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  1. Mahrad Almotahari & Damien Rochford (2011). Is Direct Reference Theory Incompatible with Physicalism? Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):255-268.
  2. Jared Bates (2009). A Defence of the Explanatory Argument for Physicalism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):315-324.
    One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing body of acknowledged psychophysical correlations. Jaegwon Kim has recently levelled four objections against the explanatory argument. I assess all of Kim's objections, showing that none is successful. The result is a defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism.
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  3. Reinaldo Bernal Velasquez (2013). Pourquoi la conscience phénoménale doit avoir une nature physique. In Marc Silverstein (ed.), Matériaux scientifiques et philosophiques pour un matérialisme contemporain. Éditions Matériologiques. 755-800.
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  4. L. Stafford Betty (2004). Mind, Paranormal Experience, and the Inadequacy of Materialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):373-392.
    Contemporary materialist theories purporting to account for experience are seriously flawed, for they fail to accommodate the full range of human experience, especially paranormal experience. Substance Dualism (SD) is re-examined in light of this experience,including telepathy and clairvoyance, mediumship, the near-death experience, and reincarnation cases involving children’s memories. A different kind of materialism postulating degrees of fi neness and vibration—one prefigured by the ancient Stoics and developed hereunder the heading Transcendental Materialism (TM)—is also explored. The inadequacies of both reductive and (...)
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  5. Robert C. Bishop (2006). The Hidden Premise in the Causal Argument for Physicalism. Analysis 66 (289):44-52.
    The causal argument for physicalism is anayzed and it's key premise--the causal closure of physics--is found wanting. Therefore, a hidden premise must be added to the argument to gain its conclusion, but the hidden premise is indistinguishable from the conclusion of the causal argument. Therefore, it begs the question on physicalism.
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  6. Max Black (1946). Some Questions About Donald Williams' Defense of Materialism. Philosophical Review 55 (September):572-579.
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  7. Ned Block (forthcoming). The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground. In Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates & David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim,. Cambridge University Press.
    This paper argues that the “Canberra Plan” picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as David Armstrong, David Chalmers Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Joe Levine and David Lewis--neglects ground (Fine, 2001, 2012). To the extent that the point of view endorsed by the Canberra Plan has an account of the physical/functional ground of mind at all, it is in one version trivial and in another version implausible. In its most general (...)
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  8. A. Botterell (2005). A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Philosophical Review 114 (1):125-128.
    A review of Andrew Melnyk's _A Physicalist Manifesto_ (Cambridge: CUP, 2003).
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  9. Andrew Botterell (2005). Review of Andrew Melnyk, A Physicalist Manifesto. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 114:125-128.
    A review of Andrew Melnyk, A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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  10. L. S. Carrier (2006). Aristotelian Materialism. Philosophia 34 (3):253-266.
    I argue that a modern gloss on Aristotle’s notions of Form and Matter not only allows us to escape a dualism of the psychological and the physical, but also results in a plausible sort of materialism. This is because Aristotle held that the essential nature of any psychological state, including perception and human thought, is to be some physical property. I also show that Hilary Putnam and Martha Nussbaum are mistaken in saying that Aristotle was not a materialist, but a (...)
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  11. Gregg Caruso (2001). Review of Nicholas Humphrey’s How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem. [REVIEW] Metapsychology 5 (46).
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  12. Andrew Chrucky (1990). Critique of Wilfrid Sellars' Materialism. Dissertation, Fordham University
  13. Sam Coleman (2006). Being Realistic - Why Physicalism May Entail Panexperientialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):40-52.
    In this paper I first examine two important assumptions underlying the argument that physicalism entails panpsychism. These need unearthing because opponents in the literature distinguish themselves from Strawson in the main by rejecting one or the other. Once they have been stated, and something has been said about the positions that reject them, the onus of argument becomes clear: the assumptions require careful defence. I believe they are true, in fact, but their defence is a large project that cannot begin (...)
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  14. C. F. Delaney (1968). Realism, Materialism and the Mind. New Scholasticism 42 (3):456-458.
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  15. Brian Ellis (1967). Physical Monism. Synthese 17 (June):141-161.
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  16. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this paper, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature (...)
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  17. Andreas Elpidorou (2012). Are Phenomenal Concepts Perspectival? Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):43-53.
  18. Michael Esfeld (1999). Physicalism and Ontological Holism. Metaphilosophy 30 (4):319-337.
    The claim of this paper is that we should envisage physicalism as an ontological holism. Our current basic physics, quantum theory, suggests that, ontologically speaking, we have to assume one global quantum state of the world; many of the properties that are often taken to be intrinsic properties of physical systems are in fact relations, which are determined by that global quantum state. The paper elaborates on this conception of physicalism as an ontological holism and considers issues such as supervenience, (...)
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  19. Evan Fales (2007). Naturalism and Physicalism. In Michael Martin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  20. Lewis S. Feuer (1949). Mechanism, Physicalism, and the Unity of Science. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9 (June):627-643.
  21. Carrie Figdor (forthcoming). Verbs and Minds. In Mark Sprevak Jesper Kallestrup (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind.
    I introduce and defend verbialism, a metaphysical framework appropriate for accommodating the mind within the natural sciences and the mechanistic model of explanation that ties the natural sciences together. Verbialism is the view that mental phenomena belong in the basic ontological category of activities. If mind is what brain does, then explaining the mind is explaining how it occurs, and the ontology of mind is verbialist -- at least, it ought to be. I motivate verbialism by revealing a kind of (...)
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  22. Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Reply to Professor Zaitchik on Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):292-293.
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  23. Robert Francescotti (1998). Defining "Physicalism&Quot;. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):51-64.
