A literary approach to scientific practice: Essay Review of R.I.G. Hughes' _The Theoretical Practices of Physics_.

New perspectives on Pierre Duhem’s The aim and structure of physical theory Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9467-3 Authors Anastasios Brenner, Department of Philosophy, Paul Valéry University-Montpellier III, Route De Mende, 34199 Montpellier cedex 5, France Paul Needham, Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden David J. Stump, Department of Philosophy, University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA 94117, USA Robert Deltete, Department of Philosophy, Seattle University, 901 12th Avenue, Seattle, WA 98122-1090, USA Journal Metascience (...) Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796 Journal Volume Volume 20 Journal Issue Volume 20, Number 1. (shrink)

What is the real significance of covariance anyway, and why should it be regarded as so fundamental ? What we mean by a covariant expression is one whose ...

PHILOSOPHY: BEACON OR TRAP* There was a time when everyone expected almost everything from philosophy. It was the time when philosophers drew confidently ...

This is an excellent book, by a very distinguished historian and philosopher of physics. Roberto Torretti is principally known to historians and philosophers of physics through his previous books, Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincaré (1978), Relativity and Geometry (1983), and Creative Understanding: Philosophical Reflections on Physics (1990). As the first two titles suggest, his forte is the history and philosophy of geometry and spacetime physics, especially from the nineteenth century onwards. These two books were recognized as masterly. Torretti (...) showed an extraordinary command of the many topics in mathematics, physics and the history and philosophy of science that were involved in these studies. In addition to scholarship, he showed strong acuity about philosophical issues; and had a very graceful prose style. The same merits, scientific and historical scholarship, good philosophical judgment, and stylistic grace, were equally in evidence in Creative Understanding; in which Torretti focussed on specifically philosophical topics about how physical theories in general (not just spacetime theories) represent the world. (shrink)

Spacetime, International Research Library of Philosophy, Dartmouth Publishing, 1996 (with G.Belot & M.Hogarth). From Physics to Philosophy, C.U.P., 1999 (with C. Pagonis). The Arguments of Time, British Academy and O.U.P., 1999. Non-Locality and Modality, Kluwer Academic, 2002 (with T.Placek). Quantum Entanglements, Selected Papers of Rob Clifton, O.U.P., 2004 (with H.Halvorson).

The ambition of this volume is twofold: to provide a comprehensive overview of the field and to serve as an indispensable reference work for anyone who wants to work in it. For example, any philosopher who hopes to make a contribution to the topic of the classical-quantum correspondence will have to begin by consulting Klaas Landsman’s chapter. The organization of this volume, as well as the choice of topics, is based on the conviction that the important problems in the philosophy (...) of physics arise from studying the foundations of the fundamental theories of physics. It follows that there is no sharp line to be drawn between philosophy of physics and physics itself. Some of the best work in the philosophy of physics is being done by physicists, as witnessed by the fact that several of the contributors to the volume are theoretical physicists: viz., Ellis, Emch, Harvey, Landsman, Rovelli, ‘t Hooft, the last of whom is a Nobel laureate. Key features - Definitive discussions of the philosophical implications of modern physics - Masterly expositions of the fundamental theories of modern physics - Covers all three main pillars of modern physics: relativity theory, quantum theory, and thermal physics - Covers the new sciences grown from these theories: for example, cosmology from relativity theory; and quantum information and quantum computing, from quantum theory - Contains special Chapters that address crucial topics that arise in several different theories, such as symmetry and determinism - Written by very distinguished theoretical physicists, including a Nobel Laureate, as well as by philosophers - Definitive discussions of the philosophical implications of modern physics - Masterly expositions of the fundamental theories of modern physics - Covers all three main pillars of modern physics: relativity theory, quantum theory, and thermal physics - Covers the new sciences that have grown from these theories: for example, cosmology from relativity theory; and quantum information and quantum computing, from quantum theory - Contains special Chapters that address crucial topics that arise in several different theories, such as symmetry and determinism - Written by very distinguished theoretical physicists, including a Nobel Laureate, as well as by philosophers. (shrink)

This is the editors' introduction to a new anthology of commissioned articles covering the various branches of philosophy of physics. We introduce the articles in terms of the three pillars of modern physics: relativity theory, quantum theory and thermal physics. We end by discussing the present state, and future prospects, of fundamental physics.

