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  1. Mahrad Almotahari & Damien Rochford (2011). Is Direct Reference Theory Incompatible with Physicalism? Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):255-268.
  2. Jared Bates (2009). A Defence of the Explanatory Argument for Physicalism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):315-324.
    One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing body of acknowledged psychophysical correlations. Jaegwon Kim has recently levelled four objections against the explanatory argument. I assess all of Kim's objections, showing that none is successful. The result is a defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism.
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  3. L. Stafford Betty (2004). Mind, Paranormal Experience, and the Inadequacy of Materialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):373-392.
    Contemporary materialist theories purporting to account for experience are seriously flawed, for they fail to accommodate the full range of human experience, especially paranormal experience. Substance Dualism (SD) is re-examined in light of this experience,including telepathy and clairvoyance, mediumship, the near-death experience, and reincarnation cases involving children’s memories. A different kind of materialism postulating degrees of fi neness and vibration—one prefigured by the ancient Stoics and developed hereunder the heading Transcendental Materialism (TM)—is also explored. The inadequacies of both reductive and (...)
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  4. Robert C. Bishop (2006). The Hidden Premise in the Causal Argument for Physicalism. Analysis 66 (289):44-52.
    The causal argument for physicalism is anayzed and it's key premise--the causal closure of physics--is found wanting. Therefore, a hidden premise must be added to the argument to gain its conclusion, but the hidden premise is indistinguishable from the conclusion of the causal argument. Therefore, it begs the question on physicalism.
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  5. Max Black (1946). Some Questions About Donald Williams' Defense of Materialism. Philosophical Review 55 (September):572-579.
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  6. A. Botterell (2005). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Philosophical Review 114 (1):125-128.
    A review of Andrew Melnyk's _A Physicalist Manifesto_ (Cambridge: CUP, 2003).
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  7. L. S. Carrier (2006). Aristotelian Materialism. Philosophia 34 (3):253-266.
    I argue that a modern gloss on Aristotle’s notions of Form and Matter not only allows us to escape a dualism of the psychological and the physical, but also results in a plausible sort of materialism. This is because Aristotle held that the essential nature of any psychological state, including perception and human thought, is to be some physical property. I also show that Hilary Putnam and Martha Nussbaum are mistaken in saying that Aristotle was not a materialist, but a (...)
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  8. Gregg Caruso (2001). Review of Nicholas Humphrey’s How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem. [REVIEW] Metapsychology 5 (46).
  9. Andrew Chrucky (1990). Critique of Wilfrid Sellars' Materialism. Dissertation, Fordham University
  10. Sam Coleman (2006). Being Realistic - Why Physicalism May Entail Panexperientialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):40-52.
    In this paper I first examine two important assumptions underlying the argument that physicalism entails panpsychism. These need unearthing because opponents in the literature distinguish themselves from Strawson in the main by rejecting one or the other. Once they have been stated, and something has been said about the positions that reject them, the onus of argument becomes clear: the assumptions require careful defence. I believe they are true, in fact, but their defence is a large project that cannot begin (...)
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  11. Brian Ellis (1967). Physical Monism. Synthese 17 (June):141-161.
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  12. Andreas Elpidorou (2012). Are Phenomenal Concepts Perspectival? Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):43-53.
  13. Michael Esfeld (1999). Physicalism and Ontological Holism. Metaphilosophy 30 (4):319-337.
    The claim of this paper is that we should envisage physicalism as an ontological holism. Our current basic physics, quantum theory, suggests that, ontologically speaking, we have to assume one global quantum state of the world; many of the properties that are often taken to be intrinsic properties of physical systems are in fact relations, which are determined by that global quantum state. The paper elaborates on this conception of physicalism as an ontological holism and considers issues such as supervenience, (...)
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  14. Evan Fales (2007). Naturalism and Physicalism. In Michael Martin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  15. Lewis S. Feuer (1949). Mechanism, Physicalism, and the Unity of Science. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9 (June):627-643.
