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  1. George Ainslie (2009). Pleasure and Aversion: Challenging the Conventional Dichotomy. Inquiry 52 (4):357 – 377.
    Philosophy and its descendents in the behavioral sciences have traditionally divided incentives into those that are sought and those that are avoided. Positive incentives are held to be both attractive and memorable because of the direct effects of pleasure. Negative incentives are held to be unattractive but still memorable (the problem of pain) because they force unpleasant emotions on an individual by an unmotivated process, either a hardwired response (unconditioned response) or one substituted by association (conditioned response). Negative incentives are (...)
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  2. Murat Aydede (2014). How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
    A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis of (...)
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  3. Murat Aydede (2000). An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):537-570.
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  4. Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson, Theories of Sensory Affect: Compare and Contrast.
    Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, critically (...)
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  5. Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson (2014). Affect: Representationalists' Headache. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.
    Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it.
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  6. Alexander Bain (1892). Pleasure and Pain. Mind 1 (2):161-187.
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  7. David Bain (2013). What Makes Pains Unpleasant? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
    The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be accounted for purely in terms of pain’s possession of indicative representational content. Instead, they have explained it in terms of subjects’ inclinations to stop their pains, or in terms of pain’s imperative content. I claim that such “noncognitivist” accounts fail to accommodate unpleasant pain’s reason-giving force. What is needed, I argue, is a view on which pains are unpleasant, motivate, and provide reasons in virtue of (...)
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  8. David Bain & Michael Brady (2014). Pain, Pleasure, and Unpleasure. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):1-14.
    Compare your pain when immersing your hand in freezing water and your pleasure when you taste your favourite wine. The relationship seems obvious. Your pain experience is unpleasant, aversive, negative, and bad. Your experience of the wine is pleasant, attractive, positive, and good. Pain and pleasure are straightforwardly opposites. Or that, at any rate, can seem beyond doubt, and to leave little more to be said. But, in fact, it is not beyond doubt. And, true or false, it leaves a (...)
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  9. David Benatar (2011). No Life is Good. The Philosophers' Magazine 53 (53):62-66.
    The worst pains seem to be worse than the best pleasures are good. Anybody who doubts this should consider what choice they would make if they wereoffered the option of securing an hour of the most sublime pleasures possible in exchange for suffering an hour of the worst pain possible.
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  10. Yitzchak M. Binik (1997). Pain, Pleasure, and the Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):440-441.
    The target articles by blumberg et al. and berkley reflect some of the recent major theoretical and clinical advances in two areas of pain research. These two articles also represent two very different approaches to which type of variables are considered relevant to the study of pain. These different approaches are contrasted in the context of the different emphases in pain and pleasure research.
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  11. Alex Blum (1996). The Agony of Pain. Philosophical Inquiry 18 (3-4):117-120.
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  12. Francis H. Bradley (1888). On Pleasure, Pain, Desire and Volition. Mind 13 (49):1-36.
  13. Ben Bramble (2013). The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
    In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by (...)
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  14. E. J. C. (1969). Pleasure and Pain. Review of Metaphysics 23 (1):126-127.
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  15. Roderick M. Chisholm (1987). Brentano's Theory of Pleasure and Pain. Topoi 6 (1):59-64.
  16. Oliver Conolly (2005). Pleasure and Pain in Literature. Philosophy and Literature 29 (2):305-320.
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  17. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Emotions and Well-Being. Philosophical Topics.
    It is striking that for each major theory of well-being, there exists a companion theory of the emotions. Thus, to classical hedonic views of well-being, there corresponds no less classical pure feeling views of the emotions; to desire views that conceive of well-being in terms of desire satisfaction, there corresponds a variety of theories approaching the emotions in terms of the satisfaction/frustration of desires; and finally, to so called objective list theories of well-being, there corresponds a variety of theories that (...)
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  18. Tom Dougherty (2011). On Whether To Prefer Pain to Pass. Ethics 121 (3):521-537.
    Most of us are “time-biased” in preferring pains to be past rather than future and pleasures to be future rather than past. However, it turns out that if you are risk averse and time-biased, then you can be turned into a “pain pump”—in order to insure yourself against misfortune, you will take a series of pills which leaves you with more pain and better off in no respect. Since this vulnerability seems rationally impermissible, while time-bias and risk aversion seem rationally (...)
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  19. Otniel E. Dr0r (2012). Visceral Pleasures and Pains. In Esther Cohen (ed.), Knowledge and Pain. Rodopi. 84--147.