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  24. Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.) (2000). Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide through an area of philosophical thought ...
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  25. A. Campbell Garnett (1948). Naturalism and the Concept of Matter. Journal of Philosophy 45 (August):477-488.
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  26. Gary Gates (2001). Physicalism, Empiricism, and Positivism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
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  27. Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.) (2001). Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
    Physicalism, a topic that has been central to philosophy of mind and metaphysics in recent years, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of new essays offers a series of 'state-of-the-art' perspectives on this (...)
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  28. Irwin Goldstein (1996). Ontology, Epistemology, and Private Ostensive Definition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.
    People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
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  29. Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  30. Simone Gozzano (2012). Type-Identity Conditions for Phenomenal Properties. In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspective on Type Identity. The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. 111.
    In this essay I shall argue that the crucial assumptions of Kripke's argument, i.e. the collapse of the appearance/reality distinction in the case of phenomenal states and the idea of a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, imply an objective principle of identity for mental-state types. This principle, I shall argue, rather than being at odds with physicalism, is actually compatible with both the type-identity theory of the mind and Kripke's semantics and metaphysics. Finally, I shall sketch a version of the type-identity (...)
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  31. Simone Gozzano (2009). Levels, Orders and the Causal Status of Mental Properties. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):347-362.
    In recent years Jaegwon Kim has offered an argument – the ‘supervenience argument’ – to show that supervenient mental properties, construed as second- order properties distinct from their first-order realizers, do not have causal powers of their own. In response, several philosophers have argued that if Kim’s argument is sound, it generalizes in such a way as to condemn to causal impotency all properties above the level of basic physics. This paper discusses Kim’s supervenience argument in the context of his (...)
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  32. Simone Gozzano (2007). Pensieri Materiali: Corpo, Mente E Causalità. Utet Università.
    Un uomo in cappa e cilindro di fronte a voi promette: “muoverò la materia con la sola forza del pensiero”. Scettici aspettate la prova. Ed ecco che, mirabilmente, egli alza un braccio. Un braccio, il suo braccio! Un pezzo di materia, dotato di massa, carica elettrica, proprietà magnetiche e quant’altro, si è mosso solo grazie alla sua volontà di alzarlo. Con la sola forza del pensiero il braccio si è sollevato! Per quanti sforzi retorici faccia, nessuno riterrà particolarmente sorprendente l’esperimento. (...)
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  33. Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.) (2012). New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press.
    Th e type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, fi nding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics, and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. Th is volume (...)
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  34. O. Harvey Green (1973). Some Supposed Advantages of Materialism. Analysis 33 (March):124-129.
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  35. Theodore Guleserian (1971). Contemporary Materialism and Epistemological Values. International Philosophical Quarterly 11 (September):403-426.
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  36. Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb (ed.) (2008). Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences : Papers of the 31th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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  37. G. Hellman & F. Thomson (1977). Physicalist Materialism. Noûs 11 (November):309-45.
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  38. G. Hellman & F. Thomson (1975). Physicalism: Ontology, Determination and Reduction. Journal of Philosophy 72 (October):551-64.
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  39. Sidney Hook (1944). Is Physical Realism Sufficient? Journal of Philosophy 41 (September):544-550.
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  40. Jennifer Hornsby (2002). Review: Causing Actions. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (441):159-161.
    Some of the claims of Paul Petroski's _Causing Actions_ are discussed in this review of the book.
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  41. Robert J. Howell (2009). The Ontology of Subjective Physicalism. Nous 43 (2):315-345.
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  42. A. Huttemann (2004). What's Wrong with Microphysicalism. Routledge.
    Microphysicalism , the view that whole objects behave the way they do in virtue of the behavior of their constituent parts, is an influential contemporary view with a long philosophical and scientific heritage. In What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? Andreas Huttemann offers a fresh challenge to this view. Huttemann agrees with the microphysicalists that we can explain compound systems by explaining their parts, but claims that this does not entail that the parts determine the whole. At most, it shows that there (...)
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  43. Frank Jackson (1994). Finding the Mind in the Natural World. In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. 227-49.
  44. Pierre Jacob (2002). Some Problems for Reductive Physicalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):648-654.
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  45. Charles E. Jarrett (1982). Materialism. Philosophy Research Archives 1459:457-497.
    The following paper will attempt (i) to set forth a form of materialism that is ‘Spinozistic’ in maintaining that there is a conceptual, but not an ontological distinction between mental and physical phenomena; (ii) to undermine objections to this based on (a) ‘functionalism’ and (b) the conception of (and identity conditions for) an event that has been advocated by Goldman, Brandt, and Kim; and (iii) to explain why, according to the identity ‘theory’, the apparent failure of the indiscernibility of identicals (...)
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  46. Jaegwon Kim (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.
    "This is a fine volume that clarifies, defends, and moves beyond the views that Kim presented in Mind in a Physical World.
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  47. Jaegwon Kim (1971). Materialism and the Criteria of the Mental. Synthese 22 (May):323-345.
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  48. Richard L. Kirkham (1993). Tarski's Physicalism. Erkenntnis 38 (3):289-302.
    Hartry Field has argued that Alfred Tarski desired to reduce all semantic concepts to concepts acceptable to physicalism and that Tarski failed to do this. In the two succeeding decades, Field has been charged with being too lenient with Tarski; but it has been almost universally accepted that an objection at least as strong as Field's is telling against Tarski's theory. Close examination of the relevant literature, most of it printed in this journal in the 1930s, reveals that Field's conception (...)
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  49. Stephen Leeds (2001). Possibility: Physical and Metaphysical. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  50. Joseph Levine, Comments on Melnyk's A Physicalist Manifesto.
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