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Philosophy of Probability

Edited by Darrell Rowbottom (Lingnan University)
Assistant editor: Joshua Luczak (University of Western Ontario, Georgetown University)
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  1. added 2016-02-08
    J. Pust (2011). Sleeping Beauty and Direct Inference. Analysis 71 (2):290-293.
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  2. added 2016-02-08
    Jan Sprenger (2010). Probability, Rational Single-Case Decisions and the Monty Hall Problem. Synthese 174 (3):331-340.
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  3. added 2016-02-08
    Greg Novack (2010). A Defense of the Principle of Indifference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):655-678.
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  4. added 2016-02-04
    Matteo Colombo, Jun Lai & Vincenzo Crupi, Sleeping Beauty Goes to the Lab: The Psychology of Self-Locating Evidence.
    The <span class='Hi'>Sleeping</span> <span class='Hi'>Beauty</span> Problem is a challenging puzzle in probabilistic reasoning, which has attracted enormous attention and still fosters ongoing debate. The problem goes as follows: Suppose that some researchers are going to put you to sleep. During the two days that your sleep will last, they will briefly wake you up either once or twice, depending on the toss of a fair coin. After each waking, they will put you back to sleep with a drug that makes (...)
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  5. added 2016-02-01
    Jennifer Rose Carr (2016). Don’T Stop Believing. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):744-766.
    It’s been argued that there are no diachronic norms of epistemic rationality. These arguments come partly in response to certain kinds of counterexamples to Conditionalization, but are mainly motivated by a form of internalism that appears to be in tension with any sort of diachronic coherence requirements. I argue that there are, in fact, fundamentally diachronic norms of rationality. And this is to reject at least a strong version of internalism. But I suggest a replacement for Conditionalization that salvages internalist (...)
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  6. added 2016-02-01
    Sven Rosenkranz & Moritz Schulz (2015). Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities. Dialectica 69 (4):551-586.
    The current debate about peer disagreement has so far mainly focused on the question of whether peer disagreements provide genuine counterevidence to which we should respond by revising our credences. By contrast, comparatively little attention has been devoted to the question by which process, if any, such revision should be brought about. The standard assumption is that we update our credences by conditionalizing on the evidence that peer disagreements provide. In this paper, we argue that non-dogmatist views have good reasons (...)
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  7. added 2016-02-01
    C. Howson (2015). What Probability Probably Isn't. Analysis 75 (1):53-59.
    Joyce and others have claimed that degrees of belief are estimates of truth-values and that the probability axioms are conditions of admissibility for these estimates with respect to a scoring rule penalising inaccuracy. In this paper I argue that the claim that the rules of probability are truth-directed in this way depends on an assumption which is both implausible and lacks any supporting evidence, strongly suggesting that the probability axioms have nothing intrinsically to do with truth-directedness.
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  8. added 2016-02-01
    Jan Sprenger, Conditional Degree of Belief.
    It is a commonplace in epistemology that credences should equal known chances. It is less clear, however, that conditional credences should do so, too. Following Ramsey, this paper proposes a counterfactual interpretation of conditional probability which provides a justification for this equality without relying on the Principal Principle. As a result, we obtain a refined view of Bayesian inference where both learning and supposing have a place.
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  9. added 2016-02-01
    C. Howson (2014). What Probability Probably Isn't. Analysis 75 (1):53-59.
    Joyce and others have claimed that degrees of belief are estimates of truth-values and that the probability axioms are conditions of admissibility for these estimates with respect to a scoring rule penalizing inaccuracy. In this article, I argue that the claim that the rules of probability are truth-directed in this way depends on an assumption that is both implausible and lacks any supporting evidence, strongly suggesting that the probability axioms have nothing intrinsically to do with truth-directedness.
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  10. added 2016-02-01
    Antony Eagle (ed.) (2011). Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
    _Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings_ is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...)
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  11. added 2016-01-15
    Frank Arntzenius & Cian Dorr (forthcoming). Self-Locating Priors and Cosmological Measures. In Khalil Chamcham, John Barrow, Simon Saunders & Joe Silk (eds.), The Philosophy of Cosmology. Cambridge University Press
    We develop a Bayesian framework for thinking about the way evidence about the here and now can bear on hypotheses about the qualitative character of the world as a whole, including hypotheses according to which the total population of the world is infinite. We show how this framework makes sense of the practice cosmologists have recently adopted in their reasoning about such hypotheses.
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  12. added 2016-01-13
    Brad Armendt (2005). Frank Plumpton Ramsey. In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge 671-681.
    On the work of Frank Ramsey, emphasizing topics most relevant to philosophy of science.
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  13. added 2016-01-12
    Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum (forthcoming). Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge From Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes. Mind and Language.
    Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling’s classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics’ in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of visual memory (...)
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  14. added 2016-01-06
    Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). Checking the Neighborhood: A Reply to DiPaolo & Behrends on Promotion. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    In previous work I argued that purely probabilistic accounts of what it takes to promote a desire are mistaken. This is because, I argued, there are desires that it is possible to promote but impossible to probabilistically promote. In a recent article critical of my account, Joshua DiPaolo and Jeffrey Behrends articulate a methodological principle -- Check the Neighborhood -- and claim that respecting this principle rescues pure probabilism from my argument. In this reply, I accept the methodological principle and (...)