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  20. Steven M. Duncan, Pain and Evil.
    In this paper I defend the thesis that, considered simply as certain sorts of bodily sensations, pleasure is not the good nor is pain intrinsically evil. In fact, the opposite is largely the case: pursuit of pleasure is generally productive of ontic evil, and pain, when heeded, directs us toward the ontic good.
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  21. R. Edwards (1975). Do Pleasures and Pains Differ Qualitatively? Journal of Value Inquiry 9 (4):270-81.
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  22. Benjamin Franklin (1930). A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain. The Facsimile Text Society.
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  23. Keith Bj Franklin (1993). The Neural Basis of Pleasure and Pain. In R. Michod, L. Nadel & M. Hechter (eds.), The Origin of Values. Aldine de Gruyer.
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  24. Irwin Goldstein (2002). Are Emotions Feelings? A Further Look at Hedonic Theories of Emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.
    Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant (...)
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  25. Irwin Goldstein (2000). Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States. Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.
    By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many kinds of (...)
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  26. Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  27. Irwin Goldstein (1989). Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional Intrinsic Values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.
    That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa Foot, R M (...)
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  28. Irwin Goldstein (1983). Pain and Masochism. Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (3):219-223.
    That pain and suffering are unwanted is no truism. Like the sadist, the masochist wants pain. Like sadism, masochism entails an irrational, abnormal attitude toward pain. I explain this abnormality.
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  29. Irwin Goldstein (1981). Cognitive Pleasure and Distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.
    Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".
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  30. Irwin Goldstein (1980). Why People Prefer Pleasure to Pain. Philosophy 55 (July):349-362.
    Against Hume and Epicurus I argue that our selection of pleasure, pain and other objects as our ultimate ends is guided by reason. There are two parts to the explanation of our attraction to pleasure, our aversion to pain, and our consequent preference of pleasure to pain: 1. Pleasure presents us with reason to seek it, pain presents us reason to avoid it, and 2. Being intelligent, human beings (and to a degree, many animals) are disposed to be guided by (...)
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  31. Richard Gray (2014). Pain, Perception and the Sensory Modalities: Revisiting the Intensive Theory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):87-101.
    Pain is commonly explained in terms of the perceptual activity of a distinct sensory modality, the function of which is to enable us to perceive actual or potential damage to the body. However, the characterization of pain experience in terms of a distinct sensory modality with such content is problematic. I argue that pain is better explained as occupying a different role in relation to perception: to indicate when the stimuli that are sensed in perceiving anything by means of a (...)
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  32. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2014). Pleasure Gone Awry? A New Conceptualization of Chronic Pain and Addiction. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):71-85.
    I examine what happens in the brain when patients experience chronic pain and when subjects are addicted to alcohol. We can find important parallels between these two cases, and these parallels can perhaps point us toward new ways of treating (or at least understanding) both issues. Interestingly, we can understand both cases as our pleasure system gone awry. In brief, I argue that chronic pain and alcohol addiction both stem from a dysregulation in our brain’s reward structure. This dysregulation in (...)
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  33. Chris Heathwood (2007). The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):23-44.
    One of the leading approaches to the nature of sensory pleasure reduces it to desire: roughly, a sensation qualifies as a sensation of pleasure just in case its subject wants to be feeling it. This approach is, in my view, correct, but it has never been formulated quite right; and it needs to be defended against some compelling arguments. Thus the purpose of this paper is to discover the most defensible formulation of this rough idea, and to defend it against (...)
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  34. Daniel Howard-Snyder (1994). Theism, the Hypothesis of Indifference, and the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure. Faith and Philosophy 11 (3):452-466.
    Following Hume’s lead, Paul Draper argues that, given the biological role played by both pain and pleasure in goal-directed organic systems, the observed facts about pain and pleasure in the world are antecedently much more likely on the Hypothesis of Indifference than on theism. I examine one by one Draper’s arguments for this claim and show how they miss the mark.
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  35. Leslie A. Howe (2007). Vicarious Pain and Genuine Pleasure: Some Reflections on Spectator Transformation of Meaning in Sport. In Heather Sheridan Leslie A. Howe & Keith Thompson (eds.), Sporting Reflections: Some Philosophical Perspectives. Meyer & Meyer Sport.
    Ambiguity in the athlete’s perception and description of pain that opens the door to a series of reinterpretations of athletic experience and events that argue the development of an increasingly inauthentic relation to self and others on the part of those who consume performance as third parties (spectators) and ultimately those who produce it first hand (athletes). The insertion of the spectator into the sport situation as a consumer of the athlete’s activity and the preference given to spectator interpretation shift (...)
