Heinemann}, year = {2008}, } @article{Williams2001-WILIMN, author = {Justin H. G. Williams and Andrew Whiten and Thomas Suddendorf and David I. Perrett}, abstract = {Various deficits in the cognitive functioning of people with autism have been documented in recent years but these provide only partial explanations for the condition. We focus instead on an imitative disturbance involving difficulties both in copying actions and in inhibiting more stereotyped mimicking, such as echolalia. A candidate for the neural basis of this disturbance may be found in a recently discovered class of neurons in frontal cortex, 'mirror neurons' (MNs). These neurons show activity in relation both to specific actions performed by self and matching actions performed by others, providing a potential bridge between minds. MN systems exist in primates without imitative and \textquoteleft{}theory of mind\textquoteright abilities and we suggest that in order for them to have become utilized to perform social cognitive functions, sophisticated cortical neuronal systems have evolved in which MNs function as key elements. Early developmental failures of MN systems are likely to result in a consequent cascade of developmental impairments characterised by the clinical syndrome of autism.}, title = {Imitation, mirror neurons and autism}, journal = {[Journal (Paginated)]}, year = {2001}, } @article{Wilson1994-WILTDR, volume = {42}, number = {1}, author = {Daniel R. Wilson}, abstract = {The paper offers contextual and integrating comments about sex, evolution and psychopathology as a point of departure toward a new and more scientific understanding of human neurosis. The evolved roots of neurotic behavior are firmly linked to theorems of evolution, which is emerging as the basic science of psychopathology. Evolutionary tenets serve to: 1) redefine key aspects of neuroses, 2) place neurotic behavior in a broad and integrated evolutionary context, and 3) pose basic questions for all psychopathology. Readers who wish to expand, clarify or confirm elements of might well consult basic books in either field as a passing familiarity with psychiatry and biology is assumed.}, title = {The Darwinian roots of human neurosis}, journal = {Acta Biotheoretica}, year = {1994}, } @book{Wilson2003-WILTBB, author = {Stephen Wilson}, title = {The Bloomsbury Book of the Mind: Key Writings on the Mind From Plato and the Buddha Through Shakespeare, Descartes, and Freud to the Latest Discoveries of Neuroscience}, publisher = {Bloomsbury}, year = {2003}, } @article{Wolf2008-WOLNTB, volume = {8}, number = {1}, author = {Susan M. Wolf}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Neurolaw: The big question}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2008}, pages = {21 -- 22}, } @article{Wollheim1975-WOLNAT, volume = {8}, number = {2}, author = {Richard Wollheim}, title = {Neurosis and the artist}, journal = {Leonardo}, year = {1975}, pages = {155--157}, } @article{Wolpe2005-WOLRTC, volume = {5}, number = {2}, author = {Paul Root Wolpe and Kenneth R. Foster and Daniel D. Langleben}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Response to commentators on "emerging neurotechnologies for lie-detection: Promises and perils?"}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2005}, pages = {W5}, } @article{Wood2004-WOOSCN, volume = {27}, number = {3}, author = {Jacqueline N. Wood}, abstract = {Krueger \& Funder (K\&F) describe social cognitive research as being flawed by its emphasis on performance errors and biases. They argue that a perspective shift is necessary to give balance to the field. However, such a shift may already be occurring with the emergence of social cognitive neuroscience leading to new theories and research that focus on normal social cognition.}, title = {Social cognitive neuroscience: The perspective shift in progress}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {360-361}, } @article{Wood2009-WOOAPA, volume = {8}, number = {4}, author = {Rachel Wood and Susan A. J. Stuart}, abstract = {Phantom limb experiences demonstrate an unexpected degree of fragility inherent in our self-perceptions. This is perhaps most extreme when congenitally absent limbs are experienced as phantoms. Aplasic phantoms highlight fundamental questions about the physiological bases of self-experience and the ontogeny of a physical, embodied sense of the self. Some of the most intriguing of these questions concern the role of mirror neurons in supporting the development of self--{}other mappings and hence the emergence of phantom experiences of congenitally absent limbs. In this paper, we will examine the hypothesis that aplasic phantom limb experience is the result of an ontogenetic interplay between body schemas and mirror neuron activity and that this interplay is founded on embedding in a social context. Phantom limb experience has been associated with the persistence of subjective experience of a part of the body after deafferentation through surgical or traumatic removal. We maintain that limited association is inconsistent with the extent to which phantom limb experience is reported by aplasic individuals.}, title = {Aplasic phantoms and the mirror neuron system: An enactive, developmental perspective}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year = {2009}, } @article{Woody1995-WOOFPF, volume = {2}, author = {J. Melvin Woody and Jamie L. Phillips}, title = {Freud's project for a scientific psychology after 100 years: The unconscious mind in the era of cognitive neuroscience}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology}, year = {1995}, pages = {123-34}, } @book{Wright2007-WRITAO-2, author = {Gordon Herbert Wright}, title = {The Anatomy of Metaphor: A Neurological Analysis of Language or, More Pretentiously, Principia Neurologica Philosophiae}, publisher = {G.H. Wright}, year = {2007}, } @article{Wright1997-WRILAD, volume = {20}, number = {4}, author = {J. J. Wright}, abstract = {Simulations and analytic considerations show that synchronisation occurs in delay neural networks at the surrounds of externally driven sites. In the synchronous fields, network transmission has a static transfer function and H(X|R,C) is minimal. But when autonomous local states with attractor dynamics develop in the network, H(X|R,C) is not minimized. Physiological realism may therefore require some modifications in application of coherent infomax.}, title = {Local attractor dynamics will introduce further information to synchronous neuronal fields}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {701-702}, } @article{Wu2008-WUSIN, volume = {8}, number = {9}, author = {Kevin Chien-Chang Wu}, title = {Soul-making in neuroimaging?}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2008}, pages = {21 -- 22}, } @incollection{Wynn2006-WYNBMI, author = {Jonathan K. Wynn and Michael F. Green}, booktitle = {gmen, Haluk; Breitmeyer, Bruno G. (2006). The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. (Pp. 171-184). Cambridge, MA, US: MIT Press. Xi, 410 Pp}, title = {Backward masking in schizophrenia: Neuropsychological, electrophysiological, and functional neuroimaging findings}, year = {2006}, } @book{Wynn2006-WYNGHB, author = {Jonathan K. Wynn and Michael F. Green}, title = {gmen, Haluk; Breitmeyer, Bruno G. (2006). The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. (Pp. 171-184). Cambridge, MA, US: MIT Press. Xi, 410 Pp}, year = {2006}, } @article{Yagisawa1994-YAGTIN, volume = {76}, number = {2-3}, author = {Takashi Yagisawa}, title = {Thinking in neurons: Comments on Stephen Schiffer's \_The Language-of-Thought Relation and its Implications\_}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {1994}, pages = {287-96}, } @article{Young2000-YOUWST, volume = {15}, number = {1}, author = {Andrew W. Young}, title = {Wondrous strange: The neuropsychology of abnormal beliefs}, journal = {Mind and Language}, year = {2000}, pages = {47--{}73}, } @incollection{Young1995-YOUNOA, author = {Andrew W. Young}, booktitle = {Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience}, title = {Neuropsychology of awareness}, publisher = {Lawrence Erlbaum}, year = {1995}, } @article{Zaidel1999-ZAINCR, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Dahlia W. Zaidel}, abstract = {When circumscribed brain regions are damaged in humans, highly specific iimpairments in language, memory, problem solving, and cognition are observed. Neurosurgery such as "split brain" or hemispherectomy, for example has shown that encompassing regions, the left and right cerebral hemispheres each control human behavior in unique ways. Observations stretching over 100 years of patients with unilateral focal brain damage have revealed, withouth the theoretical benefits of "cognitive neuroscience" or "cognitive psychology," that human behavior is indeed controlled by the brain and its neurons.}, title = {Neuronal connectivity, regional differentiation, and brain damage in humans}, journal = {[Journal (Paginated)]}, year = {1999}, pages = {854-855}, } @article{Zegura1997-ZEGCCA, volume = {20}, number = {2}, author = {Stephen L. Zegura}, title = {Color categories and biology: Considerations from molecular genetics, neurobiology, and evolutionary theory}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {211-212}, } @article{Zigmond2003-ZIGIEI, volume = {9}, number = {2}, author = {Michael J. Zigmond}, abstract = {In 1994, the governing council of the Society for Neuroscience was asked to make a brief statement on an issue regarding responsible conduct in publishing. The present article reviews how that initial request grew over the next four years into a lengthy document. Drawing on that experience, which was presided over by the author, comments are made about the potential impact of such guidelines, the lessons learned, and the proper role of professional societies in promoting responsible conduct in research.}, title = {Implementing ethics in the professions: Preparing guidelines on scientific communication for the society for neuroscience}, journal = {Science and Engineering Ethics}, year = {2003}, } @incollection{stergaard2009-STEIMN, author = {Sven \O{}stergaard}, booktitle = {Metarepresentation, Self-Organization and Art}, title = {Imitation, mirror neurons, and meta-cognition}, publisher = {Peter Lang}, year = {2009}, } @article{Anderson2007-ANDMRE, volume = {159}, number = {3}, author = {Michael L. Anderson}, abstract = { Abstract: The massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) is a theory about the functional topography of the human brain, offering a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other. Central to MRH is the claim that cognitive evolution proceeded in a way analogous to component reuse in software engineering, whereby existing components-originally developed to serve some specific purpose-were used for new purposes and combined to support new capacities, without disrupting their participation in existing programs. If the evolution of cognition was indeed driven by such exaptation, then we should be able to make some specific empirical predictions regarding the resulting functional topography of the brain. This essay discusses three such predictions, and some of the evidence supporting them. Then, using this account as a background, the essay considers the implications of these findings for an account of the functional integration of cognitive operations. For instance, MRH suggests that in order to determine the functional role of a given brain area it is necessary to consider its participation across multiple task categories, and not just focus on one, as has been the typical practice in cognitive neuroscience. This change of methodology will motivate (even perhaps necessitate) the development of a new, domain-neutral vocabulary for characterizing the contribution of individual brain areas to larger functional complexes, and direct particular attention to the question of how these various area roles are integrated and coordinated to result in the observed cognitive effect. Finally, the details of the mix of cognitive functions a given area supports should tell us something interesting not just about the likely computational role of that area, but about the nature of and relations between the cognitive functions themselves. For instance, growing evidence of the role of \textquotedblleft{}motor\textquotedblright areas like M1, SMA and PMC in language processing, and of \textquotedblleft{}language\textquotedblright areas like Broca\textquoteright{}s area in motor control, offers the possibility for significantly reconceptualizing the nature both of language and of motor control}, title = {Massive redeployment, exaptation, and the functional integration of cognitive operations}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2007}, } @article{Anderson2007-ANDTMR, volume = {21}, number = {2}, author = {Michael L. Anderson}, abstract = {This essay introduces the massive redeployment hypothesis, an account of the functional organization of the brain that centrally features the fact that brain areas are typically employed to support numerous functions. The central contribution of the essay is to outline a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other, in such a way as to account for the supporting data on both sides of the argument. The massive redeployment hypothesis is supported by case studies of redeployment, and compared and contrasted with other theories of the localization of function}, title = {The massive redeployment hypothesis and the functional topography of the brain}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2007}, pages = {143-174}, } @article{Avison2002-AVIFBM, volume = {3}, author = {M. J. Avison}, title = {Functional brain mapping: What is it good for? Absolutely nothing}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {367-73}, } @article{Bechtel2002-BECDTB, volume = {3}, number = {1}, author = {William P. Bechtel}, abstract = {This paper defends cognitive neuroscience\textquoteright{}s project of developing mechanistic explan- ations of cognitive processes through decomposition and localization against objections raised by William Uttal in The New Phrenology. The key issue between Uttal and researchers pursuing cognitive neuroscience is that Uttal bets against the possibility of decomposing mental operations into component elementary operations which are localized in distinct brain regions. The paper argues that it is through advancing and revising what are likely to be overly simplistic and incorrect decompositions that the goals of cognitive neuroscience are likely to be achieved}, title = {Decomposing the brain: A long term pursuit}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {229-242}, } @incollection{Bechtel2001-BECDAL, author = {William P. Bechtel}, booktitle = {Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader}, title = {Decomposing and localizing vision: An exemplar for cognitive neuroscience}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {2001}, } @book{Bechtel2001-BECPAT-2, author = {William P. Bechtel and Pete Mandik and Jennifer Mundale and Robert S. Stufflebeam}, abstract = {2. Daugman, J. G. Brain metaphor and brain theory 3. Mundale, J. Neuroanatomical Foundations of Cognition: Connecting the Neuronal Level with the Study of Higher Brain Areas}, title = {Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {2001}, } @article{Bechtel1997-BECPET, volume = {64}, number = {4}, author = {William P. Bechtel and Robert S. Stufflebeam}, title = {PET: Exploring the myth and the method}, journal = {Philosophy Of Science}, year = {1997}, } @article{Berridge2009-BERWAL, volume = {52}, number = {4}, author = {Kent C. Berridge}, abstract = {Different brain mechanisms seem to mediate wanting and liking for the same reward. This may have implications for the modular nature of mental processes, and for understanding addictions, compulsions, free will and other aspects of desire. A few wanting and liking phenomena are presented here, together with discussion of some of these implications.