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  16. Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Reply to Professor Zaitchik on Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):292-293.
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  17. Robert Francescotti (1998). Defining "Physicalism". Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):51-64.
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  18. Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.) (2000). Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide through an area of philosophical thought ...
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  19. A. Campbell Garnett (1948). Naturalism and the Concept of Matter. Journal of Philosophy 45 (August):477-488.
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  20. Gary Gates (2001). Physicalism, Empiricism, and Positivism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
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  21. Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.) (2001). Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
    Physicalism, a topic that has been central to philosophy of mind and metaphysics in recent years, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of new essays offers a series of 'state-of-the-art' perspectives on this (...)
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  22. Irwin Goldstein (1996). Ontology, Epistemology, and Private Ostensive Definition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.
    People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
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  23. Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  24. Simone Gozzano (2012). Type-Identity Conditions for Phenomenal Properties. In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspective on Type Identity. The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press.
    In this essay I shall argue that the crucial assumptions of Kripke's argument, i.e. the collapse of the appearance/reality distinction in the case of phenomenal states and the idea of a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, imply an objective principle of identity for mental-state types. This principle, I shall argue, rather than being at odds with physicalism, is actually compatible with both the type-identity theory of the mind and Kripke's semantics and metaphysics. Finally, I shall sketch a version of the type-identity (...)
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  25. Simone Gozzano (2009). Levels, Orders and the Causal Status of Mental Properties. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):347-362.
    In recent years Jaegwon Kim has offered an argument – the ‘supervenience argument’ – to show that supervenient mental properties, construed as second- order properties distinct from their first-order realizers, do not have causal powers of their own. In response, several philosophers have argued that if Kim’s argument is sound, it generalizes in such a way as to condemn to causal impotency all properties above the level of basic physics. This paper discusses Kim’s supervenience argument in the context of his (...)
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  26. Simone Gozzano (2007). Pensieri Materiali: Corpo, Mente E Causalità. Utet Università.
    Un uomo in cappa e cilindro di fronte a voi promette: “muoverò la materia con la sola forza del pensiero”. Scettici aspettate la prova. Ed ecco che, mirabilmente, egli alza un braccio. Un braccio, il suo braccio! Un pezzo di materia, dotato di massa, carica elettrica, proprietà magnetiche e quant’altro, si è mosso solo grazie alla sua volontà di alzarlo. Con la sola forza del pensiero il braccio si è sollevato! Per quanti sforzi retorici faccia, nessuno riterrà particolarmente sorprendente l’esperimento. (...)
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  27. Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.) (2012). New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press.
    Th e type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, fi nding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics, and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. Th is volume (...)
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  28. O. Harvey Green (1973). Some Supposed Advantages of Materialism. Analysis 33 (March):124-129.
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  29. Theodore Guleserian (1971). Contemporary Materialism and Epistemological Values. International Philosophical Quarterly 11 (September):403-426.
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  30. Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb (ed.) (2008). Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences : Papers of the 31th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
  31. G. Hellman & F. Thomson (1977). Physicalist Materialism. Noûs 11 (November):309-45.
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  32. G. Hellman & F. Thomson (1975). Physicalism: Ontology, Determination and Reduction. Journal of Philosophy 72 (October):551-64.
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  33. Sidney Hook (1944). Is Physical Realism Sufficient? Journal of Philosophy 41 (September):544-550.
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  34. Jennifer Hornsby (2002). Review: Causing Actions. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (441):159-161.
    Some of the claims of Paul Petroski's _Causing Actions_ are discussed in this review of the book.
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  35. Robert J. Howell (2009). The Ontology of Subjective Physicalism. Nous 43 (2):315-345.
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  36. A. Huttemann (2004). What's Wrong with Microphysicalism. Routledge.
