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Philosophy of Probability

Edited by Darrell Rowbottom (Lingnan University)
Assistant editor: Joshua Luczak (University of Western Ontario, Georgetown University)
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  1. added 2016-08-27
    Paul D. Thorn (2016). Against Deductive Closure. Theoria 82 (3):n/a-n/a.
    The present article illustrates a conflict between the claim that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences, and a very inclusive claim about the factors that are sufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions. Inasmuch as it is implausible to hold that the factors listed here are insufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions, we have good reason to deny that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences.
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  2. added 2016-08-27
    Mudyń Krzysztof (2015). On the False Ontological Consensus. Polish Psychological Bulletin 46 (2):160-173.
    The objective of the research was to check whether False Consensus Effect (FCE), shown in much research,is also valid for ontological decisions. Test participants, faced with an ontological dilemma, made a choice three times,which of the 3 item set (Cracow City, Me myself, the Universe) refers to something most real. The research conducted first among psychology students (N=116), then replicated on mathematics students (N=126) and middle-aged people (N=106). Results: 1) All groups chose the Universe most seldom (4%-11% subjects), the remaining (...)
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  3. added 2016-08-26
    Terence Horgan (2017). Essays on Paradoxes. Oxford University Press Usa.
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  4. added 2016-08-21
    Renée Bilodeau (2001). Croyance et justification. Cahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 37:153-165.
    Cet article se propose de montrer que l’éthique de la croyance, si elle permet de clarifier certains problèmes épistémiques, a le tort d’être utilisée à des fins pour lesquelles le réseau conceptuel de l’éthique est inadéquat. Dans ce but, je présente d’abord la thèse de la divergence et les arguments qui militent en sa faveur. J’indique ensuite pourquoi ces arguments ne sont pas concluants en examinant de plus près les rapports existant entre raisons épistémiques et raisons pratiques. Cette discussion se (...)
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  5. added 2016-08-19
    Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini (forthcoming). Why We Can Still Believe the Error Theory. International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-14.
  6. added 2016-08-15
    Thomas Raleigh (forthcoming). Another Argument Against Uniqueness. Philosophical Quarterly.
    I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle: (roughly stated) If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One motivation for denying this principle – viz. (...)
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  7. added 2016-08-11
    David Ellerman (2016). Quantum Mechanics Over Sets: A Pedagogical Model with Non-Commutative Finite Probability Theory as its Quantum Probability Calculus. Synthese 2016:1-34.
    This paper shows how the classical finite probability theory (with equiprobable outcomes) can be reinterpreted and recast as the quantum probability calculus of a pedagogical or toy model of quantum mechanics over sets (QM/sets). There have been several previous attempts to develop a quantum-like model with the base field of ℂ replaced by ℤ₂. Since there are no inner products on vector spaces over finite fields, the problem is to define the Dirac brackets and the probability calculus. The previous attempts (...)
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  8. added 2016-08-08
    Nick Bostrom, Sleeping Beauty and Self-Location: A Hybrid Model.
    The Sleeping Beauty problem is test stone for theories about self-locating belief, i.e. theories about how we should reasons when data or theories contain indexical information. Opinion on this problem is split between two camps, those who defend the "1/2 view" and those who advocate the "1/3 view". I argue that both these positions are mistaken. Instead, I propose a new "hybrid" model, which avoids the faults of the standard views while retaining their attractive properties. This model _appears_ to violate (...)
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  9. added 2016-08-08
    Frank Arntzenius & Ned Hall (2003). On What We Know About Chance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):171-179.
    The 'Principal Principle' states, roughly, that one's subjective probability for a proposition should conform to one's beliefs about that proposition's objective chance of coming true. David Lewis has argued that this principle provides the defining role for chance; that it conflicts with his reductionist thesis of Humean supervenience, and so must be replaced by an amended version that avoids the conflict; hence that nothing _perfectly_ deserves the name 'chance', although something can come close enough by playing the role picked out (...)
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  10. added 2016-08-08
    Nick Bostrom, The Doomsday Argument, Adam & Eve, UN⁺⁺, and Quantum Joe.
    The Doomsday argument purports to show that the risk of the human species going extinct soon has been systematically underestimated. This argument has something in common with controversial forms of reasoning in other areas, including: game theoretic problems with imperfect recall, the methodology of cosmology, the epistomology of indexical belief, and the debate over so-called fine-tuning arguments for the design hypothesis. The common denominator is a certain premiss: the Self-Sampling Assumption. We present two strands of argument in favor of this (...)
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  11. added 2016-08-05
    H. Orri Stefánsson (forthcoming). What is "Real" in Probabilism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper defends two related claims about belief. First, the claim that unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real. Second, the claim that the fundamental norm of Probabilism is not that numerical degrees of belief should satisfy the probability axioms, but rather that comparative beliefs should satisfy certain constraints.
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  12. added 2016-08-02
    Nevin Climenhaga (forthcoming). Inference to the Best Explanation Made Incoherent. Journal of Philosophy.
