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  1. Ernest W. Adams (1978). Two Aspects of Physical Identity. Philosophical Studies 34 (August):111-134.
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  2. Karl Ameriks (1976). Personal Identity and Memory Transfer. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):385-391.
  3. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (2013). Bodily Thought and the Corpse Problem. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):575-592.
    : A key consideration in favour of animalism—the thesis that persons like you and me are identical to the animals we walk around with—is that it avoids a too many thinkers problem that arises for non-animalist positions. The problem is that it seems that any person-constituting animal would itself be able to think, but if wherever there is a thinking person there is a thinking animal distinct from it then there are at least two thinkers wherever there is a thinking (...)
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  4. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (2010). Functionalism and Thinking Animals. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):347 - 354.
    Lockean accounts of personal identity face a problem of too many thinkers arising from their denial that we are identical to our animals and the assumption that our animals can think. Sydney Shoemaker has responded to this problem by arguing that it is a consequence of functionalism that only things with psychological persistence conditions can have mental properties, and thus that animals cannot think. I discuss Shoemaker’s argument and demonstrate two ways in which it fails. Functionalism does not rid the (...)
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  5. Andrew M. Bailey (2014). The Elimination Argument. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):475-482.
    Animalism is the view that we are animals: living, breathing, wholly material beings. Despite its considerable appeal, animalism has come under fire. Other philosophers have had much to say about objections to animalism that stem from reflection on personal identity over time. But one promising objection (the `Elimination Argument') has been overlooked. In this paper, I remedy this situation and examine the Elimination Argument in some detail. I contend that the Elimination Argument is both unsound and unmotivated.
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  6. Lynne Baker (2007). Persons and Other Things. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):17-36.
    In the large recent literature on the nature of human persons, persons are usually studied in isolation from the world in which they live. What persons are most fundamentally, philosophers say, are human animals, or brains, or perhaps souls -- without any consideration of the social and physical environments without which persons would not exist. In this article, I want to compensate for such overly narrow focus. Instead of beginning with the nature of persons cut off from any environment, I (...)
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  7. Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). Review: Eric T. Olson: What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (468):1120-1122.
  8. Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). Response to Eric Olson. Abstracta 3 (3):43-45.
  9. Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). Big-Tent Metaphysics. Abstracta 2 (3):8-15.
    Eric Olson won the hearts of my graduate students by dedicating his book “to the unemployed philosophers.” (The students subsequently got fine jobs, but it’s the thought (or rather the sympathy) that counts.) As appreciated as the dedication was, however, I doubt that it was responsible for the wonderful reception that Olson’s book, The Human Animal, has had. Rather, the cleverness of his arguments, the vigor with which Olson writes, and the new interpretations of old thought experiments and arguments have (...)
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  10. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Persons and Other Things. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):5-6.
  11. Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Précis of Persons and Bodies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):592-598.
  12. M. Bekoff (ed.) (2007). Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships. Greenwood Press.
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  13. Stephan Blatti, Animalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Among the questions to be raised under the heading of “personal identity” are these: “What are we?” (fundamental nature question) and “Under what conditions do we persist through time?” (persistence question). Against the dominant neo-Lockean approach to these questions, the view known as animalism answers that each of us is an organism of the species Homo sapiens and that the conditions of our persistence are those of animals. Beyond describing the content and historical background of animalism and its rivals, this (...)
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  14. Stephan Blatti (2012). A New Argument for Animalism. Analysis 72 (4):685-690.
    The view known as animalism asserts that we are human animals—that each of us is an instance of the Homo sapiens species. The standard argument for this view is known as the thinking animal argument . But this argument has recently come under attack. So, here, a new argument for animalism is introduced. The animal ancestors argument illustrates how the case for animalism can be seen to piggyback on the credibility of evolutionary theory. Two objections are then considered and answered.
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  15. Stephan Blatti (2007). Animalism and Personal Identity. In M. Bekoff (ed.), Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships. Greenwood Press.
    After motivating the general problem of personal identity and considering several possible accounts, this entry reviews a variety of arguments for and against the animalist criterion of personal identity.
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  16. Stephan Blatti (2007). Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases. Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):595-608.
    The rare condition known as dicephalus occurs when (prior to implantation) a zygote fails to divide completely, resulting in twins who are conjoined below the neck. Human dicephalic twins look like a two-headed person, with each brain supporting a distinct mental life. Jeff McMahan has recently argued that, because they instance two of us but only one animal, dicephalic twins provide a counterexample to the animalist's claim that each of us is identical with a human animal. To the contrary, I (...)
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  17. Stephan Blatti (2006). Animalism. In A. C. Grayling, A. Pyle & N. Goulder (eds.), Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy. Thoemmes Continuum.
    This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim is that each of us is identical with a human animal. Moreover, animalists typically claim that we could not exist except as animals, and that the (biological) conditions of our persistence derive from our status as animals. Prominent advocates of this view include Michael Ayers, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins.