}, title = {Wanting and liking: Observations from the neuroscience and psychology laboratory}, journal = {Inquiry}, year = {2009}, pages = {378 -- 398}, } @article{Blair2001-BLAEAU, volume = {25}, number = {1}, author = {James R. Blair and Karina S. Perschardt}, abstract = {We question whether empathy is mediated by a unitary circuit. We argue that recent neuroimaging data indicate dissociable neural responses for different facial expressions as well as for representing others' mental states (Theory of Mind, TOM). We also argue that the general empathy disorder considered characteristic of autism and psychopathy is not general but specific for each disorder.}, title = {Empathy: A unitary circuit or a set of dissociable neuro-cognitive systems?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {27-28}, } @incollection{Bogen2002-BOGEAO, author = {James Bogen}, booktitle = {The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science}, title = {Experiment and observation}, publisher = {Cambridge: Blackwell}, year = {2002}, } @article{Bogen2002-BOGECP, volume = {69}, number = {3}, author = {James Bogen}, title = {Epistemological custard pies from functional brain imaging}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {S59-S71}, } @book{Bogen2002-BOGTBG, author = {James Bogen}, title = {The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science}, publisher = {Cambridge: Blackwell}, year = {2002}, } @incollection{Bogen2001-BOGFIE, author = {James Bogen}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, title = {Functional imaging evidence: Some epistemic hotspots}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {2001}, } @book{Brook2005-BROCAT, author = {Andrew Brook and Kathleen Akins}, abstract = {This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in this volume are clustered around five major themes: data and theory in neuroscience; neural representation and computation; visuomotor transformations; color vision; and consciousness}, title = {Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2005}, } @article{Buller2000-BULEPM, volume = {1}, number = {3}, author = {David J. Buller and Valerie Gray Hardcastle}, abstract = {Evolutionary psychologists claim that the mind contains \textquotedblleft{}hundreds or thousands\textquotedblright of \textquotedblleft{}genetically speci{}ed\textquotedblright modules, which are evolutionary adaptations for their cognitive functions. We argue that, while the adult human mind/brain typically contains a degree of modularization, its \textquotedblleft{}modules\textquotedblright are neither genetically speci{}ed nor evolutionary adaptations. Rather, they result from the brain\textquoteright{}s developmental plasticity, which allows environmental task demands a large role in shaping the brain\textquoteright{}s information-processing structures. The brain\textquoteright{}s developmental plasticity is our fundamental psychological adaptation, and the \textquotedblleft{}modules\textquotedblright that result from it are adaptive responses to local conditions, not past evolutionary environments. If different individuals share common environ- ments, however, they may develop similar \textquotedblleft{}modules,\textquotedblright and this process can mimic the development of genetically speci{}ed modules in the evolutionary psychologist\textquoteright{}s sense}, title = {Evolutionary psychology, meet developmental neurobiology: Against promiscuous modularity}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2000}, pages = {307-25}, } @unpublished{Burock2009-BUROFN, author = {Marc Burock}, abstract = {Cognitive neuroscientists use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure properties of a participant\textquoteright{}s brain during a cognitive task. These imaging results are transformed into compelling pictures of brain activity using statistical models. I will argue that, for a broad class of experiments, neuroimaging experts have a tendency to over{}interpret the functional significance of their data. This over{}interpretation appears to follow from contentious theoretical assumptions about the mind{}brain connection, and from a propensity to conflate the anatomical location of a statistically{}significant correlation with knowledge of the mechanistic functioning at that location.}, title = {Over{}interpreting functional neuroimages}, year = {2009}, } @article{Celone2009-CELANP, volume = {9}, number = {1}, author = {Kim Celone and Chantal Stern}, title = {A neuroimaging perspective on the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fmri) in educational and legal systems}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2009}, pages = {28 -- 29}, } @article{Chaminade2001-CHAACF-4, volume = {24}, number = {5}, author = {Thierry Chaminade and Jean Decety}, abstract = {In recent years, neurophysiological evidence has accumulated in favor of a common coding between perception and execution of action. We review findings from recent neuroimaging experiments in the action domain with three complementary perspectives: perception of action, covert action triggered by perception, and reproduction of perceived action (imitation). All studies point to the parietal cortex as a key region for body movement representation, both observed and performed.}, title = {A common framework for perception and action: Neuroimaging evidence}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {879-882}, } @incollection{Cleeremans2006-CLECCO, author = {Axel Cleeremans}, booktitle = {The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology: Progress in Brain Research}, abstract = {Over the past few years numerous proposals have appeared that attempt to characterize consciousness in terms of what could be called its computational correlates: Principles of information processing with which to characterize the differences between conscious and unconscious processing. Proposed computational correlates include architectural specialization (such as the involvement of specific regions of the brain in conscious processing), properties of representations (such as their stability in time or their strength), and properties of specific processes (such as resonance, synchrony, interactivity, or information integration). In exactly the same way as one can engage in a search for the neural correlates of consciousness, one can thus search for the computational correlates of consciousness. The most direct way of doing is to contrast models of conscious versus unconscious information processing. In this paper, I review these developments and illustrate how computational modeling of specific cognitive processes can be useful in exploring and in formulating putative computational principles through which to capture the differences between conscious and unconscious cognition. What can be gained from such approaches to the problem of consciousness is an understanding of the function it plays in information processing and of the mechanisms that subtend it. Here, I suggest that the central function of consciousness is to make it possible for cognitive agents to exert ?exible, adaptive control over behavior. From this perspective, consciousness is best characterized as involving (1) a graded continuum de?ned over quality of representation, such that availability to consciousness and to cognitive control correlates with properties of representation, and (2) the implication of systems of meta-representations}, title = {Computational Correlates of Consciousness}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {2006}, } @article{Cleeremans2005-CLECCI, volume = {9}, number = {8}, author = {Axel Cleeremans and Tiago V. Maia}, abstract = {Over the past decade, many {}ndings in cognitive about the contents of consciousness: we will not address neuroscience have resulted in the view that selective what might be called the \textquoteleft{}enabling factors\textquoteright for conscious- attention, working memory and cognitive control ness (e.g. appropriate neuromodulation from the brain- stem, etc.). involve competition between widely distributed rep-}, title = {Consciousness: Converging insights from connectionist modeling and neuroscience}, journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {397-404}, } @article{Cranford1981-CRATIT, volume = {3}, author = {Ronald E. Cranford and Barbara Killpatrick}, title = {Tests in the diagnosis of brain death: The role of the radioisotope brain scan}, journal = {Bioethics Quarterly}, year = {1981}, pages = {67-72}, } @article{Crusio1997-CRUNIU, volume = {20}, number = {3}, author = {Wim E. Crusio}, title = {Neuropsychological inference using a microphrenological approach does not need a locality assumption}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {517-518}, } @article{Downie2005-DOWFTR, volume = {5}, number = {2}, author = {Jocelyn Downie and Michael Hadskis}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Finding the right compass for issue-mapping in neuroimaging}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2005}, pages = {27 -- 29}, } @book{Erneling2005-ERNMAA, author = {Christina E. Erneling and D. Johnson}, abstract = {Printbegr\ae{}nsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session.}, title = {Mind As a Scientific Object}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2005}, } @article{Ford2005-FORCIL, volume = {5}, number = {2}, author = {Paul J. Ford and Cynthia S. Kubu}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Caution in leaping from functional imaging to functional neurosurgery}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2005}, pages = {23 -- 25}, } @article{Foster1997-FOSTLA, volume = {20}, number = {3}, author = {Jonathan K. Foster}, title = {The \textquotedblleft{}locality assumption\textquotedblright: Lessons from history and neuroscience?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {518-519}, } @article{Gerrans2008-GERGOP, volume = {59}, number = {2}, author = {Philip Gerrans and Valerie E. Stone}, abstract = {Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it suggests a parsimonious cognitive architecture can account for apparent domain specificity. We argue for such an architecture in two stages. First, on conceptual grounds, contrasting the case of language with ToM, and second, by showing that recent evidence in the form of fMRI and lesion studies supports the more parsimonious hypothesis. Theory of Mind, Metarepresentation, and Modularity Developmental Components of ToM The Analogy with Modularity of Language Dissociations without Modules The Evidence from Neuroscience Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?}, title = {Generous or parsimonious cognitive architecture? Cognitive neuroscience and theory of mind}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, } @incollection{Hardcastle2005-HARLIT-2, author = {Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart}, booktitle = {Cognition and the Brain}, title = {Localization in the brain and other illusions}, publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press}, year = {2005}, } @article{Hardcastle2004-HARNAT, volume = {18}, number = {1}, author = {Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart}, abstract = {This article examines how scientists move from physical measurementsto actual observation of single-cell recordings in the brain. We highlight how easy it is to change the fundamental nature of ourobservations using accepted methodological techniques for manipulatingraw data. Collecting single-cell data is thoroughly pragmatic. Weconclude that there is no deep or interesting difference betweenaccounting for observations by measurements and accounting forobservations by theories}, title = {Neuroscience and the art of single-cell recordings}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2004}, pages = {195-208}, } @article{Hardcastle2002-HARWDB, volume = {69}, number = {3}, author = {Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart}, title = {What do brain data really show?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {572-582}, } @article{Johnson2007-JOHTNO-2, volume = {7}, number = {9}, author = {Kevin A. Johnson and F. Andrew Kozel and Steven J. Laken and Mark S. George}, title = {The neuroscience of functional magnetic resonance imaging fmri for deception detection}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2007}, pages = {58 -- 60}, } @article{Kennedy2005-KENNRR, volume = {5}, number = {2}, author = {Donald Kennedy}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Neuroimaging: Revolutionary research tool or a post-modern phrenology?