In Rudolph Camap (,) established himself as a professor in Vienna. The philosophical atmosphere awaiting him there was not new to him: the year before he ...

A Critique of Localized Realism Abstract In an attempt to avert Laudan’s pessimistic induction, Worrall and Psillos introduce a narrower version of scientific realism. According to this version, which can be referred to as “localized realism”, realists need not accept every component in a successful theory. They are supposed only to accept those components that led to the theory’s empirical success. Consequently, realists can avoid believing in dubious entities like the caloric and ether. This paper examines and critiques localized realism. (...) It also scrutinizes Psillos’s historical study of the caloric theory of heat, which is intended to support localized realism. (shrink)

Carl G. Hempel exerted greater influence upon philosophers of science than any other figure during the 20th century. In this far-reaching collection, distinguished philosophers contribute valuable studies that illuminate and clarify the central problems to which Hempel was devoted. The essays enhance our understanding of the development of logical empiricism as the major intellectual influence for scientifically-oriented philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists of the 20th century.

This document (in French) is an introduction to the philosophy of physics that I wrote for Anouk Barberousse (ed.), Manuel des Issambres, Gallimard, to be published.

This chapter (in French) compares the ways to access to events in science and in art. In particular, the Déotte's concept of "appareil" is discussed. To be published in Jean-Louis Déotte and Sylvestra Mariniello (ed.), Appareil et Intermédialité, L'Harmattan, 2007.

Atomistic metaphysics motivated an explanatory strategy which science has pursued with great success since the scientific revolution. By decomposing matter into its atomic and subatomic parts physics gave us powerful explanations and accurate predictions as well as providing a unifying framework for the rest of science. The success of the decompositional strategy has encouraged a widespread conviction that the physical world forms a compositional hierarchy that physics and other sciences are progressively articulating. But this conviction does not stand up to (...) a closer examination of how physics has treated composition, as a variety of case studies will show. (shrink)

This paper tries to get a grip on two seemingly conflicting intuitions about reductionism in quantum mechanics. On the one hand it is received wisdom that quantum mechanics puts an end to ‘reductionism’. Quantum-entanglement is responsible for such features of quantum mechanics as holism, the failure of supervenience and emergence. While I agree with these claims I will argue that it is only part of the story. Quantum mechanics provides us with thorough-going reductionist explanations. I will distinguish two kinds of (...) micro-explanation (or micro-‘reduction’). I will argue that even though quantum-entanglement provides an example for the failure of one kind of micro-explanation it does not affect the other. Contrary to a recent paper by Kronz and Tiehen I claim that the explanation of the dynamics of quantum mechanical systems is just as reductionist as it used to be in classical mechanics. (shrink)

I argue that algebraic quantum field theory (AQFT) permits an undisturbed view of the right ontology for fundamental physics, whereas standard (or Lagrangian) QFT offers different mutually incompatible ontologies.My claim does not depend on the mathematical inconsistency of standard QFT but on the fact that AQFT has the same concerns as ontology, namely categorical parsimony and a clearly structured hierarchy of entities.

I provide a comprehensive metaphysics of causation based on the idea that fundamentally things are governed by the laws of physics, and that derivatively difference-making can be assessed in terms of what fundamental laws of physics imply for hypothesized events. Highlights include a general philosophical methodology, the fundamental/derivative distinction, and my mature account of causal asymmetry.

