This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
263 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 263
  1. Isaac Aaronson (1914). Perception. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 11 (2):37-46.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. C. Abell & K. Bantinaki (eds.) (2010). Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. Oxford University Press.
    This volume of specially written essays by leading philosophers offers to set the agenda for the philosophy of depiction.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3. Jonas Åkerman (2009). Perspectival Thought: A Plea for Moderate Relativism. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 62 (4).
  4. Mary Jean Amon & Luis H. Favela (2015). The Complex Experience of Touching Metallic, Damp, and Slimy Things. Theory and Psychology 25:543-545.
    The importance of touch to mammalian survival and well-being cannot be overstated. The capacity for action depends on the sense of touch, which is a necessary feature of an animal’s being-in-the-world (O’Shaughnessy, 1989, pp. 38–39). Interpersonal touch has been shown to be an important part of human welfare, including disease prevention and treatment (see Field, 2001 for review). Throughout a mammal’s lifespan, social relation- ships are also mediated by touch behavior (see Thayer, 1986 for review). Given these facts, the sense (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. István Aranyosi (2008). Review of Roy Sorensen's Seeing Dark Things. The Philosophy of Shadows. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):513-515.
  6. Gavin Ardley (1958). The Nature of Perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (December):189-200.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. David M. Armstrong (1961). Perception And The Physical World. Humanities Press.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   41 citations  
  8. Robert N. Audi (2004). Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9. Robert N. Audi (2004). Perception and Consciousness. In Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen & Jan Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub 57--108.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Murat Aydede, Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum (TD). Pain experiences are consistent with TD. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis (ST) that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about phenomenology. I argue that pain experiences (as well as some other similar experiences) are not transparent in this strong sense. Hence I argue that representationalism is false. Then, I outline a framework about how the introspection (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson (2014). Affect: Representationalists' Headache. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.
    Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. David Bain (2009). McDowell and the Presentation of Pains. Philosophical Topics 37 (1):1-24.
    It can seem natural to say that, when in pain, we undergo experiences which present to us certain experience-dependent particulars, namely pains. As part of his wider approach to mind and world, John McDowell has elaborated an interesting but neglected version of this account of pain. Here I set out McDowell’s account at length, and place it in context. I argue that his subjectivist conception of the objects of pain experience is incompatible with his requirement that such experience be presentational, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13. Bryan Baird (2006). The Transcendental Nature of Mind and World. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):381-398.
    Critics of John McDowell’s Mind and World have by and large failed to take sufficient notice of the transcendental context within whichMcDowell situates his work—a failure that has adversely affected their criticisms. In this paper, I make clear this transcendental context and show how it figures in the transcendental argument I see McDowell offering in Mind and World. Interpreting McDowell’s argument in this way, I further argue, helps to answer some of the most pressing objections to what he is doing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Clare Batty (2015). Review of Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (Eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Review.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Clare Batty (2014). Olfactory Objects. In S. Biggs, D. Stokes & M. Matthen (eds.), Perception and its Modalities. Oxford University Press 222-245.
    Much of the philosophical work on perception has focused on vision. Recently, however, philosophers have begun to correct this ‘tunnel vision’ by considering other modalities. Nevertheless, relatively little has been written about the chemical senses—olfaction and gustation. The focus of this paper is olfaction. In light of new physiological and psychophysical research on olfaction, I consider whether olfactory experience is object-based. In particular, I explore the claim that “odor objects” constitute sensory individuals. It isn’t obvious—at least at the outset—whether they (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Clare Batty (2014). The Illusion Confusion. Frontiers in Psychology 5:1-11.
    In "What the Nose Doesn't Know", I argue that there are no olfactory illusions. Central to the traditional notions of illusion and hallucination is a notion of object-failure—the failure of an experience to represent particular objects. Because there are no presented objects in the case of olfactory experience, I argue that the traditional ways of categorizing non-veridical experience do not apply to the olfactory case. In their place, I propose a novel notion of non-veridical experience for the olfactory case. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17. Charles A. Baylis (1966). Perception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):117-122.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Charles A. Baylis (1959). Professor Chisholm on Perceiving. Journal of Philosophy 56 (September):773-790.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (1993). The Perceptual System: A Philosophical and Psychological Perspective. New York: Lang.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   56 citations  
  20. Aaron Ben-Zeev & Michael Strauss (1984). The Dualistic Approach to Perception. Man and World 17 (1):3-18.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21. J. C. Berendzen (2014). Motor Imagery and Merleau-Pontyian Accounts of Skilled Action. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1 (7):169-198.