}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2005}, pages = {19}, } @article{KleinForthcoming-KLETDT, author = {Colin Klein}, abstract = {The dual-track theory of moral reasoning has received considerable attention due to the neuroimaging work of Greene et al. Greene et al. claimed that certain kinds of moral dilemmas activated brain regions specific to emotional responses, while others activated areas specific to cognition. This appears to indicate a dissociation between different types of moral reasoning. I re-evaluate these claims of specificity in light of subsequent empirical work. I argue that none of the cortical areas identified by Greene et al. are functionally specific: each is active in a wide variety of both cognitive and emotional tasks. I further argue that distinct activation across conditions is not strong evidence for dissociation. This undermines support for the dual-track hypothesis. I further argue that moral decision-making appears to activate a common network that underlies self-projection : the ability to imagine oneself from a variety of viewpoints in a variety of situations. I argue that the utilization of self-projection indicates a continuity between moral decision-making and other kinds of complex social deliberation. This may have normative consequences, but teasing them out will require careful attention to both empirical and philosophical concerns.}, title = {The dual track theory of moral decision-making: A critique of the neuroimaging evidence}, journal = {Neuroethics}, year = {forthcoming}, } @article{Klein2010-KLEPII-2, volume = {5}, number = {2}, author = {Colin Klein}, abstract = {Functional neuroimaging (NI) technologies like Positron Emission Tomography and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have revolutionized neuroscience, and provide crucial tools to link cognitive psychology and traditional neuroscientific models. A growing discipline of 'neurophilosophy' brings fMRI evidence to bear on traditional philosophical issues such as weakness of will, moral psychology, rational choice, social interaction, free will, and consciousness. NI has also attracted critical attention from psychologists and from philosophers of science. I review debates over the evidential status of fMRI, including the differences between brain scans and ordinary images, the legitimacy of forward inference and reverse inference, and deductive versus probabilistic accounts of NI evidence. I conclude with a discussion of fMRI as exploratory rather than confirmatory evidence, linking this debate to the growing literature on cognitive ontology.}, title = {Philosophical issues in neuroimaging}, journal = {Philosophy Compass}, year = {2010}, pages = {186-198}, } @article{Landreth2004-LANLAT, volume = {17}, number = {1}, author = {Anthony Landreth and Robert C. Richardson}, abstract = {William Uttal's The new phrenology is a broad attack on localization in cognitive neuroscience. He argues that even though the brain is a highly differentiated organ, "high level cognitive functions" should not be localized in specific brain regions. First, he argues that psychological processes are not well-defined. Second, he criticizes the methods used to localize psychological processes, including imaging technology: he argues that variation among individuals compromises localization, and that the statistical methods used to construct activation maps are flawed. Neither criticism is compelling. First, as we illustrate, there are behavioral measures which offer at least weak constraints on psychological attribution. Second, though imaging does face methodological difficulties associated with variation among individuals, these are broadly acknowledged; moreover, his specific criticisms of the imaging work, and in particular of fMRI, misrepresent the methodology. In concluding, we suggest a way of framing the issues that might allow us to resolve differences between localizationist models and more distributed models empirically}, title = {Localization and the new phrenology: A review essay on William Uttal's the new phrenology}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2004}, pages = {107-123}, } @book{Laureys2005-LAUTBO-3, author = {Steven Laureys}, title = {The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology: Progress in Brain Research}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {2005}, } @article{Leo2003-LEOBBO, volume = {24}, number = {1}, author = {John R. Leo and D. Cohen}, title = {Broken brains or flawed studies? A critical review of ADHD neuroimaging research}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, year = {2003}, pages = {29-55}, } @article{Lloyd2002-LLOSTM, volume = {3}, number = {1}, author = {Dan Lloyd}, abstract = {Good research requires, among other virtues,(i) methods that yield stable experimentalobservations without arbitrary (post hoc)assumptions, (ii) logical interpretations ofthe sources of observations, and (iii) soundinferences to general causal mechanismsexplaining experimental results by placing themin larger explanatory contexts. In TheNew Phrenology , William Uttal examines theresearch tradition of localization, and findsit deficient in all three virtues, whetherbased on lesion studies or on new technologiesfor functional brain imaging. In this paper Iconsider just the arguments concerning brainimaging, especially functional MagneticResonance Imaging. I think that Uttal is tooharsh in his methodological critique, butcorrect in his assessment of the conceptuallimitations of localist evidence. I proposeinstead a data-driven test for assessingrelative modularity in brain images, and showits use in a secondary analysis of fMRI datafrom the National fMRI Data Center(www.fmridc.org). Although the analysis is alimited pilot study, it offers additionalempirical challenge to localism}, title = {Studying the mind from the inside out}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {243-59}, } @article{Lloyd2000-LLOTCF, volume = {1}, number = {1}, author = {Dan Lloyd}, abstract = {For more than a century the paradigm inspiringcognitive neuroscience has been modular and localist.Contemporary research in functional brain imaginggenerally relies on methods favorable to localizingparticular functions in one or more specific brainregions. Meanwhile, connectionist cognitive scientistshave celebrated the computational powers ofdistributed processing, and pioneered methods forinterpreting distributed representations. This papertakes a connectionist approach to functionalneuroimaging. A tabulation of 35 PET (positronemission tomography) experiments strongly indicatesdistributed function for at least the ''medium sized''anatomical units, the cortical Brodmann areas. Moreimportant, when these PET experiments were interpretedas distributed representations, multidimensionalscaling revealed a ''brain activation space'' with asalient structure organized primarily by the sensorymodality of the stimulus, and secondarily by the typeof motor response. These results suggest that currentanalytical techniques in functional neuroimagingshould be augmented by distributed processinganalyses, and that these analyses may lead to manydiscoveries about the structure of ''inner space.''}, title = {Terra cognita: From functional neuroimaging to the map of the mind}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2000}, pages = {93-116}, } @book{Machamer2001-MACTAM-2, author = {Peter K. Machamer and Peter McLaughlin and Rick Grush}, abstract = {Surveys theories in contemporary neuroscience, exploring many of its methodological techniques and problems.}, title = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {2001}, } @article{Mole2007-MOLFAB, volume = {20}, number = {2}, author = {Christopher Mole and Corey Kubatzky and Jan Plate and Rawdon Waller and Marilee Dobbs and Marc Nardone}, abstract = {The use of brain scanning now dominates the cognitive sciences, but important questions remain to be answered about what, exactly, scanning can tell us. One corner of cognitive science that has been transformed by the use of neuroimaging, and that a scanning enthusiast might point to as proof of scanning's importance, is the study of face perception. Against this view, we argue that the use of scanning has, in fact, told us rather little about the information processing underlying face perception and that it is not likely to tell us much more}, title = {Faces and brains: The limitations of brain scanning in cognitive science}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2007}, pages = {197 -- 207}, } @article{Mundale2002-MUNCOL, volume = {3}, number = {3}, author = {Jennifer Mundale}, abstract = {A spate of recent anti-localizationist publications have re-ignited the old debate about the localization of function. Many of the recent attacks on localization, however, are directed at what I will argue to be a narrow and outmoded view of localization, and thus have little conceptual or empirical impact. What I hope to present here is an analysis of functional localization that more adequately reflects the sophistication and complexity of its use in neuroscientific research, both historically and recently. Proceeding first by way of contrast, I examine theanti-localizationist positions of holism andequipotentiationism. Then, I present a four-fold analysis of localization according to physical scope, physical kind, functional scope, and functional kind. Next, I turn to a discussion of the heuristic value oflocalization in deciphering structure-functionrelationships. Finally, I hope to show that the overall view of functional localization that emerges from these considerations constitutes a much more elusive target than its critics assume. It serves to mitigate, and insome instances even defeat, some forms ofanti-localizationist criticisms}, title = {Concepts of localization: Balkanization in the brain}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {313-30}, } @incollection{Mundale2001-MUNNFO, author = {Jennifer Mundale}, booktitle = {Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader}, title = {Neuroanatomical foundations of cognition: Connecting the neuronal level with the study of higher brain areas}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {2001}, } @article{OBrien1999-OBRPCI, volume = {22}, number = {1}, author = {Gerard O'Brien and Jonathan Opie}, abstract = {The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain\textquoteright{}s explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the general plausibility of a vehicle theory to our specific attempts to deal with the dissociation studies. We address these concerns, and then finish by considering whether the vehicle theory we have defended has a coherent story to tell about the active, unified subject to whom conscious experiences belong}, title = {Putting content into a vehicle theory of consciousness}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {175-196}, } phdthesis{Opie1998-OPICAC, author = {Jonathan Opie}, abstract = {To my father, who got me thinking, and to Tricia, who provided the love, support, and encouragement that enabled me to see this through}, title = {Consciousness: A Connectionist Perspective}, school = {University of Adelaide}, year = {1998}, } @article{Opie1999-OPIACT, volume = {22}, author = {Jonathan Opie and Gerard O'Brien}, abstract = {When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches \_vehicle\_ and \_process\_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are \_dissociable\_, and on the other, by the \_classical\_ computational theory of mind -- the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies -- so critical, in fact, it\textquoteright{}s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of \_connectionism; \_and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: \_phenomenal experience consists in the explicit\_ \_representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks\_..}, title = {A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {127-148}, } @article{Roskies2008-ROSNAI, volume = {1}, number = {1}, author = {Adina L. Roskies}, abstract = {Brain images are used both as scientific evidence and to illustrate the results of neuroimaging experiments. These images are apt to be viewed as photographs of brain activity, and in so viewing them people are prone to assume that they share the evidential characteristics of photographs. Photographs are epistemically compelling, and have a number of characteristics that underlie what I call their inferential proximity. Here I explore the aptness of the photography analogy, and argue that although neuroimaging does bear important similarities to photography, the details of the generation and analysis of neuroimages significantly complicate the relation of the image to the data. Neuroimages are not inferentially proximate, but their seeming so increases the potential for misinterpretation. This suggests caution in appealing to such images in the public domain.}, title = {Neuroimaging and inferential distance}, journal = {Neuroethics}, year = {2008}, } @article{Roskies2007-ROSANL, volume = {74}, number = {5}, author = {Adina L. Roskies}, abstract = {Images come in many varieties, but for evidential purposes, photographs are privileged. Recent advances in neuroimaging provide us with a new type of image that is used as scientific evidence. Brain images are epistemically compelling, in part because they are liable to be viewed as akin to photographs of brain activity. Here I consider features of photography that underlie the evidential status we accord it, and argue that neuroimaging diverges from photography in ways that seriously undermine the photographic analogy. While neuroimaging remains an important source of scientific evidence, proper interpretation of brain images is much more complex than it appears. \ddag{}This work was supported in part by a grant from the Leslie Humanities Center at Dartmouth College. I thank John Kulvicki for helpful comments, and Kim Sterelny, for making it possible for me to spend some time at the ANU with a grant from the Australian Research Council. \dag{}To contact the author, please write to: Dartmouth College, Department of Philosophy, Hanover, NH 03755; e-mail: adina.roskies@dartmouth.edu.}, title = {Are neuroimages like photographs of the brain?