    Microphysicalism , the view that whole objects behave the way they do in virtue of the behavior of their constituent parts, is an influential contemporary view with a long philosophical and scientific heritage. In What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? Andreas Huttemann offers a fresh challenge to this view. Huttemann agrees with the microphysicalists that we can explain compound systems by explaining their parts, but claims that this does not entail that the parts determine the whole. At most, it shows that there (...)
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  37. Frank Jackson (1994). Finding the Mind in the Natural World. In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
  38. Pierre Jacob (2002). Some Problems for Reductive Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):648-654.
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  39. Charles E. Jarrett (1982). Materialism. Philosophy Research Archives 1459:457-497.
    The following paper will attempt (i) to set forth a form of materialism that is ‘Spinozistic’ in maintaining that there is a conceptual, but not an ontological distinction between mental and physical phenomena; (ii) to undermine objections to this based on (a) ‘functionalism’ and (b) the conception of (and identity conditions for) an event that has been advocated by Goldman, Brandt, and Kim; and (iii) to explain why, according to the identity ‘theory’, the apparent failure of the indiscernibility of identicals (...)
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  40. Jaegwon Kim (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.
    "This is a fine volume that clarifies, defends, and moves beyond the views that Kim presented in Mind in a Physical World.
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  41. Jaegwon Kim (1971). Materialism and the Criteria of the Mental. Synthese 22 (May):323-345.
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  42. Richard L. Kirkham (1993). Tarski's Physicalism. Erkenntnis 38 (3):289-302.
    Hartry Field has argued that Alfred Tarski desired to reduce all semantic concepts to concepts acceptable to physicalism and that Tarski failed to do this. In the two succeeding decades, Field has been charged with being too lenient with Tarski; but it has been almost universally accepted that an objection at least as strong as Field's is telling against Tarski's theory. Close examination of the relevant literature, most of it printed in this journal in the 1930s, reveals that Field's conception (...)
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  43. Stephen Leeds (2001). Possibility: Physical and Metaphysical. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  44. Joseph Levine, Comments on Melnyk's A Physicalist Manifesto.
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  45. David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.
  46. Manuel Liz (2001). New Physical Properties. In Tian Yu Cao (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 10: Philosophy of Science. Philosophy Doc Ctr.
    Discussions on physicalism, reduction, special sciences, the layered image of reality, multiple realizability, emergence, downward causation, and so forth, typically make the ontological presupposition that there is no room for new properties in the physical world. It is my purpose in this paper to explore the alternative hypothesis that there can be—and in fact are—new physical properties. In the first section, I will propose a brief analysis of the notions of property, physical property, and new physical property. In the second (...)
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  47. Barry M. Loewer (2001). From Physics to Physicalism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
    The appeal of materialism lies precisely in this, in its claim to be natural metaphysics within the bounds of science. That a doctrine which promises to gratify our ambition (to know the noumenal) and our caution (not to be unscientific) should have great appeal is hardly something to be wondered at. (Putnam (1983), p.210) Materialism says that all facts, in particular all mental facts, obtain in virtue of the spatio- temporal distribution, and properties, of matter. It was, as Putnam says, (...)
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  48. David Ludwig (2011). Beyond Physicalism and Dualism? Putnam’s Pragmatic Pluralism and the Philosophy of Mind. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (1).
  49. Laureano Luna (2011). Reasoning From Paradox. The Reasoner 5 (2):22-23.
    Godel's and Tarski's theorems were inspired by paradoxes: the Richard paradox, the Liar. Godel, in the 1951 Gibbs lecture argued from his metatheoretical results for a metaphysical claim: the impossibility of reducing, both, mathematics to the knowable by the human mind and the human mind to a finite machine (e.g. the brain). So Godel reasoned indirectly from paradoxes for metaphysical theses. I present four metaphysical theses concerning mechanism, reductive physicalism and time for the only purpose of suggesting how it could (...)
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  50. Geoffrey C. Madell (1988). Mind and Materialism. Edinburgh University Press.