    Maurice Merleau-Ponty is often interpreted as claiming that opportunities for action are directly present in perceptual experience. However, he does not provide much evidence for how or why this would occur, and one can doubt that this is an appropriate interpretation of his phenomenological descriptions. In particular, it could be argued the Merleau-Pontyian descriptions mistakenly attribute pre-perceptual or post-perceptual elements such as allocation of attention or judgment to the perceptual experience itself. This paper argues for the Merleau-Pontyian idea that opportunities (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Dávid Bitter (2014). Is Low-Level Visual Experience Cognitively Penetrable? The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9 (1):1-26.
    Philosophers and psychologists alike have argued recently that relatively abstract beliefs or cognitive categories like those regarding race can influence the perceptual experience of relatively low-level visual features like color or lightness. Some of the proposed best empirical evidence for this claim comes from a series of experiments in which White faces were consistently judged as lighter than equiluminant Black faces, even for racially ambiguous faces that were labeled ‘White’ as opposed to ‘Black’ (Levin and Banaji 2006). The latter result (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Stephan Blatti (2006). No Impediment to Solidity as Impediment. Metaphysica 7 (1):35-41.
    ABSTRACT: Quassim Cassam (1997) accepts the standard account of solidity, according to which, if S feels x as solid, then S feels x as an imediment to his movement. Recently, Martin Fricke and Paul Snowdon (2003) have presented a battery of counter-examples designed to show that S may feel x as solid and as exerting a pressure that supports or facilitates his movement. In this note, I defend the standard account against Fricke and Snowdon’s attack. Integral to this defense is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Philip Blosser (1986). The Status of Mental Images in Sartre's Theory of Consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):163-172.
    Sartre attacks the "illusion" that mental images are "immanent" in consciousness. After comparing sartre with husserl, I develop his view that mental images are non-Perceptual phenomena involving a relationship with something non-Present. From the impoverished, Unworldly view that results, I suggest that sartre's own view is still too attached to the perceptual analogy and conclude with the richer, Alternative view of ricoeur that imaginal fiction has a constructive role in shaping reality.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Maria Brincker (2015). The Aesthetic Stance - on the Conditions and Consequences of Becoming a Beholder. In Alfonsina Scarinzi (ed.), Aesthetics and the Embodied Mind: Beyond Art Theory and the Cartesian Mind-Body Dichotomy. Springer 117-138.
    What does it mean to be an aesthetic beholder? Is it different than simply being a perceiver? Most theories of aesthetic perception focus on 1) features of the perceived object and its presentation or 2) on psychological evaluative or emotional responses and intentions of perceiver and artist. In this chapter I propose that we need to look at the process of engaged perception itself, and further that this temporal process of be- coming a beholder must be understood in its embodied, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science. Philosophical Topics 44 (2).
    Pictures are 2D surfaces designed to elicit 3D-scene-representing experiences from their viewers. In this essay, I argue that philosophers have tended to underestimate the relevance of research in vision science to understanding the nature of pictorial experience. Both the deeply entrenched methodology of virtual psychophysics as well as empirical studies of pictorial space perception provide compelling support for the view that pictorial experience and seeing face-to-face are experiences of the same psychological, explanatory kind. I also show that an empirically informed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (2015). Time and Time Perception. Topoi 34 (1):257-263.
    There is little doubt that we perceive the world as tensed—that is, as consisting of a past, present and future each with a different ontological status—and transient—that is, as involving a passage of time. We also have the ability to execute precisely timed behaviors that appear to depend upon making correct temporal judgments about which changes are truly present and which are not. A common claim made by scientists and philosophers is that our experiences of entities enduring through transient changes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28. Derek H. Brown (2016). A Study in Deflated Acquaintance Knowledge: Sense-Datum Theory and Perceptual Constancy. In Sorin Costreie (ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy: New Perspectives on the Tradition. Springer 99-125.