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2007}, } @article{Schutter2004-SCHITM, volume = {141}, number = {2}, author = {D. Schutter and J. van Honk and Jaak Panksepp}, abstract = {~~{}Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a method capable of transiently modulating neural excitability. Depending on the stimulation parameters information processing in the brain can be either enhanced or disrupted. This way the contribution of different brain areas involved in mental processes can be studied, allowing a functional decomposition of cognitive behavior both in the temporal and spatial domain, hence providing a functional resolution of brain/mind processes. The aim of the present paper is to argue that TMS with its ability to draw causal inferences on function and its neural representations is a valuable neurophysiological tool for investigating the causal basis of neuronal functions and can provide substantive insight into the modern interdisciplinary and (anti)reductionist neurophilosophical debates concerning the relationships between brain functions and mental abilities. Thus, TMS can serve as a heuristic method for resolving causal issues in an arena where only correlative tools have traditionally been available}, title = {Introducing transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and its property of causal inference in investigating brain-function relationships}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2004}, pages = {155-73}, } @article{Stinson2009-STISFT, volume = {15}, number = {1}, author = {Catherine Stinson}, abstract = {William James presaged, and Alan Allport voiced criticisms of cause theories of executive attention for involving a homunculus who directs attention. I review discussions of this problem, and argue that existing philosophical denials of the problem depend on equivocations between different senses of \textquotedblleft{}Cartesian error\textquotedblright. Another sort of denial tries to get around the problem by offering empirical evidence that such an executive attention director exists in prefrontal cortex. I argue that the evidence does not warrant the conclusion that an executive director can be localized in prefrontal cortex unless dubious assumptions are made, and that computational models purporting to support these assumptions either beg the question, or fail to model executive attention in terms of cause theories.}, title = {Searching for the Source of Executive Attention}, journal = {PSYCHE}, year = {2009}, pages = {137-154}, } @article{Stufflebeam1997-STUPET, volume = {64}, number = {4}, author = {Robert S. Stufflebeam and William P. Bechtel}, title = {PET: Exploring the myth and the method}, journal = {Philsophy of Science}, year = {1997}, pages = {95-106}, } @book{Trehub1991-TRETCB, author = {Arnold Trehub}, title = {The Cognitive Brain}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1991}, } @article{Uttal2002-UTTFBM, volume = {3}, author = {William R. Uttal}, title = {Functional brain mapping: What is it good for? Plenty, but not everything}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {375-79}, } @article{Uttal2002-UTTRTB, volume = {3}, number = {1}, author = {William R. Uttal}, abstract = {The field of cognitive imaging is explodingboth in terms of the amount of our scientificresources dedicated to it and the associatedpublication rate. However, all of this effortis based on a critical question -- Do cognitivemodules exist? Both of the reviewers of my book(Uttal, 2001) and I agree that this questionhas not yet been satisfactorily answered and,depending on the ultimate answer, the cognitiveimaging approach as well as some other parts ofthe quest for mechanistic models of mind mightnot be successful. Our views of how our scienceshould respond to this serious problem,however, are quite different. Both ProfessorBechtel and Lloyd argue for an optimisticattack on the problem of the localization ofcognitive processes in the brain based on thehistory of other sciences. I argue that arealistic appreciation of the limits of thisapproach should temper the enthusiasm for whatultimately will go the way of other attempts tounravel the mind-brain problem}, title = {Response to Bechtel and Lloyd}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {261-273}, } @book{Uttal2001-UTTTNP, author = {William R. Uttal}, title = {The New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2001}, } @article{vanOrden1997-VANFNF, volume = {64}, number = {4}, author = {G. C. van Orden}, title = {Functional neuroimages fail to discover pieces of mind in the parts of the brain}, journal = {Philosophy of Science Supplement}, year = {1997}, pages = {85-94}, } @incollection{Zawidski2004-ZAWGLR, author = {Tadeusz Zawidski and William P. Bechtel}, booktitle = {Mind As a Scientific Object}, title = {Gall's legacy revisited: Decomposition and localization in cognitive neuroscience}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2004}, } @article{Akins1996-AKIOSS, volume = {93}, number = {7}, author = {Kathleen Akins}, title = {Of sensory systems and the "aboutness" of mental states}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1996}, } @unpublished{AtmanspacherManuscript-ATMINC, author = {Harald Atmanspacher}, abstract = {The dynamics of neuronal systems, briefly neurodynamics, has developed into an attractive and influential research branch within neuroscience. In this paper, we discuss a number of conceptual issues in neurodynamics that are important for an appropriate interpretation and evaluation of its results. We demonstrate their relevance for selected topics of theoretical and empirical work. In particular, we refer to the notions of determinacy and stochasticity in neurodynamics across levels of microscopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic descriptions. The issue of correlations between neural, mental and behavioral states is also addressed in some detail. We propose an informed discussion of conceptual foundations with respect to neurobiological results as a viable step to a fruitful future philosophy of neuroscience.}, title = {Interpreting neurodynamics: Concepts and facts}, } @unpublished{AtmanspacherManuscript-ATMTSO, author = {Harald Atmanspacher}, abstract = {Stable neuronal assemblies are generally regarded as neural correlates of mental representations. Their temporal sequence corresponds to the experience of a direction of time, sometimes called the psychological time arrow. We show that the stability of particular, biophysically motivated models of neuronal assemblies, called coupled map lattices, is supported by causal interactions among neurons and obstructed by non-causal or anti-causal interactions among neurons. This surprising relation between causality and stability suggests that those neuronal assemblies that are stable due to causal neuronal interactions, and thus correlated with mental representations, generate a psychological time arrow. Yet this impact of causal interactions among neurons on the directed sequence of mental representations does not rule out the possibility of mentally less efficacious non-causal or anti-causal interactions among neurons.}, title = {The significance of causally coupled, stable neuronal assemblies for the psychological time arrow}, } @article{Baianu2006-BAICNB, volume = {16}, number = {1-2}, author = {I. C. Baianu and R. Brown and G. Georgescu and J. F. Glazebrook}, abstract = {A categorical, higher dimensional algebra and generalized topos framework for \L{}ukasiewicz--{}Moisil Algebraic--{}Logic models of non-linear dynamics in complex functional genomes and cell interactomes is proposed. \L{}ukasiewicz--{}Moisil Algebraic--{}Logic models of neural, genetic and neoplastic cell networks, as well as signaling pathways in cells are formulated in terms of non-linear dynamic systems with n-state components that allow for the generalization of previous logical models of both genetic activities and neural networks. An algebraic formulation of variable \textquoteleft{}next-state functions\textquoteright is extended to a \L{}ukasiewicz--{}Moisil Topos with an n-valued \L{}ukasiewicz--{}Moisil Algebraic Logic subobject classifier description that represents non-random and non-linear network activities as well as their transformations in developmental processes and carcinogenesis. The unification of the theories of organismic sets, molecular sets and Robert Rosen\textquoteright{}s (M,R)-systems is also considered here in terms of natural transformations of organismal structures which generate higher dimensional algebras based on consistent axioms, thus avoiding well known logical paradoxes occurring with sets. Quantum bionetworks, such as quantum neural nets and quantum genetic networks, are also discussed and their underlying, non-commutative quantum logics are considered in the context of an emerging Quantum Relational Biology.}, title = {Complex non-linear biodynamics in categories, higher dimensional algebra and \l{}ukasiewicz--{}moisil topos: Transformations of neuronal, genetic and neoplastic networks}, journal = {Axiomathes}, year = {2006}, } @article{Banerjee2001-BANTRP, volume = {24}, number = {5}, author = {Arunava Banerjee}, abstract = {The framework within which Tsuda proposes his solution for transitory dynamics between attractor states is flawed from a neurological perspective. We present a more genuine framework and discuss the roles that external input and synaptic modulations play in the evolution of the dynamics of neuronal systems. Chaotic itinerancy, it is argued, is not necessary for transitory dynamics.}, title = {The roles played by external input and synaptic modulations in the dynamics of neuronal systems}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {811-812}, } @article{Beaman2000-BEANAT, volume = {23}, number = {4}, author = {C. Philip Beaman}, abstract = {Page's target article presents an argument for the use of localist, connectionist models in future psychological theorising. The \textquotedblleft{}manifesto\textquotedblright marshalls a set of arguments in favour of localist connectionism and against distributed connectionism, but in doing so misses a larger argument concerning the level of psychological explanation that is appropriate to a given domain.}, title = {Neurons amongst the symbols?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {468-470}, } @book{Bechtel2001-BECPAT-2, author = {William P. Bechtel and Pete Mandik and Jennifer Mundale and Robert S. Stufflebeam}, abstract = {2. Daugman, J. G. Brain metaphor and brain theory 3. Mundale, J. Neuroanatomical Foundations of Cognition: Connecting the Neuronal Level with the Study of Higher Brain Areas}, title = {Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {2001}, } @article{Borisyuk2001-BORTPO, volume = {24}, number = {5}, author = {Roman Borisyuk}, abstract = {Experimental evidence and mathematical/computational models show that in many cases chaotic, nonregular oscillations are adequate to describe the dynamical behaviour of neural systems. Further work is needed to understand the meaning of this dynamical regime for modelling information processing in the brain.}, title = {The puzzle of chaotic neurodynamics}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {812-813}, } @article{Breidbach1999-BREIRP, volume = {20}, number = {4}, author = {Olaf Breidbach}, title = {Internal representations--a prelude for neurosemantics}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, year = {1999}, pages = {403-419}, } @book{Brook2005-BROCAT, author = {Andrew Brook and Kathleen Akins}, abstract = {This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in this volume are clustered around five major themes: data and theory in neuroscience; neural representation and computation; visuomotor transformations; color vision; and consciousness}, title = {Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2005}, } @article{Brown2006-BROWIA-2, volume = {19}, number = {6}, author = {Richard Brown}, abstract = {Philosophers have been talking about brain states for almost 50 years and as of yet no one has articulated a theoretical account of what one is. In fact this issue has received almost no attention and cognitive scientists still use meaningless phrases like 'C-fiber firing' and 'neuronal activity' when theorizing about the relation of the mind to the brain. To date when theorists do discuss brain states they usually do so in the context of making some other argument with the result being that any discussion of what brain states are has a distinct en passant flavor. In light of this it is a goal of mine to make brain states the center of attention by providing some general discussion of them. I briefly look at the argument of Bechtel and Mundale, as I think that they expose a common misconception philosophers had about brain states early on. I then turn to briefly examining Polger's argument, as I think he offers an intuitive account of what we expect brain states to be as well as a convincing argument against a common candidate for knowledge about brain states that is currently "on the scene." I then introduce a distinction between brain states and states of the brain: Particular brain states occur against background states of the brain. I argue that brain states are patterns of synchronous neural firing, which reflects the electrical face of the brain; states of the brain are the gating and modulating of neural activity and reflect the chemical face of the brain}, title = {What is a brain state?}, publisher = {Routledge Journals, Taylor \& Francis Ltd}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2006}, pages = {729-742}, } @article{Cappuccio2009-CAPCTS, volume = {65}, number = {2}, author = {Massimiliano Cappuccio}, abstract = {This article distinguishes three archetypal ways of articulating spatial cognition: (1) via metric representation of objective geometry, (2) via somatosensory constitution of the peripersonal environment, and (3) via pragmatic comprehension of the finalistic sense of action. The last one is documented by neuroscientific studies concerning mirror neurons. Bio-robotic experiments implementing mirror functions confirm the constitutive role of goal-oriented actions in spatial processes.