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  1. Isaac Aaronson (1914). Perception. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 11 (2):37-46.
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  2. C. Abell & K. Bantinaki (eds.) (2010). Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. Oxford University Press.
    This volume of specially written essays by leading philosophers offers to set the agenda for the philosophy of depiction.
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  3. Jonas Åkerman (2009). Perspectival Thought: A Plea for Moderate Relativism. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 62 (4).
  4. István Aranyosi (2008). Review of Roy Sorensen's Seeing Dark Things. The Philosophy of Shadows. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):513-515.
  5. Gavin Ardley (1958). The Nature of Perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (December):189-200.
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  6. David M. Armstrong (1961). Perception And The Physical World. Humanities Press.
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  7. Robert N. Audi (2004). Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.
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  8. Robert N. Audi (2004). Perception and Consciousness. In Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen & Jan Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub. 57--108.
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  9. David Bain (2009). McDowell and the Presentation of Pains. Philosophical Topics 37 (1):1-24.
    It can seem natural to say that, when in pain, we undergo experiences which present to us certain experience-dependent particulars, namely pains. As part of his wider approach to mind and world, John McDowell has elaborated an interesting but neglected version of this account of pain. Here I set out McDowell’s account at length, and place it in context. I argue that his subjectivist conception of the objects of pain experience is incompatible with his requirement that such experience be presentational, (...)
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  10. Bryan Baird (2006). The Transcendental Nature of Mind and World. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):381-398.
    Critics of John McDowell’s Mind and World have by and large failed to take sufficient notice of the transcendental context within whichMcDowell situates his work—a failure that has adversely affected their criticisms. In this paper, I make clear this transcendental context and show how it figures in the transcendental argument I see McDowell offering in Mind and World. Interpreting McDowell’s argument in this way, I further argue, helps to answer some of the most pressing objections to what he is doing (...)
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  11. Charles A. Baylis (1966). Perception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):117-122.
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  12. Charles A. Baylis (1959). Professor Chisholm on Perceiving. Journal of Philosophy 56 (September):773-790.
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  13. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (1993). The Perceptual System: A Philosophical and Psychological Perspective. New York: Lang.
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  14. Aaron Ben-Zeev & Michael Strauss (1984). The Dualistic Approach to Perception. Man and World 17 (1):3-18.
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  15. Stephan Blatti (2006). No Impediment to Solidity as Impediment. Metaphysica 7 (1):35-41.
    ABSTRACT: Quassim Cassam (1997) accepts the standard account of solidity, according to which, if S feels x as solid, then S feels x as an imediment to his movement. Recently, Martin Fricke and Paul Snowdon (2003) have presented a battery of counter-examples designed to show that S may feel x as solid and as exerting a pressure that supports or facilitates his movement. In this note, I defend the standard account against Fricke and Snowdon’s attack. Integral to this defense is (...)
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  16. Philip Blosser (1986). The Status of Mental Images in Sartre's Theory of Consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):163-172.
    Sartre attacks the "illusion" that mental images are "immanent" in consciousness. After comparing sartre with husserl, I develop his view that mental images are non-Perceptual phenomena involving a relationship with something non-Present. From the impoverished, Unworldly view that results, I suggest that sartre's own view is still too attached to the perceptual analogy and conclude with the richer, Alternative view of ricoeur that imaginal fiction has a constructive role in shaping reality.
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  17. Mike Bruno & Eric Mandelbaum (2010). Locke's Answer to Molyneux's Thought Experiment. History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (2):165-80.
    Philosophical discussions of Molyneux's problem within contemporary philosophy of mind tend to characterize the problem as primarily concerned with the role innately known principles, amodal spatial concepts, and rational cognitive faculties play in our perceptual lives. Indeed, for broadly similar reasons, rationalists have generally advocated an affirmative answer, while empiricists have generally advocated a negative one, to the question Molyneux posed after presenting his famous thought experiment. This historical characterization of the dialectic, however, somewhat obscures the role Molyneux's problem has (...)
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  18. Tyler Burge (2003). Perception. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 84 (1):157-167.
    The article is an overview of some central philosophical problems associated with perception. It discusses what distinguishes perception from other sensory capacities and from conception. It discusses anti-individualism, a view according to which the nature of a perceptual state is dependent not just causally but for its identity or 'essence' on relations to a normal environment in which systems containing that state were formed. It discusses different views about epistemic warrant. By emphasising the deep ways in which human and animal (...)
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  19. Tyler Burge (1986). Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception. In Philip Pettit & John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, And Context. Clarendon Press.
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  20. Tom Burke (2004). Ecological Psychology in Context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the Legacy of William James's Radical Empiricism. [REVIEW] Newsletter of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy 32 (99):54-57.