Since he proved his theorem in 1982, Fine has been challenging the traditional interpretation of the experimental violation of the Bell Inequalities (BI). A natural interpretation of Fine's theorem is that it provides us with an alternative set of assumptions on which to place blame for the failure of the BI, and opens to a new interpretation of the violation of the BI. Fine has a stronger interpretation for his theorem. He claims that his result undermines the traditional interpretation in (...) terms of local realism. The aim of this paper is to understand and to assess Fine's claim. We distinguish three different strategies that Fine uses in order to support his view. We show that none of these strategies is successful. Fine fails to prove that local realism is not at stake in the violation of the BI by quantum phenomena. (shrink)

Newton’s Principia introduces four rules of reasoning for natural philosophy. Although useful, there is a concern about whether Newton’s rules guarantee truth. After redirecting the discussion from truth to validity, I show that these rules are valid insofar as they fulfill Goodman’s criteria for inductive rules and Newton’s own methodological program of experimental philosophy; provided that cross-checks are used prior to applications of rule 4 and immediately after applications of rule 2 the following activities are pursued: (1) research addressing observations (...) that systematically deviate from theoretical idealizations and (2) applications of theory that safeguard ongoing research from proceeding down a garden path. (shrink)

This work develops an epistemology of measurement, that is, an account of the conditions under which measurement and standardization methods produce knowledge as well as the nature, scope, and limits of this knowledge. I focus on three questions: (i) how is it possible to tell whether an instrument measures the quantity it is intended to? (ii) what do claims to measurement accuracy amount to, and how might such claims be justified? (iii) when is disagreement among instruments a sign of error, (...) and when does it imply that instruments measure different quantities? Based on a series of case studies conducted in collaboration with the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), I argue for a model-based approach to the epistemology of physical measurement. To measure a physical quantity, I argue, is to estimate the value of a parameter in an idealized model of a physical process. Such estimation involves inference from the final state (‘indication’) of a process to the value range of a parameter (‘outcome’) in light of theoretical and statistical assumptions. Contrary to contemporary philosophical views, measurement outcomes cannot be obtained by mapping the structure of indications. Instead, measurement outcomes as well as claims to accuracy, error and quantity individuation can only be adjudicated relative to a choice of idealized modelling assumptions. (shrink)

Questo breve volumetto prosegue l'analisi iniziata a proposito del confronto fra la speculazione bruniana e la metafisica aristotelica. Ora la critica bruniana si appunta sul testo aristotelico della "Fisica", demolendo e disgregando la possibilità che non vi sia un principio ed un movimento infinito. Seguendo ed integrando le riflessioni precedenti, il pensiero di Giordano Bruno conserva l'unitarietà fra momento teoretico e momento pratico, approfondendo la determinazione dell'infinito creativo e doppiamente dialettico.

A fundamental error has dominated philosophy and science since ancient times, the assumption of the existence of the 'unicorn-world', that is, the existence of one unique world. In order to avoid this error, it is necessary to replace the unicorn-world with epistemologically different worlds (which presuppose that each class of entities forms a single, unique epistemological world within the same spatio-temporal framework). Within this new framework, we analyze the definition of the “I” in neural (physical) terms and psychological terms and (...) the relationships between the “I” and the other EDWs. Moreover, I show that the majority of “mysteries” like entanglement, non-locality and non-spatiality, are due to the erroneous human thinking presupposition of the “world”, uni-verse in which everything (waves, micro and macro particles) has been situated since Ancient times. The replacement of the “world” with epistemologically different worlds (epistemologically constitutive interactions among classes of epistemologically different entities that belong to epistemologically different worlds) seems to be a better alternative for solving, in fact eliminating, the great mysteries of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This book is about the epistemologically different worlds (hyperverse) in relationship with the "I", the mind-body problem (Frith, Llinas), Bechtel's mechanisms, Clark's extended mind, Bickle's molecular and cellular cognition, Kauffman's life, quantum mechanics, gravity, hyperspace vs. hyperverse -/- .