}, title = {Constructing the space of action: From bio-robotics to mirror neurons}, journal = {World Futures}, year = {2009}, pages = {126 -- 132}, } @incollection{Christoff2008-CHRAOM, author = {Kalina Christoff and Kamyar Keramatian}, booktitle = {Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior}, title = {Abstraction of mental representations : Theoretical considerations and neuroscientific evidence}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2008}, } @incollection{Churchland1989-CHUNRA, volume = {4}, author = {Patricia S. Churchland and Terrence J. Sejnowski}, booktitle = {Neural Connections, Mental Computations}, title = {Neural representation and neural computation}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1989}, pages = {343-382}, } @article{Churchland1986-CHUCNA, volume = {1}, number = {1}, author = {Paul M. Churchland}, abstract = {~~{}This paper outlines the functional capacities of a novel scheme for cognitive representation and computation, and it explores the possible implementation of this scheme in the massively parallel organization of the empirical brain. The suggestion is that the brain represents reality by means of positions in suitably constitutes phase spaces; and the brain performs computations on these representations by means of coordinate transformations from one phase space to another. This scheme may be implemented in the brain in two distinct forms: (1) as a phase-space sandwich, which may explain certain laminar structures, such as cerebral cortex and the superior colliculus; and (2) as a neural matrix, which may explain other structures, such as the beautifully orthogonal architecture of the cerebellum}, title = {Cognitive neurobiology: A computational hypothesis for laminar cortex}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {1986}, pages = {25-51}, } @incollection{Cliff1990-CLICNA, author = {D. Cliff}, booktitle = {From Animals to Animats: Proceedings of The First International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (Complex Adaptive Systems)}, title = {Computational Neuroethology: A Provisional Manifesto}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1990}, } phdthesis{Collins2009-COLTNA, author = {Mike Collins}, abstract = {I defend a theory of mental representation that satisfies naturalistic constraints. Briefly, we begin by distinguishing (i) what makes something a representation from (ii) given that a thing is a representation, what determines what it represents. Representations are states of biological organisms, so we should expect a unified theoretical framework for explaining both what it is to be a representation as well as what it is to be a heart or a kidney. I follow Millikan in explaining (i) in terms of teleofunction, explicated in terms of natural selection. To explain (ii), we begin by recognizing that representational states do not have content, that is, they are neither true nor false except insofar as they both \textquotedblleft{}point to\textquotedblright or \textquotedblleft{}refer\textquotedblright to something, as well as \textquotedblleft{}say\textquotedblright something regarding whatever it is they are about. To distinguish veridical from false representations, there must be a way for these separate aspects to come apart; hence, we explain (ii) by providing independent theories of what I call f-reference and f-predication (the \textquoteleft{}f\textquoteright simply connotes \textquoteleft{}fundamental\textquoteright, to distinguish these things from their natural language counterparts). Causal theories of representation typically founder on error, or on what Fodor has called the disjunction problem. Resemblance or isomorphism theories typically founder on what I\textquoteright{}ve called the non-uniqueness problem, which is that isomorphisms and resemblance are practically unconstrained and so representational content cannot be uniquely determined. These traditional problems provide the motivation for my theory, the structural preservation theory, as follows. F-reference, like reference, is a specific, asymmetric relation, as is causation. F-predication, like predication, is a non-specific relation, as predicates typically apply to many things, just as many relational systems can be isomorphic to any given relational system. Putting these observations together, a promising strategy is to explain f-reference via causal history and f-predication via something like isomorphism between relational systems. This dissertation should be conceptualized as having three parts. After motivating and characterizing the problem in chapter 1, the first part is the negative project, where I review and critique Dretske\textquoteright{}s, Fodor\textquoteright{}s, and Millikan\textquoteright{}s theories in chapters 2-4. Second, I construct my theory about the nature of representation in chapter 5 and defend it from objections in chapter 6. In chapters 7-8, which constitute the third and final part, I address the question of how representation is implemented in biological systems. In chapter 7 I argue that single-cell intracortical recordings taken from awake Macaque monkeys performing a cognitive task provide empirical evidence for structural preservation theory, and in chapter 8 I use the empirical results to illustrate, clarify, and refine the theory.}, title = {The Nature and Implementation of Representation in Biological Systems}, school = {City University of New York}, year = {2009}, } @article{Coulter1995-COUTIN, volume = {5}, number = {4}, author = {Jeff Coulter}, title = {The informed neuron: Issues in the use of information theory in the behavioral sciences}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {1995}, pages = {583-96}, } phdthesis{Eliasmith2000-ELIHNM, author = {Chris Eliasmith}, abstract = {Questions concerning the nature of representation and what representations are about have been a staple of Western philosophy since Aristotle. Recently, these same questions have begun to concern neuroscientists, who have developed new techniques and theories for understanding how the locus of neurobiological representation, the brain, operates. My dissertation draws on philosophy and neuroscience to develop a novel theory of representational content}, title = {How Neurons Mean: A Neurocomputational Theory of Representational Content}, school = {Washington University in St. Louis}, year = {2000}, } @article{Freeman1997-FRENNO, volume = {18}, number = {2-3}, author = {Walter J. Freeman}, title = {Nonlinear neurodynamics of intentionality}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, year = {1997}, pages = {291-304}, } @article{Friederici2000-FRISIT, volume = {23}, number = {1}, author = {Angela D. Friederici and D. Yves von Cramon}, abstract = {We criticize the lack of neuroanatomical precision in the Grodzinsky target article. We propose a more precise neuroanatomical characterization of syntactic processing and suggest that syntactic procedures are supported by the left frontal operculum in addition to the anterior part of the superior temporal gyrus, which appears to be associated with syntactic knowledge representation.}, title = {Syntax in the brain: Linguistic versus neuroanatomical specificity}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {32-33}, } @article{Garson2003-GARTIO, volume = {70}, number = {5}, author = {James W. Garson}, abstract = {The first use of the term \textquotedblleft{}information\textquotedblright to describe the content of nervous impulse occurs in Edgar Adrian's The Basis of Sensation (1928). What concept of information does Adrian appeal to, and how can it be situated in relation to contemporary philosophical accounts of the notion of information in biology? The answer requires an explication of Adrian's use and an evaluation of its situation in relation to contemporary accounts of semantic information. I suggest that Adrian's concept of information can be to derive a concept of arbitrariness or semioticity in representation. This in turn provides one way of resolving some of the challenges that confront recent attempts in the philosophy of biology to restrict the notion of information to those causal connections that can in some sense be referred to as arbitrary or semiotic}, title = {The introduction of information into neurobiology}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2003}, pages = {926-936}, } @unpublished{Garson2002-GARTIO-2, author = {Justin Garson}, abstract = {The first use of the term "information" to describe the content of nervous impulse occurs 20 years prior to Shannon`s (1948) work, in Edgar Adrian`s The Basis of Sensation (1928). Although, at least throughout the 1920s and early 30s, the term "information" does not appear in Adrian`s scientific writings to describe the content of nervous impulse, the notion that the structure of nervous impulse constitutes a type of message subject to certain constraints plays an important role in all of his writings throughout the period. The appearance of the concept of information in Adrian`s work raises at least two important questions: (i) what were the relevant factors that motivated Adrian`s use of the concept of information? (ii) What concept of information does Adrian appeal to, and how can it be situated in relation to contemporary philosophical accounts of the notion of information in biology? The first question involves an account of the application of communications technology in neurobiology as well as the historical and scientific background of Adrian`s major scientific achievement, which was the recording of the action potential of a single sensory neuron. The response to the second question involves an explication of Adrian`s concept of information and an evaluation of how it may be situated in relation to more contemporary philosophical explications of a semantic concept of information. I suggest that Adrian`s concept of information places limitations on the sorts of systems that are referred to as information carriers by causal and functional accounts of information.}, title = {The introduction of information into neurobiology}, year = {2002}, } @article{Grush2003-GRUIDO, volume = {18}, number = {1}, author = {Rick Grush}, abstract = {~~{}I argue against a growing radical trend in current theoretical cognitive science that moves from the premises of embedded cognition, embodied cognition, dynamical systems theory and/or situated robotics to conclusions either to the effect that the mind is not in the brain or that cognition does not require representation, or both. I unearth the considerations at the foundation of this view: Haugeland's bandwidth-component argument to the effect that the brain is not a component in cognitive activity, and arguments inspired by dynamical systems theory and situated robotics to the effect that cognitive activity does not involve representations. Both of these strands depend not only on a shift of emphasis from higher cognitive functions to things like sensorimotor processes, but also depend on a certain understanding of how sensorimotor processes are implemented - as closed-loop control systems. I describe a much more sophisticated model of sensorimotor processing that is not only more powerful and robust than simple closed-loop control, but for which there is great evidence that it is implemented in the nervous system. The is the emulation theory of representation, according to which the brain constructs inner dynamical models, or emulators, of the body and environment which are used in parallel with the body and environment to enhance motor control and perception and to provide faster feedback during motor processes, and can be run off-line to produce imagery and evaluate sensorimotor counterfactuals. I then show that the emulation framework is immune to the radical arguments, and makes apparent why the brain is a component in the cognitive activity, and exactly what the representations are in sensorimotor control}, title = {In defense of some "cartesian" assumption concerning the brain and its operation}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2003}, pages = {53-92}, } @incollection{Grush2001-GRUTSC, author = {Rick Grush}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, title = {The semantic challenge to computational neuroscience}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {2001}, } @book{Held2006-HELMMA, author = {Carsten Held and Markus Knauff and Gottfried Vosgerau}, abstract = {"Cognitive psychology," "cognitive neuroscience," and "philosophy of mind" are names for three very different scientific fields, but they label aspects of the same scientific goal: to understand the nature of mental phenomena. Today, the three disciplines strongly overlap under the roof of the cognitive sciences. The book's purpose is to present views from the different disciplines on one of the central theories in cognitive science: the theory of mental models. Cognitive psychologists report their research on the representation and processing of mental models in human memory. Cognitive neuroscientists demonstrate how the brain processes visual and spatial mental models and which neural processes underlie visual and spatial thinking. Philosophers report their ideas about the role of mental models in relation to perception, emotion, representation, and intentionality. The single articles have different and mutually complementing goals: to introduce new empirical methods and approaches, to report new experimental results, and to locate competing approaches for their interpretation in the cross-disciplinary debate. The book is strongly interdisciplinary in character. It is especially addressed to researchers in any field related to mental models theory as both a reference book and an overview of present research on the topic in other disciplines. However, it is also an ideal reader for a specialized graduate course.}, title = {Mental Models and the Mind: Current Developments in Cognitive Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {2006}, } @book{Howard2004-HOWNSC, author = {Harry Howard}, abstract = {This book attempts to marry truth-conditional semantics with cognitive linguistics in the church of computational neuroscience. To this end, it examines the truth-conditional meanings of coordinators, quantifiers, and collective predicates as neurophysiological phenomena that are amenable to a neurocomputational analysis. Drawing inspiration from work on visual processing, and especially the simple/complex cell distinction in early vision (V1), we claim that a similar two-layer architecture is sufficient to learn the truth-conditional meanings of the logical coordinators and logical quantifiers. As a prerequisite, much discussion is given over to what a neurologically plausible representation of the meanings of these items would look like. We eventually settle on a representation in terms of correlation, so that, for instance, the semantic input to the universal operators (e.g. and, all)is represented as maximally correlated, while the semantic input to the universal negative operators (e.g. nor, no)is represented as maximally anticorrelated. On the basis this representation, the hypothesis can be offered that the function of the logical operators is to extract an invariant feature from natural situations, that of degree of correlation between parts of the situation. This result sets up an elegant formal analogy to recent models of visual processing, which argue that the function of early vision is to reduce the redundancy inherent in natural images. Computational simulations are designed in which the logical operators are learned by associating their phonological form with some degree of correlation in the inputs, so that the overall function of the system is as a simple kind of pattern recognition. Several learning rules are assayed, especially those of the Hebbian sort, which are the ones with the most neurological support. Learning vector quantization (LVQ) is shown to be a perspicuous and efficient means of learning the patterns that are of interest. We draw a formal parallelism between the initial, competitive layer of LVQ and the simple cell layer in V1, and between the final, linear layer of LVQ and the complex cell layer in V1, in that the initial layers are both selective, while the final layers both generalize. It is also shown how the representations argued for can be used to draw the traditionally-recognized inferences arising from coordination and quantification, and why the inference of subalternacy breaks down for collective predicates. Finally, the analogies between early vision and the logical operators allow us to advance the claim of cognitive linguistics that language is not processed by proprietary algorithms, but rather by algorithms that are general to the entire brain. Thus in the debate between objectivist and experiential metaphysics, this book falls squarely into the camp of the latter. Yet it does so by means of a rigorous formal, mathematical, and neurological exposition -- in contradiction of the experiential claim that formal analysis has no place in the understanding of cognition. To make our own counter-claim as explicit as possible, we present a sketch of the LVQ structure in terms of mereotopology, in which the initial layer of the network performs topological operations, while the final layer performs mereological operations. The book is meant to be self-contained, in the sense that it does not assume any prior knowledge of any of the many areas that are touched upon. It therefore contains mini-summaries of biological visual processing, especially the retinocortical and ventral /what?