  51. Joseph Margolis (1973). The Perils of Physicalism. Mind 82 (October):566-578.
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  52. Michael Martin (ed.) (2007). The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    In this volume, eighteen of the world's leading scholars present original essays on various aspects of atheism: its history, both ancient and modern, defense ...
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  53. Steve Matthews (2010). A History of Philosophy of Mind in Australasia. In N. N. Trakakis (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Monash University Publishing.
  54. Nicholas Maxwell (1966). Physics and Common Sense. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (February):295-311.
    In this paper I set out to solve the problem of how the world as we experience it, full of colours and other sensory qualities, and our inner experiences, can be reconciled with physics. I discuss and reject the views of J. J. C. Smart and Rom Harré. I argue that physics is concerned only to describe a selected aspect of all that there is – the causal aspect which determines how events evolve. Colours and other sensory qualities, lacking causal (...)
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  55. Colin McGinn (1980). Philosophical Materialism. Synthese 44 (June):173-206.
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  56. Andrew Melnyk, Naturalism, Free Choices, And Conscious Experiences. God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence.
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  57. Andrew Melnyk (2003). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    A Physicalist Manifesto is the fullest treatment yet of the comprehensive physicalist view that, in some important sense, everything is physical. Andrew Melnyk argues that the view is best formulated by appeal to a carefully worked-out notion of realization, rather than supervenience; that, so formulated, physicalism must be importantly reductionist; that it need not repudiate causal and explanatory claims framed in non-physical language; and that it has the a posteriori epistemic status of a broad-scope scientific hypothesis. Two concluding chapters argue (...)
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  58. Andrew Melnyk (2003). Some Evidence for Physicalism. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
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  59. Andrew Melnyk (2002). Physicalism. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
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  60. Andrew Melnyk (1995). Physicalism, Ordinary Objects, and Identity. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:221-235.
    Any philosopher sympathetic to physicaIism (or materiaIism) will allow that there is some sense in which ordinary objects---tables and chairs, etc.---are physicaI. But what sense, exactly? John Post holds a view implying that every ordinary object is identical with some or other spatio-temporal sum of fundamental entities. I begin by deploying a modal argument intended to show that ordinary objects, for example elephants, are not identical with spatio-temporal sums of such entities. Then I claim that appeal to David Lewis’s counterpart (...)
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  61. Andrew Melnyk (1994). Being a Physicalist: How and (More Importantly) Why. Philosophical Studies 74 (2):221-241.
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  62. Jan G. Michel & Marius Backmann (eds.) (2009). Physikalismus, Willensfreiheit, Künstliche Intelligenz. mentis.
    Die Debatten zu den Themen Physikalismus, Willensfreiheit und Künstliche Intelligenz stehen seit einigen Jahren im Mittelpunkt der Philosophie des Geistes. -/- In den Debatten um den Physikalismus geht es dabei u.a. um folgende Fragen: Lässt sich alles, was es gibt, physikalisch erklären – auch der menschliche Geist? Lässt sich alles auf das Physische reduzieren? Ist der Bereich des Physischen kausal geschlossen? Realisiert das Physische das Mentale? Wie lässt sich mentale Verursachung erklären? -/- In den Debatten um Willensfreiheit fragt man sich: (...)
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  63. Barbara Montero (2003). Varieties of Causal Closure. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
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  64. Barbara Montero & David Papineau (2005). A Defense of the Via Negativa Argument for Physicalism. Analysis 65 (287):233-237.
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  65. Paul K. Moser (1996). Physicalism and Mental Causes: Contra Papineau. Analysis 56 (4):263-67.
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  66. Alyssa Ney (2007). Physicalism and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):41 – 60.
    that the properties of science are purely extrinsic with the metaphysical principle that substances must also have intrinsic properties, the arguments reach the conclusion that there are intrinsic properties of whose natures we cannot know. It is the goal of this paper to establish that such arguments are not just ironic but extremely problematic. The optimistic physicalist principles that help get the argument off the ground ultimately undermine any justification the premises give for acceptance of the conclusion. Though I do (...)