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  15. added 2016-01-06
    Anthony F. Peressini (forthcoming). Causation, Probability, and the Continuity Bind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Analyses of singular (token-level) causation often make use of the idea that a cause in- creases the probability of its effect. Of particular salience in such accounts are the values of the probability function of the effect, conditional on the presence and absence of the putative cause, analyzed around the times of the events in question: causes are characterized by the effect’s probability function being greater when conditionalized upon them. Put this way it becomes clearer that the ‘behavior’ (continuity) of (...)
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  16. added 2015-12-29
    Andrés Páez (2015). Estándares múltiples de prueba en medicina y derecho. In Hechos, evidencia y estándares de prueba. Ensayos de epistemolgía jurídica. Ediciones Uniandes 123-152.
    Varios teóricos del derecho han propuesto el uso de umbrales o estándares de prueba más flexibles y más finamente discriminados. En la medicina es común utilizar estándares que poseen estas características en los procedimientos diagnósticos y en los exámenes médicos. Esta ponencia ofrece un marco probabilístico para establecer estándares de prueba múltiples en cualquier disciplina. La tesis principal es que la evidencia es un concepto umbral con respecto a la probabilidad. Múltiples umbrales pueden ser establecidos en un marco de intervalos (...)
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  17. added 2015-12-11
    Erica Thompson, Roman Frigg & Casey Helgeson (forthcoming). Expert Judgment for Climate Change Adaptation. Philosophy of Science.
    Climate change adaptation is largely a local matter, and adaptation planning can benefit from local climate change projections. Such projections are typically generated by accepting climate model outputs in a relatively uncritical way. We argue, based on the IPCC’s treatment of model outputs from the CMIP5 ensemble, that this approach is unwarranted and that subjective expert judgment should play a central role in the provision of local climate change projections intended to support decision-making.
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  18. added 2015-12-07
    Richard Pettigrew (forthcoming). Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. Oxford University Press.
    Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief).The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. Pettigrew looks to decision theory in order to ground his argument.He treats an agent’s credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by (...)
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  19. added 2015-12-07
    Martin Smith (2016). Between Probability and Certainty - Introduction. Oxford University Press.
    This book explores a question central to philosophy--namely, what does it take for a belief to be justified or rational? According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is, given one's evidence. In this book this view is rejected and replaced with another: in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it--roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition (...)
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  20. added 2015-12-05
    Yann Benétreau-Dupin (2015). Probabilistic Reasoning in Cosmology. Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario
    Cosmology raises novel philosophical questions regarding the use of probabilities in inference. This work aims at identifying and assessing lines of arguments and problematic principles in probabilistic reasoning in cosmology. -/- The first, second, and third papers deal with the intersection of two distinct problems: accounting for selection effects, and representing ignorance or indifference in probabilistic inferences. These two problems meet in the cosmology literature when anthropic considerations are used to predict cosmological parameters by conditionalizing the distribution of, e.g., the (...)
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  21. added 2015-11-25
    Christopher J. G. Meacham (2016). Understanding Conditionalization. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):767-797.
    At the heart of the Bayesianism is a rule, Conditionalization, which tells us how to update our beliefs. Typical formulations of this rule are underspecified. This paper considers how, exactly, this rule should be formulated. It focuses on three issues: when a subject’s evidence is received, whether the rule prescribes sequential or interval updates, and whether the rule is narrow or wide scope. After examining these issues, it argues that there are two distinct and equally viable versions of Conditionalization to (...)
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  22. added 2015-11-24
    Leszek Wronski, A New Way to Block a Dutch Book Argument, or The Stubborn Non-Probabilist.
    We point out a yet unnoticed flaw in Dutch Book arguments that relates to a link between degrees of belief and betting quotients. We offer a set of precise conditions governing when a nonprobabilist is immune to the classical Dutch Book argument. We suggest that diachronic Dutch Book arguments are also affected.
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  23. added 2015-11-20
    Matthew Kopec (2015). A New Group Dutch Book Argument. Ratio 28 (4).
    In this essay, I repair the group Dutch Book argument presented by Donald Gillies. I then examine what additional assumptions would be needed for the argument to generate genuinely normative prescriptions for groups of inquirers. Although the resulting norms will apply to fewer groups than Gillies originally intended, they are still an important addition to the normative landscape in social epistemology.
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  24. added 2015-11-19
    Graham Oddie, What Accuracy Could Not Be.
    The concept of accuracy is ubiquitous. Two different programs—both born in 1960 but raised separately—are in the business of trying to explicate it. The epistemic utility (EU) program was ushered into the world by Carl Hempel, and the truthlikeness (TL) program by Karl Popper. In this paper I begin a long overdue examination of the relationship between these two important programs. The upshot is unsettling. There are two rather obvious principles that govern accuracy—I call them the Weak Proximity and Strong (...)
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  25. added 2015-11-13
    Darrell P. Rowbottom (forthcoming). How Might Degrees of Belief Shift? On Action Conflicting With Professed Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology.
    People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions (such as trembling in fear when their death becomes an imminent possibility, despite earlier professing that “Death is not bad!”). But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief (or degrees of confidence) may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of (...) may shift. (shrink)
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