/ parvocellular pathways computational models of neural signaling, and in particular the reduction of the Hodgkin-Huxley equations to the connectionist and integrate-and-fire neurons Hebbian learning rules and the elaboration of learning vector quantization the linguistic pathway in the left hemisphere memory and the hippocampus truth-conditional vs. image-schematic semantics objectivist vs. experiential metaphysics and mereotopology. All of the simulations are implemented in MATLAB, and the code is available from the book\textquoteright{}s website. \textbullet The discovery of several algorithmic similarities between visison and semantics. \textbullet The support of all of this by means of simulations, and the packaging of all of this in a coherent theoretical framework.}, title = {Neuromimetic Semantics: Coordination, Quantification, and Collective Predicates}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {2004}, } @article{Jacobson2003-JACMRW, volume = {16}, number = {2}, author = {Anne Jaap Jacobson}, abstract = {This paper investigates how "representation" is actually used in some areas in cognitive neuroscience. It is argued that recent philosophy has largely ignored an important kind of representation that differs in interesting ways from the representations that are standardly recognized in philosophy of mind. This overlooked kind of representation does not represent by having intentional contents; rather members of the kind represent by displaying or instantiating features. The investigation is not simply an ethnographic study of the discourse of neuroscientists. If there are indeed two different kinds of representations, and the non-standard ones are the ones referred to in some areas of cognitive neuroscience, then we will have to give up the idea that appealing to inner representations with intentional contents is the defining distinction between cognitive neuroscience and behaviorist psychology (Montgomery, 1995). Further, if the conclusions of this paper are correct, many general accounts of how neural states represent are either false or theoretically ill-motivated}, title = {Mental representations: What philosophy leaves out and neuroscience puts in}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2003}, pages = {189-204}, } @article{Kayser2006-KAYVSY, volume = {16}, number = {15}, author = {Christoph Kayser and Nicos Logothetis}, abstract = {Attentional selection biases the processing of higher visual areas to particular parts of a scene. Recent experiments show how stimulation of neurons in the frontal eye fields can mimic this process.}, title = {Vision: Stimulating your attention}, journal = {Current Biology}, year = {2006}, pages = {R581-R583}, } @article{Keeley1999-KEEFCA, volume = {14}, number = {3}, author = {Brian L. Keeley}, title = {Fixing content and function in neurobiological systems: The neuroethology of electroreception}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {1999}, pages = {395-430}, } @article{Kentridge1995-KENSNS, volume = {4}, number = {4}, author = {Robert W. Kentridge}, abstract = {A wide range of systems appear to perform computation: what common features do they share? I consider three examples, a digital computer, a neural network and an analogue route finding system based on soap-bubbles. The common feature of these systems is that they have autonomous dynamics --- their states will change over time without additional external influence. We can take advantage of these dynamics if we understand them well enough to map a problem we want to solve onto them. Programming consists of arranging the starting state of a system so that the effects of the system''s dynamics on some of its variables corresponds to the effects of the equations which describe the problem to be solved on their variables. The measured dynamics of a system, and hence the computation it may be performing, depend on the variables of the system we choose to attend to. Although we cannot determine which are the appropriate variables to measure in a system whose computation basis is unknown to us I go on to discuss how grammatical classifications of computational tasks and symbolic machine reconstruction techniques may allow us to rule out some measurements of a system from contributing to computation of particular tasks. Finally I suggest that these arguments and techniques imply that symbolic descriptions of the computation underlying cognition should be stochastic and that symbols in these descriptions may not be atomic but may have contents in alternative descriptions}, title = {Symbols, neurons, soap-bubbles and the neural computation underlying cognition}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {1995}, } @book{Khlentzos2007-KHLMSV, author = {Drew Khlentzos and Andrea Schalley}, title = {Mental States Volume 1: Evolution, function, nature}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, year = {2007}, } @book{Machamer2001-MACTAM-2, author = {Peter K. Machamer and Peter McLaughlin and Rick Grush}, abstract = {Surveys theories in contemporary neuroscience, exploring many of its methodological techniques and problems.}, title = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {2001}, } @incollection{Mandik2005-MANAR, author = {Pete Mandik}, booktitle = {Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement}, abstract = {Often, sensory input underdetermines perception. One such example is the perception of illusory contours. In illusory contour perception, the content of the percept includes the presence of a contour that is absent from the informational content of the sensation. (By \textquotedblleft{}sensation\textquotedblright I mean merely information-bearing events at the transducer level. I intend no further commitment such as the identification of sensations with qualia.) I call instances of perception underdetermined by sensation \textquotedblleft{}underdetermined perception.\textquotedblright The perception of illusory contours is just one kind of underdetermined perception. The focus of this chapter is another kind of underdetermined perception: what I shall call "active perception". Active perception occurs in cases in which the percept, while underdetermined by sensation, is determined by a combination of sensation and action. The phenomenon of active perception has been used by several to argue against the positing of representations in explanations of sensory experience, either by arguing that no representations need be posited or that far fewer than previously thought need be posited. Such views include, but are not limited to those of Gibson (1966, 1986), Churchland.}, title = {Action-oriented representation}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2005}, } @article{Mandik2003-MANVOR, volume = {18}, number = {1}, author = {Pete Mandik}, abstract = {~~{}In this paper I discuss one of the key issuesin the philosophy of neuroscience:neurosemantics. The project of neurosemanticsinvolves explaining what it means for states ofneurons and neural systems to haverepresentational contents. Neurosemantics thusinvolves issues of common concern between thephilosophy of neuroscience and philosophy ofmind. I discuss a problem that arises foraccounts of representational content that Icall ``the economy problem'': the problem ofshowing that a candidate theory of mentalrepresentation can bear the work requiredwithin in the causal economy of a mind and anorganism. My approach in the current paper isto explore this and other key themes inneurosemantics through the use of computermodels of neural networks embodied and evolvedin virtual organisms. The models allow for thelaying bare of the causal economies of entireyet simple artificial organisms so that therelations between the neural bases of, forinstance, representation in perception andmemory can be regarded in the context of anentire organism. On the basis of thesesimulations, I argue for an account ofneurosemantics adequate for the solution of theeconomy problem}, title = {Varieties of representation in evolved and embodied neural networks}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2003}, pages = {95-130}, } @incollection{Mandik2002-MANSN, author = {Pete Mandik}, booktitle = {Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Philosophy and Computing}, abstract = {Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to conceive of how physical systems give rise to mental properties. As method and model, the computational techniques of artificial life and embodied evolutionary connectionism are used to conduct prosthetically enhanced thought experiments concerning the evolvability of mental representations. Central to this essay is a discussion of the computer simulation and evolution of three-dimensional synthetic animals with neural network controllers. The minimally cognitive behavior of finding food by exhibit- ing positive chemotaxis is simulated with swimming and walking creatures. These simulations form the basis of a discussion of the evolutionary and neurocomputa- tional bases of the incremental emergence of more complex forms of cognition. Other related work has been used to attack computational and representational theories of cognition. In contrast, I argue that the proper understanding of the evolutionary emergence of minimally cognitive behaviors is computational and representational through and through.}, title = {Synthetic neuroethology}, publisher = {Blackwell Pub.}, year = {2002}, } @book{Meyer1990-MEYFAT, author = {Jean-Arcady Meyer and Stewart W. Wilson}, title = {From Animals to Animats: Proceedings of The First International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (Complex Adaptive Systems)}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1990}, } @book{Nadel1989-NADNCM, author = {L. Nadel}, title = {Neural Connections, Mental Computations}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1989}, } @article{Ross1998-ROSFWF, volume = {21}, number = {6}, author = {William D. Ross}, abstract = {Discriminating behavior depends on neural representations in which the sensory activity patterns guiding different responses are decorrelated from one another. Visual information can often be parsimoniously transformed into these behavioral bridge-locus representations within neuro-computational visuo-spatial maps. Isomorphic inverse-optical world representation is not the goal. Nevertheless, such useful transformations can involve neural filling-in. Such a subpersonal representation of information is consistent with personal-level vision theory.}, title = {Filling-in while finding out: Guiding behavior by representing information}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1998}, pages = {770-771}, } @article{Ryder2004-RYDSNA, volume = {19}, number = {2}, author = {Dan Ryder}, title = {SINBaD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation}, journal = {Mind and Language}, year = {2004}, pages = {211-240}, } @article{Ryder2001-RYDTNA, volume = {2}, number = {2}, author = {Dan Ryder and Oleg Favorov}, abstract = {The ability to predict is the most importantability of the brain. Somehow, the cortex isable to extract regularities from theenvironment and use those regularities as abasis for prediction. This is a most remarkableskill, considering that behaviourallysignificant environmental regularities are noteasy to discern: they operate not only betweenpairs of simple environmental conditions, astraditional associationism has assumed, butamong complex functions of conditions that areorders of complexity removed from raw sensoryinputs. We propose that the brain's basicmechanism for discovering such complexregularities is implemented in the dendritictrees of individual pyramidal cells in thecerebral cortex. Pyramidal cells have 5--{}8principal dendrites, each of which is capableof learning nonlinear input-to-outputtransfer functions. We propose that eachdendrite is trained, in learning its transferfunction, by all the other principal dendritesof the same cell. These dendrites teach eachother to respond to their separate inputs with matching outputs. Exposed to differentbut related information about the sensoryenvironment, principal dendrites of the samecell tune to functions over environmentalconditions that, while different, are correlated . As a result, the cell as awhole tunes to the source of the regularitiesdiscovered by the cooperating dendrites,creating a new representation. When organizedinto feed-forward/feedback layers, pyramidalcells can build their discoveries on thediscoveries of other cells, graduallyuncovering nature's hidden order. Theresulting associative network is powerfulenough to meet a troubling traditionalobjection to associationism: that it is toosimple an architecture to implement rationalprocesses.