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  67. Stephen J. Noren (1972). A Quick Materialism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):33-36.
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  68. Stephen J. Noren (1972). The Two Theory Approach to Materialism. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):81-90.
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  69. David Papineau (2006). Comments on Galen Strawson: Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):100-109.
    Galen Strawson (2006) thinks it is 'obviously' false that 'the terms of physics can fully capture the nature or essence of experience' (p. 4). He also describes this view as 'crazy' (p. 7). I think that he has been carried away by first impressions. It is certainly true that 'physicSalism', as he dubs this view, is strongly counterintuitive. But at the same time there are compelling arguments in its favour. I think that these arguments are sound and that the contrary (...)
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  70. David Papineau (2001). The Rise of Physicalism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
    In this paper I want to discuss the way in which physical science has come to claim a particular kind of hegemony over other subjects in the second half of this century. This claim to hegemony is generally known by the name of "physicalism". In this paper I shall try to understand why this doctrine has come to prominence in recent decades. By placing this doctrine in a historical context, we will be better able to appreciate its strengths and weaknesses.
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  71. David Papineau (1993). Philosophical Naturalism. Blackwell.
  72. George S. Pappas (1977). Armstrong's Materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (September):569-592.
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  73. Jeffrey S. Poland (1994). Physicalism: The Empirical Foundations. Oxford University Press.
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  74. Thomas W. Polger (2009). Identity Theories. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834.
    Identity theories are those that hold that 'sensations are brain processes'. In particular, they hold that mental/psychological state kinds are identical to brain/neuroscientific state kinds. In this paper, I isolate and explain some of the key features of contemporary identity theories. They are then contrasted with the main live alternatives by means of considering the two most important lines of objection to identity theories.
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  75. Thomas W. Polger (2006). A Place for Dogs and Trees? Psyche 12 (5):online.
    Rosenberg does not provide arguments for some crucial premises in his argument against physicalism. In particular, he gives no independent argument to show that physicalists must accept the entry-by-entailment thesis. The arguments provided establish weaker premises than those that are needed. As a consequence, Rosenberg.
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  76. Thomas W. Polger & Lawrence Shapiro (2008). Understanding the Dimensions of Realization. Journal of Philosophy 105 (4):213-222.
    Carl Gillett has defended what he calls the “dimensioned” view of the realization relation, which he contrasts with the traditional “flat” view of realization (2003, 2007; see also Gillett 2002). Intuitively, the dimensioned approach characterizes realization in terms of composition whereas the flat approach views realization in terms of occupiers of functional roles. Elsewhere we have argued that the general view of realization and multiple realization that Gillett advances is not able to discharge the theoretical duties of those relations (Shapiro (...)
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  77. Tom Polger, A Posteriori Physicalism.
    A consideration of the benefits of taking physicalism to be necessarily true if true, against the standard view that physicalism is at best contingently true. Presented at the 2006 Central Division meeting of the APA, in the session Themes from Jaegwon Kim, sponsored by the Society for Asian and Asian-American Philosophy.
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  78. Panu Raatikainen (2008). The Return of Reductive Physicalism. In Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb (ed.), Reduction and elimination in philosophy and the sciences : papers of the 31th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    The importance of the exclusion argument for contemporary physicalism is emphasized. The recent attempts to vindicate reductive physicalism by invoking certain needed revisions to the Nagelian model of reduction are then discussed. It is argued that such revised views of reduction offer in fact much less help to reductive physicalism than is sometimes supposed, and that many of these views lead to trouble when combined with the exclusion argument.
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  79. Erich Rast (2009). What Simulations Can't Do. The Reasoner 3 (10):5-6.
    Simulations can only simulate knowledge.