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  36. Thomas Hurka (2010). Asymmetries In Value. Noûs 44 (2):199-223.
    Values typically come in pairs. Most obviously, there are the pairs of an intrinsic good and its contrasting intrinsic evil, such as pleasure and pain, virtue and vice, and desert and undesert, or getting what one deserves and getting its opposite. But in more complex cases there can be contrasting pairs with the same value. Thus, virtue has the positive form of benevolent pleasure in another’s pleasure and the negative form of compassionate pain for his pain, while desert has the (...)
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  37. Oliver A. Johnson (1981). Pleasures and Pains. International Studies in Philosophy 13 (2):83-84.
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  38. G. Marian Kinget (1999). On Being Human and Pleasure and Pain: Two Humanistic Works. University Press of America.
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  39. Colin Klein (2014). The Penumbral Theory of Masochistic Pleasure. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):41-55.
    Being whipped, getting a deep-tissue massage, eating hot chili peppers, running marathons, and getting tattooed are all painful. Sometimes they are also pleasant—or so many people claim. Masochistic pleasure consists in finding such experiences pleasant in addition to, and because of, the pain. Masochistic pleasure presents a philosophical puzzle. Pains hurt, they feel bad, and are aversive. Pleasures do the opposite. Thus many assume that the idea of a pleasant pain is downright unintelligible. I disagree. I claim that cases of (...)
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  40. Justin Klocksiem (2010). Pleasure, Desire, and Oppositeness. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Why is pain the opposite of pleasure? Several theories of pleasure and pain have substantial difficulty explaining this basic feature. Theories according to which pleasure and pain are individual sensations or features of sensations have particular difficulty, since it is difficult to understand how pairs of sensations could be opposites. Some philosophers argue that the pain is the opposite of pleasure because pain and pleasure are fundamentally a matter of desire and aversion, and desire and aversion are clear opposites. I (...)
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  41. Henry Rutgers Marshall (1895). Emotions Versus Pleasure-Pain. Mind 4 (14):180-194.
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  42. Henry Rutgers Marshall (1894). Pleasure-Pain. Mind 3 (12):533-535.
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  43. Henry Rutgers Marshall (1893). Prof. Bain on Pleasure and Pain. Mind 2 (5):89-93.
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  44. Henry Rutgers Marshall (1892). Pleasure-Pain and Sensation. Philosophical Review 1 (6):625-648.
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  45. Henry Rutgers Marshall (1891). The Physical Basis of Pleasure and Pain. Mind 16 (63):327-354.
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  46. Henry Rutgers Marshall (1891). The Physical Basis of Pleasure and Pain. (II.). Mind 16 (64):470-497.
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  47. Henry Rutgers Marshall (1889). The Classification of Pleasure and Pain. Mind 14 (56):511-536.
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  48. Olivier Massin (2014). Pleasure and Its Contraries. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):15-40.
    What is the contrary of pleasure? “Pain” is one common answer. This paper argues that pleasure instead has two natural contraries: unpleasure and hedonic indifference. This view is defended by drawing attention to two often-neglected concepts: the formal relation of polar opposition and the psychological state of hedonic indifference. The existence of mixed feelings, it is argued, does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure.
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  49. Olivier Massin (2013). The Intentionality of Pleasures. In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi.
    This paper defends hedonic intentionalism, the view that all pleasures, including bodily pleasures, are directed towards objects distinct from themselves. Brentano is the leading proponent of this view. My goal here is to disentangle his significant proposals from the more disputable ones so as to arrive at a hopefully promising version of hedonic intentionalism. I mainly focus on bodily pleasures, which constitute the main troublemakers for hedonic intentionalism. Section 1 introduces the problem raised by bodily pleasures for hedonic intentionalism and (...)
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  50. Olivier Massin (2011). Joies Amères Et Douces Peines [Bitter Joys and Sweet Sorrows]. In Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Les ombres de l'âme, Penser les émotions négatives. Markus Haller.
    This paper argues (i) that the possibility of experiencing at once pleasures and unpleasures does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure. (ii) That the hedonic balance calculated by adding all pleasures and displeasures of a subject at a time yields an abstract result that does not correspond to any new psychological reality. There are no resultant feelings. (iii) That there are nevertheless, in some cases, sentimental fusions: when the co-occurent pleasures and unpleasures do not have any bodily location, (...)
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