}, title = {The new associationism: A neural explanation of the predictive powers of the cerebral cortex}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2001}, pages = {161-194}, } @incollection{Stufflebeam2001-STUBMA, author = {Robert S. Stufflebeam}, booktitle = {Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader}, title = {Brain matters: A case against representations in the brain}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {2001}, } @book{Trehub1991-TRETCB, author = {Arnold Trehub}, title = {The Cognitive Brain}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1991}, } @incollection{Vereschagin2007-MANEAM, author = {Alex Vereschagin and Mike Collins and Pete Mandik}, booktitle = {Mental States Volume 1: Evolution, function, nature}, abstract = {We explicate representational content by addressing how representations that ex- plain intelligent behavior might be acquired through processes of Darwinian evo- lution. We present the results of computer simulations of evolved neural network controllers and discuss the similarity of the simulations to real-world examples of neural network control of animal behavior. We argue that focusing on the simplest cases of evolved intelligent behavior, in both simulated and real organisms, reveals that evolved representations must carry information about the creature\textquoteright{}s environ- ments and further can do so only if their neural states are appropriately isomor- phic to environmental states. Further, these informational and isomorphism rela- tions are what are tracked by content attributions in folk-psychological and cognitive scientific explanations of these intelligent behaviors.}, title = {Evolving artificial minds and brains}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, year = {2007}, } @article{Abraham2003-ABRFTT, volume = {18}, number = {3}, author = {Tara H. Abraham}, abstract = {Recent literature on the role of pictorial representation in the life sciences has focused on the relationship between detailed representations of empirical data and more abstract, formal representations of theory. The standard argument is that in both a historical and epistemic sense, this relationship is a directional one: beginning with raw, unmediated images and moving towards diagrams that are more interpreted and more theoretically rich. Using the neural network diagrams of Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts as a case study, I argue that while in the empirical sciences, pictorial representation tends to move from data to theory, in areas of the life sciences that are predominantly theoretical, when abstraction occurs at the outset, the relationship between detail and abstraction in pictorial representations can be of a different character.}, title = {From theory to data: Representing neurons in the 1940s}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2003}, } @unpublished{AllenManuscript-ALLMMN, author = {Colin Allen}, abstract = {Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher-order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so-called \textquotedblleft{}mirror neurons\textquotedblright in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher-order intentionality, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behavioral studies of humans and monkeys. A decisive resolution to the paradox requires substantial additional empirical work and perhaps a rejection of the standard philosophical view.}, title = {Macaque mirror neurons}, } @article{Amos2000-AMOTOO, volume = {23}, number = {4}, author = {A. J. Amos and C. D. L. Wynne}, abstract = {We praise Arbib et al.'s Neural organization for its support of the integration of different levels of analysis, while noting that it does not always achieve what it advocates. We extend this approach into an area of neuropsychological activity in need of the structure offered by Organization at the intersection of the conflated fields of executive function and frontal lobe function.}, title = {The organization of organization: Neuronal scaffold or cognitive straitjacket?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {533-534}, } @incollection{Arbib1989-ARBMSA, author = {Michael A. Arbib}, booktitle = {Computers, Brains and Minds}, title = {Modularity, schemas and neurons: A critique of Fodor}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1989}, } @article{Aronson1976-AROSDN, volume = {6}, number = {1}, author = {Jerrold L. Aronson}, title = {Some dubious neurological assumptions of radical behaviourism}, journal = {Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour}, year = {1976}, pages = {49--{}60}, } @unpublished{AtmanspacherManuscript-ATMINC, author = {Harald Atmanspacher}, abstract = {The dynamics of neuronal systems, briefly neurodynamics, has developed into an attractive and influential research branch within neuroscience. In this paper, we discuss a number of conceptual issues in neurodynamics that are important for an appropriate interpretation and evaluation of its results. We demonstrate their relevance for selected topics of theoretical and empirical work. In particular, we refer to the notions of determinacy and stochasticity in neurodynamics across levels of microscopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic descriptions. The issue of correlations between neural, mental and behavioral states is also addressed in some detail. We propose an informed discussion of conceptual foundations with respect to neurobiological results as a viable step to a fruitful future philosophy of neuroscience.}, title = {Interpreting neurodynamics: Concepts and facts}, } @unpublished{Bechtel2005-BECMMW, author = {William P. Bechtel}, abstract = {trying to explain these reactions in terms of changes in ele- began trying to characterize physiological processes in}, title = {Mental mechanisms: What are the operations?}, year = {2005}, } @article{Bechtel2005-BECTCO-2, volume = {84}, author = {William P. Bechtel}, abstract = {Neuroscience and cognitive science seek to explain behavioral regularities in terms of underlying mechanisms. An important element of a mechanistic explanation is a characterization of the operations of the parts of the mechanism. The challenge in characterizing such operations is illustrated by an example from the history of physiological chemistry in which some investigators tried to characterize the internal operations in the same terms as the overall physiological system while others appealed to elemental chemistry. In order for biochemistry to become successful, researchers had to identify a new level of operations involving operations over molecular groups. Existing attempts at mechanistic explanation of behavior are in a situation comparable to earlier approaches to physiological chemistry, drawing their inspiration either from overall psychology activities or from low-level neural processes. Successful mechanistic explanations of behavior require the discovery of the appropriate component operations. Such discovery is a daunting challenge but one on which success will be beneficial to both behavioral scientists and cognitive and neuroscientists}, title = {The challenge of characterizing operations in the mechanisms underlying behavior}, journal = {Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior}, year = {2005}, pages = {313-325}, } @article{Bechtel2002-BECAMR, volume = {2002}, number = {3}, author = {William P. Bechtel}, abstract = {The need to align multiple experimental procedures and produce converging results so as to demonstrate that the phenomenon under investigation is real and not an artifact is a commonplace both in scienti{}c practice and discussions of scienti{}c methodology (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Wimsatt 1981). Although sometimes this is the purpose of aligning techniques, often there is a different purpose---{}multiple techniques are sought to supply different perspectives on the phenomena under investigation that need to be integrated to answer the questions scientists are asking. After introducing this function, I will illustrate it by considering three of the major techniques in cognitive neuroscience for linking cognitive function with neural structure}, title = {Aligning multiple research techniques in cognitive neuroscience: Why is it important?}, journal = {Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association}, year = {2002}, pages = {548-558}, } @incollection{Bechtel2001-BECCNR, author = {William P. Bechtel}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, title = {Cognitive neuroscienec: Relating neural mechanisms and cognition}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {2001}, } @article{Bechtel1983-BECABB, volume = {44}, number = {November}, author = {William P. Bechtel}, title = {A bridge between cognitive science and neuroscience: The functional architecture of mind}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {1983}, pages = {319-30}, } @article{Bechtel1996-BECINP, volume = {6}, number = {4}, author = {William P. Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale}, abstract = {The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psyychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of distinctly teleological functional considerations in brain cartography. Only by invoking teleological criteria can researchers distinguish the fruitful ways of identifying brain components from the myriad of possible ways. One likely reason for reluctance to turn to neuroscience is fear of reduction, but we argue that, in the context of a teleological perspective on function, this concern is misplaced. Adducing such theoretical considerations as top-down and bottom-up constraints on neuroscientific and psychological models, as well as existing cases of productive, multidisciplinary cooperation, we argue that integration of neuroscience into psychology and evolutionary biology is likely to be mutually beneficial. We also show how it can be accommodated methodologically within the framework of an interfield theory.}, title = {Integrating neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology through a teleological conception of function}, journal = {Minds And Machines}, year = {1996}, pages = {481-505}, } @article{Blumenthal1999-BLUBNI, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Terry Blumenthal and James Schirillo}, abstract = {A biological neuroscientific theory must acknowledge that the function of a neurological system is to produce behaviors that promote survival. Thus, unlike what Gold \& Stoljar claim, function and behavior are the province of neurobiology and cannot be relegated to the field of psychological phenomena, which would then trivialize the radical doctrine if accepted. One possible advantage of adopting such a (correctly revised) radical doctrine is that it might ultimately produce a successful, evolutionarily based, theory of mind.}, title = {Biological neuroscience is only as radical as the evolution of mind}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {831-831}, } @article{Boyle2008-BOYNAP, volume = {15}, number = {3}, author = {Noel Boyle}, abstract = {Analytic and continental philosophies of mind are too long divided. In both traditions there is extensive discussion of consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, subjectivity, perception (especially visual) and so on. Between these two discussions there are substantive disagreements, overlapping points of insight, meaningful differences in emphasis, and points of comparison which seems to offer nothing but confusion. In other words, there are the ideal circumstances for doing philosophy. Yet, there has been little discourse. This paper invites expanding discourse between these two philosophical traditions. The first part briefly describes the existing literature which works across the analytic- phenomenology divide, situating my work within it as a focus on analytic physicalism and phenomenal explanation. In the longer second part, I sketch a model for explanation embedded simultaneously in both traditions. Hopefully, a theoretical framework emerges that the unlikely combination of Maurice Merleau- Ponty and Patricia Churchland could accept. In the third part, I apply the three-tiered model to a discussion of plasticity and suggest that the model both reflects existing research across three levels of analysis and can be a fruitful way to approach future research. My suggestion for a three-tiered model is quite tentative. Much less tentative is my claim that constructive dialogue between phenomeno- logical and physicalist study of consciousness is long-overdue, illuminating, and practical.}, title = {Neurobiology and phenomenology: Towards a three-tiered intertheoretic model of explanation}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, year = {2008}, pages = {34-58}, } @article{Brothers1999-BROTLO-7, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Leslie Brothers}, abstract = {Logical problems inherent in claims that biological neuroscience can ultimately explain mind are not anomalous: They result from underlying social interests. Neuroscientists are currently making a successful bid to fill a vacuum of authority created by the demise of Freudian theory in popular culture. The conflations described in the Gold \& Stoljar target article are the result of alliances between certain apologist-philosophers, neuroscientists, and institutions, for the purpose of commanding authority and resources. Social analysis has a role to play in addressing logical issues in the philosophy of neuroscience.}, title = {The logic of interests in neuroscience}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {831-832}, } @article{Carlos2008-CARDID, author = {Carlos and Campis Ren\'e}, abstract = {In this paper we analyze Libet\textquoteright{}s conclusions on \guillemotleft{}free will\guillemotright (FW), rejecting his view of the concept and defending a partially aligned view with Wittgenstein\textquoteright{}s early remarks on FW. First, the concept of Readiness Potential (RP) and Libet\textquoteright{}s view are presented. Second, we offer an account of Wittgenstein\textasciiacute{}s point of view. Third, a dual-domain analysis is proposed; finally, we offer our conclusions. This article\textasciiacute{}s conclusion is part of an ongoing research.}, title = {DID I DO IT? -YEAH, YOU DID!