    We perceive the objective world through a subjective perceptual veil. Various perceived properties, particularly “secondary qualities” like colours and tastes, are mind-dependent. Although mind-dependent, our knowledge of many facts about the perceptual veil is immediate and secure. These are well-known facets of sense-datum theory. My aim is to carve out a conception of sense-datum theory that does not require the immediate and secure knowledge of a wealth of facts about experienced sense-data (§1). Such a theory is of value on its (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Mike Bruno & Eric Mandelbaum (2010). Locke's Answer to Molyneux's Thought Experiment. History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (2):165-80.
    Philosophical discussions of Molyneux's problem within contemporary philosophy of mind tend to characterize the problem as primarily concerned with the role innately known principles, amodal spatial concepts, and rational cognitive faculties play in our perceptual lives. Indeed, for broadly similar reasons, rationalists have generally advocated an affirmative answer, while empiricists have generally advocated a negative one, to the question Molyneux posed after presenting his famous thought experiment. This historical characterization of the dialectic, however, somewhat obscures the role Molyneux's problem has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30. Tyler Burge (2003). Perception. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 84 (1):157-167.
    The article is an overview of some central philosophical problems associated with perception. It discusses what distinguishes perception from other sensory capacities and from conception. It discusses anti-individualism, a view according to which the nature of a perceptual state is dependent not just causally but for its identity or 'essence' on relations to a normal environment in which systems containing that state were formed. It discusses different views about epistemic warrant. By emphasising the deep ways in which human and animal (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Tyler Burge (1986). Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception. In Philip Pettit & John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, And Context. Clarendon Press
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  32. Tom Burke (2004). Ecological Psychology in Context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the Legacy of William James's Radical Empiricism. [REVIEW] Newsletter of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy 32 (99):54-57.
  33. Carmelo Calì (2008). Experimental Phenomenology in Contemporary Perception Science. Teorie E Modelli 13 (1/2).
    Some issues heavily debated in perception sciences are presented: the explanatory gap and the experience measurement problem. The experimental phenomenology is said to provide substantive contribution to settle controversy over the phenome- nological adequacy of perception theory and models. An interpretation of experi- mental phenomenology as explanation of the perceptual manifold, and definition of relation varieties to eventually map onto other perception sciences’ domains is sketched.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (2003). Sfondo e figura. Rivista di Estetica 43 (24):38-40.
    A dialogue between a figure and its background, illustrating that the perceptual conditions that determine which is which are not as clear as standard Gestalt theory dictates.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2011). Perceptual Content and Sensorimotor Expectations. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):383-391.
    I distinguish between two kinds of sensorimotor expectations: agent- and object-active ones. Alva Noë's answer to the problem of how perception acquires volumetric content illicitly privileges agent-active expectations over object-active expectations, though the two are explanatorily on a par. Considerations which Noë draws upon concerning how organisms may ‘off-load’ internal processes onto the environment do not support his view that volumetric content depends on our embodiment; rather, they support a view of experience which is restrictive of the body's role in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36. Ariel S. Cecchi (2014). Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural Plasticity. Dialectica 68 (1):63-95.
    Cognitive penetration of perception, broadly understood, is the influence that the cognitive system has on a perceptual system. The paper shows a form of cognitive penetration in the visual system which I call ‘architectural’. Architectural cognitive penetration is the process whereby the behaviour or the structure of the perceptual system is influenced by the cognitive system, which consequently may have an impact on the content of the perceptual experience. I scrutinize a study in perceptual learning that provides empirical evidence that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  37. Alon Chasid (forthcoming). Imaginatively-Colored Perception. Southern Journal of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Alon Chasid (2014). Pictorial Experience and Intentionalism. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (4):405-416.