  21. Carmelo Calì (2008). Experimental Phenomenology in Contemporary Perception Science. Teorie E Modelli 13 (1/2).
    Some issues heavily debated in perception sciences are presented: the explanatory gap and the experience measurement problem. The experimental phenomenology is said to provide substantive contribution to settle controversy over the phenome- nological adequacy of perception theory and models. An interpretation of experi- mental phenomenology as explanation of the perceptual manifold, and definition of relation varieties to eventually map onto other perception sciences’ domains is sketched.
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  22. Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2011). Perceptual Content and Sensorimotor Expectations. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):383-391.
    I distinguish between two kinds of sensorimotor expectations: agent- and object-active ones. Alva Noë's answer to the problem of how perception acquires volumetric content illicitly privileges agent-active expectations over object-active expectations, though the two are explanatorily on a par. Considerations which Noë draws upon concerning how organisms may ‘off-load’ internal processes onto the environment do not support his view that volumetric content depends on our embodiment; rather, they support a view of experience which is restrictive of the body's role in (...)
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  23. Ariel S. Cecchi (2014). Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural Plasticity. Dialectica 68 (1):63-95.
    Cognitive penetration of perception, broadly understood, is the influence that the cognitive system has on a perceptual system (e.g., visual, auditory, haptic). The paper shows a form of cognitive penetration in the visual system (defined as early vision) which I call ‘architectural’. Architectural cognitive penetration is the process whereby the behaviour or the structure of the perceptual system is influenced by the cognitive system, which consequently may have an impact on the content of the perceptual experience. I scrutinize a study (...)
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  24. Alon Chasid (forthcoming). Pictorial Experience and Intentionalism. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
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  25. Roderick M. Chisholm (1957). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
    The purpose of this book is to develop a terminological structure in which private perceptions can be discussed publicly without bringing into existence the usual unnecessary philosophical problems of confused usage of language. chisholm displays an appraisive, quasi-ethical use of language, whereby he claims that a thing has some particular sensible property is to have adequate evidence that it actually does have that property. (staff).
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  26. Austen Clark (2003). Philosophical Issues About Perception. In L. Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
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  27. Austen Clark (2003). Perception, Philosophical Issues About. In L. Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
    the philosophical regions. I will identify three: three obvious zones of The first and third of these kinds of problem are studied almost tectonic conflict within contemporary cognitive approaches to exclusively within departments of philosophy. Applied to perception.
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  28. Austen Clark (1994). Contemporary Problems in the Philosophy of Perception. American Journal of Psychology 107 (4):613-22.
    Imagine, if you will, that the entire community of investigators interested in the problems of perception all lived together in the same town. Some continual shuffling of neighbors would be inevitable, and there might be occasional episodes of mass relocation and energetic bulldozing, but after a while the residents would probably settle down and find themselves living in districts defined roughly by disciplinary boundaries. The experimental psychologists would occupy the newer part of town, laced with superhighways, workshops and factories, machines (...)
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  29. Austen Clark (1984). Seeing and Summing: Implications of Computational Theories of Vision. Cognition and Brain Theory 7 (1):1-23.
    Marr's computational theory of stereopsis is shown to imply that human vision employs a system of representation which has all the properties of a number system. Claims for an internal number system and for neural computation should be taken literally. I show how these ideas withstand various skeptical attacks, and analyze the requirements for describing neural operations as computations. Neural encoding of numerals is shown to be distinct from our ability to measure visual physiology. The constructs in Marr's theory are (...)
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  30. Jonathan Cohen (2010). Perception and Computation. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):96-124.
    Students of perception have long puzzled over a range of cases in which perception seems to tell us distinct, and in some sense conflicting, things about the world. In the cases at issue, the perceptual system is capable of responding to a single stimulus — say, as manifested in the ways in which subjects sort that stimulus — in different ways. This paper is about these puzzling cases, and about how they should be characterized and accounted for within a general (...)
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  31. Jonathan Cohen (2009/2011). The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology. Oxford.
    The space of options -- The argument from perceptual variation -- Variation revisited : objections and responses -- Relationism defended : linguistic and mental representation of color -- Relationism defended : ontology -- Relationism defended : phenomenology -- A role functionalist theory of color -- Role functionalism and its relationalist rivals.
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  32. Jonathan Cohen, C. L. Hardin & Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). The Truth About 'the Truth About True Blue'. Analysis 67 (294):162–166.
    It can happen that a single surface S, viewed in normal conditions, looks pure blue (“true blue”) to observer John but looks blue tinged with green to a second observer, Jane, even though both are normal in the sense that they pass the standard psychophysical tests for color vision. Tye (2006a) finds this situation prima facie puzzling, and then offers two different “solutions” to the puzzle.1 The first is that at least one observer misrepresents S’s color because, though normal in (...)
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  33. Kevin Connolly (forthcoming). Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception. Erkenntnis:1-12.
    Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of "being a wren." Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of "being a wren." I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one’s attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have (...)
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  34. Kevin Connolly (forthcoming). Sensory Substitution and Perceptual Learning. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Oxford University Press.
    When a user integrates a sensory substitution device into her life, the process involves perceptual learning, that is, ‘relatively long-lasting changes to an organism’s perceptual system that improve its ability to respond to its environment’ (Goldstone 1998: 585). In this paper, I explore ways in which the extensive literature on perceptual learning can be applied to help improve sensory substitution devices. I then use these findings to answer a philosophical question. Much of the philosophical debate surrounding sensory substitution devices concerns (...)
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  35. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Perceptual Learning (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question One).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: What is perceptual learning?
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  36. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Report on the Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop.
    This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York on March 19th and 20th, 2012: 1. What is perceptual learning? 2. Can perceptual experience be modified by reason? 3. How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology? 4. How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception? 5. How is perceptual learning coordinated with action?
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  37. Kevin Connolly, Jennifer Corns, Nilanjan Das, Zachary Irving & Lu Teng, Mind and Attention in Indian Philosophy: Workshop Report, Question Four.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on mind and attention in Indian philosophy at Harvard University, on September 21st and 22nd, 2013, written by Kevin Connolly, Jennifer Corns, Nilanjan Das, Zachary Irving, and Lu Teng, and available at http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This portion of the report explores the question: What can Indian philosophy tell us about how we perceive the world?
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  38. Kevin Connolly, John Donaldson, David M. Gray, Emily McWilliams, Sofia Ortiz-Hinojosa & David Suarez, Recognizing Emotion in Music (Network for Sensory Research Toronto Workshop on Perceptual Learning: Question Six).
    This is an excerpt from a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from the workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of Toronto, Mississauga on May 10th and 11th, 2012. This excerpt explores the question: How do we recognize distinct types of emotion in music?
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  39. Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor, Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question Two.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: Do multisensory percepts involve emergent features?
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  40. Thomas Davidson (1882). Perception. Mind 7 (28):496-513.
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  41. Rafael de Clercq & Leon Horsten (2004). Perceptual Indiscriminability: In Defence of Wright's Proof. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):439-444.
    A series of unnoticeably small changes in an observable property may add up to a noticeable change. Crispin Wright has used this fact to prove that perceptual indiscriminability is a non-transitive relation. Delia Graff has recently argued that there is a 'tension' between Wright's assumptions. But Graff has misunderstood one of these, that 'phenomenal continua' are possible; and the other, that our powers of discrimination are finite, is sound. If the first assumption is properly understood, it is not in tension (...)
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  42. Willem A. deVries (2006). McDowell, Sellars, and Sense Impressions. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):182–201.
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  43. John Dewey (1925). The Naturalistic Theory of Perception by the Senses. Journal of Philosophy 22 (22):596-605.
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  44. Georges Dicker (1982). The Concept of Immediate Perception and Berkeley's Immaterialism. In Colin M. Turbayne (ed.), Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays.
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  45. Jérôme Dokic & Jean-Rémy Martin (2012). Disjunctivism, Hallucination and Metacognition. WIREs Cognitive Science 3:533-543.
    Perceptual experiences have been construed either as representational mental states—Representationalism—or as direct mental relations to the external world—Disjunctivism. Both conceptions are critical reactions to the so-called ‘Argument from Hallucination’, according to which perceptions cannot be about the external world, since they are subjectively indiscriminable from other, hallucinatory experiences, which are about sense-data ormind-dependent entities. Representationalism agrees that perceptions and hallucinations share their most specific mental kind, but accounts for hallucinations as misrepresentations of the external world. According to Disjunctivism, the phenomenal (...)
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  46. Ralph D. Ellis (2005). The Ambiguity of 'in Here/Out There' Talk: In What Sense is Perception 'Out in the World'? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (6):82-87.
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  47. George Englebretsen (1974). Behaviorism and Perception. Man and World 7 (2):149-157.
  48. Frank K. Fair (1976). Two Problems with Roderick Chisholm's Perceiving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (June):547-550.
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  49. Jeremy Fantl & Robert J. Howell (2003). Sensations, Swatches, and Speckled Hens. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):371-383.
  50. Katalin Farkas (forthcoming). A Sense of Reality. In Fiona MacPherson (ed.), Hallucinations. MIT Press.
    Hallucinations occur in a wide range of organic and psychological disorders, as well as in a small percentage of the normal population According to usual definitions in psychology and psychiatry, hallucinations are sensory experiences which present things that are not there, but are nonetheless accompanied by a powerful sense of reality. As Richard Bentall puts it, “the illusion of reality ... is the sine qua non of all hallucinatory experiences” (Bentall 1990: 82). The aim of this paper is to find (...)
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