}, journal = {Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences}, year = {2008}, pages = {34- 37}, } @incollection{Cliff1990-CLICNA, author = {D. Cliff}, booktitle = {From Animals to Animats: Proceedings of The First International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (Complex Adaptive Systems)}, title = {Computational Neuroethology: A Provisional Manifesto}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1990}, } @article{Coltheart2003-COLIAE, volume = {39}, number = {1}, author = {Max Coltheart and Martin Davies}, abstract = {The question posed by Dunn and Kirsner (D\&K) is an instance of a more general one: What can we infer from data? One answer, if we are talking about logically valid deductive inference, is that we cannot infer theories from data. A theory is supposed to explain the data and so cannot be a mere summary of the data to be explained. The truth of an explanatory theory goes beyond the data and so is never logically guaranteed by the data. This is not just a point about cognitive neuropsychology, or even about psychology in general. It is a familiar point about all science}, title = {Inference and explanation in cognitive neuropsychology}, journal = {Cortex}, year = {2003}, pages = {188-191}, } @article{Coulter1995-COUTIN, volume = {5}, number = {4}, author = {Jeff Coulter}, title = {The informed neuron: Issues in the use of information theory in the behavioral sciences}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {1995}, pages = {583-96}, } @unpublished{Craver2006-CRAWTH, author = {Carl Craver}, abstract = {Hodgkin and Huxley\textquoteright{}s 1952 model of the action potential is an apparent dream case of covering-law explanation. The model appeals to general laws of physics and chemistry (specifically, Ohm\textquoteright{}s law and the Nernst equation), and the laws, coupled with details about antecedent and background conditions, entail many of the significant properties of the action potential. However, Hodgkin and Huxley insist that their model falls short of an explanation. This historical fact suggests either that there is more to explaining the action potential than subsuming it under a general laws or that Hodgkin and Huxley were wrong about the explanatory import of their model. In this paper, I defend Hodgkin and Huxley\textquoteright{}s view that their model alone does not explain the action potential (contra Weber 2005). I argue further that neuroscientists lacked crucial explanatory details about the action potential until they could describe the molecular and ionic mechanisms by virtue of which their model holds (see Bogen 2005). Mathematical generalizations are important epistemic tools for assessing mechanistic explanations, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for adequate explanations, even at the lowest levels of organization where biological phenomena are integrated with physics and chemistry.}, title = {Why the Hodgkin and huxely model does not explain the action potential}, year = {2006}, } @article{Craver2008-CRAPLA, volume = {75}, number = {5}, author = {Carl F. Craver}, abstract = {Hodgkin and Huxley\textquoteright{}s model of the action potential is an apparent dream case of covering{}law explanation in biology. The model includes laws of physics and chemistry that, coupled with details about antecedent and background conditions, can be used to derive features of the action potential. Hodgkin and Huxley insist that their model is not an explanation. This suggests either that subsuming a phenomenon under physical laws is insufficient to explain it or that Hodgkin and Huxley were wrong. I defend Hodgkin and Huxley against Weber\textquoteright{}s heteronomy thesis and argue that explanations are descriptions of mechanisms. \dag{}To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Philosophy{}Neuroscience{}Psychology Program, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, Wilson Hall, St. Louis, MO 63130; e{}mail: ccraver@artsci.wustl.edu.}, title = {Physical law and mechanistic explanation in the Hodgkin and Huxley model of the action potential}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, } @book{Craver2007-CRAETB, author = {Carl F. Craver}, abstract = {... ISBN0199299315 ...}, title = {Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience}, publisher = {Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;}, year = {2007}, } @article{Craver2003-CRATMO, volume = {36}, number = {1}, author = {Carl F. Craver}, title = {The making of a memory mechanism}, journal = {Journal of the History of Biology}, year = {2003}, pages = {153-95}, } @article{Craver2002-CRAIEA, volume = {69}, number = {3}, author = {Carl F. Craver}, title = {Interlevel experiments and multilevel mechanisms in the neuroscience of memory}, journal = {Philosophy of Science Supplemental Volume}, year = {2002}, pages = {S83-S97}, } @article{Craver2001-CRARFM, volume = {68}, number = {1}, author = {Carl F. Craver}, title = {Role functions, mechanisms, and hierarchy}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2001}, pages = {53-74}, } @article{Craver2007-CRATCW, volume = {22}, number = {4}, author = {Carl F. Craver and William Bechtel}, abstract = {We argue that intelligible appeals to interlevel causes (top-down and bottom-up) can be understood, without remainder, as appeals to mechanistically mediated effects. Mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of causal and constitutive relations, where the causal relations are exclusively intralevel. The idea of causation would have to stretch to the breaking point to accommodate interlevel causes. The notion of a mechanistically mediated effect is preferable because it can do all of the required work without appealing to mysterious interlevel causes. When interlevel causes can be translated into mechanistically mediated effects, the posited relationship is intelligible and should raise no special philosophical objections. When they cannot, they are suspect.}, title = {Top-down causation without top-down causes}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2007}, } @incollection{Craver2001-CRADMI, author = {Carl F. Craver and Lindley Darden}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in Neuroscience}, title = {Discovering mechanisms in neurobiology: The case of spatial memory}, publisher = {Pittsburgh: University of Pitt Press}, year = {2001}, } @incollection{Cruse2001-CRUTEP, author = {H. Cruse}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, title = {The explanatory power and limits of simulation models in the neurosciences}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {2001}, } @article{Delcomyn2001-DELBMC, volume = {24}, number = {6}, author = {Fred Delcomyn}, abstract = {The idea that biorobots can be used as a testbed for the evaluation of hypotheses about how an animal functions is supported. Generation of realistic feedback is a major advantage of biorobotic models. Nevertheless, skeptics can only be convinced that this approach is valid if significant biological insights are generated from its application.}, title = {Biorobotic models can contribute to neurobiology}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {1056-1057}, } @article{denBosch2005-DENSIN-2, volume = {84}, number = {1}, author = {den Bosch and M. P.}, abstract = {This paper explores structuralism as a way to model theories from scientific practice. As a case study I analyzed a theory about the dynamics of the basal ganglia, a part of the brain that is involved in Parkinson's disease. After introducing the case study I explore how to structurally represent qualitative assumptions about disease, intervention and dynamical systems in general. I further explicate the structure of the basal ganglia theory in detail, how it explains Parkinson's disease and how it implies treatments. I close with a consideration of how a structuralist representation could be useful in practice to explore and develop theories with the aid of a computer.}, title = {Structures in neuropharmacology}, journal = {Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities}, year = {2005}, pages = {343-359}, } @article{Elliott1997-ELLNFN, volume = {20}, number = {4}, author = {T. Elliott and N. R. Shadbolt}, abstract = {Quartz \& Sejnowski (Q\&S) disregard evidence that suggests that their view of dendrites is inadequate and they ignore recent results concerning the role of neurotrophic factors in synaptic remodelling. They misrepresent neuronal selectionism and thus erect a straw-man argument. Finally, the results discussed in section 4.2 require neuronal proliferation, but this does not occur during the period of neuronal development of relevance here. Footnotes1 Address correspondence to TE at te@proteus.psyc.nott.ac.uk.}, title = {Neurotrophic factors, neuronal selectionism, and neuronal proliferation}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {561-562}, } @article{Freeman1997-FRENNO, volume = {18}, number = {2-3}, author = {Walter J. Freeman}, title = {Nonlinear neurodynamics of intentionality}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, year = {1997}, pages = {291-304}, } @article{Gerrans2008-GERGOP, volume = {59}, number = {2}, author = {Philip Gerrans and Valerie E. Stone}, abstract = {Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it suggests a parsimonious cognitive architecture can account for apparent domain specificity. We argue for such an architecture in two stages. First, on conceptual grounds, contrasting the case of language with ToM, and second, by showing that recent evidence in the form of fMRI and lesion studies supports the more parsimonious hypothesis. Theory of Mind, Metarepresentation, and Modularity Developmental Components of ToM The Analogy with Modularity of Language Dissociations without Modules The Evidence from Neuroscience Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?}, title = {Generous or parsimonious cognitive architecture? Cognitive neuroscience and theory of mind}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, } @article{Gerrans2003-GERNAN, volume = {18}, number = {1}, author = {Philip Gerrans}, abstract = {~~{}Nativists about syntactic processing have argued that linguisticprocessing, understood as the implementation of a rule-basedcomputational architecture, is spared in Williams syndrome, (WMS)subjects -- and hence that it provides evidence for a geneticallyspecified language module. This argument is bolstered by treatingSpecific Language Impairments (SLI) and WMS as a developmental doubledissociation which identifies a syntax module. Neuroconstructivists haveargued that the cognitive deficits of a developmental disorder cannot beadequately distinguished using the standard gross behavioural tests ofneuropsychology and that the linguistic abilities of the WMS subject canbe equally well explained by a constructivist strategy of neurallearning in the individual, with linguisitic functions implemented in anassociationist architecture. The neuroconstructivist interpretation ofWMS undermines the hypothesis of a double dissociation between SLI andWMS, leaving unresolved the question of nativism about syntax. Theapparent linguistic virtuosity of WMS subjects is an artefact ofenhanced phonological processing, a fact which is easier to demonstratevia the associationist computational model embraced byneuroconstructivism}, title = {Nativism and neuroconstructivism in the explanation of Williams syndrome}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2003}, pages = {41-52}, } @article{Gerrans2002-GERNNA, volume = {25}, number = {6}, author = {Philip Gerrans}, abstract = {Either genetically specified modular cognitive architecture for syntactic processing does not exist (neuroconstructivism), or there is a module but its development is so abnormal in Williams syndrome (WS) that no conclusion can be drawn about its normal architecture (moderate nativism). Radical nativism, which holds that WS is a case of intact syntax, is untenable. Specific Language Impairment and WS create a dilemma that radical nativism cannot accommodate.}, title = {Nativism, neuroconstructivism, and developmental disorder}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2002}, pages = {757-758}, } @article{Gold1999-GOLINA, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Ian Gold and Daniel Stoljar}, abstract = {Although a wide variety of questions were raised about different aspects of the target article, most of them fall into one of five $<$span class='Hi'$>$categories$<$/span$>$ each of which deals with a general question. These questions are (1) Is the radical neuron doctrine really radical? (2) Is the trivial neuron doctrine really trivial? (3) Were we sufficiently critical of the radical neuron doctrine? (4) Is there a distinction to be drawn at all between the two doctrines? and (5) How does our argument bear on related issues in the ontology of mind? Our replies to the objections and observations presented are organized around these five questions.}, title = {Interpreting neuroscience and explaining the mind}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {856-866}, } @article{Hardcastle2008-HARROC-5, volume = {2008}, number = {1}, author = {Valerie Gray Hardcastle}, title = {Review of Carl F. Craver, \_Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience\_}, journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews}, year = {2008}, } @incollection{Hardcastle2001-HARTSI, author = {Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, title = {Theory structure in neuroscience}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {2001}, } @incollection{Hartmann2001-HARMCA, author = {Stephan Hartmann}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, title = {Mechanisms, coherence, and the place of psychology}, publisher = {Pittsburgh: University of Pitt Press}, year = {2001}, } @book{Hartmann2001-HARTAM, author = {Stephan Hartmann}, title = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, publisher = {Pittsburgh: University of Pitt Press}, year = {2001}, } @article{Heinke2000-HEIADS, volume = {23}, number = {4}, author = {D. Heinke}, abstract = {Neural organization contains a wealth of facts from all areas of brain research and provides a useful overview of physiological data for those working outside the immediate field. Furthermore, it gives a good example that the approach of dynamical system theory together with the concepts of cooperative and competitive interaction can be fruitful for an interdisciplinary approach to cognition.}, title = {A dynamical system theory approach to cognitive neuroscience}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {543-543}, } @unpublished{Hurley2006-HURTSC, author = {Susan L. Hurley}, title = {The shared circuits model. How control, mirroring, and simulation can enable imitation and mind reading}, year = {2006}, } @unpublished{KeilManuscript-KEITSA, author = {Frank Keil}, abstract = {\& Explanations of psychological phenomena seem to genervs. with neuroscience) design. Crucially, the neuroscience inate more public interest when they contain neuroscientific..}, title = {The seductive allure of neuroscience explanations}, }