    This article examines the compatibility of intentionalism (also called ‘representationalism’) in the philosophy of perception with the thesis that we can visually experience an object by looking at a picture of that object (the pictorial experience thesis, or PET). I begin by presenting three theses associated with intentionalism and various accounts of depiction that uphold PET. Next, I show that pictures sometimes depict an object indeterminately, thereby rendering the alleged visual experience of the depicted object partly nonintentional. I then argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Roderick M. Chisholm (1957). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
    The purpose of this book is to develop a terminological structure in which private perceptions can be discussed publicly without bringing into existence the usual unnecessary philosophical problems of confused usage of language. chisholm displays an appraisive, quasi-ethical use of language, whereby he claims that a thing has some particular sensible property is to have adequate evidence that it actually does have that property. (staff).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   213 citations  
  40. Austen Clark (2003). Philosophical Issues About Perception. In L. Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Austen Clark (2003). Perception, Philosophical Issues About. In L. Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group
    the philosophical regions. I will identify three: three obvious zones of The first and third of these kinds of problem are studied almost tectonic conflict within contemporary cognitive approaches to exclusively within departments of philosophy. Applied to perception.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Austen Clark (1994). Contemporary Problems in the Philosophy of Perception. American Journal of Psychology 107 (4):613-22.
    Imagine, if you will, that the entire community of investigators interested in the problems of perception all lived together in the same town. Some continual shuffling of neighbors would be inevitable, and there might be occasional episodes of mass relocation and energetic bulldozing, but after a while the residents would probably settle down and find themselves living in districts defined roughly by disciplinary boundaries. The experimental psychologists would occupy the newer part of town, laced with superhighways, workshops and factories, machines (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Austen Clark (1984). Seeing and Summing: Implications of Computational Theories of Vision. Cognition and Brain Theory 7 (1):1-23.
    Marr's computational theory of stereopsis is shown to imply that human vision employs a system of representation which has all the properties of a number system. Claims for an internal number system and for neural computation should be taken literally. I show how these ideas withstand various skeptical attacks, and analyze the requirements for describing neural operations as computations. Neural encoding of numerals is shown to be distinct from our ability to measure visual physiology. The constructs in Marr's theory are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Jonathan Cohen (2010). Perception and Computation. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):96-124.
    Students of perception have long puzzled over a range of cases in which perception seems to tell us distinct, and in some sense conflicting, things about the world. In the cases at issue, the perceptual system is capable of responding to a single stimulus — say, as manifested in the ways in which subjects sort that stimulus — in different ways. This paper is about these puzzling cases, and about how they should be characterized and accounted for within a general (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  45. Jonathan Cohen (2009). The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology. Oxford.
    The space of options -- The argument from perceptual variation -- Variation revisited : objections and responses -- Relationism defended : linguistic and mental representation of color -- Relationism defended : ontology -- Relationism defended : phenomenology -- A role functionalist theory of color -- Role functionalism and its relationalist rivals.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   30 citations  
  46. Jonathan Cohen, C. L. Hardin & Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). The Truth About 'the Truth About True Blue'. Analysis 67 (294):162–166.
    It can happen that a single surface S, viewed in normal conditions, looks pure blue (“true blue”) to observer John but looks blue tinged with green to a second observer, Jane, even though both are normal in the sense that they pass the standard psychophysical tests for color vision. Tye (2006a) finds this situation prima facie puzzling, and then offers two different “solutions” to the puzzle.1 The first is that at least one observer misrepresents S’s color because, though normal in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  47. Kevin Connolly (forthcoming). Sensory Substitution and Perceptual Learning. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Oxford University Press
    When a user integrates a sensory substitution device into her life, the process involves perceptual learning, that is, ‘relatively long-lasting changes to an organism’s perceptual system that improve its ability to respond to its environment’ (Goldstone 1998: 585). In this paper, I explore ways in which the extensive literature on perceptual learning can be applied to help improve sensory substitution devices. I then use these findings to answer a philosophical question. Much of the philosophical debate surrounding sensory substitution devices concerns (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48. Kevin Connolly (2014). Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception. Erkenntnis 79 (6):1407-1418.
    Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of being a wren. Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of being a wren. I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one’s attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Report on the Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop.
    This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York on March 19th and 20th, 2012: 1. What is perceptual learning? 2. Can perceptual experience be modified by reason? 3. How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology? 4. How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception? 5. How is perceptual learning coordinated with action?
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Perceptual Learning (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question One).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: What is perceptual learning?
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 263