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  18. Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.) (forthcoming). Essays on Animalism: Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
    Arguably the most significant development in the recent history of the personal identity debate has been the emergence of the view known as "animalism." This volume brings together original contributions on this topic written by both well-known and emerging philosophers. Contributors: Lynne Rudder Baker, Stephan Blatti, David Hershenov, Jens Johansson, Mark Johnston, Rory Madden, Jeff McMahan & Tim Campbell, Eric Olson, Derek Parfit, Mark Reid, Denis Robinson, David Shoemaker, Sydney Shoemaker, Paul Snowdon.
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  19. Roland Breeur & Arnold Burms (2008). Persons and Relics. Ratio 21 (2):134–146.
    We describe a number of puzzling phenomena and use them as evidence for a hypothesis about why bodily continuity matters for personal identity. The phenomena all belong to a particular kind of symbolisation: each of them illustrates how an entity (object or person) sometimes acquires symbolic significance in virtue of a material link with the symbolised entity. Relics are the most obvious example of what happens here: they are cherished, desired or respected, not because of their intrinsic features, but because (...)
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  20. Andrew A. Brennan (1969). Persons and Their Brains. Analysis 30 (October):27-31.
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  21. P. A. Campbell (1942). Body And Self, One And Inseparable. San Francisco: Kennedy.
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  22. W. R. Carter (1999). Will I Be a Dead Person? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):167 - 171.
  23. William R. Carter (2002). Many Minds, No Persons. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):55-70.
    Four non-Cartesian conceptions of a person are considered. I argue tor one of these, a position called animalism. I reject the idea that a (human) person coincides with, but is numerically distinct from, a certain human animal. Coinciding physical beings would both be psychological subjects. I argue that such subjects could not engage in self-reference. Since self-reference (or the capacity tor self-reference) is a necessary condition for being a person, no physical subject coincident with another such subject can be a (...)
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  24. William R. Carter (1999). Will I Be a Dead Person? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):167-171.
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  25. David Coder (1973). How Brains Think. Dialogue 12 (March):78-86.
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  26. Kevin Corcoran (ed.) (2001). Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Cornell University Press.
    This collection brings together cutting-edge research on the metaphysics of human nature and soul-body dualism.Kevin Corcoran's collection, Soul, Body, and ...
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  27. Fraser Cowley (1971). The Identity of a Person and His Body. Journal of Philosophy 68 (October):678-683.
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  28. Stephen T. Davis (2001). Physicalism and Resurrection. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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  29. D. Degrazia (2002). Are We Essentially Persons? Olson, Baker, and a Reply. Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.
  30. Frederick Doepke (1996). The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument. Open Court Publishing Company.
    The Kinds of Things strongly supports the commonsense belief that in normal human life even changes in our deeply-held affections and ideals do not erode the ...
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  31. Annette Dufner (2009). Michael Quante, Person. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):569-570.
    Michael Quante’s book Person offers a systematic and argumentative assessment of the question what a person is and accounts for the multiple aspects that play a role in our everyday understanding of the term. Quante is skeptical about the possibility of constructing a purely psychological account of the person and proposes to base the diachronic unity conditions of persons on the human organism. At the same time he acknowledges that psychological considerations, including the notion of a person’s personality, are important (...)
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  32. Martin Francisco Fricke (2010). Autoconciencia e identidad personal. Península. Revista Semestral Del Centro Peninsular En Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales 5 (1):99-118.
    Las teorías lockeanas de la identidad personal afirman que una persona persiste en el tiempo si su conciencia persiste y los criterios para la persistencia de su conciencia son principalmente psicológicos. Una posible motivación para tal teoría es la idea de que “la identidad de una persona no debería ser distinta de lo que la persona misma considera que es”(Rovane 1990, 360). ¿Pero es posible que la propia identidad dependa de lo que uno mismo piensa que es? En este trabajo (...)
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  33. Richard M. Gale (1969). A Note on Personal Identity and Bodily Continuity. Analysis 30 (June):193-195.
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  34. Bernard Gert (1971). Personal Identity and the Body. Dialogue 10 (3):458-478.
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  35. Cody Gilmore (2007). Defining 'Dead' in Terms of 'Lives' and 'Dies'. Philosophia 35 (2):219-231.
    What is it for a thing to be dead? Fred Feldman holds, correctly in my view, that a definition of ‘dead’ should leave open both (1) the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being alive, and (2) the possibility of things that go directly from being alive to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. But if this is right, then surely such a definition should also leave open the possibility of things that (...)
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  36. David Hershenov (2008). A Hylomorphic Account of Personal Identity Thought Experiments. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (3):481 - 502.
    Hylomorphism offers a third way between animalist approaches to personal identity that maintain psychology is irrelevant to our persistence and neo-Lockean accounts that deny we are animals. A Thomistic-inspired account is provided that explains the intuitive responses to thought experiments involving brain transplants and the transformation of organic bodies into inorganic ones without having to follow the animalist in abandoning the claim that it is our identity that matters in survival nor countenance the puzzles of spatially coincident entities that plague (...)