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  80. Georges Rey (2001). Physicalism and Psychology: A Plea for a Substantive Philosophy of Mind. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
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  81. Daniel N. Robinson (1991). On Crane and Mellor's Argument Against Physicalism. Mind 100 (397):135-36.
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  82. Howard M. Robinson (1998). Materialism in the Philosophy of Mind. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
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  83. Howard M. Robinson (ed.) (1993). Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    Physicalism has, over the past twenty years, become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the United States, and Australasia, show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in accommodating sensory consciousness, but also bring (...)
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  84. Sean Sayers, A Note on Emergent Materialism.
    In common with other forms of nonreductive materialism, emergent materialism of this sort is accused of trying to have its cake and eat it. Ontological physicalism, it is said, necessarily implies reductionism which rules out the idea that there are irreducible emergent mental properties and laws. For according to such physicalism, everything is composed of physical constituents whose behaviour is governed by the laws of physics and mechanics. It follows that, in theory at least, every particular mental process is describable (...)
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  85. Elizabeth Schechter (2009). Persons and Psychological Frameworks: A Critique of Tye. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):141-163.
    This paper concerns the relationships between persons, brains, behaviour, and psychological explanation. Tye defines a ‘psychological framework’ (PF) as a set of token beliefs, desires, intentions, memories, streams of consciousness, higher-order mental states, etc., that ‘form a coherent whole’ and against which a creature’s ‘behavior can be explained’ (p. 141). A person is the subject of such a psychological framework. Each person has one PF, and with each new PF there is a new person. Meanwhile materialism tells us, according to (...)
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  86. Naomi Scheman (2000). Feminism in Philosophy of Mind: Against Physicalism. In Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
  87. Stephen R. Schiffer (1990). Physicalism. Philosophical Perspectives 4:153-185.
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  88. Roy Wood Sellars (1946). Positivism and Materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 7 (September):12-41.
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  89. Joseph Wayne Smith (1989). The Recent Case Against Physicalist Theories of Mind: A Review Essay. Explorations in Knowledge 6 (1):13-30.
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  90. David Spurrett, The Completeness of Physics.
    The present work is focussed on the completeness of physics, or what is here called the Completeness Thesis: the claim that the domain of the physical is causally closed. Two major questions are tackled: How best is the Completeness Thesis to be formulated? What can be said in defence of the Completeness Thesis? My principal conclusions are that the Completeness Thesis can be coherently formulated, and that the evidence in favour if it significantly outweighs that against it. In opposition to (...)
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  91. David Spurrett & David Papineau (1999). A Note on the Completeness of "Physics". Analysis 59 (1):25-29.
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  92. Helen Steward (1996). Papineau's Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):667-672.
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  93. Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) (2002). Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
  94. Barry G. Stroud (1990). Perspectives on Quine. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  95. Barry G. Stroud (1990). Quine's Physicalism. In Perspectives on Quine. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  96. Scott Sturgeon (1998). Physicalism and Overdetermination. Mind 107 (426):411-432.
    I argue that our knowledge of the world's causal structure does not generate a sound argument for physicalism. This undermines the popular view that physicalism is the only scientifically respectable worldview.
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  97. Pär Sundström (2006). Review of David Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW] Theoria 72 (1):80-86.
  98. Charles T. Taylor (1969). Two Issues About Materialism. Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January):73-79.
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  99. Graham Trakakis, N. N., Oppy (ed.) (2010). A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Monash University Publishing.
  100. Agustín Vicente (2006). On the Causal Completeness of Physics. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):149 – 171.
    According to an increasing number of authors, the best, if not the only, argument in favour of physicalism is the so-called 'overdetermination argument'. This argument, if sound, establishes that all the entities that enter into causal interactions with the physical world are physical. One key premise in the overdetermination argument is the principle of the causal closure of the physical world, said to be supported by contemporary physics. In this paper, I examine various ways in which physics may support the (...)
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