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Philosophy of Probability

Edited by Darrell Rowbottom (Lingnan University)
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  1. added 2014-07-23
    Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). Problems for Pure Probabilism About Promotion (and a Disjunctive Alternative). Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Humean promotionalists about reasons think that whether there is a reason for an agent to ϕ depends on whether her ϕ-ing promotes the satisfaction of at least one of her desires. Several authors have recently defended probabilistic accounts of promotion, according to which an agent’s ϕ-ing promotes the satisfaction of one of her desires just in case her ϕ-ing makes the satisfaction of that desire more probable relative to some baseline. In this paper I do three things. First, I formalize (...)
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  2. added 2014-07-03
    Ilho Park (forthcoming). Confirmation Measures and Collaborative Belief Updating. Synthese.
    There are some candidates that have been thought to measure the degree to which evidence incrementally confirms a hypothesis. This paper provides an argument for one candidate—the log-likelihood ratio measure. For this purpose, I will suggest a plausible requirement that I call the Requirement of Collaboration. And then, it will be shown that, of various candidates, only the log-likelihood ratio measure l satisfies this requirement. Using this result, Jeffrey conditionalization will be reformulated so as to disclose explicitly what determines new (...)
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  3. added 2014-07-03
    Yann Benétreau-Dupin (forthcoming). Blurring Out Cosmic Puzzles. Philosophy of Science.
    The Doomsday argument and anthropic arguments are illustrations of a paradox. In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, the paradox constitutes a challenge to Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made to avoid these conclusions, but some versions of the paradox cannot be dissolved within the framework of orthodox Bayesianism. I show that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic reasoning allows for a more adequate representation of ignorance (...)
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  4. added 2014-06-25
    David Dowe, MML, Hybrid Bayesian Network Graphical Models, Statistical Consistency, Invariance and Uniqueness.
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  5. added 2014-06-25
    Hykel Hosni, Towards a Bayesian Theory of Second-Order Uncertainty: Lessons From Non- Standard Logics.
    Second-order uncertainty, also known as model uncertainty and Knightian uncertainty, arises when decision-makers can (partly) model the parameters of their decision problems. It is widely believed that subjective probability, and more generally Bayesian theory, are ill-suited to represent a number of interesting second-order uncertainty features, especially “ignorance” and “ambiguity”. This failure is sometimes taken as an argument for the rejection of the whole Bayesian approach, triggering a Bayes vs anti-Bayes debate which is in many ways analogous to what the classical (...)
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  6. added 2014-06-25
    Mike Oaksford (2014). Normativity, Interpretation, and Bayesian Models. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  7. added 2014-06-25
    Kevin Korb & Ann Nicholson, The Causal Interpretation of Bayesian Networks.
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  8. added 2014-06-25
    Sylvia Nagl, Matthew Williams, Nadjet El-Mehidi, Vivek Patkar & Jon Williamson, Objective Bayesian Nets for Integrating Cancer Knowledge: A Systems Biology Approach.
    According to objective Bayesianism, an agent’s degrees of belief should be determined by a probability function, out of all those that satisfy constraints imposed by background knowledge, that maximises entropy. A Bayesian net offers a way of efficiently representing a probability function and efficiently drawing inferences from that function. An objective Bayesian net is a Bayesian net representation of the maximum entropy probability function. In this paper we apply the machinery of objective Bayesian nets to breast cancer prognosis. Background knowledge (...)
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  9. added 2014-06-25
    Lucas Hope & Kevin Korb, A Bayesian Metric for Evaluating Machine Learning Algorithms.
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  10. added 2014-06-12
    Theodore Bach (2014). A Unified Account of General Learning Mechanisms and Theory‐of‐Mind Development. Mind and Language 29 (3):351-381.
    Modularity theorists have challenged that there are, or could be, general learning mechanisms that explain theory-of-mind development. In response, supporters of the ‘scientific theory-theory’ account of theory-of-mind development have appealed to children's use of auxiliary hypotheses and probabilistic causal modeling. This article argues that these general learning mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the modularist's challenge. The article then explores an alternative domain-general learning mechanism by proposing that children grasp the concept belief through the progressive alignment of relational structure that (...)
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  11. added 2014-06-09
    John R. Welch (forthcoming). Moral Strata. Springer.
    This volume recreates the received notion of reflective equilibrium. It reconfigures reflective equilibrium as both a cognitive ideal and a method for approximating this ideal. The ideal of reflective equilibrium is restructured using the concept of discursive strata, which are formed by sentences and differentiated by function. Sentences that perform the same kind of linguistic function constitute a stratum. The book shows how moral discourse can be analyzed into phenomenal, instrumental, and teleological strata, and the ideal of reflective equilibrium reworked (...)
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  12. added 2014-06-09
    Julia Staffel (forthcoming). Disagreement and Epistemic Utility-Based Compromise. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-14.
    Epistemic utility theory seeks to establish epistemic norms by combining principles from decision theory and social choice theory with ways of determining the epistemic utility of agents’ attitudes. Recently, Moss (Mind, 120(480), 1053–69, 2011) has applied this strategy to the problem of finding epistemic compromises between disagreeing agents. She shows that the norm “form compromises by maximizing average expected epistemic utility”, when applied to agents who share the same proper epistemic utility function, yields the result that agents must form compromises (...)
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  13. added 2014-06-09
    Anna Mahtani (2014). Dutch Books, Coherence, and Logical Consistency. Noûs 48 (3).
    In this paper I present a new way of understanding Dutch Book Arguments: the idea is that an agent is shown to be incoherent iff (s)he would accept as fair a set of bets that would result in a loss under any interpretation of the claims involved. This draws on a standard definition of logical inconsistency. On this new understanding, the Dutch Book Arguments for the probability axioms go through, but the Dutch Book Argument for Reflection fails. The question of (...)
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  14. added 2014-05-23
    Susanna Rinard (forthcoming). A Decision Theory for Imprecise Credences. Philosophers' Imprint.
    Those who model doxastic states with a set of probability functions, rather than a single function, face a pressing challenge: can they provide a plausible decision theory compatible with their view? Adam Elga (2010) and others claim that they cannot, and that the set of functions model should be rejected for this reason. This paper aims to answer this challenge. The key insight is that the set of functions model can be seen as an instance of the supervaluationist approach to (...)
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  15. added 2014-05-23
    Susanna Rinard (2014). The Principle of Indifference and Imprecise Probability. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):110-114.
    Sometimes different partitions of the same space each seem to divide that space into propositions that call for equal epistemic treatment. Famously, equal treatment in the form of equal point-valued credence leads to incoherence. Some have argued that equal treatment in the form of equal interval-valued credence solves the puzzle. This paper shows that, once we rule out intervals with extreme endpoints, this proposal also leads to incoherence.
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  16. added 2014-05-15
    Lukas M. Verburgt (2014). John Venn's Hypothetical Infinite Frequentism and Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (3):248-271.
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  17. added 2014-05-14
    Michael J. Shaffer (2014). Reflection, Conditionalization and Indeterminacy About the Future. The Reasoner 8:65-66.
    This paper shows that any view of future contingent claims that treats such claims as having indeterminate truth values or as simply being false implies probabilistic irrationality. This is because such views of the future imply violations of reflection, special reflection and conditionalization.
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