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  37. David Hershenov (2005). Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity? Mind 114 (453):31 - 59.
    Part of the appeal of the biological approach to personal identity is that it does not have to countenance spatially coincident entities. But if the termination thesis is correct and the organism ceases to exist at death, then it appears that the corpse is a dead body that earlier was a living body and distinct from but spatially coincident with the organism. If the organism is identified with the body, then the unwelcome spatial coincidence could perhaps be avoided. It is (...)
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  38. David B. Hershenov (2011). Soulless Organisms? American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3):465-482.
    It is worthwhile comparing Hylomorphic and Animalistic accounts of personal identity since they both identify the human animal and the human person.The topics of comparison will be three: The first is accounting for our intuitions in cerebrum transplant and irreversible coma cases. Hylomorphism, unlike animalism, appears to capture “commonsense” beliefs here, preserves the maxim that identity matters, and does not run afoul of the Only x and y rule. The next topic of comparison reveals how the rival explanations of transplants (...)
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  39. David B. Hershenov (2002). Olson's Embryo Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):502-511.
  40. David B. Hershenov (2001). Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity? Mind 114 (453):31-59.
    One reason why the Biological Approach to personal identity is attractive is that it doesn’t make its advocates deny that they were each once a mindless fetus.[i] According to the Biological Approach, we are essentially organisms and exist as long as certain life processes continue. Since the Psychological Account of personal identity posits some mental traits as essential to our persistence, not only does it follow that we could not survive in a permanently vegetative state or irreversible coma, but it (...)
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  41. Jens Johansson (2010). Parfit on Fission. Philosophical Studies 2010 (150):21 - 35.
    Derek Parfit famously defends a number of surprising views about "fission." One is that, in such a scenario, it is indeterminate whether I have survived or not. Another is that the fission case shows that it does not matter, in itself, whether I survive or not. Most critics of the first view contend that fission makes me cease to exist. Most opponents of the second view contend that fission does not preserve everything that matters in ordinary survival. In this paper (...)
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  42. Jens Johansson (2009). Am I a Series? Theoria 75 (3):196-205.
    Scott Campbell has recently defended the psychological approach to personal identity over time by arguing that a person is literally a series of mental events. Rejecting four-dimensionalism about the persistence of physical objects, Campbell regards constitutionalism as the main rival version of the psychological approach. He argues that his "series view" has two clear advantages over constitutionalism: it avoids the "two thinkers" objection and it allows a person to change bodies. In addition, Campbell suggests a reply to the objection, often (...)
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  43. Jens Johansson (2007). What is Animalism? Ratio 20 (2):194–205.
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  44. Jens Johansson (2007). Non-Reductionism and Special Concern. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):641 – 657.
    The so-called 'Extreme Claim' asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.
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  45. Mark Johnston (1987). Human Beings. Journal of Philosophy 84 (February):59-83.
  46. David Kettle (1994). Michael Polanyi and Human Identity. Tradition and Discovery 21 (3):5-18.
    This paper conceives the distinction between human and animal identity in terms (drawn from theological anthropology) of distinctively human “habitation of a world.’’ It develops models for this using Polanyi’s account of the figure-ground polarity of acts of knowing in general. It identifies three distinct forms taken by this polarity, each offering its own model for human identity in its engagement with the world. Two of these models prove fatally one-sided. The third discloses the character of human identity in its (...)
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  47. Rose Koch (2006). Conjoined Twins and the Biological Account of Personal Identity. The Monist 89 (3):351-370.
    During the first 16 days after fertilization, the developing embryo has the capacity to separate into two genetically identical embryos, or monozygotic twins (triplets, etc.). Because of this capacity, philosophers typically argue that the pre-16 day embryo is not a human being. On a Biological Account of Personal Identity (BAPI), which considers us human beings as essentially organisms, the development of the embryo into an organism at 16 (or 21) days marks our origins. The development of an embryo into an (...)
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  48. Daniel Kolak (2008). Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity. Synthese 162 (3):341 - 372.
    Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians” such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity. Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of (...)
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  49. Silas Langley (2001). Aquinas, Resurrection, and Material Continuity. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:135-147.
    Aquinas’s understanding of bodily resurrection can take two different directions. Either continuity of the soul alone is sufficient to reconstitute the same body as the pre-mortem body at the resurrection, or continuity of the matter of the pre-mortem body is also required. After arguing that Aquinas’s account of personal identity over time requires sameness of soul and sameness of body, I suggest that Aquinas’s two possible views on bodily resurrection are consistent with this account of personal identity and are both (...)
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  50. William S. Larkin (2004). Persons, Animals, and Bodies. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):95-116.
    The philosophical problem of personal identity starts with something like Descartes’ famous question—“But what then am I?”—construed as an inquiry into the most fundamental nature of creatures like us. Let us stipulate that creatures like us are most fundamentally persons. That is, ‘person’ is the name of our..
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