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Philosophy of Probability

Edited by Darrell Rowbottom (Lingnan University)
Assistant editor: Joshua Luczak (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2015-06-23
    Jan Sprenger (forthcoming). A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence. .
    One of the most troubling and persistent challenges for Bayesian Confirmation Theory is the Problem of Old Evidence . The problem arises for anyone who models scientific reasoning by means of Bayesian Conditionalization. This article addresses the problem as follows: First, I clarify the nature and varieties of the POE and analyze various solution proposals in the literature. Second, I present a novel solution that combines previous attempts while making weaker and more plausible assumptions. Third and last, I summarize my (...)
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  2. added 2015-06-23
    Aaron Bronfman (2015). Reflection and Self‐Trust. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):75-82.
    The Reflection principle expresses a kind of epistemic deference to one's future self. There is a plausible intuitive argument to the effect that, if one believes one will reason well and gain information over time, then one ought to satisfy Reflection. There are also associated formal arguments that show that, if one's beliefs about one's current and future selves meet certain criteria, then one is committed by the axioms of probability to satisfy Reflection. The formal arguments, however, rely on an (...)
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  3. added 2015-06-23
    Gary Ebbs (2014). Conditionalization and Conceptual Change: Chalmers in Defense of a Dogma. Journal of Philosophy 111 (12):689-703.
    David Chalmers has recently argued that Bayesian conditionalization is a constraint on conceptual constancy, and that this constraint, together with “standard Bayesian considerations about evidence and updating,” is incompatible with the Quinean claim that every belief is rationally revisable. Chalmers’s argument presupposes that the sort of conceptual constancy that is relevant to Bayesian conditionalization is the same as the sort of conceptual constancy that is relevant to the claim that every belief is rationally revisable. To challenge this presupposition I explicate (...)
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  4. added 2015-06-18
    Robert Northcott (2015). A Dilemma for the Doomsday Argument. Ratio 28 (2).
    I present a new case in which the Doomsday Argument runs afoul of epistemic intuition much more strongly than before. This leads to a dilemma: in the new case either DA is committed to unacceptable counterintuitiveness and belief in miracles, or else it is irrelevant. I then explore under what conditions DA can escape this dilemma. The discussion turns on several issues that have not been much emphasised in previous work on DA: a concern that I label trumping; the degree (...)
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  5. added 2015-06-06
    Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji (forthcoming). Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition (...)
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  6. added 2015-05-18
    Jürgen Landes & Jon Williamson, Justifying Objective Bayesianism on Predicate Languages.
    Objective Bayesianism says that the strengths of one’s beliefs ought to be probabilities, calibrated to physical probabilities insofar as one has evidence of them, and otherwise sufficiently equivocal. These norms of belief are often explicated using the maximum entropy principle. In this paper we investigate the extent to which one can provide a unified justification of the objective Bayesian norms in the case in which the background language is a first-order predicate language, with a view to applying the resulting formalism (...)
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  7. added 2015-05-18
    C. Howson (2014). What Probability Probably Isn't. Analysis 75 (1):53-59.
    Joyce and others have claimed that degrees of belief are estimates of truth-values and that the probability axioms are conditions of admissibility for these estimates with respect to a scoring rule penalizing inaccuracy. In this article, I argue that the claim that the rules of probability are truth-directed in this way depends on an assumption that is both implausible and lacks any supporting evidence, strongly suggesting that the probability axioms have nothing intrinsically to do with truth-directedness.
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  8. added 2015-04-24
    Philippe Gagnon (2015). Review Article on Amir D. Aczel, Why Science Does Not Disprove God (New York: W. Morrow, 2014). [REVIEW] ESSSAT News and Reviews 25 (2):22-27.
    Review of the book by mathematician and science writer Amir Aczel, Why Science does not Disprove God, recently reissued in paperback, with a focus on the chapters on mathematics and God, and criticisms from the standpoint of the epistemology of the science and religion dialogue.
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  9. added 2015-04-16
    Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler (forthcoming). Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  10. added 2015-04-15
    H. Orri Stefánsson & Richard Bradley (forthcoming). How Valuable Are Chances? Philosophy of Science.
    Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true (or being false), its chance of being true should be a matter of practical indierence. The aim of this paper is to examine whether Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality. We prove that given Chance Neutrality, the Principal Principle entails a thesis called Linearity; the centrepiece of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With this in mind, we argue that the Principal Principle is a requirement of (...)
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  11. added 2015-04-10
    Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton (forthcoming). Defeatism Defeated. Philosophical Perspectives.
    Many epistemologists are enamored with a defeat condition on knowledge. In this paper we present some implementation problems for defeatism, understood along either internalist or externalist lines. We then propose that one who accepts a knowledge norm of belief, according to which one ought to believe only what one knows, can explain away much of the motivation for defeatism. This is an important result, because on the one hand it respects the plausibility of the intuitions about defeat shared by many (...)
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