    Defenders of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) claim that explanatory factors should play an important role in empirical inference. They disagree, however, about how exactly to formulate this role. In particular, they disagree about whether to formulate IBE as an inference rule for full beliefs or for degrees of belief, and, if it is formulated as a rule for degrees of belief, how this rule relates to Bayesianism. In this essay I advance a new argument against non-Bayesian versions of (...)
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  13. added 2016-08-02
    Nevin Climenhaga (forthcoming). How Explanation Guides Confirmation. Philosophy of Science.
    Where E is the proposition that [If H and O were true, H would explain O], William Roche and Elliot Sober have argued that P(H|O&E) = P(H|O). In this paper I argue that not only is this equality not generally true, it is false in the very kinds of cases that Roche and Sober focus on, involving frequency data. In fact, in such cases O raises the probability of H only given that there is an explanatory connection between them.
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  14. added 2016-08-01
    Christopher J. G. Meacham (forthcoming). Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization. Ergo.
    Conditionalization is a widely endorsed rule for updating one’s beliefs. But a sea of complaints have been raised about it, including worries regarding how the rule handles error correction, changing desiderata of theory choice, evidence loss, self-locating beliefs, learning about new theories, and confirmation. In light of such worries, a number of authors have suggested replacing Conditionalization with a different rule — one that appeals to what I’ll call “ur-priors”. But different authors have understood the rule in different ways, and (...)
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  15. added 2016-08-01
    Christopher J. G. Meacham (forthcoming). Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms? In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford University Press
    Some of the most interesting recent work in formal epistemology has focused on developing accuracy-based approaches to justifying Bayesian norms. These approaches are interesting not only because they offer new ways to justify these norms, but because they potentially offer a way to justify all of these norms by appeal to a single, attractive epistemic goal: having accurate beliefs. Recently, Easwaran & Fitelson (2012) have raised worries regarding whether such “all-accuracy” or “purely alethic” approaches can accommodate and justify evidential Bayesian (...)
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  16. added 2016-07-20
    Kenny Easwaran, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock & Joel D. Velasco (2016). Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy. Philosophers' Imprint 16 (11).
    We introduce a family of rules for adjusting one’s credences in response to learning the credences of others. These rules have a number of desirable features. 1. They yield the posterior credences that would result from updating by standard Bayesian conditionalization on one’s peers’ reported credences if one’s likelihood function takes a particular simple form. 2. In the simplest form, they are symmetric among the agents in the group. 3. They map neatly onto the familiar Condorcet voting results. 4. They (...)
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  17. added 2016-07-20
    Mikito Kobayashi & Satoshi Tojo (2009). Agent Communication for Dynamic Belief Update. Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 24:314-321.
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  18. added 2016-07-20
    Frank Arntzenius (2003). Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection. Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):356-370.
  19. added 2016-07-20
    Mark Lange (1999). Calibration and the Epistemological Role of Bayesian Conditionalization. Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):294.
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  20. added 2016-07-20
    Jon Dorling (1992). Bayesian Conditionalization Resolves Positivist/Realist Disputes. Journal of Philosophy 89 (7):362.
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  21. added 2016-07-18
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). Determinism, Supervenience, and Probabilistic Inference. Amazon Digital Services LLC.
    This volume identifies the different ways in which one event can compel the occurrence of another event and on this basis identifies important facts about the nature of probability and probabilistic inference.
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  22. added 2016-06-27
    Wlodek Rabinowicz, Safeguards of a Disunified Mind.
    The papers focuses on pragmatic arguments for various rationality constraints on a decision maker’s state of mind: on her beliefs or preferences. An argument of this kind typically targets constraint violations. It purports to show that a violator of a given constraint can be confronted with a decision problem in which she will act to her guaranteed disadvantage. Dramatically put, she can be exploited by a clever bookie who doesn’t know more than the agent herself. Examples of pragmatic arguments of (...)
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  23. added 2016-06-21
    Charlotte Werndl, Determinism.
    This article focuses on three recent discussions on determinism in the philosophy of science. First, determinism and predictability will be discussed. Then, second, the paper turns to the topic of determinism, indeterminism, observational equivalence and randomness. Finally, third, there will be a discussion about deterministic probabilities. The paper will end with a conclusion.
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  24. added 2016-06-12
    Michael Starks, What Do Paraconsistent, Undecidable, Random, Computable and Incomplete Mean? A Review of Godel's Way: Exploits Into an Undecidable World by Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria , Newton C.A. Da Costa 160p (2012).
    In ‘Godel’s Way’ three eminent scientists discuss issues such as undecidability, incompleteness, randomness, computability and paraconsistency. I approach these issues from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that there are two basic issues which have completely different solutions. There are the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts about the world that need to be investigated observationally and philosophical issues as to how language can be used intelligibly (which include certain questions in mathematics and logic), which need to be decided by looking at (...)
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